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24.11.2005

On parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan

   

Sargis Harutyunyan 

With the parliamentary elections held in Azerbaijan on the 6th of November 2005 the governmental upheaval, begun in summer 2003, came to its logical end.

The Situation shaped in the context of the South Caucasus developments after Georgian “Rose revolution” in November 2003, the Ukrainian “Orange revolution” a year late and Washington’s failure in Uzbekistan may perhaps witness to a version of an interim a geopolitical consensus.

The Parliamentary elections held in Azerbaijan on the 6th of November 2005 may be conditionally divided in two parts: Pre-election developments which predetermined the outcome of elections and post-election situation, which is more related to the problem’s geopolitical aspect.

It’s worth mentioning that the process of elections on the 6th of November didn’t essentially change anything. It means that by that time I. Aliyev already didn’t have a real opposition inside the country and had reached certain agreements with all the main actors outside it.

The first part: Pre-election developments

After October 15 the pre-election situation in Azerbaijan became strained. The authorities’ later actions, particularly the whole power structure’s turn to the more intensified regime, has come to prove how seriously the threats were accepted in Aliyev’s administration.

The above mentioned makes us suppose that in reality the threats couldn’t be issued only from the opposition (mainly “Azadlig”, “Yeni Siyaset” pre-election allies). That’s to say Aliyev had problems both within the system under its leadership and with some external powers.

The pre-election developments were mainly concentrated on two problems: the “flight” of the ex-speaker of Azerbaijani parliament and Azerbaijan’s Democratic Party leader Rasul Guliyev and the arrests of high-ranking officials.

Still on the 10th of October Rasul Guliyev announced that he intended to return to his country on the 17th of October, after 9 years of wanderings, to take part in parliamentary elections. As it is known he didn’t manage to return as at the same day he was arrested in Simferopol. He left for Kiev after being released, and then to Kiev and now he is again in the United States where he has applied for political asylum.

It’s obvious that Rasul Guliyev’s PR-kind action “to return” to Baku was essentially a successful one, which was supported by the US, Great Britain, Ukraine and Greece (connected with the later improvement in Azerbaijan-Northern Cyprus relations). The main aim of that action was to exert informational pressure on Aliyev junior’s administration and to elevate Guliyev’s and his Democratic Party’s authority in Azerbaijan’s opposition. The strategy was actually successful since the Azerbaijani and foreign mass media paid serious attention to Guliyev’s “flight” and to democratic problems in Azerbaijan in general.

For example, Guliyev’s arrest in informational field and his release later on (by the participation of well known Ukraine “Pora” movement members, famous for their modern and mainly positive elucidations) was accepted as a moral victory over Aliyev administration, which was very important before the elections on the 6th of November. In this sense the date of “the return”, on the 17th of October, wasn’t chosen by chance as well, as the next day, on the 18th of October would be celebrated the country’s Independence Day.

It is probable that Aliyev considered Guliyev to be his most severe adversary. His suppositions were based on the ground of Guliyev’s fortune, his authority still remaining in the administration in power and his ties in the West. Especially for the ruling administration’s middle level it is easer and more advantageous to agree, if necessary, with “their men” from the near past, Rasul Guliyev, then, for example, with A. Kerimly or I. Ghambary.

We must say that such occurrences are common in Post-Soviet countries. In these sense the arrests of high-ranking officials in Azerbaijan following Guliyev’s “flight” were not by chance, though from another hand, I. Aliyev got use of the proper time to make these arrests.

Thus, at the same time, with R. Guliyev’s “flight” on the 17th of October, a number of people (about 20 in number) were arrested and dismissed, which made visible changes in Azerbaijan’s inner political situation.

The analyses based on informational field shows that the arrest of Azerbaijan’s already ex-minister of economic development Farhad Aliyev in Aliyev close circle is observed as neutralization of a person aspiring for a higher post, having close ties in the West and in the opposition as well as with tangible economic recourses. Aliyev’s administration represented all these as “struggle against antistate conspiracy and corruption”.

The arrest of Azerbaijan’s Health Minister A. I. Insanov is another issue, which should first of all be observed under the light of discrepancy between Heidar Aliyev’s brother Jalal Aliyev and I. Aliyev. After H. Aliyev’s death his brother has repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction about “transferring the power to the young”. In this sense J. Aliyev- A. Insanov well known ties were decisive. A. Insanov’s arrest was also presented in the context of “the struggle against antistate conspiracy and corruption”.

Thus, if we try to summarize, then beginning from October 2005 the United State’s influence on Aliyev junior’s administration became obvious. On the 5th of October famous Kozeni and his two American partners were charged with bribing “high-ranking officials” millions of dollars at the period of 1997-1999. Kozeny’s case was fallowed by Guliyev’s “flight”.

From this standpoint we must also single out the US Secretary of State’s assistant on European and Eurasian affairs, Daniel Fried’s announcement on the 20th of October 2005, that the official Washington will recognize the results of Azerbaijani parliamentary elections if the difference between “exit-pole” and Azerbaijan’s central electoral commission doesn’t exceed 2 %.

A special attention needs to be given to the fact that the arrested ministers and high-ranking officials (including the ones from the country’s home affairs system) were first of all charged to “organize a coup d’etat”. The addition of “corruption” charges occurred later. If we also take into consideration the fact that the process of neutralization of “conspirators” was realized under the direct leadership of Azerbaijan’s National Security Minister Eldar Makhmudov appointed in that post by I. Aliyev in summer 2004, then the existing danger becomes more serious.

And at last we should add to the above mentioned Aliyev’s intention to get rid of adversaries (inner-clan grouping). In this sense it is not accidental the hypothesis that at the presidential elections on the 15th of October 2003 Aliyev took very “hard” the obstacles imposed by the clan inherited from his father which aimed to have a possibly weak president.

The second part: Post-election situation

It should be stated that the first signs of “post-election situation” were first noticeable before the elections on the 6th of November. On the 27th of October the US ambassador to Azerbaijan Rino Harnish, being in Gyanja, directly clamed the Azebaijani opposition to try to avoid of using violence which may hinder the process of elections.

A day later, at the round-table discussion organized by “Heritage” foundation in Washington, Deniel Frid’s assistant Metue Brayz repeated almost the same words.

However the favorable attitude of American officials didn’t last very long, and on the 8th of November the US State Secretariat officially agreed with the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) for the parliamentary elections of the Republic of Azerbaijan including OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP) and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) that the elections didn’t correspond to the OSCE suggested electoral standards1.

In contrast to the above mentioned the CIS observation mission working under the leadership of Russia as well as Turkish and Iranian observers defined the elections as democratic. Russian president Vladimir Putin even congratulated Aliyev junior with holding elections. According to some information he will come to Baku in the near future.

There is an impression that during the past month Washington noticeably succeeded in solving its problems with Azerbaijan. It is well known that this problem is mainly divided in four parts: stationing US forces (here we should point out the withdrawal of Americans from Uzbekistan), Azerbaijan and the Caspian see as a transit route to Central Asia (Azerbaijan as a proper fulcrum), Caspian energy carriers and the Iranian problem. In the represented context special attention deserves the US vice president Dick Cheney’s telephone conversation with Ilham Alyev on the 26th of October.

In its turn it is obvious that at the electoral process Aliyev didn’t have serious problems with American (and in general Western) structures. Moreover, Aliev’s tough pressure on some international observers, journalists (in some cases their expulsion from Azerbaijan)2 makes us think about the Washington-Baku possible arrangement before elections.

However the problem can’t be solved with such a “simple” arrangement. The US State Secretary’s above mentioned announcement on the 8th of November and certain changes in the actions of the US ambassador to Azerbaijan (meeting with the representatives of opposition, his claim to Azerbaijani authorities to “restore justice” in some constituencies, etc.) have come to prove the following:

  • Washington has taken steps to increase its influence and in certain cases even exert pressure on Alyev’s administration in the future.
  • The US takes steps directed to preserve its own authority in international relations.
  • In general, the US carried policy aims to deprive the Aliyev’s administration of authority.

In the present situation the behavior of “the European line” deserves certain attention. It is probable that the EU has assumed the most negative position to the held elections (for example the behaviors of Greek and Norwegian ambassadors in Baku). First of all it can be conditioned with the fact of paying little attention to Brussels’s opinion in pre-election arrangements. (By the way, in this sense it is noticeable the EU position weakening in Southern Caucasus. The case of Azerbaijan’s already ex-foreign minister Salome Zurabishvili’s dismiss may serve as an indicator. In the near future it is probably accepted farther weakening of “the European leading line” in our region).

Perhaps we will not be mistaken if we point out that after the US and Russia tried to make the best use of the situation. Putin’s urgent support to Aliyev, the visit of former and current Russian special services’ high–ranking officials’ visits (including the visit of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence service’s head Sergey Lebedev to Baku) to Azerbaijan’s capital before the elections, the CIS observing mission’s positive estimation of the elections.

In the present conditions the best candidate for Kremlin is Ilham Aliyev who got his education in Moscow, and has close relations with the special services thanks to his father Heydar Aliyev.

As a reserved version the Russian part tried to raffle for Ayaz Mutalibov, at present living in Moscow, also in the circles of “Yeni Siyaset” pre-election alliance.

We can see the same Russian factor in the appointment of the new minister of Azerbaijan’s economic development. The new minister, Heidar Babayev, is well known with his close ties in Moscow business circles (he was the vice-president of Russian “Mostbank” and then the head of Azerbaijani branch).The support of the Turkish part to Aliyev junior was not by pure accident. Apart from traditional allied relations the new, pro-Turkish initiative of official Baku in South Cyprus’s problem played an important role during these elections. In its turn it may mean the strengthening of Ankara’s position in Alyev junior’s administration.

The Iranian part was quite passive. Tehran’s inactivity and the Iranian observation mission’s announcement that the elections met democratic standards proves that at present Iran doesn’t have any serious resources in Azerbaijan’s political field: the Islamic factor is not strong enough. Thus, probably the main aim of Iranian policy is not to make the relations with Aliyev’s administration tense, also taking into account Azerbaijan’s role in US-Iran relations.

Conclusion

In spite of the opposition’s post-election activities, the probability that any serious changes will be made in Azerbaijani governing system till the presidential elections in 2008 is very little. Certainly, we shouldn’t exclude everything, however taking into account the absence of opposition, the governing administration’s arrangements made with foreign actors and the possible regional developments, we can suppose that Azerbaijan’s governing system won’t face any serious changes.

From another hand, it is probable that the US, the EU and Russian will consider the cooperation with Aliyev’s administration quite problematic for still quite a long period of time. In particular the US and EU adopted informational policy to deprive I. Aliyev’s administration of authority may be interpreted by this state of affairs.

It’s worth mentioning that as for Armenia Ilham Aliyev’s presidency from the first sight doesn’t reduce that country’s predictability for us, however, from the other hand, his long-term presidency may result a steady period of resource accumulating for that country.

1On the 8the of November Great Britain made similar announcement on behalf of the EU, which will preside over the EU till the end of the year. It’s worth mentioning that to this America-Europe position also joined the official Kiev, which grounded its standpoint by the evaluation of the elections by the above mentioned joint observation mission. The Ukrainian position is a new element in Kiev’s policy carried in the CIS which is based on the model of creating a system of “Black see-Caspian nations” together with Baltic Republics, Poland and Georgia.

2 One of the striking examples is the prohibition of American influential National Democratic Institute observers to arrive in Azerbaijan for monitoring November the 6th parliamentary elections, in case when NDI leader, US ex-state secretary Madeln Olbrait was in Baku two months ago.


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