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01.03.2006

The Karabakh issue; situational analysis

   

Sargis Harutyunyan 

Today the Karabakh issue has appeared in the focus of Black Sea-Caucasus-Iran-Caspian Basin-Central Asia international processes and the problem related developments should be observed in this context. The most expansive project carried out in the given region by the US is the creation of Europe-Black Sea (or Turkey)-South Caucasus-Caspian Basin-Central Asia geostrategic line (the Trsanseurasian project), which has clear-cut geopolitical and geo-economic goals.

The European Union often appears from the same position as the US which is conditioned by problems relating to Europe’s energetic security exerting its own influence. This reality is consolidated (maybe a little mechanically) by North-Atlantic cooperation providing supplementary resources for the US on global level.

In the mentioned region Russia has a comparatively little role, however, in parallel with its economic development it displays a tendency to return to the big policy.

In briefly represented situation there is an impression that still in 2005 a Karabakh conflict model of “settlement” was shaped according to the logic of Transeurasian project in South Caucasus by the initiative of the US and the EU.

On the initiative

Diplomatic and information service of the above mentioned model has began with the report of leader of PACE subcommittee on Karabakh issue Lord Russell Johnston on January 9 in Strasburg and the announcement of OSCE new chairman, Belgium’s Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht (concerning to OSCE Minsk group activities in 2005). On February 2006 Robert Kocharyan and Ilham Aliyev were to conclude a peace treaty and peace keeping units were to be deployed in the conflict zone.

The organizations, which are conditionally called “non governmental”1, International Crisis Group, Eurasia Group and Jane’s Information Group, were also furnishing information, the representatives of which introduced the following principles of conflict settlement into the information field.

  • Armenia withdraws its military units from Karabakh’s liberated areas.
  • International peace keeping military units should be deployed there, which mustn’t be from OSCE co-presiding countries or South Caucasus neighbor countries.
  • The refugees will return to their homes.
  • After a certain period of time a referendum will be held in Karabakh making the international status of the area clear.

Special attention deserves the fact that the represented were specific clauses2 of a draft agreement on Karabakh conflict “settlement” which, according to those organizations’ representatives, were already agreed by Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities.

In this context must also be observed the telephone conversations of the US State secretary Condoleezza Rise with the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia before Aliev-Kocharian negotiations on February 10-11 in Rambue castle, 40 kilometers away from Paris.

The Russian factor

In the context of the above represented developments, Moscow’s attitude has an alternative character providing a chance for Yerevan and Baku to maneuver3.

In general in the latest regional developments the processes evolving in parallel with gas price rise may be considered to be an element of Russian policy. Particularly in case of Armenia that circumstance may provide additional influence on Karabakh negotiations for Moscow. Perhaps that’s why the official Yerevan separated Armenian-Russian military-political cooperation from contradictions on Russian gas price: the Russian part seized this opportunity to consolidate it position in OCSE Minsk group4.

On January 2006 the position of the Russian part was expressed more definitely in the form of announcements made by the secretary general of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolai Borduzha and the first vice prime minister in Russia, the defense minister Sergei Ivanov.

In the first half of January in his interview given to “Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie” weekly Borduzha pointed out that military aggression to any CSTO member state (in this case having Armenia in view) will be automatically considered as an aggression committed to the other members of the organization.

During his official visit to Baku on January 23 Sergey Lavrov announced that only after political-diplomatic settlement of Karabakh conflict “it will be possible to speak about peace-keeping mission as well as Russia’s possible participation”. “However first of all the conflict must be settled” repeated Lavrov.

At last, according to information in mass media, before the negotiations in Rambue, Russia-Armenia presidents had telephone conversation mostly devoted to Karabakh issues.

Summarizing, it’s worth mentioning that Russia’s political goal is not to let the realization of the above mentioned model of conflict settlement, as the dislocation of predominantly European (NATO states) military units of “peacekeepers” in Karabakh would deprive Moscow of the only serious opportunity to be present in South Caucasus – military-political relations with Republic of Armenia (RA). The absence of Russian-Armenian mutual cooperation in military field would denote Russia’s return to the South Caucasus.

Thus Russia has applied “an anti-project” logic in Karabakh issue, in other words without offering its own model, this power state tries to prevent the realization of western projects. Let’s remark that Russia applies such a political logic in South Osetian and Abkhazian issues as well. One must also accept that this policy still works in favor of nations’ self-determination.

After the Rambue

As it is well known the negotiations in Rambue didn’t have any results. As a matter of fact the main goal of the current Karabakh conflict “settlement” is to have Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani relations under the control of American and European military-political structures which may radically change the region’s general situation. Such “a settlement” of Karabakh conflict denotes expansion of geopolitical and geo-economic transatlantic projects towards Russia, Central Asia, Iran and the Middle East.

It goes without saying that American-Europe initiative preceding the negotiations in Rambue didn’t aim at the real settlement of the conflict. Otherwise long before Rambue and even before summer 2005 a task would be set to carry out both bilateral relations and psychological information elaborations of each of these countries intrapublic relations. Besides, in the presence of such a goal both in Armenia and Azerbaijan we would become witnesses of certain changes in logic of mutual relations both within the authorities and among the authorities and the opposition which wasn’t noticeable before Rambue5. The optimism expressed by Armenia’s Foreign Ministry soon after the failure of negotiations in Rambue coincided with discontent of European and American representatives. It means that maybe some pressure will be exerted upon official Yerevan6.

Besides it is obvious that Baku also expresses dissatisfaction with the idea of “peacekeeping mission”. Consequently an opportunity to maneuver is presented.

The offer made by Russian defense minister Sergey Ivanov to Azerbaijan in November 14 to establish “Casfor” should be considered in the context of Karabakh conflict developments. It is not excluded that Moscow aims at keeping its positions on Karabakh issue strong on the line of South Caucasus-Caspian Basin-Central defending it from any Western break-through. Hence “Casfor” is considered to be an additional system of hampering American-European possible advancement.

As for Iran, it is noteworthy the announcement made by its foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki on February 14 in Yerevan in connection with the construction of Iran-Armenia oil pipeline and the reconstruction of railroad between these countries. It is obvious that in Tehran Karabakh conflict “settlement” is considered as a direct threat to their national security (in the context of geopolitical US maintained blockade). In this sense official Yerevan must at least feel Iran’s indirect backing. By the way, the same may be said in case of Baku as well. Azerbaijan’s tough position fosters non-acceptance of any mutual agreement on “settlement” which has caused concern in Tehran7.

In the context of Karabakh issue the developments in Kosovo are very important. According to some information, as a result of Contact group session held in London on Kosovo issue in the beginning of February, a decision was made to bring the process of granting the territory international status to the end. In this sense it’s worth mentioning the President of Russia’s announcement that the settlement of the Kosovo issue must have a universal character; the other not-recognized countries also may be granted international status. One may suppose that Russian diplomacy may actively use that formula in negotiations on Karabakh conflict.

Special attention should be devoted to the news dominating in informational field in a short period of time after Rambue, according to which Armenia’s president broke off negotiations in Rambue with the reasoning of the death of Armenia’s defense minister’s father-in law. This information as well as Azerbaijani foreign minister Elmar Mammadyarov’s announcement on reaching mutual agreement on seven points out of nine were first of all represented in information field as a sign of weakness by the Armenian part. One can feel that more developed informational-psychological methods of pressure are tried to be exerted against Armenia. There is a great probability that not only Azerbaijani structures are backing these actions. The fact that the rumors about sudden departure of Robert Kocharyan from Rambue received very wide publicity in information field has come to prove it.

At present the backstage negotiations8 among the United States, the European Union and Russia on the very problem took on special significance. The results of these negotiations may come to light in the beginning of March in Washington at the meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers as well as the co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk group.

1In the role of conflict settlement active mediator and in a more general sense in the role of the advance-guard of American and European interests was tasted the format of “non-governmental” organizations. One may suppose that the inclusion of “non-governmental», analytical organizations into international problems by western diplomats is sure to have its continuation and here it is notable methodological similarity with the stile of work of non-governmental organizations under European or American guardianship in other countries of the world.

2In particular one may make such an assumption from the announcements of the president of New York consulting company “Eurasia Group” Ian Bremmer: “From the conversations with Bush administration members it became clear that the parties are very close to concluding a preliminary agreement. We think that the agreement is ready”.

3Of course there is a factor of Iran, however the problem refers to the influence that country has in international system which is incomparable with Russia’s capabilities.

4By the way Armenia’s defense minister- Serge Sargsyan’s visit to Pentagon in October 2005 may be considered as a starting point of new developments in the US-Armenia-Russia triangle on Karabakh issue.

5“Qualitative” shift in the attitude towards the problem in Azerbaijani or Armenian information field or change in logic of mutual relations in the given country’s political or social powers may be conceived as indicators characterizing the situation in the process of Karabakh conflict settlement.

6It’s worth mentioning that in different times behind the acceptation of anti-Armenian formula by a number of Muslim international organizations we may see American or European diplomacy: the goal is to exert pressure on Yerevan.

7In the context of intensified international tension on Iran’s nuclear program Karabakh conflict “settlement” may denote the US facilitated progress in geopolitical isolation of this Islamic republic.

8These negotiations have already begun. During the meeting held on February 16 between Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and “European triangle” (at the meeting took part present and future chairmen of the European Union: thr Foreign Ministers of Austria and Finland Ursula Plassnik and Erkki Tuomioja, European commissioner for external relations and European neighbourhood policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, EU high representative for the common foreign and security policy Javier Solana) were discussed the situation in South Caucasus including issues on Karabakh conflict.

February 19, 2006

The expert of “Noravank” Foundation Karen Veranyan also expressed his observations on the subject.

In comparison with the other post-soviet conflicts, the Karabakh conflict has gained a more internationalized character from political and political-legal standpoint. Remaining on the same level with regional and geopolitical developments, Abkhazian and South Ossian conflicts are comparatively localized and are predominantly at the intersection of Russian-Georgian diplomatic and non-diplomatic relations. Thus, one may say that in comparison with the other conflicts on CIS territory the Karabakh conflict is on the level of multidimensional cooperation which, in its turn, extends the conflict’s concernment in South Caucasian and Eurasian geopolitical processes.

In spite of the fact that many foreign centers are included in Karabakh conflict settlement in South Caucasus, the Russian part has a direct participation in Abkhazian and South Ossian conflict settlement.


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