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06.07.2006

Karabakh conflict: situational analysis

   

Sargis Harutyunyan

Developments after Rambue

As the main result of negotiations in Rambue the American diplomacy, as a matter of fact, singled out from OSCE Minsk Group. It seems that the results in Rambue became an argument for Washington to ground its unilateral steps on Karabakh issue.

From March to May in 2006 all the senior officials engaged in Karabakh issue of the US State Departament made official visits to the South Caucasus-the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew J. Bryza and US former Co-chairman of OSCE Minsk Group Steven Mann.

The peak of that visits may be considered May 24-25, when the representatives OSCE Minsk Group presiding countries-Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Grogory Karasin, Daniel Fried and the representative of French Foreign Ministry Pier Moreli as well as Co-chairmen of Minsk Group Yuri Merlzyakov (Russia), Steven Mann (USA) and Bernard Facier (France), paid official visits to Baku and Yerevan. As a matter of fact were once and for all clarified the suggestions of mediator parties, which had preliminary been discussed during Oskanyan-Mamedyarov meeting in Strasburg on May 18 and which have been presented at Robert Kocharyan-Ilhan Aliyev meeting in the beginning of June in Bucharest.

The agreement concluded on March 27 between the Armenian Government and “Millennium challenges” corporation (as a result of which Yerevan may get more then $236.5 million for the five years to come), as well as the indication on Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (as a transitional country) in the report on the condition of illegal circulation of drugs by the US State Departament and singling out Armena as “an initial country” of trafficking made out in the fifth annual report released by the US Department on June 5 should be considered as a part of the US policy towards Karabakh issue.

Support provided by European diplomacy to Washington on changing situation in Karabakh became more obvious after Rambue. In particular the visit made in February by the EU Commissioner of External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner to the region and the announcement made by the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby that in connection with the Karabakh issue the EU is ready to send peace-keeping mission to the region as well as further post-conflict situation settlement.

The visit of Bernard Facier made on April 11-13 in 2006 to Baku and Yerevan and the announcement made by the EU High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana on May 4 in Vilnius (“the EU goes on taking active part in settling frozen conflicts in South Caucasus”) and at last Jacques Chirac-Ilham Aliyev meeting in Paris on May 30 should be considered in the same context.

The next important move on Karabakh issue after Rambue was the strengthening of Russia’s influence in Armenia. On April 6, 2006 the transfer of the fifth power-unit of Hrazdan’s total energy power station and the Armenian part of Iran-Armenia gas pipeline to Moscow should also be considered in the context of Karabakh issue. Such a favorable decision for Moscow has come to prove about problems Yerevan has with Washington and Paris.

The visit of the Secretary General of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolai Borduzha to Yerevan on March 13-14 as well as the meeting of ambassadors of Russia to Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia headed by Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin on April 20 in Yerevan should be considered with the same logic.

At the same time, however, Russia made serious attempts to strengthen its influence in Azerbaijan in the context of ongoing developments. The visit of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin to Baku on February 21-22, 2006 and the one of Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov on May 30-31 and the announcement they made there have come to prove it.

In general the meeting in Bucharest was presided by the same geopolitical logic prevailing on the eve of the meeting in Rambue, that’s to say in parallel with American-European initiative to change situation in Karabakh issue were also actual Moscow’s and Teheran’s policies to keep status quo the same.

The meeting in Bucharest: Observations

As for “expectations” from the meeting in Bucharest, then taking into consideration the fact that the main aim of activating Karabakh negotiations was changing status quo in South Caucasus, the possibility of any serious regional configuration changes before the G8 summit, which is to be held in Saint-Petersburg in July, is hardly possible.

In this respect the main indicator is the Iranian issue. After the six parties (UN Security Council permanent members and Germany) meeting in Vienna and the package of suggestions presented to the Iranian part, the possibility that any concrete mutual agreement will be reached in the context of general development before the summit in Petersburg is very little.

Thus, both for Armenian and Azerbaijani parties it is not advantageous to make their positions in regional developments more precise through unprecedented agreements, when the results of the meeting in Petersburg are unknown.

Second, it is not a secret that especially the Azerbaijani party expressed serious hope in connection with Bush-Aliyev meeting held in Washington on April 28. However, one shouldn’t exclude the fact that everything Aliyev reached due to the meeting was the meeting itself (the legitimization of Ilham Aliyev in response to Azerbaijana’s concession in Iranian issue). In other circumstances such a meeting couldn’t even be held, taking into account the presidential and parliamentary elections held in October 2003 and in November 2005 in Azerbaijan, as a result of which the power was handed over from Aliyev the father to Aliyev the son. During Bush-Aliyev meeting once again was ignored the main element of Bush’s doctrine “spread of demarcation all over the world” as a result of which the White House was criticized by the Congress.

In this sense one may suppose that the discussions led in Rambue and Bucharest by the initiative of American and European diplomacies aiming at exerting pressure on Russia before the meeting of G8 to be held in Saint-Petersburg in the middle of July. However, from the other hand, a very essential thing has been affirmed by Washington for the last half a year-any pressure exerted on Yerevan and Baku makes Russia more influential in the South Caucasus.

Perspectives

As a circumstance of special importance should be singled out the situation following the forthcoming summit of G8. After unprecedented for the last years tension between Russian-American and American-Chinese relation also relating to the Iranian issue in the period of April-May, today pre-consensual developments progress on several issues of international importance: American-Iranian possible agreement, reconsideration of the Iraqi campaign’s strategy launched by the US, uncertainty of the situation in Ukraine, developments on Kazakhstan (the issues of Kazakh energy carriers’ export and its geopolitical orientation) etc.

The summit held in Saint-Petersburg will try to find at least medium-term answers to several questions. However any outcome of the discussions led in Saint-Petersburg will directly affect on the logic of South Caucasian geopolitical configuration, thus on the Karabakh issue.

The next important factor for Karabakh issue is the perspective of a number of regional processes. From that standpoint the development in Russian-Azerbaijani relations and the possible intensification of tension between Russia and Georgia deserve special attention. And at last Turkey’s “passive” role in developments on Karabakh issue also attracts attention. In this sense one may expect new elements to appear in relations between Ankara and Yerevan.

15 June, 2006
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