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27.01.2009

ON THE POLICY OF RUSSIA ON POST-SOVIET TERRITORY

   

Sargis Harutyunyan

Though the new treaty, which was signed between Russia and Ukraine, generally settled the matter of Russian gas supply to Ukraine and its transmission to the EU, but the issue still remains open.

The point is that Moscow and Kiev have not come to an agreement about long-term price on natural gas1. And this means that parties have not also come to an agreement about long-term price for gas transmission to Europe through the territory of Ukraine2. Hence, one thing is clear that the causes of the crisis are not excluded yet. Though the parties have clarified the rules of the game for this year, the crisis may be repeated in the long term.

The question is why Russia have decided to use its energetic capabilities for the first time since 20063 although Moscow and Kiev had a contract of gas delivery to Ukraine and its transmission to Europe and on this occasion situation did not differ essentially from that of winters of 2006-2007 and 2007-2008.

Situational analysis

The main innovation of this gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine was that Moscow implemented an important change in the energetic policy with Kiev. Russia had never suspended gas delivery, particularly to Ukraine, before. If in 2006 Russia had reduced gas delivery to Ukraine for several days, then in this case they had completely suspended gas delivery since January 7th.

If we try to formulate somehow all what happened, then we shall get the following picture: Russia shifted from the threat of use of its energetic capabilities to the implementation of that threat. We can draw a parallel with the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. The threat of use of Russian military and political pressure towards Georgia (this had been speculated for many years since 2003) transformed into the implementation of that threat last summer and it is for the first time since Saakashvili came to power (in 2003).

It is essential to see “the true value” of those changes. If those corrections caused the change of status quo4 in South Caucasus, then all above mentioned tells us that in the case with Ukraine Kremlin is not going to be satisfied with the positional achievements. The decision of Moscow to move from threats to a implementation of energetic capacities or in other words to cross “the red line” means that even on the back of Putin-Timoshenko gas agreements Ukrainian issue remains open for Russia, and in this regard Russia has passed to “warfare”. There is almost no doubt that in the near future serious developments expect Ukraine and in the mid-term it will be difficult to implement its “balances policy”, which has been formed after 1991.

The only question without response is whether Russia will succeed to bring Ukraine back under its control and if they cannot do that on the whole territory of the country then which part of Ukrainian territories Kremlin will recognize “independent”.

One more remark. As in the case of South Caucasus, in the Ukrainian direction Russia also tries to gain the assistance of one regional leader. If in South Caucasus Turkey tried to take over that role then in the case with Ukraine that role was taken over by Germany5. And this is not far from geopolitical solutions implemented by Moscow in the first half of the 20th century6.

Conclusions

Time factor plays great role in all above mentioned.

From strategic point of view it is important for Russia to make the most of the US involvement in Middle East, which consumes diplomatic, military, economic and ideological resources. This circumstance not only restricts capabilities of American policy on the post-Soviet territory, but it also opens “the window of possibilities” for Russia to regain their positions after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The decision of the USA to “leave” Iraq and to initiate new strategic projects in Eurasia (e.g. in the line of India – Central Asia), may be a signal for Russia, which shows that “the window of possibilities” may shut down soon. This conditioned the resolute steps of Kremlin in the lines of Georgia and Ukraine.

As for Ukrainian issue, time factor is also important here. It is not a secret that in the end of 2009 presidential elections will be held in Ukraine. The decision of Moscow to use their gas factor to put pressure upon (for the first time since 2006) is supposed to be connected with the elections in Ukraine. It is not a mere chance that during the crisis Russian informational policy considered president Viktor Yushenko to be the main person who was guilty for that, and gas contract they have signed with his opponent, prime-minister Yulia Timoshenko and this contributed to the growth of her authority in the domestic policy. It is not excluded that Kremlin will support the chairman of “Regions party” Viktor Yanukovich on the elections in Ukraine, but today the main aim of Moscow is to except the reelection of president Yushenko7.

1The following fact speaks in favour of that conclusion. The parties do not tell the market price of natural gas for Ukraine, which is going to be establish on January 1st, 2010. On January 18th after the negotiations between Putin and Timoshenko the parties stated that they would pass to the international, European high prices from January 1st 2010. The same prices will be established for the transmission of gas to the EU. As for 2009, it was mentioned that Russia would sell gas to Ukraine with 20% concession and the latest would let Russia supply gas to Europe through the Ukrainian territory on low prices. It is known that the EU countries bounded with Ukraine pay $470 per one cubic meter of gas. In 2008 Ukraine paid $179,5.

2It is known that Ukrainian party connects the price of Russian natural gas they buy with the price for its transmission to the third parties.

3To be exact it was in 2006 when the first large-scale gas war between Russia and Ukraine broke out.

4We also mean the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence, which means that Russia made definite changes in its policy in South Caucasus and this is not quite clear for us yet.

5Our conclusion is not only based on the monitoring of German position in the course of gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, but also on some significant change which can be noticed in the foreign policy of Berlin. The latest illustrative example was the open letter by vice-prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs and virtual leader of one of the ruling coalition parties (Social-democratic party) Frank-Walter Steinmeier to Barak Obama printed in the 13th issue of German “Der Spiegel” magazine. Steinmeier called the new president of the US to take into account Russian interests in international policy.

6It is possible that the instability in the former Soviet Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) is caused by the same solutions and some American and British sources blame Moscow for it.

7The results of the opinion pole, held by on of the centers of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine (January 13, 2009) show that Viktor Yanukovich has 30,3%, Yulia Timoshenko 16,7%, and president Viktor Yushenko 2,9%.

January 19, 2009


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