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09.06.2006

On American-Turkish relations

   

Sargis Harutyunyan 

During the last years realities and ongoing development occurred in Turkish-American relations (by the way the same can be said about American-Saudi relations) are the most obvious indicators of geostrategic changes in Eurasian sub-regions.

Turkey lost its importance in US’s Russian policy (in this connection even contrary tendencies came to light: “Blue stream” gas-pipeline, military-technical cooperation, etc.). The rise of American military-political presence in the Middle East, Balkans and South Caucasus essentially reduced Ankara’s tactical-operative importance for Washington. After a short while this circumstance turned into Turkish-American discrepancies: restriction of Turkey’s presence or its absence in the new regional formats is nothing but disregard of Turkish interests.

Thus geopolitical logic of the region has changed, which supposes that the evolution of the US regional policy has reached to a point when it is disadvantageous for Ankara to support Washington’s Middle Eastern initiatives. In April 2003 the decision of Turkish elite not to place under Pentagon’s disposal Turkey’s territory in case of the latter’s attack on Iraq was the result of those developments.

Turkish-American new arrangements

From this year on the situation began changing. The Iranian issue became the reason promoting new level of Turkish-American relations.

Besides issues of mere military character (providing land and air space, use of military bases), there are a few reasons why Washington needs Ankara’s support in Iranian issue.

  • Turkey is a Middle Eastern power.
  • Turkey is a Muslim country.
  • Turkey has certain influence on inner Iranian processes.

As for Turkey there are two main reasons it aims at reaching mutual agreement with Washington for.

  • Ankara has come to the conclusion that the present situation is the best moment to overcome Turkish-American crisis, which first of all supposes gaining of concessions in some issues essential for Turkey (Kurds, Iraq, Kirkuk), and second, by these steps Ankara tries to preserve its influence in case of the existence of “post-conflict Iran”.
  • From the other hand Turkey is concerned about Iran’s growing military potential, which is directly presented in the conception of Turkish national security (besides trembling Turkish-Iranian military-political balance, Iran, which has become a nuclear state, can also make Turkish influence in the Middle East secondary): Turkish policy tries to make use of the situation to weaken its regional rival.

Since autumn 2005 mainly by American initiative the parties began a new dialogue. During the last months the US National Security Adviser Steve Hadley, FBI and CIA directors Robert Muller and Porter Goss, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace and the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid official visits to Ankara.

The Secretary of Turkey’s National Security Council Yigit Alpoghan and Turkish Army’s Land Forces Commander, General Yashar Buyukanit, who is to take the office of the head of Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Staff in Augusat, replacing Hilmi Ozqyoq, paid return visits.

In March it became known that the international consortium headed by the American company «Lockheed Martin» (it develops and produces the newest military aircrafts of the new generation F-35 JSF) would order Turkey military armament of $3.5 billion, which is unprecedented in the history of Turkish-American military-technical long lasting cooperation.

According to information spread in April, Pentagon and Turkey’s Joint Chiefs of Stuff discuss the issue of establishing three military-naval bases in the territory of Turkey, near Iskenderun (Mediterranean Sea, near to “Incirlik” military bases provided for American Air Force) and two more on the coast of Aegean Sea, near the cities of Urla and Izmir.

And, at last, at the end of April and in the beginning of May unprecedented military action of Turkish armed forces against Kurdish groupings in Iraq have come to prove about new agreements between Washington and Ankara.

Turkish-American discrepancies

However, there are quite serious discrepancies in Turkish-American relations on several issues. For many years military-technical field had an essential importance in Washington-Ankara relations. However, since 2003 none of American companies has got any large-scale order from Turkey.

In December 2005 the American companies “Boeing” and “Bell Helicopter Textron” didn’t win the competition for production of 50 attack helicopters. It is probable that the American company “Sikorsky Aircraft” will suffer the same fate, the latter takes part in the competition of producing transportation helicopters for the Turkish army, as according to new Turkish requirements the companies desiring to take part in the competition must present the written consent of their governments on concluding the deal. According to American laws, only after concluding the deal the issue will be discussed in the US Congress.

Earlier Ankara refused to give the order of $183 million unmanned surveillance aircrafts to an American company, preferring to give it to Israeli “Israel Aircraft Industries”:

Even in case of F-35 JSF planes, the Turkish part is also ready to bye, as an alternative, European “Eurofighter-2000 Typhoon” military planes.

Turkey perused the new policy adopted under the rule of Eroghan towards Syria and Palestine. It is noteworthy that Turkey became the first not Arabic country where one of the leaders of “Hamas” grouping, Khaled Mashal, paid an official visit and had a meeting with Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdulah Gule.

And at last, maybe quite unexpected for Pentagon, Turkish Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed its disagreement on expansion (towards the Black Sea) of «Operative Active Endeavour» project, which has been realized under the patronage of the US in the Mediterranean Sea since 2001. In reality the expansion of this project means definite grounding of the American naval forces in the Black Sea. It is worth mentioning that among the countries of the Black sea basin only Turkey and Russia were against this initiative of Pentagon, considering that the presence of naval forces of not Black Sea countries would pose threat to their national security.

Conclusions

The American-Turkish crisis, which occurred on the occasion of Iraqi campaign 2003, in reality, is of deep and strategic character. Ankara-Washington agreements, even on the Iranian issue, as a matter of fact, have short-term character and may be depreciated in the conditions of “post-conflict Iran”, as the Iranian issue doesn’t have the same strategic meaning as, for example, struggle against the USSR.

In all probability the new regional formats shaped by the United States in the Big Near East, don’t suppose Turkey’s dominating presence, which is the main reason for contradictions.

The main reason of such a reality is the absence of the power in the region competing with the US, which would give a meaning to Turkish–American military cooperation (as it was in case of Russia for decades). Moreover, the military-political presence of America in the Middle East and the neighborhood regions-Balkans, South Caucasus, Central Asia, from mere military standpoint reduces the significance of Turkish factor and this tendency is more likely to go on.

In contrast to this Ankara was aspiring for not to be derailed from ongoing alternatives developments. This factor is in the basis of re-interpretation of Turkey’s interrelation with the EU, Russia, Iran, the Arabic world.

In this aspect the new tendencies in the process of development of Turkey’s military-technical potential are worth special observation: Ankara tries, at the minimum, to balance the American “presence” in its own army at the expense of Russian and European techniques.


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