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02.02.2009

ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND IRAN

   

Sargis Harutyunyan

us-iran-flags (medium)Though the biggest expectations from the work of the new US administration concern the financial and economical spheres, but there are also many questions in the sphere of foreign policy which require tough decisions from the 44th president of the United States.

The continuous escalation of the tension in the line of Afghanistan–Iran and the developments expected in the line of India-Central Asia, the latest war between Israel and Palestine and general situation in the Middle East, Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis with all its consequences on the post-Soviet territory and Eastern Europe. This is the incomplete list of the issues that Washington has to face and to which it has worked out fundamental approaches. Moreover, after entering White house Obama will find out that there are some issues where time is working against the US.

Therefore the point is at what extent the new US administration is ready to bring in some correctives into the foreign policy strategy, because one thing is clear: in this changed world the US can not follow the strategy of the 1990th. Moreover, this was realized by the Bush administration, because there are many examples when Obama will simply implement the changes which were planed in the days of Bush’s presidency.

The issue of the prospects of the relations between the US and Iran is one of the most important. This issue is essential for us on two grounds:

  • It has never concerned mainly those two countries and it always has a regional effect.
  • For the recent times American-Iranian relations has become almost of the same importance for the national security of Armenia as the relations between the US and Russia.

Situational survey

Since the Islamic revolution in 1970, for the first time in about 30 years, in November 2008 the president of Iran decided to congratulate the person who was elected on the post of the president of the United States. Of course this step by Mahmud Ahmadinejad logically corresponded to the chain of events, which in the end of 2007 witnessed to the thaw in American-Iranian relations1. Nevertheless the fact that from the first days of the new administration both parties decided to continue their relations in new informational environment is equally important2.

From this point of view the last Israeli-Palestinian war is worthy of note. In spite of the traditional rigorous statements by Iranian side, the fact is that in those 20 days of war Tehran had not taken any practical step against Israel.

It is known that in the period from January 8 to 14 from the territory of Lebanon at least six missiles were launched in the direction of the settlements in the North of Israel. This gave a reason to believe that Iran by means of Lebanese “Hezbollah” organization intended to force Israel two-front war. But the fact is that the war was over and “Hezbollah” stood off military actions. All foregoing becomes more obvious if we take into consideration the fact that during that war on January 2-3 the secretary of the Supreme national security council of Iran Said Djalali visited Damask and Beirut and met not only with the leaders of those countries but also with the leaders of “Hamas”, “Hezbollah” and “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”. It is unlikely that organizations which receive financial, political and military support from Iran would reject the decision of Iranian political authorities to strike along the northern borders of Israel3.

There can be one conclusion. If the decision of Iran not to make concessions to Israel is particularly assured then the foregoing position of the Iranian party could interest only Washington. If in 2006, when “Hezbollah”4 was fighting against Israel, Tehran wanted to show Washington its capabilities in the Middle East then now when the agreements with the US are in process, Iranian party could not have such a purpose. It is more probable that today restraining “Hezbollah” Iran wants to show the US the benefits of the collaboration.

Conclusions

The developments in at least two directions make the US reach an agreement with Iran. Firstly, it is the extension of Russian influence on the post-Soviet territory and Eastern Europe and secondly, the developments which are expected in the line of India – Central Asia.

In the case with Russia Iran may facilitate the US in the following three points:

  • The general stabilization of the situation in the Middle East, which allows the US to concentrate more resources in the line of Moscow,
  • The chance to enter South Caucasus, the Caspian region and Central Asian and this will be of more importance for the US especially after Russian-Georgian war,
  • And finally the supply of Iranian natural gas to Europe, which will reduce the dependence of the European countries and especially Germany from Russian energy carriers, i.e. it will reduce the influence of Moscow in the European affairs.

As for the line of India – Central Asian then in this direction the significance of Tehran role may occur only by now. It is already known that in the initial period of the Obama administration the US is going not only to stay in Afghanistan but also to enlarge their military presence on 30 thousand soldiers. Taking into account the growing instability in Pakistan and its strained relations with India, it should not be excluded that in the near future the US will have to get permission from Tehran to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia, because other ways go through the territories of Russia and China.

It is not a secret that the following operation logic of Washington in the line of Iran gathers headway: Tehran should be treated the way Nixon did with China. May be the US will make concessions in the issue of regional security and lift economic sanctions. Nevertheless the main issue remains open: What will they do with Iranian nuclear weapons?

1Among such events the report of the National Intelligence Council of the USA should be mentioned. It said that most likely Iran stopped its nuclear program in the autumn of 2008. The other important feature is that in August 2008 American–Iranian agreements were reached about American military presence in Iraq, and this could not happen without the consent of the Iranian party.

2E.g. Barak Obama in his interviews twice (on December 7, 2008 and on January 11, 2009) stated that this issue should be tackled through diplomatic channels and his administration intended to involve Iran in settling regional issues.

3This particularly refers to “Hezbollah”, which with the help of Iranian military experts could make Israel retreat and from this point of view may be it has unprecedented experience in the struggle with Israeli military machine.

4The possibility that Djalali’s visits to Damask and Beirut pursued that aim should not be excluded either.


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