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27.06.2011

POLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan

When on May 1 the president of Iran returned to work after a 10-days break and made a statement that the state bodies must follow the guidelines of the spiritual authorities, there was an impression that the president of Iran smoothed the contradictions with the spiritual class of Iran and that the political crisis in Iran was gradually being settled. Such an opinion was also substantiated by the statement of the spiritual leader of Iran Ali Khamenei that though the government had made mistakes but everybody must render assistance to it with their criticism and advices, for the good of the Islamic republic. However, as the further developments came to prove, the political struggle in Iran has no sign of ceasing.

The process of domestic political struggle

The appeal of the spiritual leader to “assist” Ahmadinejad has not stopped two very important anti-presidential processes – the discussion of the impeachment in Madjlis and the arrests of the people close to the president.

On May 27 Majlis, as it was planned, held hearings on the anti-constitutional activity of the government; those hearings, as it supposed, might cause the resignation of the president. Though such a resolution was not passed but Majlis has not renounced its intention and decided to implement the so-called tactics of “long-term process”: the deputies decided to turn to the court for it to consider the order of the president Ahmadinejad about the appointment of the later to the post of the Minister of Oil. The fact that the order is illegal is obvious as the president who appointed himself on a post of the Minister of Oil discussed his decision neither with the spiritual leader not with the Council of the Guardians or the parliament.

Though on June 3 the president resigned from the post of the Minister of Oil, the upcoming decision of the court may serve a ground for the impeachment to the president. While expecting the decision of the court, Iran’s parliament is also waiting for the further development of the confrontation between the president and spiritual leadership and whether M. Akhmadinejad will manage to oppose the campaign directed against his milieu (which seems very doubtful today, taking into consideration the large-scale arrests by the security services of Iran).

According to the Iranian web-sites over the last month several dozens of M. Akhmadinejad’s “teammates” were arrested; most of them are blamed in spreading anti-Islamic ideas, as well as in anti-state activity. The most influential among the arrested people is the counsellor of the president administration Kazem Kiapasha, the so-called “grey eminence”, a person who together with the president and the head of his administration Rahim Mashayi developed president’s policy and took direct participation in governing the country. Different Iranian sources call Kiapasha “the confidant and friend” of the president, and over the last period there were even discussions that M. Ahmadinejad was going to “make Kiapasha a president”, taking into consideration the fact that the positions of Mashayi in the spiritual circles were more than weak. The arrest of Kiapasha, which is today approved by the Iranian authorities, in fact knocked out one of the main candidates at the presidential elections in 2013 who could acquire the support of the incumbent president. According to non-official data, which has also been spread by a number of western media, the Head of the Cultural Council under the president Hojatoleslam A. Amirifar was arrested together with Kiapasha. Let us mention that if the arrest really took place it was sanctioned by A. Khamanei, because without his consent Hojatoleslam – the factual representative of the spiritual leader – cannot be arrested.

At present one of the most important issues: whether R. Mashayi has been arrested, remains open. They have been speaking about his arrest for 3 weeks and the fact that the head of the president administration is inaccessible at home and does not go to work at all, fuels the rumours about his arrest.

The fact that many confidants of the president were arrested is indirectly approved by the president either. On June 7, while answering the questions of the journalists about the arrests of people from his milieu and their connections with “wizards” he said: “Those people you are talking about have been arrested so let the government continue doing its work. Now you should allow us continue our work, serve our people and complete our revolutionary goals”. Such an answer by the president made an impression that he had fully ceded his positions, took defeatist stance, but at the same meeting with the journalists he characterized his relations with the conservative and spiritual circles as “we are far from each on 180 degrees; we are on different sides”. It should be mentioned that the arrests of the president’s confidants, most probably, were the reason of postponing his visit to Yerevan: according to Fararu web-site two people who were accompanying the president were prohibited to leave Tehran and due to this Ahmadinejad was obliged to postpone his visit. The visit was postponed under force-majeure circumstances; and this is also proved by the fact that Iranian state agency IRNA spread last official statement about the visit on June 5 at 18.00, just several hours before the visit. It is obvious that the visit was postponed at the last moment; it is also not excluded that it happened at the airport where people from the administration of the president were not allowed to leave the country.

On June 5 the chairman of the parliament of Iran Ali Larijani sent rather harsh letter to the president demanding to follow more attentively the decisions of the Majlis from now on, regarding the appointment of a new Minister of Oil. It should also be underlined that the press-conference of the president on June 7, at which he stated about the discrepancies with the spiritual authorities, was not planned (because at that time president should have been in Armenia) and was arranged hastily. Most probably it was caused by the same processes which impeded M. Ahmadinejad’s visit to Yerevan. Let us also mention that A. Larijani who accused president has recently stirred up his activity in foreign policy too; he and not the president made an official proposal to the countries of the Persian Gulf to create common anti-missile defence system and it was Larijani who stated before the session of the OPEC that Iran was against changing the quota of the oil production. The fact that the statement was made when president Ahmadinejad occupied the post of the Minister of Oil was symbolic.

It is also remarkable that the president of Iran, most probably, has lost the support of the Army of Guardians of Islamic Revolution. At least it is proved by statement by the member of the Council of Experts of Iran, ayatollah A. Namazi that at the meeting with the spiritual leader Khamenei, the commander of the Army of Guardians M. Jafari asked him to allow arresting R. Mashayi, but, however, he was not allowed to do it. And on June 8 M. Jolnur, the representative of Khamenei in the Army of the Guardians, stated that the Army of Guardians is ready to deliver strike on any anti-state powers “which want to destroy the system by using the possibilities delivered by that system”. It is obvious that he spoke about the people who govern the country and who are capable of ruining the system from inside.

On further developments

Most probably, the spiritual authorities of Iran do everything to avoid resignation of the president as it will bring to new elections, holding of which against the background of the Arab revolutions may destabilize the situation in the country. But in the months to come the spiritual leader will do everything to deprive the president of all his leverages, striking first of all at his team or “clan”, the considerable part of which has been working and cooperating with Ahmadinejad for recent 15 years. Most of them have started their high political career in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, that is why president’s team is often conventionally called “Ardabil clan”. Among them are:

1. The head of the administration of the president Mashayi who was the founder of the branch of the Army of Guardians of Revolution in Kurdistan province, later also occupied high posts in the command staff of the Army of Guardians in Ardabil.

2. The former governor of Kurdistan, and currently the vice-president M. Rahimi, who is accused by Majlis of being the head of the “corruption group” (“Fatemi group”, after the name of Fatemi street where the office of the vice-president is situated). He is considered to be the “treasurer” of the president and, as many believe, he manages all the financial flows of the administration.

3. Ali Nikzad who used to be the governor of Ardabil, has headed the Ministry of Municipal Engineering since 2009 and on February 7, 2011 he was also appointed on the post of the Minister of Transport. He was the initiator of the project of withdrawal of state structures from Tehran and establishing new city; in this project the spiritual authorities saw a potential threat that government might get independent from Ghom.

4. The Minister of Public Health and Social Issues S, Mahsuli who used to be the Minister of Home Affairs and vice-governor of Western Azerbaijan and who is considered to be one of the richest persons in today’s Iran. According to unofficial information his wealth is about several billion dollars.

5. Head of Martyrs and self sacrifice's Affairs Foundation and relative of president M. Zaribafan who works directly with the veterans of Iranian-Iraqi war, solves their problems and provides their support to the president.

In the time to come the struggle against the aforementioned personalities should be expected in Iran and in this struggle both the spiritual authorities and Iranian Majlis will be involved. Though making forecasts concerning Iran is thankless task, but today’s state of affairs implies that president’s team will be defeated and in a consequence in the remaining two years of the presidential term the possibilities and factual influence of M. Ahmadinejad will be restricted.


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