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04.07.2014

WHAT MAKES US DIPLOMATS TALK OF CAUCASUS CRISIS-2014?

   

Ekaterina Kudashkina

US experts and diplomats have been warning of a new security crisis that could break out in the South Caucasus in autumn of 2014. How good is the forecast and is there any evidence the region is really headed for a new war? Or is it rather a threat aimed at disrupting these countries’ ties with Russia? We are discussing the issue with Razi Nurullayev, Azerbaijani political analyst and the head of “Region” International Analytical Centre, and Sevak Sarukhanyan, deputy head of the Noravank think tank in Yerevan.

On October 5, 2012, Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian presented a lecture in Los Angeles titled “Arab Awakening, The Turkish Role in The Region and The Future of Armenians in the Middle East". According to the 'USA Armenian Life' reporting, he claimed that "2014 is a potentially deadly deadline for Armenia and Armenians worldwide imposed by Azerbaijan." He sternly cautioned Diaspora Armenians about the so-called "Azerbaijan deadline" for political settlement of the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict by 2014… He tersely warned that a formidable military buildup by Azerbaijan spelled trouble for Armenia.

This year Ambassador Richard Morningstar, the US envoy to Azerbaijan, issued a similarly stern warning to Baku, promising it a "Maidan" if the government doesn’t loosen its grip on the opposition.

In both cases, the Ambassadors suggested that Armenia and Azerbaijan had to adopt more "open" policies towards the West and scale down their contacts with Russia. Or face the consequences?

Razi Nurullayev, Azerbaijani political analyst and the head of "Region" International Analytical Centre:

I would say the Caucasian explosion is always pending. The Caucasus is a very sensitive area, both geopolitically and economically. And that is why I think it is not only the matter of autumn, but that is a matter of all the time.

We remember the case of war between Georgia and Russia in 2008, in August. And after that a lot of things happened in the Caucasus. And the Caucasus has been the point of interest not only for Russia that comes from the fact that it is its political, but also for the West, including the US and the EU country.

And of course, we cannot forget about the issue of Turkey. Turkey also is very bound to the Caucasus region historically and it also has its own interests. And Turkey’s interests in the Caucasus are being implemented with the help of Azerbaijan, both brotherly countries.

So, in autumn the Caucasian explosion may happen, but I can’t say on what perspective Mr. Ambassador has said that. Georgia is going to conclude the association agreement with the EU this month, Ukraine does the same and Armenia is going to join the Eurasian Union. So, this tangles this paradox of the developments in the Caucasus and really creates such an environment in which an explosion might happen.

Another point, Azerbaijan is also invited to the Eurasian Union and, on the other hand, the EU has a big pressure on Azerbaijan to sign an association agreement with the EU. So, in this context I think the interests have collided between Russia and the West.

So, it may depend on the further developments and I would actually put more focus on the Ukrainian events. It depends on how Ukraine is going to get out of the situation which it found itself in. And depending on that situation the fate of Caucasus may also be cleared.

Actually, with the Ukrainian events the eastern partnership initiated by the EU has been severely damaged. The other countries of the eastern partnership, including Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus feel that the EU is more of an economic union and when it comes to conflicts and the collision of interests with Russia, the EU cannot defend either of the countries, which has now produced a radical change in the minds of the countries, in their policies.

The Azerbaijan President said in last December that Azerbaijan would not in any way sign an association agreement with the EU and Azerbaijan would prefer an equal strategic partnership between the two sides, in which the EU is not interested.

So, here the connection is – if Russia is more confident and keeps the status quo as it is now in Ukraine, then it would somehow pursue the successful policy in the Caucasus as well. If the West – the US and the EU countries – are successful in Ukraine (which I can’t believe can ensure its territorial integrity and bring peace to its eastern provinces), then it might give a motivation to the other eastern partnership countries to pursue the European integration policy, which I believe is a hard task for now.

So, Ukraine in this context is a point where all the other countries look at and draw the lessons from there.

Of course, we know that Caucasus is an extremely important region, and at the same time, it is a very delicate region in terms of balances that are now kept, but could so easily be tipped. Who of all players could really be interested in creating a stir in that region, in destabilizing it?

Actually, it is a very hard question and it is not very easy to just simply answer it. I think the Caucasus is now a place of the war of interests between Russia and the West. That is why at the moment, it is my personal view, Russia would be interested in the Caucasus to be peaceful, to be economically and geopolitically stable unless it answers its interests.

So, if Russia has an influence over the Caucasus and Russia’s interests are pursued and ensured in the Caucasus, then Russia would be interested in bringing the stability to Caucasus, and would also be interested in the resolution of the frozen conflicts.

As far as the EU is concerned, broadly speaking the EU and the US, until now they did not seem to be active and very interested in peace in the Caucasus. It was out of their very close point of interest. They wanted peace, but never did anything for peace in the region.

But now, after the Ukrainian events the West thinks that the unstable and conflict-fledged Caucasus solely serves the Russian interests. In this context the West, and in particular the US have mobilized their efforts for peace in the Caucasus.

In particular, I remember some high-ranking officials’ statements from the US about Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. So, they now have become more active and try to bring the sides to the round table and find the solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which I think is not possible without the Russia’s consent and participation."

Sevak Sarukhanyan, deputy head of the Noravank think tank in Yerevan:

"To my mind, just now I don’t see any reasons for a sudden blast, because the world and the region is quite busy with the things which are going on in Ukraine. And now every country in the region and also the international actors, they cannot provide any kind of forecast for what will happen in the Caucasus if anything happens. That’s why there are no international actors who are interested in any kind of instability here.

And in 2014 I don’t see any kind of reasons for that, if we talk about countries, Georgia is quite stable after the presidential and parliamentary elections. Armenia is on its route of integration into the Eurasian Union and Azerbaijan is trying to find its new place in the European and American market out of the Ukrainian crisis, because Azerbaijan is becoming part of the total European interest in the non-Russian natural gas and oil. From this point of view each country in the region is not interested in such kind of a blast.

But of course the processes which are going on in the wider region, I mean, for example, Syria, Iran, somehow Turkey, they can also influence and bring something sudden, which cannot be forecasted just now, at this moment."

In one of his recent interviews US Ambassador to Baku Richard Morningstar was warning of a possible ‘Maidan’ scenario in Baku....

Actually, I must say that for example Azerbaijan has a lot of differences in comparison with Ukraine, because Azerbaijan is a more eastern country with more government control over political and economic processes in the country. And from this point of view, of course, Aliev is better controlling the situation than Yanukovych did in Ukraine, which limits the possibilities of the opposition to organize something.

And from the other point of view the opposition doesn’t have the freedom of action, because the political process is not democratic, as in many countries in the former Soviet Union. To my mind the American approach is dictated by the Baku’s policy, which is that Aliev doesn’t want to chose any kind of geopolitical side, because his policy is quite pro-Western, but it is not an anti-Russian, actually.

And Azerbaijan’s decision now is a decisive one for Caspian region new energy project. For example, if the West needs Turkmen gas or gas from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, oil from Kazakhstan passing not through the territory of Russia, Azerbaijan’s decisions must be considered as the most important ones, because Azerbaijan is the main transit route for the Caspian energy resources.

From this point of view I think the American embassy’s approach is somehow dictated by the fact that Azerbaijan now doesn’t want to take any kind of direct anti-Russian steps, which means that Azerbaijan doesn’t want to make the process of construction of pipelines through this territory in a fast way.

So, I think Azerbaijan, if it keeps its policy of tossing between powers, will get more critics from Washington and from the West. But, at the same time, Azerbaijan is a reliable partner of the West in energy resources export and import. The whole situation is that the West wants from Baku more than Baku can give.

And from this point of view I think that the critics over Azerbaijan’s democracy and human rights processes in this country will become more and more from the Western side. But actually I don’t see any reasons for the Maidan movement, because, I must repeat, the Government of Azerbaijan is controlling the situation.

Of course, there is a small part of processes which are out of control, but they have no connection with the West. I'm speaking, first of all, about the new Islamic movements which are now Azerbaijan. Mostly Iran was supporting the Shia resistance and the renaissance of Shia Islam in Azerbaijan. And some Islamic groups are out of control of the Azerbaijani Government.

Of course, they have a lot of other religious organizations which are supported from Saudi Arabia, the Wahhabi groups. And we see a lot of people fighting in Syria. And these groups also are in some kind of opposition to the Government, which is a secular one. But to talk about them in terms of Maidan is not correct, because they are living in other kind of political ideology. And their opposition can be wilder than what was in Kiev, but in Kiev we also had a lot of victims of the protests.

It is interesting that you’ve just mentioned the presence of the Islamist factor. Do I get you right that it has been growing over the past years?

It is growing and it is a logical process for these countries, because these things like Islamism and radicalism, they are becoming more competitive in the areas where the level of education and the level of society is going down. Of course, the socio economic situation and the conditions for the majority of the population are creating relevant grounds for the renaissance of such kinds of movements.

And the post-Soviet Union territory is somehow a new territory for Islamic radicalism. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and all the other states are somehow suffering from that. I think that the only tool to provide secularism in these counties is to promote real democratic institutions, because if you are closing officially secular political parties because they are in opposition to you, you are creating a good fundament for the radicals who can take the place of these secular oppositionists.

The thing which happened in Iran, before the revolution the last Iranian Shah was arresting the oppositionists – the liberals, the democrats – and in the 1970 the people who were against the government, they found that the only secure places for meetings were mosques. And that is why the political Islam became the main instrument of protesting the government and creating any kind of base for the opposition.

So, I think that the Islamic fundamentalists are getting more positions in the region because of two reasons – bad socio-economic conditions of the population and the non-democratic character of the governance.

And in that sense I cannot help asking you a question about another huge Islamic country with an increasingly Islamist government, which is Turkey. If we have been talking about the Shia groups present in Azerbaijan, Turkey has got a huge Sunni influence. Is it active in the region too?

Actually, it is active. But the Turkish political Islam is an interesting one because it is part of a political process. We should say that not the people of religion are doing politics in Turkey, but the politicians who are religious are creating the political process. That is a very big difference of Turkey when we compare this country with Iran.

From this point of view, it has some advantages and disadvantages. For example, for the Iranians it is quite easy to enter the region through the religious organizations. But for the Turks, for example, the official political institutions and economic activities, they are the most effective tools for entering the region.

The Turks in that sense, for example, in Georgia are huge, especially in the Adjara region. They have a very high level of cooperation with Azerbaijan. But at the same time, we should say that for example the Azeri investments in Turkey are higher than the Turkish investments are in Azerbaijan. The construction of the TANAP pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which is going to be constructed for Azeri investments. The level of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey will become higher.

So, at this moment we cannot say that Turkey has some kind of decisive influence on the Azerbaijani Government, because Azerbaijan has its own share of influence in Turkey. And also the Turks have some limitation of entering the region, because the closed Armenian-Turkish border, it is a closed border for the Turkish entrance to the region.

You can invest a lot, you can be active in Azerbaijan, in Georgia, but if your border is closed with Armenia, it makes you not a regional country. You are partly a part of the region, because Armenia is a quite important country from the geographic point of view. And for Turkey, from the economic point of view, Armenia is much more important than Georgia, because Armenia and Turkey are now connected with railways, they are connected with high voltage transmission lines.

So, if we compare Turkey, for example, with Iran, Iran is more effective in the region as a region, because Iran has investments both in Armenia, Azerbaijan, in Georgia. But in the case of Turkey there is only a triangle – Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Somehow it is also a geopolitical alliance which does not let us to talk that Turkey has a joint or a common south Caucasian strategy. The south Caucasus for Turkey is only Georgia and Azerbaijan, which is also limiting the Turkish possibilities and instruments of influence in the region."

http://voiceofrussia.com/radio_broadcast/25298789/273601295/


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