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01.08.2013

CSTO AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY

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Based on a report presented at the “Regional Security” panel discussion (26.06.2013)

Sevak Sarukhanyan
Head of the Center for Political Studies, “Noravank” Foundation, PhD

On June 26, 2013 a meeting of the CSTO Secretary General N.Bordyuzha and Coordinator of the CSTO Analytical Association I.Panarin with the Armenian experts was held at “Noravank” Foundation. Communication security issue was among those on the agenda.

In particular, it was mentioned that currently the CSTO did not carry out the function of protection of the communication infrastructures, which were of vital importance for the organization’s member countries and which go through the territories of the third countries, but according to N. Bordyuzha such function should not be excluded in the future.

It can become an important step for the CSTO, because NATO carries similar function today and it is ready to provide (in the military aspect) security of the main international transportation corridors, on the stable activity of which security of the member countries depends. First of all it refers to the international energy corridors, malfunctioning of which may deliver a serious blow to the security of other countries, including NATO member countries. First of all this refers to Strait of Ormuz and Suez Canal, which theoretically can be “closed” by Iran and Egypt correspondingly but this does not happen because of the supposed counteractions by the US and NATO.

Provision of the security of the communications going through the territories of the third countries is an important issue for the CSTO too but it has not been resolved yet. The main reason is that the CSTO member countries (except Armenia) have no vital necessity to protect communications going through the third countries – Russia and Kazakhstan export energy carriers on a large scale, Kirgizstan and Belarus have direct access to Kazakhstan and Russia correspondingly, and they do not depend on the activity of international corridors. The situation with the Republic of Armenia is different; it has no common border with other CSTO countries and it imports gas from Russia through the territory of Georgia. The instability in Georgia in the 1990s was the main challenge to the energy security of Armenia because due to the factual civil war and domestic conflicts Tbilisi could not provide security of the transportation corridors going through its territory.

It is obvious that over the last decade the domestic political situation in Georgia stabilized and Armenian-Georgian relations develop in rather positive way. In this aspect the fact that Tbilisi never conditioned the activity of North-South gas pipeline by its relations with Moscow can be welcomed. But the gas pipeline coming to Armenia through Georgia is still rather risky. The high-risk of the gas pipeline is conditioned by a number of circumstances:

1. The gas pipeline going through the territory of Georgia can become a subject to subversions as it was in the early 1990s during the Karabakh war. Unfortunately there is no ultimate survey of how many times, by whom and on which segments the pipeline was blown up but we found publications about at least 3 explosions in 1993. Those explosions obviously aimed to deliver blow to Armenia and to affect its fighting efficiency. The attempts of such subversions are not excluded in the future either, taking into consideration theoretical possibilities of the Azerbaijani-Armenian military encounters. Today Georgia has become a stable and developing country but it can hardly control the whole length of the gas pipeline, taking into consideration the fact that there is no such necessity because energy security of Georgia does not depend on it. It should be mentioned that taking of the decision by the CSTO on providing security of the strategic communications can become a serious stimulus for Georgia to raise the level of gas pipeline security and its protection.

2. After signing the EU Association Agreement with Armenia and Georgia these states will take an energy system liberalization track. Of course this policy may take a while but it is obvious that Yerevan, as well as Tbilisi, sooner or later will join EU “third energy package”, which provides absolutely free access of the “third parties” to the energy system. In this aspect the possibility of privatization of the North-South gas pipeline by the government of Georgia is rising and Tbilisi has avoided it in recent years. Let us remind that the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan stated that they wanted to buy the pipeline which (if it happens) may seriously affect the energy security of Armenia.

There will be a possibility of “energy blackmail” which will be very difficult to oppose by economic and legal means, especially taking into consideration the fact that Baku will not sign Association Agreement and will not be obliged to coordinate its actions with Brussels. This is serious challenge to Armenia and Yerevan will have to come to definite agreements with the EU concerning the future of the North-South gas pipeline and it will be much easier if the CSTO takes a decision on protection of the strategic communications.

At the same time, it should be mentioned that Armenia will face a problem of protection of two other crucial infrastructures – Iran-Armenia gas pipeline and Metsamor NPP. But these two objects are not going through the territories of the third countries and this reduces their vulnerability and gives an opportunity to provide their security by national means.

At the same time it should be mentioned that the possible decision of the CSTO on protection of the strategic communications is gainful not only for Armenia – this decision will be a serious stimulus to turn the CSTO into a real international military and political alliance and will have a positive effect on the entire system of international security.

“Globus” analytical journal, #8, 2013

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