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09.02.2015

IRAN AND SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF “FREEZING”

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Sevak Sarukhanyan
Head of the Centre for the Political Studies of the Noravank Foundation

Although Iran and the six powers were unable to reach an agreement on the nuclear issue in 2014, the negotiations will continue in 2015 and there is a theoretical chance that if not full, then at least some partial settlement will be reached in the relations between Tehran and Washington. The article presents the potential corollaries that such arrangement may bring for South Caucasus.

Rouhani’s policy of “freezing”

After Hassan Rouhani’s election as president, handling relations with the West has become one of the cornerstones of Iran’s foreign policy. The common problems that simultaneously constitute threats and matters of interest for both Tehran and Washington are used for this process. These include the nuclear issue, Iraq and Syria. In almost all these three directions the two sides try to avoid clashes and consider establishment of partial cooperation as a major component in their policies.

Washington’s airstrikes in Syria were mainly limited to territories controlled by the “Islamic State”, which caused no opposition from Iran, as the ruling government of Syria did not suffer any damage from those.

In Iraq, the fight against the “Islamic State” still proceeds without clashes between Iran and the USA. In fact, quite the opposite, the actions of the two are aimed at the same short-term goals, the results of which should be maximal impairment of the Islamists. However, in future both the US and Iran will have to agree on who should control Iraq after it is “liberated from the Islamists.” This issue is potentially fraught with serious conflicts, but it is a matter of future: given the combat-readiness and agility of the “Islamic State”, that future is not coming too soon.

The nuclear issue is not less important and requires a special discussion, but both Tehran and the White House are interested in finding a common denominator.

As for Rouhani’s strategy of handling the relations with the West, it has to be noted that for Iran it requires tremendous human and expert resources. In the last 1.5 years Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Petroleum have both made the normalization of the relations with West a cornerstone of their activities. This has indirectly resulted in “freezing” the other directions in Iran’s foreign policy, which is immediately felt both in South Caucasus and Central Asia. In the recent period Iran has adopted a strategy of passive policy in these two regions critically important for Iran, aiming to prevent new developments and focusing only on existing issues, the resolution of which pursues a single primary objective of making sure they do not interfere with the Iranian-American dialogue. Such policy of Iran results in some quite different consequences in South Caucasus. They can be divided in two main parts: policies for Armenia and Georgia, and policies for Azerbaijan. Such separation is based on the fact that there are no serious problems in Tehran’s relation with Yerevan and Tbilisi, whereas in the last 20 years some serious controversies have accumulated in the relations with Baku. Because of this very reason during the last 1.5 years there has been no progress in Tehran’s relations with Yerevan and Tbilisi, while some serious steps have been made in relations with Baku, which are aimed at not so much eliminating the conflicts, but more towards “freezing” those.

The implications of “freezing” for Armenia and Georgia

Though frequent as it is talked in Armenia about active development of Armenian-Iranian relations, there had been no positive news in this direction during the last two years. Not only the two parties have reached no agreement on any new projects (e.g. Iran-Armenia railroad), but also no steps have been undertaken towards implementation of the already agreed ones. This concerns Armenia-Iran high-voltage power transmission line and the Meghri Hydropower Plant. Both projects depend on Iran’s financing, because Armenia does not have funds available for construction of these facilities, at least not in the public sector. The construction of the high-voltage transmission line would perhaps be more realistic, if it was handed over to the only organization interested in it, which is Gazprom Armenia, since Unit 5 of Hrazdan TPS that belongs to it is the only facility with free capacity to export electricity to Iran. However, there is no such decision and the project relies mainly on financing from Iran, which is unlikely to happen under the circumstances of “freezing.”

Rouhani’s policy in Georgian direction has actually had some serious regress compared to that during the years Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s rule. The latter at least twice had talks with Georgia’s then-president Mikheil Saakashvili and achieved favorable terms for Iranian businessmen in Georgia, while during the last two years the Iranian economic and financial presence in Tbilisi has plummeted dramatically. Furthermore, under conditions of “freezing” and inattention, Tehran missed Georgia’s decision in 2014 regarding residence of foreigners in Georgia, which in fact eliminated the Iranians’ right and opportunity to visit Georgia without entry visa requirement.

The implications of “freezing” for Azerbaijan

Unlike the case with Armenia and Georgia, Tehran has made significant steps towards Baku, aiming not so much at development of new projects, but rather, “freezing” the existing problems. Rouhani-Aliyev negotiations in Tehran and Baku resulted in substantial reduction of strain in relations. The Azerbaijani authorities have stopped their “games” with respect to Southern Azerbaijan and even terminated the authorization for State Committee on Affairs with the Diaspora to work with local residents. In turn Tehran minimized support to Shia anti-government Islamists. This is especially noticeable in Nardaran suburb of Baku, where in the past anti-government protests took place directly supported by the Iran.

It has to be noted that, unfortunately, the “Armenian card” is played in the policy of “freezing” the disputes with Baku. During the visit of Hassan Rouhani to Baku in autumn of 2014 the Iranian president first time ever put his signature under an Azeri-Iranian declaration, which contained a statement regarding territorial integrity of Azerbaijan with respect to the NKR and criticized “aggression” against Azerbaijan.

It is a separate question what will happen to Iran’s policy toward South Caucasus if the relations with the West normalize. Today it can be argued that although the negotiation process itself has drastically reduced the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and the USA, its current results are rather negative for Iran-Armenia relations, which entered a deep stagnation phase. This phase will last as long as Tehran is focused on the problem of arranging its relations with the West.

“Globus” analytical bulletin, No. 1, 2015

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