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09.12.2010

DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN AND ROUND IT

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan

S.Sarukhanyan - the Deputy Director of “Noravank” Foundation, Head of the Center of Political Studies”, Candidate of Political Sciences

Developments which can be observed in the Russian-Iranian relations in the recent period create new international situation round the Islamic Republic of Iran and the main feature of that situation can be the final isolation of Iran. At the same time new changes in the social and economic sector can be observed in Iran, and those changes can undermine political stability of the country.

Russian-Iranian relations

On September 22 the executive order of the Russian president D.Medvedev “On carrying out the June 9 resolution number 1929 of the UN Security Council” was published, according to which it is prohibited to Russian companies and structures to provide Iran with S-300 antimissile systems as well as other defencive and offencive weapons. Though the contract on delivery of S-300 was concluded back in 2007, Moscow has not made haste taking into consideration difficult international situation round the Islamic Republic. After the executive order of the Russian president it became clear there would be no more supply of weapons to Iran.

Tehran’s reaction to the executive order of the Russian president cannot be considered tough. Till now neither Iran’s president nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs commented on the decision of Moscow. The only tough comment was made by the head of the Commission on International Relations and National Security A.Boronjerdi who promised to sue Russia if the later does not meet its engagements on the supply of weapons.

The answer of Moscow to the Iranian response was that they grounded on the provisions stipulated in “Force Majeure” part of the contract according to which the parties will be exempt of responsibility for partial or complete non-execution of their respective liabilities due to contingencies which are of unexpected and objective nature. The UN Security Council’s resolution was considered by the Russian Foreign Minister S.Lavrov as such a contingency which caused “force majeure”.

It can be supposed that still “soft” reaction of Tehran to the decision of Russia aims not to complicate relations with Moscow even more. The later obviously demonstrates that it does not mind to “sacrifice” relations with Tehran if it will help to establish mutual understanding with Washington on other strategic issues. The decision of Moscow is also conditioned by the fact that the cooperation with Tehran and protection of Iranian interests in the international structures has not consolidated Russian positions in the Islamic Republic: the attempts of “Gazprom”, “Lukoil”, “Rosneft”, “Beeline” and other Russian companies to make investments in Iran met resistance on behalf of the Iranian authorities. The only spheres where Iranian authorities were benevolent in regard to Russian companies were military and nuclear spheres and that was in the Iranian interests. And the refusal of Russia to cooperate in the military sector first of all struck a blow to Iran.

It is possible that toughening of the stance of Russia in regard to Iran is directly connected with the Iranian nuclear programme which has gained in scope recently. Official Tehran already stated that the third raw of centrifuges necessary for the enrichment of uranium has been put into circulation in Natanz which can have a military application. All this have been done under the negative attitude of Russian authorities. Besides, as the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister A.Nesterenko stated Iran did not inform Russia about its further steps.

In this case Russia’s anger in regard to Iran’s policy can be understood. Temporary refusal of the US to use force against Iran has also influenced the stance of Russia. This is evidenced by different sources which, besides all, also mention that Washington managed to persuade Israel from hitting Iran. As V.Koryakin mentions, making reference to “Al-Hayat” periodical, that was a mission of the Assistant to the US President and his special envoy to the Middle East D. Ross. Under such conditions Moscow can be sure that no war will start in the proximity of its southern borders and due to that reason it became imposing more definite pressure on Iran thus being conscious that this will not be used by the third countries in order to solve their strategic issues.

Most probably, in the months to come an amplification of international pressure on Iran can be expected and Tehran is preparing to that, thus facilitating the social and economic burden of the government and the main signals of it are the price rise and dollar rate appreciation.

Domestic situation in Iran

As the events arranged by the opposition in summer 2010 showed serious changes took place in the domestic political life of Iran: the former presidential candidate M.Kyarubi became the leader of the oppositional movement organized by Musavi last year. Unlike Musavi, Kyarubi made no bones about joining the demonstrators and making some tough statements in the address of the incumbent president, among other calling him “illegal president”. Most probably, the last year’s stance of Musavi who tried to keep the opposition away from the revolutionary moods seriously undermined his positions in the oppositional circles. In the coming one or two years it will be clear whether Kyarubi can take a position of leader and unite oppositional powers in order to win the parliamentary elections or not.

The situation is even more complicated in the ruling circles and this most probably is conditioned by worsening relations between president M. Ahmadinejad and spiritual leader A. Khamenei. This can be proved by the analytical materials published in Iranian state mass media in which the economic policy of the current government is toughly criticized. The fact that M.Ahmadinejad brought his relative R.Mashayi back to the ruling circles comes to prove that Iranian president more openly acts as power center independent from the spiritual leadership. Let us remind you that Mashayi was appointed vice-president last year but spiritual leader Khamenei made president discharge him because most of the spiritual elite had negative attitude to him, besides there were serious suspicions that the relative of the Iranian president was corrupted, This year, despite the negative attitude of the spiritual elite, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashayi the head of his administration and widened the circle of his duties up to the vice-president’s level.

But the main target of the spiritual elite’s criticism is the president’s programme of administrative reforms. According to it 144 state organizations and companies must be withdrawn from Tehran and taken to other regions. It is supposed that due to those measures the development of the regions will be boosted and the population of Tehran will be reduced by almost half a million. But the critics of president’s programme believe that president pursues other objects: president who also wants to move out of Tehran tends to concentrate round himself all the administrative structures and due to this make the processes in the country more controllable. In fact it is talked about creating second Ghum where the temporal authorities of Iran will be centered and which be controlled by the president and not by the spiritual leader. It is obvious that “old elite” cannot like this programme and it criticized toughly president’s programme through the media which is still under its control.

The economic policy of Ahmadinejad has also become a target of criticism. His annual budget submitted in March implied refusal from the subsidies stably given to the population. Subsidy assistance costs Iranian government about $30 billion annually: petrol, gas, water and electricity prices are subsidized. Though the Iranian parliament reacted positively to the project but nobody expected that the president will abolish subsidy assistance at once. The coupons allotted at the end of September for paying for electricity and gas caused social shock among the population. It turned out, that for example, prices for electricity grew 8 times and gas prices 3 times. The protest of people shifted to the parliament, the disturbance wave against the policy of the president raised. As for M.Ahmadinejad his reaction was as follows: this is the price for finding means necessary for modernization and we have to pay it.

Back at the end of September new blow was cast to the macro-economic security of Iran: Central Bank of Iran stopped financing stability of Iranian rial which caused 20 per cent appreciation of dollar. And though the president was criticized for that either but this step may be justified by the fact that Iran under the sanctions have to save its currency reserves which can be necessary for preserving volume of trade of the Islamic Republic.

Taking into consideration all the aforementioned it should be stated that political life in Iran has a possibility to stir up later. Its main actors will be the circles concentrated around the president of Iran and country’s “old elite”: the first will tend to consolidate and the second will try to preserve its positions.

“Globus Energy and Regional Security”, issue 6

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