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21.07.2006

Developments on Caspian energy-carriers

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan 

On June 2006 Kazakhstan agreed to join oil exportation project through Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. It was fallowed by the new Turkmenistan approaches to gas prices sold to Russia.

Kazakhstan and Baku-Ceyhan

From the very beginning international experts were announcing that with the objective to turn Baku-Ceyhan into an economic factor, it is necessary to export Kazakh oil to the port of Ceyhan through the pipeline. In comparison with Azerbaijan, oil production in Kazakhstan is growing rapidly. Only last year it constituted more then 60 million tones. According to information released by “KazMunaiGaz” company, in ten years this showing may reach up to 150 million. The above mentioned numbers have come to prove that Kazakhstan is gradually turning into a global player in the market of energy carriers.

Of course the fact that Kazakhstan jointed to Baku-Ceyhan was not a surprise. It was clear for all the experts who were specialized in strategic study of the Kazakh oil export. This strategy may be conditionally called “oil complimentarism”, the main principle of which is partial support to the realization of all the global powers’ oil interests of political and economic importance, which, in its turn, may ensure the protection of Kazakhstan’s political and economic interests.

From this standpoint Baku-Ceyhan is the main western energetic factor, which the Kazakh governing body can not ignore. The already existing oil pipelines to Russia and China were supplemented by Baku-Ceyhan together constituting the geopolitical and geo-economic energetic triangle and Kazakhstan develops taking all this into account.

However, it’s worth mentioning that efficiency of this kind of game may be provisional for Kazakhstan. It is first of all connected with further strengthening of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO member state Kazakhstan’s energetic complimentarism, may in the near future be incompatible with China’s economic and political interests. China’s policy to strengthen its position in Caspian’s energetic market will sooner or later make that power state face more serious head-on confrontations with the US, which in its turn is deeply interested in controlling Kazakh oil. That’s to say sooner or later Kazakhstan will have to be better oriented while perusing its own political line in the field of oil.

It’s also worth mentioning that SCO may develop and change in a way to make Kazakhstan limit its participation in the organization’s activities. That’s to say in the future SCO may accept countries with such military-political and economic potential, which will limit Kazakhstan’s active role undertaken in the organization. This refers mainly to three countries: India, Pakistan and Iran. At the SCO last summit Kazakhstan was the one who was against SCO’s further enlargement, first of all in regard to Iran’s membership. It was announced in Russian information and analytical circles that Iran was forced to refuse Iran by Russia and China. It is sure to be so. However, it is obvious that this position is conditioned by the interests of Kazakhstan and why not, the US.

On his last visit to Kazakhstan the US vice-president D. Cheney expressed admiring opinions on Kazakh economic and political reforms. It is obvious that one of the main issues discussed during the meeting was the problem of Kazakhstan’s joining to Baku-Ceyhan. But not only that. After D. Cheney’s visit, active policy of liquidating “free” mass media was carried out. In June a few newspapers, financed by American and Russian sources, became victims of this policy. The fact that the American party made no respond to this policy adopted by Nazarbayev, has come to prove, though indirectly, that Kazakhstan was given certain “freedom” of actions by the US. It is doubtful that it was given on condition that the latter would join Baku-Ceyhan. It is not excluded that certain Kazakh-American agreements have been reached on activities carried out in the region and SCO.

In this sense special importance is attached to Turkmenistan’s gas policy evolution, which is likely to be an inseparable part of a general political course carried out quite consistently.

Turkmenistan-Russia

The decision of Turkmenistan’s leader to reconsider cost policy with “Gaszrom” was not unexpected. It is obvious that Russian-Ukrainian gas war couldn’t but attract President Niyazov’s attention. It is also clear that he couldn’t but be worried by the fact that today Turkmen gas is bought by Gazprom at the insignificant price of 50 dollars.

However the decision to reconsider cost policy required Turkmenistan to solve some issues of primary importance in its relations with Russia beforehand. This issue was connected with the reaching of gas agreement by Turkmenistan authorities and was in principal formulated in the following way: Russia refuses the agreement on double Russian-Turkmen citizenship and Gazprom acquires additional opportunities to buy and resell Turkmen gas. At the same time Russia is to “turn a blind eye” on solving double citizenship issues, that’s to say to Turkmen policy. In general Russia accepted the Turkmen claims, as a result of which:

  • “Gazprom” got the agreement it was eager to get from Turkmenistan.
  • A great number of citizens of Turkmenistan-Russian and the representative of other nations, had to reject Russian passports as its made their living difficult in that country.
  • As a result of pension reforms thousands of former Russian citizens, at present citizens of Turkmenistan, were deprived of the last means of survival and found themselves in poverty.

As we can see only the first of the outcomes had a positive result for Russia, but only short-term. Today the Turkmen authorities gradually began depriving Russia from this privilege as well revealing the imperfection of Russia’s “What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia” policy. Partial rise in gas prices constitutes a part of the policy perused by Turkmenistan to get out of Russia’s influence and drive the Russian out of the region. In 2010, when gas production in Turkmenistan reaches 100 billion cubic meters, in all probability that country will be a freer player then today. However, the Turkmen perspective is connected with a number of possible geopolitical and geo-economic moves, two of which are more visible.

Iran’s release: It is obvious that today there is a chance to improve Iranian-Western relations, which will come true in case of reaching agreements on nuclear programs. It is obvious that better relations will lead to Iran-EU energetic dialogue. The package of suggestions presented to Iran has also come to prove it. However the Turkmen gas perspective depends on the Iranian gas perspective. One may state that if the program of exporting Iranian gas to Europe is put into practice, an opportunity will be offered for the Turkmen gas to get to the European market through Iranian and Turkish or/and South-Caucasian long-term gas carriers.

A gas pipeline to Pakistan and India: Any delay to give both political (peaceful) and military solution to the Iranian issue will speed up America’s steps directed to export Turkmen gas to Pakistan and India. The realization of this project, which is bound to hinder the construction of Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, will give Turkmenistan a chance to pass round Russia on its way to the International gas market. Today is also discussed the perspective to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, but it is not the matter of a near future. At present China makes steps to get Russian or Kazakh gas.

This partial strengthening of Russia’s position in the territory of Central Asia and Caspian went parallel with the reduction of its special energetic and transit role in the region, which caused:

  • Omissions in mere Russian policy,
  • Still considerable American influence and realization of the US energetic programs,
  • Balanced or just successful policy carried by the regional stats.

At the same time the necessity to strengthen its own energetic position should objectively make Russia activate its policy in Iranian developments both in nuclear and energy directions.


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