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10.11.2006

New developments on Iran

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan 

In spite of the fact that on August 31 Iran gave its “final” negative answer to the international community’s demand to sustain the uranium enrichment program, the developments on this country and its nuclear program didn’t take the anticipated course. However, the new processes on Iran, though lacking active elucidation in information field, has adopted quite an unfavorable course for it.

“The Iranian problem” in the US information field

The main role in the processes on Iran is due to a new political line adopted by the US, the main component part of which is spread of information on the prospective of Iranian-American possible intimacy in informational field. The realization of this political line underwent a several important phases:

  1. Iran’s former president M. Khatami’s visit to the US was not without wide response in the American mass media. A number of TV companies, including FOX NEWS, were active to elucidate the visit; the latter one is in close relations with the US present administration. According to analyses, M. Khatami’s visit was organized by direct participation of Iran’s present supreme authorities aiming at reaching comparative reestablishment of relations with the US. There were also opinions that Khatami carried secret negotiations with the US administration’s representatives, as a result of which agreements on the prospective of regulating intergovernmental relations were reached.
  2. At the end of September the US State department turned to the US Treasury with a petition to give license to American enterprises to cooperate with Iranian airlines, the component part of which was supplying equipments and details of mainly American origin to repair Iranian civil airplanes. Teheran has been struggling for such a decision for the last decade while carrying out anti-American activities in information field using the veto by Washington to sell aircraft equipments to Iran.

The objectives of the US “new Iranian policy”

  • Oil price regulation

The US State Department’s decision in Russian information field was presented as a “counteraction” directed against Iranian-Russian cooperation in the field of aircraft building. However, it is quite a simple approach, as Tu-204 aircrafts of Russian production do not compete with American aircrafts and the Russian-Turkish agreement on supplying 5 aircrafts doesn’t solve the problems of modernization of Iran’s civil aviation even partially.

The motives of the American decision are more important and better grounded.

It is obvious that reduction of interest to “the Iranian problem” caused by active work carried out in information field became one of the oil price cutting incentives from the standpoint of global consequences. As it is known, today high oil price is one of the reasons reducing index of aggression of the American policy implemented in the Middle East and Iran. It is more the matter of applying full economic sanctions against Iran then the one of possible military actions. Besides, high oil prices and their instability hinders Washington to carry out active policy in Saudi Arabia; the latter’s energy agreements concluded with China during the last few years may in the prospective limit special energetic role of the US in Saudi Arabia - strengthening Beijing’s role in the Middle East. China’s energy isolation is a component part of the US “great strategy” in the Middle Eastern, and from this standpoint the future policy of oil price falling is of great importance for the US.

From the standpoint of carrying out the US Middle Eastern “great strategy”, low oil prices are also very important in regard to Russia, as in 2007/2008 important elections are expected to be held in this country, where the implementation of administrative resource will directly be connected with economic condition of the country and population. Roughly put, the harder the economic condition in Russia is, more difficult it will be for the ruling party and the president to keep and hand over the power through “democratic” means. According to the researches conducted by the Center of Strategic Researches (Центр стратегических разработок)1 by the order of the president, possible fall of ail prices down to $40 may have destructive result for the course of RF economic development causing 5% of GDP cut within a year.

As for Iran, then oil-chemical products satisfy 40% of Iran’s GDP. It is obvious that in such conditions oil price fall may cause serious difficulties in Iran’s economic and social life. In its turn, it will influence on Iran’s internal political life2.

  • Rise of influence on Iran’s internal political life

Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s comparative success in Iran’s internal political processes conditioned by the success of “extremist course” in internal political field3, are at present in an active phase of transformation.

In September and October the critics of the president in power became very active in Iran’s internal political life. The inner incentive for criticism became Ahmadinejad’s failures in the field of economic policy. These failures will make a ground for the Iranian opposition for effecting changes in the structure of the government. The process will begin on October 22, when Iran’s Majlis begins expressing vote of non-confidence to a number of member ministers. It will first of all strike a blow to the economic block, where the president’s position is comparatively stronger. The establishment of Expediency Council under the Oversight Board headed by A.A. Hashemi Rafsanjani only partially limits implementation of economic policy by M. Ahmadinejad. Such a policy infringes the interests of Iranian political elite.

Weakening of “the Iranian policy” by the US will strengthen the position of the ones criticizing the president and will provide them a chance to give more negative assessment to the prospective of the “extremist course” continuation. Especially after M. Khatani’s visit was accepted very warmly in the US, which was followed by the US milder position to cooperation in the field of aircraft construction.

It is obvious that today the US comparatively restrained passions over the processes on Iran. A part of this policy is to influence on inner Iranian political processes, which would weaken the president’s position. It seems that today the US deliberately separates “Iran’s problem” from the issue of non-proliferation, thus attracting international community’s attention to the problem of North Korea. However, it doesn’t interfere the US authorities to make “the Iranian problem” a subject of discussions in not efficiently elucidated processes in information field and negotiations, especially Russian-American negotiations in South Caucasus and first of all in Georgia and the processes related with it.

At the same time, weakening of Russia’s position in Georgia and the fall of oil prices will make the possibility of applying limited sanctions against Iran more realistic.

1 The president of the Center’s Board of Trustees is Dmitry Kozak, who carries out that organizations’ strategic government. However the Center is financed from the annual budget of RF Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.

2 Almost as much as during economic crisis in 1998.

3The success of the “extremist course” was conditioned by two main reasons. 1. M. Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israeli and anti-American announcements remained unpunished and hadn’t any considerable negative outcome for Iran. 2. Hezbollah working under the patronage of Iran in the war against Israel (the victory was obsolete according to Iranian interpretation).


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