IRANIAN CRISIS AND “IMMEDIATE” DETERRENCE IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

16.10.2012

IRANIAN CRISIS AND “IMMEDIATE” DETERRENCE IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT

Sergey Minasyan
Candidate of Science (History), Head of the Department for the Political Studies at the Caucasus Institute

Introduction

The Iranian nuclear programme and persisting crisis in the relations of Iran with many western countries, and first of all with the U.S. and Israel, seriously influence political processes in the region as well. In some cases it is also considered as a catalyst of many regional conflicts.

As a result, recently statements have emerged that in case of military crisis round Iran Azerbaijan, taking advantage of regional and international instability, may resume armed hostilities. In other words, transformation of the external context would allow Azerbaijani authorities to dare to resume warfare in Karabakh, which has been efficiently restrained till now by means of military and technical balance in the conflict zone and uncompromising stand of almost all the external actors.

Let try to understand, using academic and practical arsenal of the theory of conventional deterrence, whether such threats are grounded and how these processes may affect security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The problematic of conventional military deterrence (deterrence by means of conventional arms) regarding Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been covered in a number of our works, so we will not go into theoretical details¹. This article is an attempt to analyze practical usage of one of the types of the conventional military deterrence – “immediate” one in regard to the regional status-quo situation.

Let us mention in advance that in this article we do not make it a point to discuss the results or the possibility of military action against Iran. In this article we shall just make an attempt to analyze how a possible tension around Iran may affect a possibility of warfare resumption by Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict zone or, in other words, how a political development of regional scale may affect an efficiency of implementation of “immediate” deterrence by the Armenian parties.

Theoretical frames of “immediate deterrence”

Unlike other types of deterrence, “immediate” deterrence appears mostly in force majeure situation, on the threshold or in the period of the crises. According to the vendor of this classification Patrick Morgan, the actor activates the mechanisms of “immediate” deterrence when an “opponent is already contemplating and preparing an attack”, in order to assuage doubts of the opponent in the level of resolution and consistency of the threats of a deterring side². “Immediate” deterrence is also implemented in case of force majeure situations on the regional level when external factors and actors has such a direct impact on a military-political balance in the conflict zone which can blunt the effectiveness of “general deterrence”.

The elements of “immediate” deterrence may involve – efficient “warning” (military parades, maneuvers in the immediate proximity to the conflict zone), demonstrative buying of new military weapons and ammunition, initiation of an appropriate reaction of allies and international organizations, complete or partial mobilization, announcement of a state of emergency, etc. “Immediate” deterrence may also include, within definite limits, power actions, such as restricted/proportional counterinsurgency in order to parry the attempts to feel around the consistency of the deterring party.

Practical parameters of “immediate” deterrence in Karabakh conflict

States intentionally unleash wars only when they are absolutely convinced in their success basing rather on favourable military balance and advantageous foreign political expectations than on their wishes. And if none of these factors works usually deterrence mechanisms, which deteriorate war resumption, actuate. In the same way deterrence in Nagrono-Karabakh conflict is based on two main elements:

Persisting military and technical balance (which includes geographically convenient for defending front line configuration with in depth defence) and more advantageous for Armenia format of the military and political involvement of third parties (CSTO membership and broadened (since August 2010) military liabilities on behalf of Russia).
Unambiguous consensus on behalf of the international community concerning non-allowance of the resumption of the combat actions, which rises political responsibility of the a possible aggressor in case of the resumption.

In both cases no serious changes are observed. Without going into a detailed analysis of military and technical balance in Karabakh conflict, it should be mentioned that over the recent period, despite large-scale procurement of various types of arms and ammunition by Azerbaijan, development of the defence industry of its own and multi-billion expenditures for military end at the expense of the earnings from selling Caspian energy resources, military and technical balance has not essentially changed. Azerbaijan has no predominance on any of the main types of arms and military technics (besides military aircrafts and helicopters). And predominance of Azerbaijan in aviation is considerably compensated by the availability of rather powerful to a regional scale air defence system adjacent to the CIS regional air defence system. Besides, air area of Armenia is protected by two divisions of antiaircraft missile system-300B which is in the inventory of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri and squadron of Mig-29 interceptors deployed in Yerevan³.

Such situation is broadly explained by the fact that one of the main peculiarities of the regional armaments race in the Karabakh conflict zone is that it is equal and asymmetric. Military parity is sustained by purchasing mainly “counter weapons” (e.g. in response to procurement of military aircrafts, strike helicopters and armor by Azerbaijan the Armenian party put into service less expensive air defence systems and anti tank guided missiles) either at the expense of concessional procurement of the arms and ammunition by the ally country or as a part of CSTO membership. At the current stage of the militarization of the region on the one side is Azerbaijan which uses its earnings from selling energy resources and on the other side are Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh which receive “compensating” and “parity” armaments transfers from Russia or within the framework of the CSTO.

Thus, specificity of the armaments race in the zone of Karabakh conflict at two decades end has not changed qualitative (and on some parameters even quantitative) military and technical balance between conflicting parties, thus anchoring though fragile but not less long-term status-quo. This will hardly happen in the months to come, which will seem the most critical from the point of view of possibility of delivering (not delivering) strike on Iran.

But at the same time one should not forget that hypothetical strike on Iran will not impact military calculations in the conflict zone, as the Iranian troops are not an element of direct military balance at the front line – there are only Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers in the trenches in Karabakh. Moreover, even if a change of a military and technical balance can be expected in conflict zone in the near future it will be rather for the worse of Azerbaijan than for its good. For example, it can be affected by the coming large-scale CSTO maneuvers in September in Armenia, continuing rearmament of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri or possible large-scale mobilization of the Iranian troops at the Azerbaijani border in case of a crisis.

Vague goals of the “Israeli contract”

Disproportionately nervous and alerted reaction of Azerbaijan is a serious argument proving that resumption of the combat actions in Karabakh is not inevitable in case of military crisis round Iran. Azerbaijani experts, journalists and political figures are not very optimistic concerning possible Iranian crisis. This is substantiated by the analysis of weapons list which are planned to be bought within the last big weapons procurement contract in the amount of $1.6 billion between Azerbaijan and Israel (the contract was concluded last year). This contract is mainly directed against Iran. And though Azerbaijani authorities tend to make an impression that those weapons will be used exclusively against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but in the reality it is not exactly the point.

In particular, within the framework of the aforementioned deal Azerbaijan plans to buy Barak-8 anti-aircraft missile system, which has been produced till now only as a sea-based antiaircraft defence system. These anti-aircraft missile systems are considered by Israel as the main antiaircraft defence means for the protection of their gas producing offshore platforms in the Eastern Mediterranean. Azerbaijan is also going to buy from Israel a batch of Gabriel-5 anti-ship missiles. It is obvious that as the Nagorno-Karabakh troops has no navy, due to the lack of access to the Caspian Sea, the main purpose of the aforementioned weapons is the protection of oil and gas offshore platforms and oil and gas producing infrastructure in the Azerbaijani water area of the Caspian Sea as well as for counter acting Iranian navy.

“Israeli contract” also provides for procurement of EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar station, which can also be used as an element for the protection of the Azerbaijani oil infrastructure (which can possibly be combined with С-300ПМУ-2 «Favorite» ainti-aircraft missile system). For Armenia and NKR those systems can constitute relative menace as they can only lower the efficacy of restraining strikes of 9К72 «Skad-B» и 9К79-1 «Tochka-U» operational-tactical and tactical missile systems of the Armenian army.

But it is obvious that the main goal of this expensive modernization of the Azerbaijani antiaircraft defence, which considerably exceeds the level of counteracting the strikes of the Armenian air force or missile complexes of the Armenian army, is the protection from much more powerful missile arsenal of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which included dozens of land-based missile systems of different radius and applicability. Besides long-range early warning goals, EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar can be used for the electronic suppression of Iran’s antiaircraft defence systems. Heron drones, which are also bought from Israel, with flying range, which overlays territories of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, may constitute threat mostly to Iran. Most probably they will be used for the reconnaissance of southern, Iranian water area of the Caspian Sea and monitoring northwestern regions of Iran with a purpose to detect Iranian missiles launches from mobile launchers⁴.

May be the semblance of “anti-Armenian” orientation of this contract, which was concluded at the end of 2011, can be reinforced by the information that Israel maintains deliveries of CARDOM 120mm Recoil Mortar Systems and Spyke anti-tank guided missiles. But one should not forget that the procurement of the aforementioned Israeli weapons as well as Sufa armored vehicles and ATMOS-200 155 mm caliber Autonomous Truck Mounted self-propelled artillery systems has been carried out since 2008, i.e. long before conclusion of the latest big contract with Israel⁵. However, recently information has appeared that Azerbaijan concluded with Israel a new contract to the sum of more than $300 million on supply of drone aircrafts, which can be used in Nagorno-Karabakh⁶.

Thus, heightening Iranophobia in Azerbaijan and increasing feeling of threat on behalf of Iran, compel Baku partially redirect its military potential from Karabakh direction to the southeast, reinforcing naval component within the framework of military and technical cooperation with Israel. Naturally, the aforementioned measures cause negative reaction in Iran, despite rather clumsy attempts of Baku to justify large-scale procurement of Israeli weapons, including those which are intended for maritime operations, by the pretext that they can be used against the Armenians in Karabakh. They have hardly forgotten in Tehran the appeals made in Azerbaijani parliament to rename that country into “Northern Azerbaijan”, and regular protest meetings in front of the Iranian embassy in Baku and many other such actions. The dynamics of the relations between Baku and Tehran since the first half of 2012 has shown that the level of tension in the Iranian-Azerbaijani relations has reached a critical point.

Geopolitical restrictions

As for the second factor of implementation of “immediate” deterrence by the Armenian parties – negative stance of international community on the resumption of combat activities in Karabakh – situation is not advantageous for official Baku either. From political point of view probability of taking advantage of regional force majeure by Azerbaijan will cause hard reaction of not only possible initiator of military action against Iran – U.S., but also of main global and regional actors in the Iranian issue – Russia, EU and Turkey. None of them will be interested in complication of regional situation in the South Caucasus and around Karabakh against the background of global negative aftermaths caused by the operation against Iran. Even if Israel tries to use Azerbaijani airfields in one-way fashion, it is not clear how this fact may impact the stance of the third parties on Karabakh issue.

The idea that a kind of haggle between Baku and U.S./Israel like “airbases in exchange to consent to unleash war in Karabakh” is possible is nothing but a propagandistic speculation. An attempt to resume war in Karabakh on a quite in, defiance of the opinion of the “high and the mighty”, may turn out to be too unreasonable and too risky venture, which was partially demonstrably illustrated by the results of “measured” aggravation of the situation, initiated by the Azerbaijani party on June 4, 2012, during the visit of the U.S. State Secretary Hilary Clinton to the South Caucasus

By the way, military and technical suitability of usage of the Azerbaijani airfields by Israeli air force is not obvious either. For example, publication of the authoritative British periodical Jane’s Defence Weekly on March 28, 2012 has remained almost unnoticed⁷. The authors of world’s leading military and analytical journal considered different variants of Israeli air force operation directed against nuclear infrastructure of Iran, taking into account technical and quantitative possibilities of the Israeli air force. According to their estimates only about 30 F-15I Ra’am and 100 F-16I Sufa of 350 aircrafts of the Israeli air force can participate in the operation. Taking into consideration both radius of action of these aircrafts and surprise effect and security, usage of the shortest rout through the air areas of Iraq and Jordan (partial usage of Saudi and Syrian air area is also possible) is the most optimal for delivering a strike.

At the same time while delivering air strike from the territory of Israel using any rout air refueling will be necessary including immediately before crossing Iranian border and on the way back. In this aspect air area of Iraq is also the most optimal and safe even taking into consideration necessity of recycle sortie of the Israeli air force, qualitative and quantitative potential of which would hardly allow accomplishing the task of at least partial destruction of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure by one strike.

On the assumption of this analysis of Jane’s analytics usage of airfields in Azerbaijan seems to be too difficult and insecure against the background of more efficient Iraqi rout. Moreover, seeming main benefit of the Azerbaijani air bases in the aspect of their proximity to the Iranian nuclear objects is at the same time their main shortcoming. In case if they are deployed there (even as a staging station on their way back after the operation) Israeli air force will be too vulnerable for the counterthrust of the Iranian army, which can even use short-range tactical missiles, not to speak of a missed element of surprise. Geopolitical restraints in the estimations of Azerbaijan combined with aftermaths of the Iranian counterstrike increases the risks of providing its territory for the operations against Iran.

Aggravation of situation in Nagorno-Karabakh on the initiative of Iran is also rather problematic. Theoretically it can be assumed that Tehran may have a temptation do destabilize oil market by means of jeopardizing Caspian energy carriers supply, adding to its deterrence potential, alongside with the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, deterioration of the Caucasian energy corridor. But in this case, if any real military threat to the Azerbaijani energy infrastructure on behalf of Iran arises, Baku will particularly be not interested in initiating two-front war. In the end it should not be forgotten that real military balance between Iran and Azerbaijan is measured rather by hours the Iranian tanks will need to get to Baku than minutes of flight of the Iranian missiles to the objects of the Azerbaijani oil and gas infrastructure.

Conclusion

It is quite natural that any kind of military and political escalation round Iran will affect the security of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Taking into consideration all the seriousness of these threats it should also be taken into consideration that according to the most probable scenario of military operation against Iran, it will include mainly air missile and bomb strikes without massive ground forces invasion. According to the estimation of the most of the experts, air strikes will last from several days to several weeks and can hardly cause mass casualties among the civilians, fall of the ruling regime, etc.

It should not be forgotten that only 20-25% of entire turnover of Armenia is going through the territory of Iran and there is only one alternative gas pipeline. In his interview to the Russian Novaya gazeta newspaper in April 2012 the Armenian prime-minister Tigran Sargsyan expressed an opinion that in case of force majeure situation in the region, including negative developments round Iran, the republic should have three months stock of products, including medication, food and fuel⁸. So it can be assumed that deterioration of the communication through Iran for several weeks will not have catastrophic aftermaths for Armenia though it will be rather painful and sensible.

Many experts, admitting in general terms that the preservation of the current status in the South Caucasus is inevitable, often subconsciously make allowance for serious force majeure situation in the region, such as military crisis around the nuclear programme of Iran, can shake or even ruin this status quo (at least around Karabakh). Correspondingly, the parameters of “immediate” deterrence of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will remain unchanged and the Iranian crisis by itself, as a “trigger” for the resumption of war in Karabakh by Azerbaijan, looks to be too dangerous and unprofitable casus belli, at least from the perspective of analysis of the military and political factors which seem to be topical and essential today.

¹ See for details: Minasyan, Sergey, “The Quest for Stability in the Karabakh Conflict: Conventional Deterrence and Political Containment”, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No.188, Washington, September 2011; Մինասյան Ս.Մ. <<Ռազմական զսպման և քաղաքական սաստման քաղաքականությունը Ղարաբաղյան հակամարտության համատեքստում>>, Հայկական Բանակ, № 4, 2011.

² Morgan, Patric M., Deterrence Now. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003, p.9.

³ О динамике военно-технического баланса в зоне карабахского конфликта см. подробнее: Минасян, Сергей, «Региональная безопасность на Южном Кавказе-2010», Кавказ-2010: Ежегодник Института Кавказа. Ереван, 2012.

⁴ See for details: Katz, Yaakov, Binnie, Jeremy, “Israel, Azerbaijan Sign $1.6bn Arms Deal”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.49, Issue 10, 7 March 2012, p.9; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

⁵ SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php

⁶ «Израиль заключил с Азербайджаном еще один крупный контракт», Vesti.Az, 30.05.2012.

⁷ Johnson, Scott and Chorley, Emily, “Studies in Pre-emption”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol.49, Issue 13, 28 March 2012.

⁸ Дерябин, Александр, «Боевой запас Армении: Премьер-министр Тигран Саркисян о подготовке республики к нестабильности в Закавказье», Независимая газета, 16.04.2012.

“Globus” analytical journal, #10, 2012

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