ARMENIA-TURKEY: NEW POLITICAL PHASE?

14.05.2009

ARMENIA-TURKEY: NEW POLITICAL PHASE?

Sergey Minasyan

Armenia_Turkey.jpg (medium) Since 1993 Turkey, because of the activation of military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh, has closed its border with Armenia. And since that time there has been no full-fledged diplomatic relations between those states, the economic and trade cooperation is implemented through the third parties. Until quite recently as precondition for the normalization of the relations with Armenia, Turkey put forward the demands, which are connected with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as with the Armenian Genocide recognition process, arranged by various organizations in Diaspora.

At the same time, the aforementioned preconditions for the normalization, but for the problem of Armenian Genocide recognition, which is most sensitive in the Armenian-Turkish relations for Ankara in general, had not been the issues, which were matters of priority for Turkey and Turkish society. One can even assert that the closed borders and the absence of the relations with its eastern neighbour subordinated the regional policy of Turkey in the respect of Armenia (and the whole South Caucuses in general) to the stance of the third party – Azerbaijan.

In its turn some concept of the usage of the Genocide factor as a “non-conventional weapon”, the resource of the pressure directed to the opening of the borders and the fence-mending with Turkey has been elaborated and used by the Armenian political elite since the end of 1990th. Taking into consideration the scarcity of the resources of Yerevan influence on Ankara, Armenia tried to use the factor of specific sensitiveness of Turkey to the Genocide as a mean of stimulating the normalization of the relations.

Nevertheless some constant remained in the 15-years period (1993-2008) in the relations between Armenia and Turkey: Turkey kept the Armenian-Turkish border closed and in fact carried out the communicational “semi-blockade” of Armenia (trying to bring Armenia to make concessions in the issue of the Genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), and Armenia tried to use the Genocide factor and the possibility to influence Ankara through Brussels and Washington to bring Turkey to change its stance and open the border. The only important exception in that row is, probably, the period between 2001 and 2004 when Armenian-Turkish commission worked (TARC), and when in Turkey, at least at the level of experts, started to talk about the advisability of the opening of the borders and the normalization of the relations with Armenia. It should also be mentioned that the result of some common regional processes influenced those relations at some extent too, i.e. the US invasion to Iraq in 2003 and the deterioration in relations between Ankara and Washington, caused by the refusal of Turkey to let the US troops enter Iraq from Turkish territory; the dynamics of the talks between Ankara and Brussels on the Turkey’s accession to the UN, Russian-Turkish rapprochement and etc.

That was the general regional picture of Armenian-Turkish relations in the beginning of 2008, when the turnaround was outlined, which was conditioned both by internal reasons and political will the presidents of two countries and the change in the geopolitical context both in South Caucuses and in wider regional aspect.

In February 2008 the presidential elections took place in Armenia, the authorities changed. Among first who congratulated newly elected president S.Sargsyan were his Turkish colleague A.Gul and prime-minister R.T.Erdogan. The change of the authorities in Armenia and the opinions expressed in some expert circles in Turkey, created preconditions for the initiating the stage of efforts directed to the normalization of the mutual relations. Though, of course, Ankara and Yerevan could not start over a new leaf: the burden of history and the complexity of the problem for both of the parties, the present inertia of unilateral actions and deep distrust announce themselves.

In May 2008 in Moscow during the meeting with the representatives of Armenian Diaspora in Russia president S.Sargsyan made a public announcement that he invited president A.Gul to Yerevan to watch the football match between Armenia and Turkey, which was to take place on September 6. In the opinion of many experts it is not a mere chance that the announcement of the invitation of Turkish president to Yerevan was made in Moscow. Probably, the Armenian authorities managed to convince the Kremlin that the normalization of the relations between Yerevan and Ankara would not take place at the expense of Armenian-Russian military and political relations. For the first time Russia not only avoided creating obstacles in the way of Armenian-Turkish dialogue, but it even tried to promote to it. According to the press, in June 2008, during the visit of Russian foreign affairs minister S.Lavrov to Turkey (not long ago after the invitation of S.Sargsyan made in Moscow) among the issues discussed by the Russian minister with Turkish party the problems of the normalization of the relations between Armenia and Turkey were also discussed.

On August 8, 2008 the “five days war” between Russia and Georgia changed the whole regional context and, established new political reality, new status quo in South Caucuses. Turkey also tried to initiate “its own game” during the crisis, to establish its new place in the regional policy in the Caucuses. It is, mainly, manifested itself in the fact that at first Ankara did not allow the US ships to get to the Georgian shore through the Black Sea straits. The changed political priorities of Turkey have also manifested themselves in the new political initiative in the respect of the South Caucasian region (with the consent of Russia), i.e. in the so called “Caucasian Stability Platform”.

The August crisis and the new status quo influenced the general background of Armenian-Turkish relations through boosting their dynamics and creating new preconditions for the normalization, which had not been taken into account by the experts before. For example, the communicational risk concerning Georgia, which aroused after the war, put forward the interest of Ankara in opening the border with Armenia and using its territory as some kind of transport or even energy corridor. In the context of the results of the “Five days war” and temporary termination of functioning of all the communication and energy projects going through Georgia, some Turkish experts and politicians, even at the level of the foreign minister of Turkey Ali Babajan, expresses the opinion that “Armenia could become the alternative to the gas pipeline going to the west from the Caspian Sea through the territory of Georgia, which became unreliable after Russian intervention”.

On the whole, one may assert that the “Five days war” in South Ossetia considerably activated or even restored the Caucasian policy of Turkey. In the opinion of many experts, this factor mostly influenced that Ankara took the final decision about the unprecedented visit of Turkish president A.Gul to Yerevan on September 6, 2008. At the same time in the course of events in August-September 2008 it proved out that in the general format of the Armenian-Turkish relations the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is of instrumental importance and among the priorities of Ankara it considerably cede to the issue of the Genocide recognition or even fence-mending with Armenia in the context of ambitions of Turkey to become a member of the European Union.

The South Caucasian crisis of 2008 came to prove the pragmatic meaning of geography within Armenian-Turkish relations, particularly on the assumption of communication priorities of Ankara on the east. The Armenian rout for communication with Central Asia is shorter, more profitable, cheaper, and, after the Georgian-Russian war may be even more secured for Ankara.

The visit of president A.Gul to Yerevan on the invitation of his Armenian colleague on September 8, 2008 was really historic and laid down a foundation for the further political dialogue between two countries. At the same time at current moment one can confidently state that the regional context of the first half of 2009 creates a very convenient moment for the regulation of the relations between Armenian and Turkey. For the first time Russia not only avoids detaining but it promotes to the normalization of the relations between Armenian and Turkey. Though Russia tries to do it at the expense of the regional influence of the US, but, taking into consideration the fact that for the Obama administration the Caucasian centre will not be of great priority, Ankara can hope that the Turkish-Russian dialogue will not cause the overreaction on behalf of the US. In its turn the EU always welcomed and favoured any progress in the Armenian-Turkish relations, especially in the issue of establishing of full-fledged diplomatic relation and opening the border.

One of the most important results of Armenian-Turkish relations was the separation of the relations between Armenia and Turkey from Nagorno-Karabakh problem and the relations of both countries with Azerbaijan. This can already be stated as a kind of entity and it seems that this fact in the future will promote to a greater extent of stability and safety in the South Caucuses, as it reduces the possibility of military actions resumption in the zone of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Because Baku cannot rely so absolutely on Ankara in political and military aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, one of the results of the crisis in South Caucuses, i.e. the signing of the Moscow declaration by the presidents of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia can also be regarded as the first attempt to reach a real compromise between the conflicting parties. And this gives Ankara legitimate possibility to accelerate the process of normalization of the relations with Armenia, proceeding from the premise that by opening the borders Turkey will promote to the continuation of the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan round Nagorno-Karabakh, taking into consideration the Moscow declaration and the provisions of the OSCE foreign ministers’ Helsinki document.

At the same time, one should accept that the closed borders with Armenia and the lack of regulation in the relations with Yerevan make Turkey vulnerable for external pressure on behalf of leading world actors – the US and the UN. The factor of unsettled Armenian-Turkish relations, in a cope with the issue of the Genocide recognition allows some powers in Brussels and Washington to use it in the issues concerning Turkey (from the prospects of the Turkey’s accession to the EU up to the future status of the northern provinces of Iraq, inhabited by the Kurds) as a leverage to put pressure on Ankara. Especially when the conception of the communication “strangling” of Armenia has not had the efficient effect. Armenia continued economic development under the “semi-blockade”, though the opening of the borders will have very positive effect for Armenia (as well as for the eastern districts of Turkey).

In its turn the opening of the border with Armenia on the east will allow Turkey to get political and propaganda dividends on the west, firstly in the dialogue with the EU. Armenia, in its turn, in case of opening the borders with Turkey and the establishment of full-fledged bilateral relations, can raise the level of its security in the political sphere and in economic sphere it can use efficiently the communication capabilities of Turkey for its further development.

The formation of greater transparency, stability and safety in the region will be the result of the regulation of bilateral relations in general; the processes of eurointegration of Turkey and Armenia will be activated. The recent news about the active negotiations between Armenia and Turkey, which have appeared in mass media recently, the results of the visit of the US president B. Obama to Turkey in the beginning of April 2009 (on the eve of April 24 - the Day of Remembrance of the victims of the Armenian Genocide) give reason to believe that new cardinal changes will take place in the relations between two countries, up to the opening of the border and the establishing of full-fledged diplomatic relations.

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