ARMENIAN – GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER “FIVE DAYS” WAR

15.10.2009

ARMENIAN – GEORGIAN RELATIONS AFTER “FIVE DAYS” WAR

Sergey Minasyan

Armenia-Georgia (original) The interstate relations between Armenia and Georgia have passed rather eventful and at the same time difficult way since the independence of these two states in 1991. Every stage in bilateral relations has been mostly dependent on the domestic political developments both in Armenia and in Georgia, as well as on the general situation in the region. The development of the Armenian-Georgian relations in the period after August 8, 2008 is no exception either.

More than a year has passed since the “Five days war” between Russia and Georgia. It influenced seriously not only the parties directly involved in the military conflict but also the relations between other countries of the region. Naturally, it also concerned the relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi making an essential impact on the formation of the new tendencies in those relations. But the analysis of the current condition and prospects of the relations between Armenia and Georgia after the “Five days war” is not possible without the perception of the regional context formed in South Caucasus.

South Caucasus in a year after the “Five days war”

The “Five days war” in August 2008 changed the regional security format in South Caucasus and the level of the involvement of external actors. Mainly after the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Moscow and including of those countries into the sphere of its influence, the political and geographic borders of South Caucasus have been restricted for Russia mainly to Armenia and Azerbaijan with their unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In its turn after the Georgian-Russian war Georgia became for Russia a kind of closed territory where the possibilities of Russia to influence domestic political and economic life were minimized. For Russia in “political and geographic” and informational plane Georgia is somewhere between Washington, Brussels and Moscow. Thus, after the “Five days war” the relations between Russia and Georgia are not in fact bilateral anymore (especially if we take into consideration the absence of diplomatic relations and diplomatic representation between two countries). After August 2008 the whole context of the relations between Moscow and Tbilisi was included in a more broad format of the relations of Russia with the United States and as well as with the European states and structures, where Georgia is though sensitive but only a small brick in “East” (Russia) – “West” (US and Europe) complicated political construction.

As a result of the “Five days war” Armenia also faced new regional challenges. It seems strange but after the victorious five days war the growth of the influence and strengthening of the position of the main ally of Yerevan in South Caucasus at the same time estranged Russia from Armenia. First of all the communication road connecting Russia and Armenia which was also used to supply the Russian military bases in Armenia was closed. Let us remind you that the usage of the Georgian territory as a transition road was stipulated by the agreements concluded between Moscow and Tbilisi in 2005 and which referred to the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from the territory of Georgia. It is clear that after the Russian-Georgian war the possibility of the transportation of military shipment through the Georgian territory is almost impossible in the nearest future. The conditions of the transportation of non-military shipment from Russia to Armenia and vice-versa have also become more complicated.

And the usage of the territories of Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey for the transportation of the military cargo to Armenia is connected with political difficulties and even more complicated restrictions though such a possibility is not excluded at all. However the supply of the Russian 102nd military base is provided through the Azerbaijani airspace. It is rather unique situation under the conditions of the unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, taking into consideration the fact that the ground communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been interrupted since the beginning of the 1990s as a result of the blockade carried out by Azerbaijan. But the usage of Azerbaijan as transition territory by Russia also has its limits and restrictions.

However, the consequences of the “Five days war” both directly and in figurative sense estranged Russia from Armenia rather significantly. On the other hand, some tenseness in Yerevan was caused by the tactical “gas rapprochement” between Azerbaijan and Russia at the end of spring of 2009 which, in its turn, was the nervous response of Baku on the process of Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and “road map” signed by Yerevan and Ankara on April 22 in Switzerland.

That is why it is natural that the dynamics of the relations between Armenia and Russia, Azerbaijan and Russia, Armenia and Turkey must affect the relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi.

Foreign policy complementarity of Armenia and communication “instrumentalism” of Georgia

“Five days war” was a peculiar “test” for Armenia which allowed proving for the twentieth time the effectiveness of complementarity as a conceptual base of the Armenian foreign policy. During the war between Russia – very important strategic partner, and Georgia – close neighbour with whom we are closely connected historically and who is our main communication partner, Armenia (which at that time was the presiding country of the CSTO – the alliance under the patronage of Russia) could maintain concrete neutrality. The official Yerevan not only managed to maintain political neutrality but also succeeded in preventing the creation of the negative image of Armenia both in Russian and in Georgian societies due to its rather maneuvering stance.

However, it should be accepted that in the period following the events of August 2008 the relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi were not deprived of problems, which were mainly (but not exclusively) caused by the “Five days war”. Besides the issue of military transition, the dinamycs of the development of the regional processes in South Caucasus also has important influence on the Armenian-Georgian relations. According to some Georgian experts, after the “Five days war” and loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia Georgia has nothing to lose or cede. That is why after the events in August 2008 the Georgian society and political elite are extremely punctilious in regard to the regional processes which can affect the regional position of their country. E.g. it is obvious that the settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh issue (or even the possibilities of positive developments) will reduce the regional significance of Georgia, will deprive it of the economic and political advantages which Tbilisi has in South Caucasus region under the conflict of its two neigbours. Even the change of the general background of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (e.g. in case of the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey and the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border), as many are worried in Tbilisi, can have negative effect on the exclusive position of Georgia in the region. Mainly, as some Georgian experts mention (e.g. well-known Georgian political scientist, the Deputy Minister of Education and the director of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development Gia Nodia), there is feeling in Georgia that in case of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, opening of the borders and setting of the communication Tbilisi will lose its “privileged position” in the regional and economic projects.

On the other hand, in recent times, Georgia in its relations with Armenia specially mentions its exclusive role in regard to the communication routs of Armenia which is reflected in the tariff policy. It even comes to “instrumentalization” of the role of Georgia as a transition country. Besides, after loosing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia, in the near future, can hardly use the potential of its power structures (Georgian authorities paid great attention and used too many resources for their development in the post-war period) in those regions. But this is compensated by the shift in the policy of the authorities and usage of the power structures resource in Samtskhe-Javakhk and Kvemo-Kartli populated by the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Naturally, such developments may affect Armenian-Georgian interstate relations in the future.

Javakhq and “Russian factor”

For Georgian society and political elite the attitude towards Armenia and Armenians in the post-Soviet period was conditioned by two main stereotypes: the problems of Javakhq populated by the Armenians and the relations between Yerevan and Moscow. The constant suspicions of “separatism” of the Armenians and the alleged intention of Armenia “to tear” Javakhq from Georgia are combined in the Georgian society with deep anti-Russian mood. Under the condition of the Armenian-Russian allied relations anti-Russian attitude is also automatically spread on Armenia and Armenians. Unfortunately, this subtext seems to be inevitable and Armenian-Georgian relations will continue to develop against this background. So the issue of Javakhq and Russian factor bring to some difficulties and even problems in the relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi with definite periodicity.

E.g. this tendency and the fears of Georgia in regard to the problem of Javakhq were clearly shown up on the threshold of the visit of the president of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili in Yerevan on July 24-25, 2009. Several days before that Georgian border guard had prohibited the deputy of the RA National Assembly Shirak Torosyan, who was born in Javkhq and who was going to the conference in Tbilisi to enter Georgia. The authorities of Georgia explained that step saying that Sh. Torosyan made sharp statements in regard to the policy carried out by the Georgian authorities in Javakhq. This incident caused the official note of protest by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia. At the same time, in the opinion of some experts and politicians involved in the Armenian-Georgia relations, this step of the Georgian authorities can be explained by several reasons. Besides, the obvious reason which was “on the surface” and which was sounded by the Georgians (Georgian authorities are displeased by the stance of S. Torosyam on Javakhq issues), all that could also be caused by internal processes of partition of the spheres of interests between different groups of the Armenians in Georgia and Armenians from Javakhq in Armenia and Russia. But that incident could also be caused by other reason: e.g. that the Georgian authorities try to raise the “price” of the negotiations with the Armenian party, including those on the issue of the opening of the Verkhni Lars checkpoint.

At the threshold of the meeting of the presidents of Armenia and Georgia there were many talks about the possibility of the opening of that check point. It is obvious that the Armenian party is very interested in the possibility to re-establish the direct transport communication with Russia though in reality there are no serious grounds for the opening of that check point – the current Russian-Georgian relations do not allow that. And Moscow and Tbilisi would hardly aspire to that. For the Kremlin the opening of the Verkhni Lars would mean to draw back from their policy of “total ignoring” of the present Georgian authorities (as it is announced in Moscow until the replacement of Saakashvili). In its turn the restoration of any kind of direct and humanitarian relations with Moscow would mean that Tbilisi accepted the situation which emerged round Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the August war. It is clear that such kind of fixation of the results of the August war on behalf of Tbilisi, theoretically, could have been only on visual level but not in the mood inside the Georgian society and political elite (which would hardly accept that in the near future), but even this is not possible today. It is suffice to remember the principle stand of Georgia in the issue of connecting the status of UN and OSCE missions with the territorial integrity, which finally brought to the veto by Russia and the suspension of the mission of those two organizations in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

But all these do not prevent Tbilisi and Moscow from making statements regularly that they are ready to open Verkhni Lars check point exclusively “for the sake of Armenia”, but “the opposite party should be constructive and be ready to make concessions”. At the same time, both Georgian and Russian parties use the interest of Armenian party in the opening of the check point for the political bargain with Yerevan on other issues, being well aware of the fact that they do not loose much in the current negotiations format. So it is not excluded that the incident with Sh. Torosyan and the actualization of the Verkhi Lars issue were used by Tbilisi for making its approaches both to the issue of Javakhq and the issues of the tariffs for Armenian shipment transportation and some other issues of bilateral relations even stricter.

On the other hand, Armenian party also tried to use the visit of the Georgian president to Armenia in their interests and to demonstrate once more its complementarity in foreign policy. First of all we mean the awarding of the order to the president of Georgia. Though it was simply protocolary event and ordinary diplomatic step (S. Sargsyan also was awarded Georgian order during his visit to Tbilisi last year), but it drew a wide response especially in Russia. Meanwhile, the political sense of all these was a kind of “discontent message” to Moscow regarding the other stage of activating of Russian-Azerbaijani contacts.

Instead of conclusion: predictable expectations

It should be underlined that the analysis of the Armenian-Georgian relations must be based not only on the developments posterior to the “Five days war”. It is necessary to take into consideration the constant factors which have their effect on interstate relations between Armenia and Georgia and first of all those are the issues connected with the functioning of the roads going through the territory of Georgia.

As for the general influence of regional context on the Armenian-Georgian relations, it is necessary first of all to mention rather emotional perception of the prospects of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement (though rather obscure) after the signing of the so-called “road map”. The echo of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement in Georgia was rather nervous and aggressive: Tbilisi was really anxious about the loosing of its privileged position in the regional policy and the exclusive communicational value for Armenia.

At the same time, the Russian factor still continues to have its negative aftertaste on the development of Armenian-Georgian relations. The withdrawal of Georgia from the CIS in 2009 will influence in one way of another the relations between Armenia and Georgia (even in economic and humanitarian issues).

However, the Modus-Vivendi historically existing between two countries make us believe in the development of the interstate relations between Armenia and Georgia, despite the regional context and existing continuous political problems which affect Tbilisi and Yerevan.

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