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20.10.2011

THREE PRINCIPLES, SIX GUIDELINES AND “STATUS-QUO” IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTELEMENT

   

Mikhail Aghajanyan

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expert

The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement is going through one of the most intensive stages. It is more correct to speak about the intensification than about stirring up, because stirring up implies the disposition of all the parties to the conflict to rapprochement, while intensification is based first of all on amplification of the external impulses. The stances of the parties, which are well-known and do not need presentation, has not changed. The external powers, carrying out mediation attempts, doubled their efforts and it is mostly prominent in Russia’s efforts.

The “dry residue” of the meeting in Kazan is that Armenia once more demonstrated constructive stand and was ready to sign the document which was often called a “road map” of the settlement. But it is not happening for one simple reason: Azerbaijan is fully occupied by the imitation of readiness to set this “road map”, one of the provisions of which clearly states “the definition of the future legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through the will expression of its population which will have legally biding force”.

Besides intensification of the process of settlement, its confidentiality, which distances this topical process from public, is emphasized. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the closed nature of the process and paucity of information about the actual settlement of the conflict, some theses which spread light on some aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement can be brought forward.

Status, security and territories

The international status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state will be founded on the legally biding force of the will expression of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and will be the best guarantee of its security. Nagorno-Karabakh has already de-facto been formed within its factual borders, the international recognition and documentary setting of which are possible after the resolution of the issue of the borders between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Those are the issues, for the resolution of which, Azerbaijan is not ready, because the resolution of the later is not possible without involvement of the representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile Baku opposes to the their involvement.

Azerbaijan is simulating vigorous activity, which comes down to unacceptability of the current status-quo in the conflict zone, but in reality it does everything for the current status-quo to remain unchanged. Nagorno-Karabakh on practice has everything what has been mentioned above – secure borders, territory of historical Artsakh, which are under the jurisdiction of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. They only need international recognition of the current de-facto status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. In this aspect the stance of the Armenian parties concerning one of the guidelines of the settlement is in granting Nagorno-Karabakh intermediate status and it seems rather well-considered and fully founded on today’s realities. The intermediate status for Karabakh “means status-quo plus”, i.e. all we have today, plus international recognition of that status” (thesis from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia E. Nalbandyan at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on July 13, 2011).

Azerbaijan is simulating the process of settlement due to very simple reason. In Baku they realize that getting back to the 1988 status and borders is not possible. The only chance for them is new aggression against Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani thesis that Nagorno-Karabakh has never been an independent state is nostalgia for 1988 with a claim for the second attempt of military revanche for the final resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue according to the scenario tested in 1990. By the way, this thesis of the Azerbaijani leadership indirectly shows that Baku is ready to consider the issue of reunion of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh which found solution in the joint resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Arm. SSR and National Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh of December 1, 1989. In Baku they believe that this will qualitatively facilitate resolution of such issues as status, security and territories from the position advantageous for Azerbaijan and it will present the conflict in quite different light, i.e. in the light of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with bringing Nagorno-Karabakh down to the level of object and not a subject of agreements.

The nostalgia syndrome of 1989 can be seen in the stance of the Azerbaijani leadership on all the levels. Unlike two other parties to the conflict and assessment of external actors, Azerbaijan has got nowhere for the recent 20 years in their desire of “instituting direct vertical sovereign control over that territory and people living there. Azerbaijan took a step to the middle of the bridge saying it was ready to show some flexibility, meaning various models of autonomy for the population in Karabakh region within Azerbaijan Republic, i.e. to flexibility within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. We are ready for that and we took a step to the middle of the bridge” (from interview of Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, personal envoy of the president of Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh settlement to “Ekho Moskvi” radio station, 19 July, 20111). The things called in Baku “flexibility” and “readiness for the compromise” more remind dictating terms with the elements of despotic caprice (“setting control over people living there”) and allegoric clownery (“taking step to the middle of the bridge”).

Repeated referendum

Agreement to holding repeated referendum for setting the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is the biggest concession of the Armenian party on this stage of the process of settlement.

The political and legal retrospective review of the issue of referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates the sequence of operations of the Armenian parties and it is connected with defining the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the aspect of political and legal actions, the actions of Azerbaijan which “won its independence by deaths of shahids” by means of physical annihilation of the Armenians in January 1990 and in 1991 it took part in the all-USSR referendum on preserving the USSR (March 17, 1991) and overwhelming majority (93.3%) voted for preserving the USSR (87.3% voted for the USSR in Nakhijevan ASSR). The population of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh did not take part in that referendum. By the way it is interesting to mention that according to Russian researchers Transdniestria, which formally did not separate from Chisinau, as well as Abkhazia and South Ossetia participated in the referendum and made it demonstrative”2.

Three principles and six guidelines

The Armenian parties, most probably in concord with each other, took an absolutely right stance on what should be considered principles and guidelines (elements) of settlement. Only three well-known principles of international law can be considered as principles in regard to the Karabakh settlement – non-use of force and threat of force, the right of people to self-determination, territorial integrity of the states. The items of the well-known statements by the presidents of the US, Russia and France (of July 10, 2009 and July 26, 2010) which were mentioned in Deauville statement on May 26, 2011 are the guidelines of the settlement (by the way in the last statement those guidelines are called “elements”). Such an interpretation allows annihilating Azerbaijani insinuations that if Nagorno-Karabakh is not taking part in the elaboration and adoption of the “basic principles” of settlement, it is not a party to the conflict, party at the negotiations and generally this is Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In reality, Nagorno-Karabakh is considering only three aforementioned principles of international law as principles of settlement. As for the rest, including the guidelines of the settlement, the signing of which even in this form, by the way, Azerbaijan avoided in Kazan, Nagorno-Karabakh has its own vision.

The document, which includes “basic principles” of settlement, which are the subject of negotiation between two of three parties to the conflict, is characterized as political and it does not have any legal liabilities for the Armenia and Azerbaijan, which may approve it in perspective. According to the distinct definition of the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov “The parties are working on the assumption that after the basic principles, anyway, legal document, i.e. peace agreement, should be prepared. Of course this will demand more attention to details. Nevertheless, the basic principles as a political document would have a great importance, as they would demonstrate in political aspect determination for obtaining the settlement”3.

However, this does not reduce the value of the checked stance of the Armenian parties which put clear accents in terminology concerning three principles and six guidelines sounded in the statements of the presidents of the US, Russia and France. Besides, focusing attention rather on political than on legally abiding essence of the “basic principles” is appropriate, particularly, in the light of the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in which reads: “the project of the basic principles is a political and not legal document which begins with words: “presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan decided to begin work over the Peace Agreement”. Then only the guidelines which we being reconciled now and which will be included in the peace agreement follow”4.

Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan may decide to begin the work over the peace agreement but that work makes no sense without participation of the official representative of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Restoring full-format negotiations

It is implied that after the adoption of the “basic principles” of the settlement on the initial stage work over the peace agreement on Karabakh conflict settlement, the chosen representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be involved in the negotiations. Azerbaijan torpedoes this too, making statements that in this case it is necessary to involve the representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh.

It is said a lot about the necessity of a speedy restoration of the full-format talks with the participation the NKR. It is also said a lot that there are no examples in modern history of the settlement of similar conflicts when one of the parties does not take part in the talks on equal terms. Here we will bring an example from the Israeli-Palestine conflict which is similar to Karabakh conflict in its complexity. It is known that the current stage of this inveterate conflict is in stagnation but it might have had simply inevitable consequences if Israeli party refused conducting negotiations with the official representatives of Palestine pleading the fact that there is no such state and Israel would conduct negotiations only with internationally recognized Arab country. There is no such thing. Quite the opposite, there have been statements and actions by Israel underlining direct talks with the representatives of Palestine. E.g. words of incumbent prime-minister B. Netanyahu that only his “direct and proceeding contacts” with the head of the Palestine national administration M. Abbas might bring to the breakthrough on main disputable issues5.

External efforts

Mediatory component is gradually becoming an irreplaceable element in the whole process of settlement. The activity of co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, special mediatory mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia has become an integral part of the process of settlement. According to definition the US, Russia and France give to the efforts of the Minsk Group – we have one goal but different interests. Their common goal is not allow sliding down of the conflict to the stage of military revanche by Azerbaijan. The difference in interests is of deeper and wider nature, which touches on an entire layer in approaches of great powers to the issues of the South Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian regions. The parties can always come to terms on one goal and they did it concerning preserving stability in the zone of Karabakh conflict. As for their interests they will never come to terms because this is the reality of balance of the internal powers in the region and the layout of the powers outside.

But close cooperation within the mediatory mechanism of the Minsk group gives all three external actors additional opportunities when both their goals and interests differ on other regional issues. So, it can be supposed that for the US, Russia and France the mechanism of co-chairmanship within the framework of the Minsk Group has turned into a convenient diplomatic ground allowing to control situation in one of the most problematic issues in the South Caucasus as well as to create preconditions for finding convergence points on problematic issues in other regions.

1 Full text of the interview: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/794348-echo/.

2 Сергей Шелин, Сказка о сохраненном Союзе, “Газета.Ру”, http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/03/16_a_3556021.shtml, 16.03.2011.

3 Стенограмма интервью министра иностранных дел России С. Лаврова азербайджанским СМИ, Москва, 27 августа 2010 года, Департамент информации и печати МИД России (http://www.mid.ru/).

4 Statement and answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.Lavrov to the mass media during the joint press-conference following the results of the negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan E. Mamadyarov, Moscow, July 18, 2011. Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (http://www.mid.ru/).

5 Netanyahu wants nonstop talks with Palestinians, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/2/netanyahu-wants-nonstop-talks-palestinians/, 02.01.2011.

“Globus Energy and Regional Security”, Issue 5, 2011

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