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21.05.2009

FROM APPLIED TO CONCEPTUAL: POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE FORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMATIONAL SECURITY OF ARMENIA

   

Mikhail Aghajanyan

Mikhail_Aghajanian (original)One of the directions in the elaboration of contemporary concepts of asymmetrical warfare is the impact on the backbone infrastructures of the rival-state. Those structures are otherwise called system forming infrastructures, which underline their determinant meaning for the minimal necessary level of national security protection of the country-bearer of such infrastructures.

The informational infrastructure takes a special place within the system of the critical infrastructure of a modern state and the efficient security of informational infrastructure is the necessary element of national security protection. Informational infrastructure comprises many elements of the critical infrastructure of the state and, consequently, it can be defined as a critical informational infrastructure. The main sectors of the critical infrastructure of the state, which are closely connected to the informational infrastructure, are the systems of managing in the government, defense, credit and finance and banking system, scientific-research sector, industry, energy (including nuclear energy), transport, water supply, communal services, telecommunications, and civil defense1.

The aforementioned spheres are of particular importance in the aspect of the implementation of the informational infrastructure protection of the Republic of Armenia, within their framework and on basis of the interrelation with the other spheres. In the context of the preparations to the elaboration of the informational security concept of Armenia the experience of other countries, which came far in the sphere of conceptual developments of their informational security, is considered to be very important. Of course, the internal national peculiarities of informational infrastructure of Armenia, as well as the external threats and challenges, which constitute real and potential menace to the country and must be solved, should be taken into consideration,

The conceptual developments of informational security protection of Armenia should take a special place among the very important documents, which have been accepted in Armenia for the recent two years (The Strategy of National Security, Military Doctrine). At the same time, in our opinion, the initiating of the implementation of applied developments for the efficient asymmetrical influence on potential enemy or hostile party in the form of state or non-state formation is a primary task for Armenia. The existing staffing shortage in the sphere of informational security conceptual documents elaboration, which is objectively pointed out by some authors2, may be compensated by the elaboration of more applied and concrete actions, which are based on the experience of the biggest countries, such as, for example, the US, Germany3, and implement it in our informational security environment, of course, taking into consideration the internal national and external factors. While the applied developments and definite informational influence actions, implemented on their base and directed, first of all, on foreign policy processes, which mostly affect national interests of Armenia, are considered more than actual at current stage. Among those reasons the following can be pointed out:

1) External threats and challenges to the national security of Armenia on informational “track” have rather certain distinctness at current stage and possible predictability in future, taking into consideration the main source of such threats on behalf of potential enemy represented by Azerbaijan. Correspondingly, Armenia needs efficient applied developments, which would reflect both the peculiarities of the influence environment to the source of threat, and the peculiarities of that very source of the threats;

2) Nationwide objectives connected with the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic can be reached in case of the implementation not less applied, i.e. definite and consistently conducted informational influences directed to the formation of the opinion of international community, separate important countries, definite political figures, who take decisions and the representatives of expert community, who are involved in elaboration of global and regional projects, which are important for Armenia;

Thus, when we speak about the applied developments of informational influence, we understand what is usually called informational operations.

Armenia, which has not only staffing shortage but also the deficit of separate resources while carrying out the wide range of informational operations, should concentrate special attention on the profits of, first of all, close collaboration of military and civil sectors of the country and, secondly, the network representativeness of the Armenian Diaspora abroad. The first profit will allow “closing” the narrow gap of staffing and technological shortage of Armenia during the implementation of the operations, and the second will consolidate Armeniancy within common informational network, where even the most local resource (e.g. city newspaper or cable TV channel) can play a very important role.

In the near future Armenia cannot use the technology resources during the implementation of informational operations, which, for example, are commonly used by the US. The doctrinal documents of the US in the sphere of informational security protection suppose the usage of such elements of common complex of informational operations implementation as Electronic Warfare, EW; Psychological Operations, PSYOPS; Computer Network Operations, CNO. Information Assurance, IA; Physical Attack on the crucial information structures of the enemy and Counterintelligence are the auxiliary elements of informational operations. It is mentioned that in their essence they are inseparable from the main elements of the informational operations and are directly or implicitly used during the solutions of such operations in general4.

The elaboration of informational operations by Armenia with the usage, in appropriate and predetermined cases, of the resources of the Armenian Diaspora and friendly states, and also of non-governmental formations, can be carried out in the following main directions of the movement to the solution of nationwide problems:

  1. informational influence on potential enemy or other actually or potentially hostile party in order to create in their internal public opinion the objective image of impossibility of the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a military way;
  2. informational influence on the public opinion and the views of the political authorities, the estimates of expert community of the states, denying the Armenian Genocide or the states, which avoid its recognition;
  3. informational influence in wide mass-media and narrower expert-academic resources directed to the promotion of the idea, that there can be no long-term stability in South Caucuses and neighbouring regions unsupported by two Armenian statehoods and their equal with other countries involvement in cross-border economic projects without any preconditions.

The analysis of the experience of such leading from information-technological point of view country as the USA, may allow Armenia to build its own system of informational influence through carrying out information operations. Here the principal of well-adjusted coordination of the structural, managing and operational components of informational influence is important.

В октябре 2003г. в США был принят «План действий по ведению информационных операций» (Information Operations Roadmap). В феврале 2006г. положения Плана действий были детализированы в «Объединённой доктрине информационных операций» – Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, JP 3-13), которая содержит в себе детальные рекомендации по обеспечению решения двенадцати основных задач:

In October 2003 the “Information Operations Roadmap” was passed in the US. In February 2006 the provisions of the roadmap were detailed in the “Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, JP 3-13”, which included the detailed recommendations on the solution of 12 main problems:

1) Formation of the general ideas about information operations;

2) Reconsideration and support of the ideas, connected with information operations;

3) Distribution of authorities;

4) Creation of the system of specialist training;

5) Provision of comprehensive and consolidated analytical support;

6) Elaboration of long-term comprehensive strategy of carrying out operations in computer networks;

7) Integration of the operations in the networks with general military system;

8) Elaboration of the strategy of the investments in the sphere of electronic warfare;

9) Improvement of the possibilities on implementation of psychological operations;

10) Functional division of psychological operations, public relations and public diplomacy;

11) Grounding of the necessity of carrying out operations on security protection and disinformation;

12) Enhancement of efficiency of the planning system, budget financing, programme elaboration and financing.

In the aforementioned roadmap the complex approach to the problem of information operations was fully reflected. That approach is based on the perceptions of information as a strategy resource, which is vital for the national security protection and military operations prosecution, which success equally depends both on the information they have and the functioning of the informational systems.

Among the abovementioned problems of complex efficiency of information operations implementation, the 4th and the10th problem need special consideration for the countries, which are just going to embark on the elaboration of their methods and practice of information operations, integration of appropriate structures to the general military and political structure and civil institutional schemes.

Alongside with such definite recommendations within the 4th problem as the participation of civilian specialists and the fast integration of informational operation learning programme to the system of military training, the roadmap also underlines that the training of specialists on information operations should take into consideration all the directions of the implementation of those operations because they are a complex of measures. It is also mentioned that till recently there had been no complex training and the specialists were prepared in narrow spheres (for example, in electronic warfare, psychological operations) and to some matters no attention had been paid (disinformation, security protection). Roadmap assigns a mission to train commanders, who are able to plan and control the implementation of full-fledged information operations.

As for the 10th problem the Roadmap recommends to coordinate the themes of reports and public speaking of the employees of the Ministry of Defense and the government of the US. It also specifies that any public appearances should be estimated with the respect to the correspondence to the interests and the objectives of the national security and policy5.

The working out of their own approaches to the solution of the problems of informational operations implementation may arouse difficult questions before the state bodies of Armenia. Here both close interagency work within the executive branch of government, which should be based on military and political structures, and wide-scale engaging of the civilian specialists are needed. It is also necessary to incorporate the corresponding experience of the leading informational and technological powers and, at the same time, to stay within the responsibilities on collective security undertaken on post-Soviet space. There are additional difficulties connected with the direct material and technical support amid the global economic recession. The most important is that any efforts and investments in that important for the national security of the country direction will have restraining, preventative and neutralizing influence on ongoing and probable threats and challenges to Armenia and the Armeniancy in the world.

1Тимофей Сайтарлы, Защита критической инфраструктуры – составная часть национальной безопасности и стабильности, //www.crime-research.ru, and Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH)): Elgin M. Brunner and Manuel Suter, International CIIP Handbook 2008/2009. An Inventory of 25 National and 7 International Critical Information Infrastructures Protection Policies. Zurich.

2Геворк Погосян, Инофрмационная безопасность требует профессионального подхода // Голос Армении, № 6 (19797), 27.01.2009.

3In 2005 Germany passed National Plan for the Protection of Information Infrastructures, NPSI, which is a common federal strategic document of the government of the country. The National plan strives to three strategic goals: the defense of the informational infrastructure, readiness to recover possible informational and technical failures; the strengthening of the potential in information security and setting of international standards. It is important to mention that the National plan is addresses both to the state structures in Germany and the civilian sector, business structures and citizens of the country.

4А. Костюхин, Г. Горбунов, А. Сажин, Информационные операции в планах командования ВС США // Зарубежное военное обозрение, 2007, № 5.

5In May 2005 a separate document of doctrinal character on the securing of the public informational support during the implementation of information operation was passed in the US (Public Affairs, JP 3-61). It is mentioned in the document that it is the guidance for the National Command authority of the US, which should be used during the public relation on national, international and other external levels


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