RUSSIA-TUKREY RELATIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE US AND UN

21.12.2010

RUSSIA-TUKREY RELATIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE US AND UN

Mikhail Aghajanyan

Recent stirring up of Russian leadership in the European direction of the foreign policy course cannot be considered in the exclusively positive vein for the relations between Russia and European countries. Preserving, and according to some Russian experts, even intensification of vigilance of the Europeans in regard to Russia is conditioned greatly by rather important for us side component of relations of Moscow with the Euro-Atlantic countries – i.e. development of Russian-Turkish relations.

In Europe and US the growth of the attention to the development of Russian-Turkish relations can be noticed due to various reasons, among which the following can be singled out:

- hyper-active behaviour of Ankara in the Middle East region and rather active actions of Russia not only on the post-Soviet territory but also in rather distant spaces (Central and Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Asia). The possibility of forming Russian-Turkish tandem on a wide range of interests alerts Europe and US, though the level of such an alertness is rather inhomogeneous (from the highest in Washington to mean level in such Euro-Atlantic centers as London and Paris and rather low level in Berlin)¹. May be, this is one of the evidences that for both Ankara and Moscow it is more convenient to work, as compared with other political centers, with Berlin on such regions as the Middle East, the Black Sea, Central Asia.

- the “provoking aggression” in the foreign policy course of Russia which the West faced in August 2008, was clearly manifested lately in the foreign policy course of Ankara (incident with “Peace Flotilla”).

- the state of affairs round the Iranian nuclear programme and the Middle East region in general which is outlined at current stage is the most undesirable for the Euro-Atlantic countries: Turkey takes a favourable stand in regard to Iran on the most sensible positions for Europe (anti-Israeli course, solidarity with Syria, support of the extremist Palestine groups)², and Russia with the concurrence of Turkey consolidates its influence in the Black Sea, Caspian and Central Asian regions, in the South Caucasus.

According to the assessments of the Russian experts, the latest meetings on the highest level between Russian and EU leaderships, as well as meetings with the top officials of Germany did not reduce the level of vigilance in Russia-EU relations (even in case with Germany they did not succeed in adding a qualitatively new level of close cooperation on the political level to the advanced Russian-German economic relations which is pressed for by Russia after rather cold reaction of Europe to the initiative on the European Security Treaty).

On May 31, 2010 in Rostov-on-Don within the framework of the Russia-EU summit an informal meeting of the president of Russia with the EU leadership was held, after which, on June 1, the official part of the event was held in the same place. At the meeting various aspects of cooperation between Russia and the EU were discussed as well as the urgent issues of international and regional agendas were concerned, in particular, measures on overcoming global financial crisis, issues of global and European security, Iranian nuclear programme, and the Middle East settlement.

Russian experts underline that the EU holds“1+1” format summits not with all countries which are situated outside its integration space. Only the US and China has the status of “special partners”. Forums with them are held regularly. To all appearances Russia is considered today as a status power, partnership with which demands special format. At the same time experts mention pointlessness of the current dialogue between Russia and the EU and the summit in Rostov-on-Don once more comes to prove that. At the end of the forum no progress was achieved on any of the key issues of the current Russian-European relations. Thus, during the consultations the parties did not restrict themselves to the process of preparation of the basic Agreement on partnership and cooperation. No substantial solutions were acquired in the sphere of easing visa system between Russia and the EU. The draft of the European Security Treaty which was submitted to Brussels on November 29, 2009 stayed in the shadow of the main agenda. The practical component of the bilateral meeting was reduced to issuance of the Joint statement of Russia-EU summit on “Partnership for Modernisation” but it also should be regarded just as a formal document. The agreement on the protection of secret information concluded between Russia and the EU on June 1, 2010 appeared to be a bit more substantial but it also could not change the character of the “pointless” meeting³.

The German-Russian memorandum concluded during the visit of the president of Russia to Germany (June 4-5, 2010) became a modest and indefinite success of Russia in foreign policy. Given memorandum can mostly be considered as a kind of concession of Moscow as it contains provisions of strengthening of the role of the EU in Transnistria issue without any softening of the EU position on the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the Memorandum reads that taking into consideration steps made, Russia and the EU will cooperate “aiming for tangible progress toward a solution of the Transnistria conflict within the existing 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, EU and US). The joint [EU-Russia] work could involve a common EU-Russia engagement to achieve a seamless transition from the present circumstances to a definitive situation”).

Russian experts mention that despite all the attempts of Moscow to optimize its course on the global arena, the West has no wish to be reckoned among Russian sympathizers. The stance of both the EU and US (which are among main Russian contractors) in regard to Russia remains restrained and cautious. And if in case with Washington Moscow still can point out some positive shifts (especially regarding issues of disarmament and political dialogue), the condition of the “European affairs” is still rather improper, The EU refuses elimination of visa system, there are no positive impulses in the issue of the EU supporting Russia’s WTO membership.

Recently coordinated approach of the US and the biggest EU countries to building their relations with Russia and Turkey can be observed. This approach is manifested in the following scheme. Some rectification of relations between the US and Russia is taking place against the background of decay in the relation between Russia and Europe, and as for Turkey, at current stage the opposite scheme is implemented – deterioration of American-Turkish relations against the background of some rectification of the relations between Ankara and European countries. In this regard two suppositions can be made: 1) the US plays critical role in non-admission any qualitative rapprochement between Moscow and Ankara; 2) a role of assistant is allotted to Europe, which on the one hand will expand for the US the field for maneuvering while implementing the aforementioned general scheme, and on the other hand, will reduce perception of those actions in Moscow and Ankara as “West’s conspiracy” against them.

The following facts can be noticed in the context of the deterioration of American-Turkish relations. At first, these are the principle contradictions between the US and Turkey on the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. Secondly, this can be supplemented by estrangement of the stances of Ankara and Washington on the perception of the processes in the Middle East in which Israeli factor is prominent.

While comparing some improvement of American-Russian relations and deterioration of the relations between the US and Turkey, the following model example can be brought: on May 2, 2010 new version of the US National Security Strategy was issued. In the Strategy little attention is paid to Turkey⁴, meanwhile there are rather solid references made to Russia. Thus, during the meeting at the Brooking Institute which took place on May 27, 2010 and in which the US State Secretary H. Clinton and the US National Security Advisor participated, they did not refer to the issue of Turkey, meanwhile the following theses in regard to Russia were presented: “deepening our engagement with key countries like Russia, China, India, and others gives us a better understanding”, “you have had a different history, you have a different experience, we see this as very threatening, let’s be as transparent and open in sharing our views and our information and determine what is a responsible way forward”⁵.

The evaluations of well-known American experts come to prove existence of some kind of policy of ignoring of Turkey by the US at the current stage. Thus, the expert on European security and Turkey in the RAND Corporation Stephen F. Larrabee mentioned on June 3, 2010 that “we have to recognize that when it comes to the Middle East, U.S. and Turkish interests only partially coincide”. “And on Iran, he believes the Turks will abstain in the Security Council on new sanctions, which will only further strain relations with the United States and Turkey's European allies”⁶.

Turkish experts also notice ignoring of Turkey. Thus, on May 10, 2010 an article by Yurter Ozscan, a participant of the Turkish Research Programme at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy was published in Turkish “Cumhuriyet” newspaper. It was mentioned in the article that several days before issuing new version of the US National Security Strategy, on April 21, 2010, the US National Security Advisor J. Jones held a lecture at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In particular, the author of the article mentioned that, turning to a wide range of issues concerning the national security of the US, J. Jones has not turned to the issue of the American-Turkish relations and to Turkey in general”⁷.

Taking into consideration all the aforementioned, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- a high level of competitiveness is preserved in the interrelations of the biggest actors in such regions as the Middle East, Black Sea, South Caucasus, Central Asia;

- within the framework of that competition the coordinated positions of the US and EU on deterrence of such actors as Russia and Turkey are outlined. The US follows more attentively the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations than their partners in Europe;

- at current stage Russia and Turkey are far from efficient coordination of their actions in the foreign policy sector on the terms of interconsistency which is promoted by unsolved issues and the long-term preserving contradictions between these two states,

¹Russian party already draws parallels between Russia-EU and Russia-Turkey relations. However, such parallels are still drawn in economic aspect but it is quite possible that time will come when comparisons will be made in political relations and those comparisons will not be favourable for the EU. Thus, on the eve of the Russian prime-minister’s visit to Turkey (June 8, 2010), D. Peskov, the spokesman of V. Putin, stated that “both economic and political relations are developed between Russia and Turkey and those relations are getting closer to the level of strategic partnership. Our relations are exemplary”. Then, reminding that the governments of two countries planned to bring the volume of economic cooperation to $100 billion annually, D. Peskov compared Russian-Turkish relations with Russia-EU relations: “This volume is huge. Today the volume of our cooperation with the EU is $200 billion. Per se, we move to the creation of a kind of economic alliance with Turkey”. (Наталья Гриб, Владимир Соловьев, Елизавета Кузнецова, Газета «Коммерсантъ», № 101, (4401), 08.06.2010).

²The assessments of western experts on the Iranian-Turkish rapprochement are becoming more categorical as for the threats to the interests of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. After the adoption of the UN resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran on June 9, 2010, the evaluations of the western experts contain following assessments: “Turkey's alliance with Iran is a threat to world peace”; “Ankara comes to realise that, so far as its policy with Iran is concerned, it is playing with fire”. (Con Coughlin, Turkey's Alliance with Iran is a Threat to World Peace, «Daily Telegraph», June 10, 2010).

³Е. Войко, Издержки беспредметности: внешняя политика с 31 мая по 6 июня 2010 года, Центр политической конъюнктуры России, http://www.ancentr.ru/modules/analitical_comments/mo_06062010.html, 06.06.2010.

⁴Turkey is concerned only once in the text of the Strategy when it is spoken about the readiness of the US to “continue to engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in its region”.

⁵Previewing the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy, A Conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Washington, The Brookings Institute, May 27, 2010.

⁶Managing a More Assertive Turkey, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), June 3, 2010.

⁷Yurter Ozcan, New U.S. National Security Strategy and Implications for Turkey Cumhuriyet, May 10, 2010, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1456.

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