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16.06.2011

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND KURDS

   

Artashes Ter-Harutyunyan

The Arab revolutions and developments conditioned by them sidelined a number of factors which have played an important role in the Middle East politics. However, the wave of revolutions in the Arab world seems to be on the decrease and the aforementioned factors make themselves felt.

The Kurdish issue is one of such issues and though in the international expert observations concerning the Middle East the topic of the Arab revolutions still prevails but there are already signs that that in the time to come the Kurdish issue will acquire a considerable place in the political developments in the Middle East. At the same time this issue acquires new meaning in a consequence of recent regional developments, in particular against the background of situation in Syria, Turkey and Iraq and the events expected there.

Instability in Syria

Though the Syrian authorities do everything to prevent the leakage of information about the events in the country, but the picture we have is enough to form an opinion about the situation there. E.g. Bashar al-Assad’s decision to draw in troops to suppress the disorders all over the country proves that police failed to handle the situation. In other words in the cities enveloped by the disturbances police has either been dismissed or it is close to that. On the other hand the decision of the government to involve heavy armoured units in suppression of disorders proves the seriousness of the situation. If all this is supplemented by information received over the last two months that the number of the deceased reaches several dozens every week, the picture seems to be clear.

But the significance of the developments in Syria gradually goes beyond the borders of the country and acquires the status of the factor of the Middle East politics. And here two circumstances are distinguished.

The first refers to the Syrian state, correspondingly to the viability of the borders of Syria. This issue has become especially topical after overthrowing of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neghbouring Iraq, when it turned out that the Iraqi state established in the 20th century has serious viability problems, and by its weakness and the lack of integrity it provides fertile ground for new redrawing of the borders in the Middle East. The same can be said about Syria. Only if in case with Iraq the collapse of the state formation was initiated in 2003 by the intrusion of the American troops, in case with Syria the current disturbances may become the beginning of such a process.

Developments in Syria, of course, are in the context of the revolutionary wave in the Arab world. And in this aspect the most probable scenario seems to be the weakening of the al-Assads’ regime and its overthrowing in the future. But the regime is not the point. The weakness of the system of the Syrian state which was established in 1946 within the borders of the former French colony (within the artificially drawn borders after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire), is proved by both many coups which took place there in 1946-1970 and authoritarian system which has been established there since 1970s. The fact is that today’s Syria has spent the 2/3 of its existence under the authoritarian regime of the al-Assads. Thus, the weakening and overthrowing of the regime will affect the state and in this aspect parallels can be drawn with neigbouring Iraq.

The second factor is the regions populated by the Kurds (about 2 million)1. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain (where the disturbances brought either to overthrowing of the regimes which had ruled for decades or seriously shook the ruling system) public disturbances in Syria may urge seriously the independence movement among Kurds (which is the main conclusion drawn by the American, British and Turkish experts dealing with the Syrian issue).

Though, there is scares information about exclusively Kurdish protest actions (and according to the available information the number of people who participated in those action is very restricted, i.e. about several hundred) against the background of the disturbances which has been continuing since the February, the executive order of the president for April 7th, according to which he granted a citizenship to about 300 thousand Kurds who were born and lived in Syria2 draws attention.

This step by al-Assad has been the most serious concession made by the official Damascus to the Kurds for recent decades3, which comes to prove that in Damascus they are concerned with the possible independence of the Kurds.

Ankara is also concerned by the situation in Syria and it should be supposed that this concern is also caused by the Kurdish issue or it is at least one of the main reasons.

Turkey and Kurds

On June 12 the parliamentary elections will be held in Turkey: the ruling Justice and Development party (JDP) intends not only to win the majority of places in the parliament but also to win constitutional majority.

Today it is the accepted opinion that the JDP has no serious political competitors on its way to this goal4, and the consequences of the global financial and economic crisis are overcome in Turkish economy.

The only problem for the JPD is the Kurdish issue and the rivals of the party try to take advantage of that.

Taking into consideration this circumstance, the Erdogan government has changed its approach to the Kurds and even initiated a dialogue with the leader of the KWP Abdullah Ocalan. In consequence an armistice was concluded between Ankara and KWP. The armistice played into the hands of the JDP as it provide opportunity to this political power headed by Erdogan to win votes in both regions populated by Kurds5 (as they promised that the issues worrying Kurds would be solved), and Turkish nationalists (as it was presented to the Turkish electorate that the Erdogan government managed to suppress “separatist” claims of the Kurds).

Meanwhile, the confrontation with the Kurds deprives the JDP of those two big segments of electorate (the Kurds will vote for the Kurdish candidate and the kemalists and nationalists will win even more votes thus speculating on the failed Kurdish policy of Erdogan).

The developments went on in accordance with the later variant, i.e. they were unfavourable for the JDP and on February 28 KWP stated about the unilateral termination of the armistice (as it has already been mentioned the JDP did not redeem the promises given to the Kurds).

At present there are no grounds for speaking about any kind of accord between the JDP and the Kurds. Even more, the responsibility for the attack on the column of the prime-minister Recep Tayip Erdogan was assumed by the KWP. If this is a truth, it proves that on the eve of the elections the Kurds try to expert pressure on the Erdogan government in order to force him to make concessions. Only time will show to what it will bring, but if till the elections the sides do not compromise the action, this may mean only one thing – after the elections the Kurdish issue will again come forward on the agenda of the domestic political life in Turkey, and in this context the developments in the neighbourng Syria and Iraq will be an additional headache for the Turks6.

Iraq after the withdrawal of the US troops

According to the preliminary agreement the American troops must leave Iraq till the end of this year. If Americans really withdraw from Iraq or reduce their military presence to the degree when they cannot seriously influence the domestic developments there, this new situation cannot but affect the Iraqi Kurdistan.

Today there are no military encounters between the central government in Baghdad and the authorities of the Iraqi Kurdistan (connected with the territorial disputes (over Kirkuk and other disputable areas), issues concerning the energy carriers (oil and gas fields in the Iraqi Kurdistan) and the authority in the sphere of security) only because of the presence of the American troops. And as for the prospects both parties have apprehensions and they are preparing for the worst scenario. This is clearly proved by the recent measures taken by the government of the Iraqi Kurdistan when in November 2010 and in February 2011 Kurdish military units, without the consent of the central government in Baghdad, located in Kirkuk and neigbouring areas.

Under such circumstances the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq most probably will bring to the furthers separation of the Iraqi Kurdistan from Baghdad as the absence of mechanisms of settling acute problems with the central government of Iraq (and the recent movements of the Kurdish units are the evidence of that) allows assuming that the Iraqi Kurdistan will lay stress rather on strengthening its own authority than coming to terms with Baghdad.

1 According to different international estimations there are about 2 million Kurds living in Syria, i.e. almost 10% of the whole population.

2 The issue of the rights of the Kurdish minority in Syria, which constitutes almost 2 million, has been on the political agenda for 2 decades. According to some estimates up to half a million Kurds have no citizenship in Syria.

3 This step was, of course, welcomed by the Kurdish leaders in Syria, but immediately statements were made that the Kurds will stop struggling for their rights. E.g. on the next day after the decision of Bashar al-Assad one of the Kurdish leaders – Habib Ibrahim, stated that his “people will continue its non-violent struggle for civil rights and democracy” and one of the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party Murad Garilan called al-Assad to take real measures to protect the rights of the Kurds in Syria, “otherwise the Kurdish rebel will be even stronger than the Arab one”.

4 Since 2003 as a result of a successive policy implemented by the JDP its two main rivals – the army and People’s Republican Party, have been weakened.

5 According to the recent data, 1 of four citizens of Turkey is an ethnic Kurd. I.e. In Turkey which population is 74 million, there are more than 18 million Kurds.

6 It is not a mere chance that against the background of the disturbances in Syria, the head the national intelligence of Turkey (MIT) Hakan Fidan visited Syria twice in April. After his second visit on April 28, the National Security Council of Turkey after the session which had lasted for 6 hours made a statement calling Syrian authorities to carry out reforms in the country and thus offered the assistance of Ankara in this issue.


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