
TURKEY AFTER THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
Artashes Ter-HarutyunyanOn September 12, the referendum on constitutional changes offered by the Justice and Development Party (JDP, Turk.; AKP) was held. Though two oppositional powers – Kemalist Republican People’s Party (RPP, Turk.: CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (NMP, Turk.: MHP) – with, sometimes evident support of the army leadership, were against those changes, the teammates of the prime-minister Erdogan managed to hold the referendum successfully and win the majority of the votes1.
It is clear that the changes offered by the JDP are the manifestation of a struggle which goes on between the political power which has been ruling in the country in recent years and Kemalists who had been ruling for decades and who are now in opposition. But the referendum which had such a result, in reality, must be compared with the parliamentary elections in 2002 when after the struggle, which had lasted for about a quarter of a century, the party with the Islamic orientation managed to come to power. Many observers adhere to the opinion that if parliamentary elections caused fundamental changes in the political field of Turkey, thus influencing the mechanisms of taking decisions and distribution of powers between the political and economic circles which had existed for decades, the results of this referendum may take those changes to more radical changes, thus turning a new page in the history of Turkey.
Constitutional changes
Back in the spring the JDP2 which holds a majority in the parliament submitted the package of constitutional changes. In order to pass the package through the legislative body and to sign it into law, it was necessary to win 2/3 of the votes of the members of the parliament, i.e. 367 votes. The JDP could not win those votes during the voting but 336 votes won were enough3 to submit the package for the referendum in 60 days after it had been signed by the president Abdulla Gul4.
The proposals on making changes in 26 articles of the constitution were submitted to a referendum. We will not cover all the changes here. We will single out those which are important in the aspect of domestic policy developments.
The most important change is that from now on if any political party is closed by the Constitutional court, the deputies from that party will continue to run their positions in the parliament till the end of the term of office, i.e. till new elections.
Those changes are very important achievement for the JDP because that power of the Constitutional court5 which is under the influence of Kemalists was a serious weapon in the hands of the political rivals of the JDP. Not long ago, in 2008, the JDP had already faced the threat of being closed (thus, losing its places in the parliament) when it offered to annihilate the prohibition to wear hijab. At that time the JDP managed to escape the threat of being closed by the Constitutional court, mainly because it renounced its intention to annihilate the hijab prohibition6. Here it should be mentioned that the JDP “father” parties were closed by the Constitutional court on a charge of threatening a secular nature of Turkey – in 1980 it was Milli Selamet Partisi, in 1998 – Refah Partisi and in 2001 – Fazilet Partisi.
Besides, according to the changed constitution the Constitutional court was enlarged – now instead of 11 members there are 17 and if previously the members of the Constitutional court were appointed by the president, in new Constitutional court president will appoint only 14 members and the other 3 will be elected by the parliament. From now on, the members of the Constitutional court will run 12 years term and after turning 65 they will have to resign. At the same time if in the past the consent of 3/5 of the members of the Constitutional court was necessary in order to close the party, now the consent of 2/3 is needed (i.e. it became more complicated).
It is clear that adding new members to the court will allow the JDP to extend its influence in the superior judicial body, because, as it is known the president of the country is a member of the JDP and in the parliament the party holds a majority.
The other constitutional change that extends the influence of the JDP concerns the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (SBJP, Turk.: HSYK). The important role of the Board in the judicial system of Turkey is conditioned by the fact that the later appoints and releases the judges of the courts which are above the courts of the first instance and prosecutors and controls the activity of the courts of the first instance. Before the constitutional changes the board had included the Minister of Justice (who is at the same time a head of the board), Deputy Minister of Justice, 3 members are appointed by the Supreme Court of Review (Turk.; Yargitay), and the other 3 by the Council of State (highest administrative court, Turk.: Danistay).
According to new constitutional changes, new members were added to the SBJP – instead of 7 members, now it consists of 21. Henceforth, 4 of 15 new members will be appointed by the president and other 11 will be elected by 13 thousand judges and prosecutors. Besides, the judges who were relieved by the SBJP from now on can appeal judicially such decisions.
Here, the benefits for the political power leaded by Erdogan is that unlike higher court, in lower degrees of jurisdiction which representatives are more numerous there are more adherents of the JDP or people who are more loyal to Muslim traditions. Correspondingly, the JDP may have serious hopes in the elections of 11 members of the SBJP.
The other important part of the constitutional changes carried out by the JDP concern militaries. Firstly, the regulations according to which it was prohibited to sue at law those militaries who carried out state coup in 1980 were annihilated7.
Secondly, the decisions by the Supreme Military Council (SMC, Turk.: YAS) concerning relieving the militaries of the armed forces of Turkey can be disputed judicially by those militaries. In past, such decisions by the SMC were terminal and this granted tangible advantage to the highest command staff to preserve its influence in the armed forces and, thus, to be more resolute in the domestic political life.
And finally, according to the constitutional changes the civil courts have a right to judge militaries. And military court cannot judge civilians any more except under the state of martial law.
It is obvious that this part of the constitutional changes initiated by the JDP is called to weaken their main rivals on the domestic political field, i.e. the military elite. The constitutional changes concerning the armed forces are, in fact, logical continuation of Ergenekon and Bayloz criminal cases, initiated correspondingly in 2007 and in January 2010, and which were directed against high-ranking militaries8.
Situational appraisal
The victory of the JDP in the referendum on September 12 grants rather serious mechanisms to the later in order to boost the process of increasing its weight and influence in the domestic life of Turkey.
The JDP will try to take advantage of those results at the parliamentary elections which will take place in summer 2011. In the opinion of many observers, it may grant Erdogan an opportunity to submit a new constitution which will finally bring the armed forces under the control of the government9.
On the other hand, the defeat of their rivals – army and Kemalists – in a referendum will make them give up on the leverages they have been using for decades. In this aspect it is probable that we will see new tactical steps taken by them in the domestic political field, and this will bring to the elaboration of new approaches on a number of issues, including traditional ones, in Turkish politics.
At the same time, it is not excluded, that from now on, taking into consideration the waiting attitude, the stance of the Kemalists and army in regard to the JDP will soften10.
1According to data presented by the Central Electoral Commission of Turkey 73.71% of the citizens who have a right to vote (at present their total number is 38.369.254) participated in a referendum. 57.88% voted for the changes and 42.12% voted against.
2Today 336 of 550 places in the Turkish parliament are occupied by the ruling JDP; oppositional RPP has 97 places, NMP has 69 palces, Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (PDP, Turk.: BDP) – 12 places, the rest of the places are distributed among other parties and independent deputies.
3In order to submit any issue for a referendum it is necessary to win at least 330 deputy votes.
4Gul signed the package on May 13, 2010.
5Usually, the higher court is under the influence of Kemalists.
6On February 7, 2008 Turkish parliament voted for the annihilation of the prohibition to wear hijab in state organizations, but on June 5, 2008 the Constitutional court repealed that decision and substantiated that it threatens the secular character of the state. It is remarkable that at that time alongside with the JDP, the Nationalist Movement Party which was considered to be a secular party also voted for the bill; it grounded such decision saying that was not the issue of the possible Islamization of Turkey but that was the issue of human rights and freedom.
7Present Turkish constitution was adopted in 1980 by the factual instigation of the militaries that carried out state coup in the same year.
8In both cases former and active highest command staff was blamed in arranging state coup in order to overthrow the JDP government. But unlike Ergenekon case, in case with Balyoz rather principle factor for Turkey was revealed. Within the frame of that criminal case active Turkish generals were also arrested which was considered by the observers as a premeditated step directed to create a precedent.
9Some western sources write that Erdogan’s purpose is to turn Turkey into a presidential republic with the help of new constitution and to be elected as a president and, thus, to continue managing the state.
10There is an opinion that the opponents of the JDP are holding hand and they will not act till Turkey faces another serious challenge, e.g. economic crisis, which will inevitably weaken the stance of the JDP on the domestic political field and will give an opportunity to the opposition to act.
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