• am
  • ru
  • en
print version
31.03.2008

NEW DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan

nuclear (medium)On March 3 the UN SC adopted the third resolution on the nuclear program of Iran which was the natural result of discussions held among the UN SC five members over settling Iran nuclear problems. Although the SC adopted document was more than even-tempered, it was foretelling a qualitatively new beginning in the developments of the Iran nuclear program and made a basis to impose tough sanctions.

The discussions held on the nuclear program in the UN SC in February were of great significance not only from the standpoint of carrying out the very nuclear program but also internal political developments. The parliamentary elections in Iran, which were over by May 14, have had clear-cut influence on Iran’s home and foreign policy of the last years.

The intergroup political struggle to take a distinguished place in the parliament with quite limited jurisdiction was conditioned by the fact that the parliamentary elections are held a year before presidential elections and in case the candidates running for presidency have a big number of supporters in the legislative body of the country, their success in presidential elections is guaranteed. Taking into consideration the fact that the developments over the nuclear issue are subject to lengthy discussions and evaluation in the Iranian society, both the UN SC adopted documents and the position of the Iranian political powers to the nuclear problem became important factors to exert influence on the election campaign.

The report of the IAEA director general M. ElBaradei and Iran’s response

The report given by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency M.ElBaradei on February 22, devoted to the Iran nuclear program and consisting of 58 articles, made a basis for the UN SC resolution adoption on March 3. In the report there wasn’t any information about Iran nuclear weapon program but it was mentioned that the official Teheran didn’t follow claims laid by the UN SC, to stop uranium enrichment, on the contrary, it has began a centrifuge program of new generation directed to uranium enrichment. Although the report was criticizing the nuclear researches of Iran, however, during the electoral campaign the conservative political powers of Iran presented it as “Iran’s victory”. Moreover, the spiritual leader of Iran, A. Khamenei, announced that the report of ElBaradei was just “closing of Iran’s nuclear file.” Suchlike announcements were voiced both by the foreign ministry of Iran and the Iranian delegation working in IAEA. It is obvious that the Iranian authorities had clear-cut idea that after the report of the IAEA director general the “nuclear file” of Iran would not only remain open but also become the UN SC subject of discussions with all the consequences to follow. From this standpoint the “optimism” of the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran should be considered as an attempt of suspending the usage of the nuclear card in the election campaign. The government’s not favorable economic and social policy of the past years has deepened dissatisfaction of the society. However, the present authority of the country is not only the president M. Ahmadinejad, but also the union of political powers called “conservative.”

Perhaps “optimistic” estimations of the report of IAEA director general were just an attempt to justify the efficiency of the though political line adopted not only by M. Ahmadinejad but more by the “conservatives.” As to so called “reformers,” than although they have never declined the necessity of developing the nuclear program but always appeared with announcements worrying against negative after effects caused by the tough policy. The UN SC resolution and the sanctions which still haven’t had mach influence on Iran’s economic and social system are the manifestations of the negative consequences. Although during the parliamentary elections at the opening of the year not much was spoken about possible victory of “reformers,” however, their position quite strengthened in February. According to the preliminary results of parliamentary elections issued on March 16, the “reformers” get 30% of the seats in Mejlis, which is quite a good result.

The UN SC resolution

The natural subsequence of the IAEA director general became the resolution adopted on March 3 by the UN SC. The document adopted as a result of discussions led among the SC permanent members serious sanctions were applied against Iran. Let’s mention a few of them:

  1. Exit of some Iranians into the territory of the UN member states is prohibited. Among them are scientists, heads of large-scale enterprises and companies.
  2. It is required from the UN member states to control all the financial deals with the Iranian banks and financial organizations. It first of all refers to quite distinguished “Melli” and “Saderat” banks.
  3. All the goods and loads exported into and out of Iran (transported by the airplanes and ships of such well known companies as “Iran Air Cargo” and “Iran Shipping Line”).

The resolution claims Iran to stop uranium enrichment and construction works of a reactor with heavy water within a day and within 90 days present a report to the IAEA director general if the Islamic Republic of Iran has met the UN SC demands.

Let’s mention one more fact. By the time the discussion of the resolution relating to Iran was in the final stage, M. Ahmadinejad made a visit to Iraq. After the Islamic revolution this was the first visit of Iran’s leader to Iraq. However, it is also worth mentioning that Iran’s leader, who visited Iraq at the eve of the resolution’s adoption, brought torrent of accusations against the US and in Bagdad controlled by the American troops called Washington a criminal and usurper. There was quite a justified impression that the president of Iran was stirring up passions in spite of the fact that Iranian-American negotiations make a certain basis in the very Bagdad to improve relations between the two countries. According to the well known analyst K. Katsman, the new “oral attacks against the US are for mere internal Iranian “circulation” and aim at solving the most important task of M. Ahmadinejad: in 2009 to be reelected a president.”

The adoption of the UN SC resolution itself did not become a subject of so lengthy discussions. It is explained by the fact that the very day the resolution was adopted the Iran’s Guardian Council reviewed its former decision and quite unexpectedly included the 300 “reformer” politicians, who were not allowed to take part in parliamentary elections one and a half months ago, into the list of candidates running for parliamentary elections. This was probably a step directed both to diverting social attention from undesirable outward developments and as a “cost” for not using the nuclear card of reformers in the internal political life.

On the very March 3 the former head of Iran’s Atomic Organization G. Amrollahi, who was repeatedly announcing that tough position will not lead to anything good, quite unexpectedly withdrew his candidacy from the parliamentary elections.

However, one should mention that the UN SC adopted resolution on the Iranian nuclear program is an event of not little importance both by its content and the expected influence on internal political life of Iran. After the resolution had been adopted the Iranian authorities announced that they will not stop Uranium enrichment work which has come to prove that in June Iran’s nuclear program will again appear in the UN SC, which will quite probably apply new sanctions.


Return
Another materials of author