• am
  • ru
  • en
print version
25.04.2013

KARS-AKHLKALAKI-TBILISI RAILWAY AND ITS REGIONAL PROSPECTS

EnglishРуский

   

Sevak Sarukhanyan
Deputy Director of “Noravank” Foundation;
Ph.D. in Political Studies

The authorities of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey plan to complete building of Kars-Akhlkalaki-Tbilisi railway by the end of 2013 and this new transportion hub will be put into commission on January 1, 2014.

The project received a negative evaluation on behalf of the Armenian analytical community from the very first day, which was substantiated by several points of view:

  1. The implementation of the project has political subtext and it is directed to the strengthening of the blockade of the Republic of Armenia.
  2. Building and even construction works of the railway may bring to the emerging of the Turkish and Azerbaijani communities in Javakhk. It is supposed that Azerbaijanis and Turks will be involved in the building of the railway and they may take their chance and settle in Javakhk.
  3. The project may suspend opening of the Armenian-Turkish border because one of its main economic components should be Kars-Gyumri railway.

All the forecasts made in these directions for recent 3-4 years either have not proved true or proved true only partially.

In reality Kars-Akhlkalaki-Tbilisi railway has never deepened the isolation of Armenia because it is built for the solution of one primary economic problem – to develop Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey freight traffic and commodity turnover infrastructure in which Armenia has never been involved. In this aspect there is absolutely no difference for Yerevan how the freight traffic from Azerbaijan to Turkey and vice-versa will be arranged. The railway does not deprive Armenia of any transportation significance as it connects the economies and countries which cooperation is implemented without Armenia’s participation.

Though building of the railway is mainly financed by Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijanis are involved in the project on the professional level. Building works on the territory of Javakhk is carried out by the Georgians and most of the workers are Georgians, so there is no penetration of the Turks and Azerbaijanis to Javakhk.

As for the influence of the project on the prospect of rectification of Armenia-Turkey relations, cause-and-effect approaches are confused here. Kars-Gyumri railway has never been considered a main cause which could or can make Armenian or Turkish parties make concessions in political issues and give an economic substantiation to impendence of opening of the border and rectification of the relations. It is obvious that the issue of settlement of the Armenian-Turkish problems is first of all in political plane and that is why it cannot be settled on the assumption of economic expediency. Eventually, Kars-Akhlkalaki railway is not of great significance because commodity turnover with Armenia is not of that big financial and economic importance for Turkey. An finally, putting into service Kars-Akhlkalaki railway does not imply disappearance or abolishment of Kars-Gyumri railway which in its turn cannot prevent Yerevan and Ankara from using it after the rectification of the relations, meanwhile such prospect seems to be impossible taking into consideration Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric and preconditions they put forward.

At the same time it should be underlined that Kars-Akhlkalaki-Tbilisi railway, most probably, may play rather important regional role. First of all it is referred to the creation of a new transportation hub between Central Asia and Europe. By connecting Turkish railways with Baku, this railway, in fact, may create a good opportunity for the Central Asian countries for gaining access to the international market: the opportunity which would allow the Central Asian countries to avoid a necessity of going through the Russian territory and using Russian railways.

Hence, this is only theoretical, or rather technical opportunity, which practical use can face a number of serious challenges depending on the political and economic developments in Central Asia. What is meant here is first of all a composition of the economies of the Central Asian countries which are based on the export of oil and gas. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are the biggest economies in the Central Asia, have only one item of export – hydrocarbons. First of all it is oil, and the second is natural gas. In both of this directions Turkey-Azerbaijan railway hub can be of no significance, because there are several active facilities for exporting Kazakh oil – firstly these are the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Atasu-Alashanku (Kazakhstan-China) oil pipelines. However it the future Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline may appear among these pipelines and it, taking into consideration reduction of the oil production in Azerbaijan, may serve mainly for the export of Kazakh oil. As for gas, the railway cannot serve for the gas export.

But even if we assume that potential of the industrial production will grow in Kazakhstan, which can come true in case of implementation of N.Nazarbayev’s economic development strategy, it does not mean that production of the Kazakh industry will be exported by means of Azerbaijan-Turkey railway. It has several main reasons from two can be distinguished:

1. The Kazakh economy is gradually getting more connected with China – in 2012 the commodity turnover between two countries went beyond $20 billion and implementation of new industrial projects will make the markets and economies of these two countries even closer.

2. Kazakhstan is a member of Customs Union and together with Russia and Belarus it eagerly works over the project of creation of the Eurasian Union. Both Customs Union and Eurasian Union make transportation through the Russian territory easier, which questions the feasibility of using South Caucasus railways.

All these problems should also be supplemented by the influence of the regional instability on the efficiency and attractiveness of the transport projects. The railway going through Russian geographically does not cut any confrontation areas and the same cannot be said about the South Caucasus – Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation, South Ossetia and Abkhazia problems, Kurdish factor in Turkey, growing contradictions and conflicts in the Middle East.

Thus, to the best of our belief, Kars-Akhlkalaki-Tbilisi railway cannot seriously affect the security of the Republic of Armenia. Even more, it can have somehow positive influence on the social and economic life in Akhlkalaki, taking into consideration the fact that Akhlkalaki can become Georgia’s most important railway and logistical hub.

“Globus” analytical journal, #4, 2013

Return
Another materials of author