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02.05.2013

NAGORNO-KARABAKH: CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO THE PROSPECTS OF THE CONFLICT SETTLEMENT

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Sergei Minasyan
Ph.D. in History, Head of the Department of the Political Studies at the Caucasus Institute

As it is known, today the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not fully involved in the negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. The stance of Stepanakert is presented in the international arena by Armenia which states that at this stage it abstains from the recognition of the NKR. Armenia considers the fact of non-recognition on its behalf as a compromise directed to non-admission of escalation of the conflict and preserving of the negotiation process.

At the same time it should be underlined that both co-chairmen and official Yerevan constantly state that Stepanakert will join the negotiations when it is time for it. In fact, point at issue is that in case if the guiding principles of the conflict settlement are accepted and the negotiation process obtains real shapes, realization of long-term peace will be impossible without involvement in the process of Nagorno-Karabakh – the main party to the conflict. Currently, when Armenia and Azerbaijan with the help of the mediators simply sound out each other’s positions, probably, Stepanakert does not have serious reasons of being involved in this process and undertaking additional obligations.

Correspondingly, Nagorno-Karabakh is currently in the position of the external observer of the conflict settlement process in which his fate is decided and in which he paradoxically (as the main interested party to the conflict) is not involved. At the same time, not being a full-fledged negotiating party, official Stepanakert has elaborated rather multi-level, but at the same time rather harmonious and logical approaches to the essence and possible goals of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.

The stance of Nagorno-Karabakh, first of all, is based on its idea of legitimacy and consistency of its struggle for independence by the analogy with many cases from world practice such as Kosovo, North Cyprus, Eritrea, East Timor, South Sudan, etc. At the same time in Karabakh they insist on not applying the principle of inviolability of borders, because here we speak about the borders set by the arbitrary rule of Stalin and which are the relics of the Soviet regime. In the opinion of the people of Karabakh two other principles of international law are decisive – the right of the nations to self-determination and non-use of force in resolution of the international controversies and conflicts.

The Karabakh elite says that there is no example in the history when the nation which won the war for independence and which have been successfully building its statehood for two decades, voluntarily renounced from its achievements. Correspondingly the negotiations on the settlement of the conflict must be held with the participation of official Stepanakert, because the accords reached without its agreement cannot be carried out anyway. That is the reason why the NKR insists on recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s right on participation in the negotiation process. Stirring up of the problem of the unrecognized or de-facto states in the world politics for recent two decades have caused the crisis of international law system and granted unrecognized countries an opportunity to reason their stance in the legal terrain.

From the point of view of traditional international law the issue of unrecognized states has essential aspect which is inseparable from the historical context. Primarily, the states are the subjects of the international law but big historical events, which cause creation of “new” states and ruin of “old” ones, are occurring outside the legal terrain and are external in regard of them. That is why many specialists on international law suppose that historical events give birth to new legal order. The classic of the world political science Raymond Aron believed that due to the reason that the birth and collapse of the states was not a metalegal (transitional-legal) process and recognition of the state on behalf of the others was rather political than a legal act or it at least did not form the elements of law, so the “legal existence of a new state depends rather on objective fulfillment of some conditions prescribed by international law to the state than on its recognition by other states”.

Trying to convince international community that the NKR has all the main attributes of the state, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh also pay attention to the formation of the government institutions in the NKR based on the free democratic elections which differ from the domestic political reality existing in the neighboring Azerbaijan.

As for the diplomatic efforts and negotiation process, the reality formed in the result of the negotiations, which have lasted for recent 20 years, is that any option of returning Karabakh to Azerbaijan is not even discussed. In case of any of the options of peaceful settlement of the conflict discussed today (whether these are Madrid principles or other proposals made by the mediators) Azerbaijan theoretically can count on reclaiming of some territories but it have to agree that Nagorno-Karabakh, at least within the administrative borders of the Soviet period and with the ground corridor connecting it with Armenia, will never be returned under its jurisdiction. This is the content of the proposals placed on the OSCE Minsk Group table. The key element of the Madrid Principles is the referendum which plays a role of the mechanism of international political and legal legitimization of separation of Karabakh from Azerbaijan.

From the point of view of Nagorno-Karabakh Kosovo precedent and recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia had good effect on its positions. And this is not only in the aspect of drawing possible parallels with Karabakh in legal and political plains but also in the aspect of an increased legitimacy of creation of new states in the perception of the international community and leading powers.

At the same time most part of the public and political elites in Armenia and Karabakh consider that the existence of de-facto independent Nagorno-Karabakh Republic strengthens positions of the Armenian parties, especially taking into consideration the world tendency of sovereignization of some unrecognized states and the so-called “Kosovo precedent”. In their opinion every day of in fact independent existence of Nagorno-Karabakh only strengthen the sovereignty and inevitability of a state building process.

The fact that the officials in Azerbaijan constantly tend to speed up the Karabakh process and blame Armenia of slowing it down, most vividly illustrates on whose side the time is in the Karabakh conflict. In fact, a syndrome of “sand-glass” begins to appear in Azerbaijan when every additional day of Karabakh loss strengthens the filling of its permanent loss among the leadership of Azerbaijan. This feeling is redoubled by almost everyday but ineffective bellicose statements which only worsen pessimistic mood of the Azerbaijani society in the issue of reclaiming Karabakh “by any means”.

In the context of negotiations the key issue for Nagorno-Karabakh is the guarantee of security of its population. Against the background of combat actions of the first half of the 1990s and constant threat sounded by Baku, before making compromises to Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Republic wants to have real guarantees of security, which will be more efficient (or at least equal) to the ones it has today. Current guarantees of security of Karabakh are fortified and convenient for defense borders, availability of transport corridor connecting Karabakh and Armenia as well as buffering zone around the administrative borders of the Soviet period Karabakh. And the line of contact between the Karabakh and Azerbaijani armies is restricted by the Mrav range in the north and Iranian border in the south. Thus the front line is shortened several times, which allows Karabakh army to easier resist to bigger Azerbaijani army.

The key element in the stance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in regard to the negotiation process is based on the fact that withdrawal of Karabakh army units at least from one region along the perimeter of Nagorno-Karabakh borders will weaken the defense line and, in the absence of final peace agreement, will increase a possibility of resumption of combat actions, thus enhancing temptation of Azerbaijan to have a military revanche on more favourable terms. Today the fortified border line is the best guarantee of non-resumption of combat actions.

Meanwhile, only recognition of independence of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (or similar status) by Baku with political and legal mechanism of achieving it, prescribed in advance (e.g. by means of additional plebiscite under the supervision of international mediators and further recognition by international community and Azerbaijan), is considered equal substitution to the current guarantees.

Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh has been tending recently to go beyond international isolation and take part in the regional projects. In fact, isolation of Karabakh from international community only moves away the prospect of reconciliation with Azerbaijan, thus forming among the people of Karabakh the syndrome of “besieged fortress” and unpreparedness for the compromise, which will be getting even deeper in the future.

Threats of official Baku to use force against civilian planes in case of opening of a new airport in Stepanakert, much talked-of incidents with Ramil Safarov and Aikram Airisli enroot in the Karabakh society and political elite of the NKR doubts concerning the possibility of compromises with Azerbaijan at current stage of development of the conflict.


“Globus” analytical journal, #4, 2013

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