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14.02.2011

POSSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: MYTHS AND REALITIES

   

Sergei Minasyan

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the only ethno-political conflict on the post-Soviet space where the stability and relative armistice on the frontline after the cease-fire has been preserved without any external assistance and peace-keeping contingents of the third parties or international organizations. At the same time in the political discourse of the conflicting parties, especially in the “opposition – authorities” format, there is a widespread opinion that the world community is allegedly very interested in the fast resolution of the conflict and can “make” parties settle the conflict by its “recipe” imposed from without. Despite unrealistic character of such a development under the preserved status-quo (which was accepted by the world community to a large degree), this mostly conspiracy discourse has a wide spread occurrence even if the whole dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict comes to prove the opposite.

While considering the possibilities of the external settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and realization of international peace-keeping, it is necessary to take into consideration the whole complicacy of such a scenario due to the divergence of the opinions on regional processes in the South Caucasus, and at the same time, due to the low topicality of the issue for the actors of the global politics. There is a distinct asymmetry between readiness of the influential actors to oppose peace-keeping initiatives of other mediators and, at the same time, their low interest in initiation, support or imposing external settlement contrary to the stance of the parties to the conflict. The technical difficulties for the external settlement and deployment of peace-keeping operation in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a tool for implementation of the international peace enforcement should also be taken into consideration.

At the same time difficulty of implementation and slim possibility of external settlement by the actors of international politics are relevant only in case of analysis of the current “neither war, nor peace” situation and relevant armistice preserved in the zone of conflict. But one cannot exclude the scenario when the international community will have to initiate peace-keeping operation directly in case of resumption of the hostilities in the conflict zone by one of the parties. Under such circumstances the reaction of the international community (if it considers situation dangerous for the regional security or capable to cause hard humanitarian consequences) may be rather tough and take a shape of “classical” peace enforcement, despite all the technical, institutional restrictions and insufficient urgency of the region. Both the coalition actions of the international forces under the aegis of the US (in 1991 in Kuwait) or NATO (in 1999 in Kosovo) and one-sided steps by separate influential actors of the global politics (involvement of Russia in August 2008 in the hostilities in South Ossetia) may serve as an analogy.

In principle, carrying out international operation on peace enforcement in case of outbreak of hostilities by one of the sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or abrupt worsening of the condition of the population on those territories (humanitarian disaster) hypothetically is possible under the aegis of the UN, OSCE, EU, NATO or CSTO.

The UN is not directly involved in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. But after the end of the Cold War the UN supported carrying out a number of operations on peace enforcement in the internal conflicts, very often being on the side the unrecognized party. However, carrying out peace-keeping operation under the aegis of the UN in this region seems hardly probable, because here the interests of Russia – one of the main permanent members of the UN Security Council – as well as the US and France – its partners in mediation attempts, which has the same status – are represented. Besides, even with all the success achieved and significant stabilizing role it plays in the world politics, the peace-keeping efforts of the UN do not always have possibility to provide comprehensive scope of the peace-keeping activity on a global basis. Moreover, there are many examples of unsuccessful or even disastrous results of the peace-keeping activity of the UN in different conflicting regions. That is why, for several recent decades steady tendency to an unconstrained shift of peace-keeping functions by the UN onto the regional organizations, military and political blocks and international coalitions can be observed, despite general increase of the range of the peace-keeping activity and number of “blue helmets”.

It seems that only the OSCE can be the regional organization which is capable to arrange peace-keeping operation in the zone of Karabakh conflict and to play a role of an international “peace enforcement” mechanism, especially, if we take into consideration that the whole negotiation process is proceeding through the instrumentality and within the framework of the OSCE Minsk group. But it should be taken into consideration a priori that the specifics of creation and functioning of the OSCE hampers peace-keeping functions of that organization in judicial, political and practical aspects, though for two recent decades the OSCE (before 1992 CSCE) has been involved in the settlement and post-conflict restoration of many hostilities within the zone of its responsibility. All the responsibilities of the OSCE member-countries are not of judicial but of politically binding character; there is no distinct mechanism of the implementation of the decisions in regard to the member-countries within the structure of the OSCE. Consensus principle of the decision making in the OSCE impedes that decision making process in case it is necessary to react efficiently and to deploy the peace-keeping operation.

The OSCE lays stress rather on the political and humanitarian than military component. The organization has no experience and there is no example of implemented peace-keeping or peace enforcement operations to be brought. The only attempt to implement peace-keeping operation by the OSCE (which had had absolutely no result and was over without even being started) was made in 1994 in the zone of Karabakh conflict1. All the unsuccessful attempts by the OSCE to deploy peace-keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, demonstrated the scanty resources and absence of necessary experience of that organization in the implementation of “classical” complex peace-keeping operations which go beyond the format of simple monitoring, preventative measures or observation missions.

This is also evidently demonstrated by the statements of the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk group. E.g., the former co-chairman of the OSCE MG Mathew Bryza mentioned in one of his statements at the beginning of August 2009 (during the meeting with the Armenian youth organizations in Tsakhkadzor) that possible peace-keeping forces in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would probably carry out only supervisory functions. According to him, co-chairmen proposed that those peace-keeping forces would not be armed and would perform only observation functions and would not be able to enforce peace... He also told that their experience in Kosovo and Bosnia came to prove that peace-keeping forces were not able to stop hostilities if any of the parties did not want it2. It is obvious that the format of the mission of non-armed observers instead of a full-fledged peace-keeping operation with the full separation of the conflicting parties, seriously restricts the possibilities of the international community to react properly, in case of non-fulfillment of the agreements by one of the sides (in this case by Azerbaijan) or in case Baku takes a decision to resume hostilities in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,

The European Union already has an experience of carrying out quasi-peace-keeping operations, or it would be better to say the experience of operational response in the restricted format, in the region of the South Caucasus (the mission of the European observes in the zones of conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia which was deployed in accord with “Medvedev – Sarkozy Agreements” concluded in August-September 2008). At the same time normative legal documents and conceptual directives of the EU do not cover the participation of the organization in the operations on peace enforcement or any other peace-keeping operation of high-intensity, as well as this organization has no practical mechanisms to carry out such kind of missions. The existing peace-keeping potential of the EU consists of response forces (reinforced battalion tactical groups) and civilian anti-crisis structures. Despite the declared global character of its anti-crisis activity, the EU has to restrict the geographic borders of its missions, paying attention to the European region and territories round its perimeter, thus singling out the Balkans, Mediterranean region and Africa (special interest to Africa is conditioned by the aspiration of the EU not to allow further humanitarian disaster on the continent which may cause the loss of control and growth of the number of migrants to Europe) 3. The towing continuation of “Eastern Partnership” and other programmes of the European Union on the cooperation with the countries of the South Caucasus at this moment does not allow considering the EU as the organization which wants and possesses necessary institutional and power resources for realization of the international peace-keeping operation or peace enforcement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Participation of NATO in the peace-keeping operation in the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could have had definite chances for success, taking into consideration the highly similar precedent in Kosovo and the role of the North Atlantic Alliance in peace enforcement and post-conflict restoration on the Balkans. But taking into consideration the participation of both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the NATO programmes and their interest in continuing that cooperation, any possible interference of NATO will be of non-military character: consultative political mechanisms and modernization of the armed forces of both of the parties, carrying out joint maneuvers and etc4. And finally, opposition of Russia and Iran to any active involvement of NATO in the region (especially it concerns the deployment of the peace-keepers and the structures of the Alliance) makes this option at this moment practically unreal.

Participation of the CSTO member countries in the implementation of the peace-keeping operation is also possible only hypothetically. The CSTO has no serious power, institutional and other resources for implementation of the peace-keeping operation in the zone of its responsibility. Forming of the Collective forces of the first response and peace-keeping contingents of the CSTO is in the early stage and it can hardly be finished in the near future. One-sided involvement and implementation of the peace-keeping operation by the CSTO in the zone of the Karabakh conflict (even when it not known whether the member-countries would want it or not) will cause opposition of all other external actors. And finally, the fact that Armenia is a member of the CSTO makes Azerbaijani perception of the peace-keeping operation under the aegis of that organization as objective and unbiased one impossible.

Thus, there is an impression that the possibilities of imposing external settlement and peace enforcement in the zone of Karabakh conflict seem rather doubtful. Global community does not interfere into all the conflicts which need to be solved. In many cases this is conditioned by the availability or absence of political pressure by leading world and regional powers which have interests in the zone of the conflict and which are ready to provide military contingents and head the operation. This is also conditioned by the prospects and reality of “settlement” of the conflict in short terms. At the same time, “strangely” among few successful examples of implementation of the peace-keeping operation are those which took place at the periphery of the world politics, in rather distant geographic regions where geopolitical or geo-economic interests of leading global actors and powers are not intercrossed.

As the world peace-keeping practice comes to prove, in case one of the sides (or all the parties to the conflict) refuses following the agreements, or if there are uncontrollable political and militarized groups inside the parties and etc, the capabilities of the world community to response fast are rather limited. From taking the decision by the UN Security Council or any other regional or international organization concerning the implementation of the peace-keeping operation to its real implementation many obstacles should be overcome, and sometimes the peace-keepers arrive upon the spot when it is late. As recently American co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk group Robert Bradtke has confessed it is impossible to deliver large peace-keeping forces to the zone of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict immediately5. For all those years of implementation of the peace-keeping operations, there have been examples of really disastrous failures which brought to resumption of military conflicts and new outbreaks of violence and the international community was not able to stop them.

It is obvious that the most efficient examples of justice restoration, peace enforcement or stopping bloodshed were not those implemented by the “blue helmets” under the direct mandate of the UN and regional organizations but the results of one-sided actions of great powers, coalitions of some states and military political blocks. It is also natural that such one-sided actions are usually politically biased; they cannot be taken as objective by all the parties to the conflict and world community, and cannot be considered as the examples of compromise and successful one-sided peace enforcement.

1The solution purposed the phase-by-phase sending of at first 200, then 400 and after that 600 military observers to Karabakh in order to separate conflicting parties. High-level Planning Group (HLPG), which had to undertake practical organization of the peace-keeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, was formed. But the operation was not carried out in the 90s due to various reasons. From time to time HLPG visited the zone of conflict and in 2003 the chairman of the OSCE issued a special directive about that. But no further step was taken, as there were no political preconditions for deployment of peace-keeping operation. The only measure on working out trust and carrying out monitoring which was realized in the zone of Karabakh conflict in the mid 90s was the personal initiative of the OSCE chairman on creation structure headed by envoy A. Kasprzyk and groups of military observers for monitoring the cease-fire regime. The new stage of negotiations with the conflicting parties has been activated since 2005 after the elaboration of another package of peaceful settlement by the Minsk group. According to the information leaked to the press, possible format of the peace-keeping operation in the zone of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict supposed separation of the parties by a buffer zone, deployment of the contingent of international peace-keepers and demilitarization of the conflict.

2«Нагорный Карабах: Миротворческие силы в зоне карабахского конфликта будут выполнять наблюдательные функции», http://www.newsarmenia.ru, 07.08.2009.

3Благовещенский А., Рышковский В., Операции и миссии Европейского Союза, Зарубежное военное обозрение, №7, 2008, сс.13-18.

4Олевский В., Деятельность НАТО по обеспечению европейской безопасности, Зарубежное военное обозрение, №5, 2010, сс. 3-10.

5«В зону карабахского конфликта невозможно немедленно доставить большие силы миротворцев: Роберт Брадтке», http://www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/armenia/1325655.html, 15.09.2010.

“Globus Energy and Regional Security”, issue 1, 2011
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