MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS

04.06.2010

MILITARY AND POLITICAL RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS

Sergey Sargsyan

00 expert.ru.jpg (original) The judicial and legal issues regarding the state border and navigation in the Caspian Sea before the collapse of the USSR were solved in terms of two documents – the 1921 treaty between the Soviet Russia and Persia and the 1940 Treaty of the Trade and Navigation between the USSR and Iran.

The appearance of the new independent countries surrounding the Caspian Sea denounced those treaties and they were replaced by bilateral treaties between Azerbaijan, Russia and Kazakhstan which at least concern the North Caspian.

At the same time the absence of the necessary consensus on the statusing and the division of the sea leaves the question of the international borders in its central and south sectors open.

Russia and Kazakhstan are for the division of the Caspian ground and its resources but for leaving the Caspian water area in general use and setting the fishing quota for all the coastal countries.

Turkmenistan adhere the similar stance, i.e. it offers to apportion energy and fishing resources to each country of the region but leave the central sector in general use.

Azerbaijan offers to extend the norms of the international law of the sea to the Caspian Sea, i.e. to set definitely the state belonging both of the ground and of the water area.

The stance of Iran is the toughest: the Caspian Sea should be divided “by right”, by allotting to each country 20%; in case the water area is left in a general use each country should have the equal share in oil and fishing resources development.

Besides, Iran stick to the programme of “Four “against”:

- against the pipelining at the sea ground;

- against transcaspian supply of the Kazakh oil to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) – on the assumption of the fears for the ecology of the sea;

- against the presence of the foreign military bases in the Caspian region.

By their stances on the status of the Caspian Sea and state sea borders the parties battle for their interests, firstly in the oil and gas sphere.

Table 1. The gas and oil resources allocation in the Caspian Sea by the countries in case of different variants of its division¹

Notes to the table

A – the division by the midline at a depth of 26 meters.

B – the division by the midline at a depth of 28 meters.

C - the division by the midline at a depth of 28 meters, Russian-Kazakh sector goes fifty-fifty.

D - the division by the midline at a depth of 28 meters, Russian-Kazakh sector is divided on Kazakhstan’s terms.

E – the division by “pragmatic” line (taking into consideration the allocated and/or produced fields).

F – 10 miles zone of the national jurisdiction, the equal access to the rest of the resources.

The stirring up of the economical activity (firstly on gas and oil production and their transition) sooner or later should have brought to the conflict of the interests between the Caspian countries.

Particularly, till now the issue of belonging of “Osman” and “Khazar” (“Chirag” and “Azeri” in Azerbaijani variants) fields, where the oil is produced within the framework of the so-called “Century project”, has not been settled, just like “Altin Asir” field (“Sharg” in Azerbaijani variant). Ashgabat many times stated that they had been ceased by Azerbaijan and it would carry its point by all the available means.

Amid those insignificant incidents and misunderstandings the exclusion of Azerbaijani research ships “Geophisic” and “Alif Gadjiev” exploring for oil in the interests of British Petroleum from the disputed territory (near “Alov” platform) by the Iranian Navy ships in June 2001 is well known.

The impossibility of compromise on the issues of borders definition on the Caspian Sea and contradictions between the countries of the region on belonging of the disputed oil and gas fields caused the attempt to obtain the needed result through strengthening of their armed forces, first of all their navies.

During the collapse of the USSR the authorities of independent Azerbaijan rigorously put forward the matter of the Caspian flotilla division which took place in spring-summer 1992 (according to the April 16, 1992 Protocol). Azerbaijan got 25% of vessels of the flotilla (17 combatant ships and boats most of which had been of no combat value) and the entire infrastructure at the territory of the country.

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan relinquished their share in the division of the flotilla in a compulsory but made to appear as voluntary way. In 1993-1997 Kazakhstan tried to arrange the buildong of the small-displacement vessels at its territory but it failed and by the November 17, 1997 Decree of President Nursultan Nazarbayev the Navy of Kazakhstan was liquidated.

Later, on February 17, 2003 the Minister of Defence of Kazakhstan Mukhtar Altinbayev spoke about the intentions to establish the national navy by 2010-2015 which, according to him, had to “provide the security of the oil regions on the Caspian Sea where big foreign funds are invested”. Though such plans of the authorities of Kazakhstan had existed for quite a long time, this time the reaction of the Russian party was rather sharp: on February 26 the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the RF Victor Kalyuzhni said “there is no sense in creating new armed forces on the Caspian Sea as Kazakhstan offers”.

It is necessary to mention that till 2002 the RF made active attempts to demilitarize the Caspian Sea; in particular, Moscow submitted the plan of the head of the Commission of State Duma on Defence and Security Andrei Nikolayev. According to it, at the first stage the countries of the Caspian region (Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) had to sign the agreement according to which they would undertake not to expand the navies on the Caspian Sea and at the second stage they had to resign the combatant ships, which carry torpedoes, missiles and mines, and the submarines, preserving only coast guard, fishing control and rescue ships.

And really till 2002 the military and technical rearmament of the Caspian navies had been carried out in the scope of obtaining small coast guard and fishing control boats with small arms.

The cue for the real militarization of the Caspian Sea was the failure of the April 2002 summit in Ashgabat on considering the status of this sea-lake when no document was signed at the meeting of the leaders of five Caspian states.

In response in 2002 Moscow showed the resolution to use its navy to protect its economic interests by carrying naval maneuvers (with the participation of Azerbaijani Navy and Air Forces of Kazakhstan) when the complex of defence functions and methods of struggle against the poachers were practiced.

During the preparation for the maneuvers Azerbaijan tried to obtain the guarantees of its military security in the districts of drilling and hydrocarbon production including those on the disputed territories. But the Russian ambassador at large, the head of the workgroup of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF on the Caspian region Andrei Urnov stated that Moscow, welcoming the aspiration of the Caspian region countries, particularly Iran and Azerbaijan, to set controversial issues at the Caspian Sea in a peaceful way, would not support any party in bilateral conflicts and disputes on the Caspian fields.

As a result, Azerbaijan activated the practical cooperation with the US. And back in the mid-August 2003 in Baku GOPLAT naval maneuvers on the protection of oil and gas producing platforms with the participation of 18 US seamen were arranged. That was the first, though the symbolic appearance of the American militaries on the Caspian Sea.

Officially Russia took those maneuvers in a rather restrained manner but just in a week it arranged its own naval maneuvers during which, alongside with the traditional “straggle against poachers and terrorist”, the tasks on repelling attacks of the ships of the imaginary enemy on which missile and artillery strike was delivered and cruise missiles were released.

Towards the end of the maneuvers, on August 31, 2003 the guard ship “Tatarstan” was assigned to the Caspian flotilla; the ship besides the torpedo and artillery armament has two “Uran” missile launchers (4 containers in each) which can hit the enemy ships of 5 000 ton’s displacement and the objects of the coast infrastructure at 130km target range.

In a month, at the end of September 2003, Iran in its turn, announced about launching of the new missile boat “Peykan” on the Caspian Sea. Military and political leadership of the IRI made a decision about the deployment of the operative and tactical unit – squadron – composed of several subdivisions and separate divisions of surface ships and submarine vessels as well as work boats and naval aviation. Iran can also increase the number of its ships on the Caspian Sea in short time by redeployment of the boats from Persian Gulf. But the main danger for the destabilizing situation in the oil production areas is constituted by three mini-submarines (built by Iran on North Korean project) which can pass 120 miles with a demolition man aboard (i.e. they cover the whole water area of the Caspian Sea). The school of Iranian military swimmers is also at the disposal of the Iranian Navy on the Caspian Sea.

Taking a special, “intermediate” stance on the issue of the Caspian Sea status, Turkmenistan uses that factor to obtain military and technical support for its navy both from Russia and from Iran. Thus, Tehran granted on a long lease to Ashgabat 7 coast guard boats and Moscow according to the agreement will provide not only military and technical aid but it will also provide the personnel training of the navy. Turkmenistan Navy plans to buy 2 small missile boats and build a naval base.

Kazakhstan’s stance is much more independent: without refusing Russia’s support at the first stage, at the same time it makes it clear that later it will arrange its navy on the NATO model and relying on its own production capacities. As a result, the tender put out back in 2007 for obtaining naval vessels of 500-1 000 ton’s displacement was won by South Korea. According to the provisions of the Development concept of Navy till 2025, the republic plans not only to buy ships of small and average displacement but also to build them.

In whole, for the last 15 years the overall number of the naval ships at the Caspian Sea has been doubled; their fighting strength moved to a brand new level; the coast infrastructure is being actively developed.

The constant feeding of the armaments race in the Caspian region can be expected in connection with the step-by-step rearmament of the Turkish navy and passing of the ships and boats removed from the inventory to Azerbaijan. The armament race in the Caspian region will objectively contribute to the enhancement of the fighting efficiency of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and will boost the morale of the soldiers which may become an additional stimulus to the attempt to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a military way.

The availability of Iran’s means to arrange subversive acts at the sea obliges the US to take into consideration in its policy in regard to the Caspian region the necessity to build comprehensive security system to avert the subversive and terrorist acts and at the same time it gives a handle for the military and political consolidation in the region. The United States set to provide financial and material and technical support to the countries of the Caspian region for the arrangement, training and equipping anti-terrorist units and structures which insure the protection of the vital communications and infrastructures for energy export.

Within the framework of “Caspian Guard” programme the US allotted to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan about $135 million. The main goals of the programme are:

- arranging maritime and air space surveillance system;

- creation of rapid deployment forces;

- training of the member-countries’ military contingents;

- providing economic and political assistance to the partners.

The deployment of two radio-location stations on the territory of Azerbaijan (in the north and south of the country), i.e. actual copying of the functioning Russian system of the Caspian Sea monitoring with the centre in Astrakhan, is in a measure caused by the vigilance of the US as for the consolidating Russian-Iranian relations, especially in the sphere of military and technical cooperation and nuclear programme of Iran. But for the full-fledged functioning of the “Caspian Guard” it is desirable to enlist Kazakhstan and/or Turkmenistan too.

The initiation of that programme increased the concern of Moscow and Iran about the deployment of any US base on the territory of Azerbaijan.

Increasing the power of its Caspian flotilla, Russia tends to preserve the dominating military and political role in the region and it will also tries to project that to the economic plane as well. Having absolute superiority of the navy Russia (in addition to such declared goals as fighting terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drugs trafficking; consolidation of the regional security; operative reaction in case of state of emergency) activates its steps in order not to allow the ships under the flags of non-regional countries to the Caspian Sea.

For this purpose Moscow offered to create the operative-tactical unit of the coastal countries “Casfor” by analogy with the US initiative “Blackseafor” at the Black Sea. Russia had had such an intention since 2002, but it was concerned definitely only in June 2005 after carrying out on the board of flagman of the Caspian flotilla “Tatarstan” conference of the representatives of the navies of five coastal countries.

At the same time militarization of the Caspian Sea may also be considered as a cause of deeper geopolitical processes going on the entire Eurasian continent. And China may play a key role in the race of armaments in the Caspian region particularly by:

- direct and indirect financing of the navies (and Armed Forces in general);

- forcing out US and other NATO member countries’ bases from Central Asia.

It is not a secret that Beijing considers the deployment of the US and NATO military bases in Central Asia as the main threat to its security, political and economic interests, and the process of their gradual deployment, as the beginning of implementation of the long-term plan analogous to the plan “Anaconda” which implied the deployment of NATO bases along the borders of the USSR during the Cold War. The support provided by China to president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov after the bloody encounters of the government forces with opposition in the city of Andidjan in May 2005, allowed Tashkent insisting on the withdrawal of the US Air Force base K2 (Kharshi-Khanabad) which was situated not far from the city of Kharshi and which provided support of the coalition troops in Afghanistan. And in order to keep the US Air Force base “Gansi” in Kirgizstan Pentagon from time to time have to make new financial concessions to Bishkek.

Militarizing of the Caspian Sea may be in the interests of China:

- as a factor favouring the interests of China which will increase the risks while transporting oil from the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to the western one, thus boosting the “redirection” of the Central Asian oil and gas to the Asian product markets, and first of all to the Chinese;

- boosting its military and political cooperation with Tehran Beijing consolidates its influence in the Caspian region rich in energy resources.

- creating the US “restraining” zone on the distant approaches – at the borders of SCO.

In the end it is necessary to mention a number of moments:

Support in modernization and development of the national navies provided by the US and Turkey to the countries of the Caspian region is directed, among other reasons, at not allowing creation of the joint navy under Russia’s leading role.
New phase of strengthening of the navies by the Caspian countries is caused particularly by:
- accumulation of the “oil dollars” by the countries of the region;
- financial, military and technical and logistic support of the foreign countries;
- uncertain status of the Caspian Sea;
- expectance of the “new wave” of energy export and energy transition projects (among them Nabucco pipeline which is sorely in need of gas sources);
- prospect of bringing into motion of the Transcaspian communication system.
Armed Forces of the countries of the Caspian region will not be used till:
- transcaspian projects which have geopolitical and geo-economic significance pass to the practical implementation stage;
- contradictions concerning the belonging of the disputable oil and gas fields between Caspian states are sharpened;
- escalation of the tension round the Iranian nuclear programme takes place.
The fact that some countries of the Caspian region have subversive units is an additional tool for trying to make cardinal changes of the current tendencies and directions of the development of the military and political and economic situation in the region. It increases not only military risks of the energy carriers’ production and transition, but also the risks of ecological character, because any ecological catastrophe may cause the stoppage of the expensive projects. At the same time carrying out secret subversive operations “under false colours” is not excluded.

¹Pivot table based on the data of “Нефтегазовая вертикаль” magazine, RF.

² In oil equivalent

March 24, 2010

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