GEORGIA: AN ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER IN A NARROW GAUGE

14.01.2013

GEORGIA: AN ATTEMPT TO MANEUVER IN A NARROW GAUGE

Sergei Sargsyan
Deputy Head of the Center for Political Studies at “Noravank” Foundation

The recent parliamentary elections in Georgia turned out to be remarkable in many aspects. They were remarkable for the results of the elections; for the fact that for the first time in the modern history of the country the change of the regime proceeded in a democratic path; for the electoral technologies used; for the effectiveness of the information operations and PR actions of the competitors.

In itself the appearance at the political arena of the countryman who made a name for himself and gathered wealth abroad, arranged self-PR and invested his own funds into his electoral campaign which seemed knowingly failed at first, deserves special scrutiny with respect to its possible repetition in both Georgia and other post-Soviet states.

But now the most interesting is how the winners will deal with the credence the electorate had in them and how and in what direction the domestic and foreign policy priorities of the new leadership will change.

The issue of the credence of the electorate in the situation when victory of Bidzina Ivanishvili became possible due to the accumulation of the protest potential in the society conditioning the protest voting, which in its essence has irrational, emotionally coloured character, is most topical and demands speedy justification of the expectations of the society.

The electorate sees in B.Ivanishvili a politician-deliverer from the undivided rule of the United National Movement of Georgia and in particular of Mikhail Saakashvili, a billionaire who is ready to invest his own money not only into the prospective programmes of the economic reforms but also into the social sphere, and this conditioned the fact that he won the majority of the votes without any detailed electoral programme.

Additional intrigue to the dynamics of the large-scale transformations in the social and economic situation in the country is also attached by his statement concerning his intentions to drop out of politics in a year and a half, i.e. after the local elections in March 2014.

The date of B.Ivanishvili’s retirement put on the agenda of his supporters the issue of finding substitution for him. And the fact that his figure plays a cementing role for rather variegated political parties and movements, which are included into the “Georgian Dream” block and are called upon to make this dream come true, is a cause for concern regarding the issue of preservation of the unity of winning powers in the nearest future.

After B.Ivanishvili’s statement two “lame ducks” appeared in the top echelons in Georgia (he and president Saakashvili), but the possibility of minimization of the losses caused by the reformation of the political structures of the UNM looks a little more preferable.

In case of keeping pace of passing of the independent deputies or the deputies who were elected from the UNM to the side of a new parliamentary majority, the “Georgian Dream” will gain the constitutional majority in the parliament which will allow them to initiate and pass the changes and amendments to legislation. From that moment on the dynamics of the reforms should rise considerably.

However, all these – populist election pledges which were meant rather for the electoral campaign than for the victory on the elections and their further fulfillment; overstated anticipations of the electorate from the winners; time trouble B. Ivanishvili was put into by himself and the whole “Georgian Dream”; preservation of a considerable potential of the UNM and M. Saakashvili’s team – trigger a necessity to concentrate on the most topical problems as well as on the aspects of foreign policy which have direct and considerable impact on the domestic processes in Georgia and the mood of the electorate. In fact the presidential electoral campaign is already in the process and this situation of competitive rush will be preserved in Georgia till the local elections in spring 2014.

Among the main foreign political issues Ivanishvili’s team will not be able to avoid or postpone are:

Searching for mutually acceptable and realistic policy in regard to the Republic of Abkhazia and Republic of South Ossetia;
Solution of the current problems with the Russian Federation, including restoration of diplomatic ties and expansion of economic relations;
Searching for the acceptable balance in the relation, on the one hand, with NATO, EU and, on the other hand, with Russia.

And there are following issues which are within the framework of the solution of the aforementioned problems:

Opening of the railway and road service through Abkhazia;
Gradual involvement of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in its social and economic space;
Modifying its foreign policy in regard to the Russian North Caucasus republics, etc.

Even partial normalization of the relations with Russia will, on the one hand, cause extension of the field of the foreign political and economic play for Tbilisi on a wide range of regional issues and, on the other hand, it will lower the influence of the Turkish-Azerbaijani tandem. It is alarming for both Ankara and Baku. That is the reason why all the steps made by Tbilisi in the direction of the improvement of the relations with Moscow will be taken by both capitals with vigilance and antagonism.

And one of the most sensitive issues for rather Baku than Ankara is opening of the roads going through Abkhazia.

In case there are prospects of real normalization of the Georgian-Russian relations it is not excluded that they will take counter measures and they will not be only of economic character. Thus Baku has already made statements that after the election of B.Ivanishvili the situation in the Azerbaijani populated region of Georgia Qvemo-Qartli has deteriorated¹.

Generally the stirring of the direct talks with Abkhazia and South Ossetia – one of the main initiatives by B.Ivanishvili – is at the same time the weakest point in his programme of changes:

Now his image will mostly depend on the stance of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
Moscow gains a very important trump in the negotiations with Tbilisi; now it is rather about the continuation of the talks on different levels (firstly within the framework of the Geneva process) than about the recognition and status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Actualization of this issue is caused by the fact that this is practically the only interest of Moscow and Sukhumi and possibility of gaining real dividends from fence mending with Tbilisi even on the initial level.

Despite a number of statements by the representatives of the authorities of the Republic of Abkhazia, as well as some Russian and Georgian experts on the disinterestedness of Sukhumi in resumption of transit, the prospects of normalizations of the issue are rather good. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned without going into a detailed assumption of the whole complex of the Abkhazian-Russian relations that:

a. If Moscow’s influence on Sukhumi is really almost unlimited, it will not be difficult for Russia to promote realization of this profitable and advantageous scenario;

b. If the influence of Moscow on Sukhumi is restricted to some extent and Abkhazia tends to carry out as independent policy as it is possible, it is interested in establishing good relations with all the regional and non-regional actors and Georgia is not an exception, at least for creation of some balance and possibility of counter positioning to the pressure of Moscow. Besides, in this case Sukhumi should be rather concerned about the creation of additional jobs, restoration and development of transport infrastructure, acquisition of income from passenger and cargo traffic. At the same time it should not be forgotten that the transport policy will be defined by Sukhumi.

In general the prospects of resumption of the transport communication through the territory of Abkhazia are really feasible proceeding from the interests of Russia, Abkhazia and Georgia, which came forward after the change of the cabinet in Tbilisi and under the critical reconsideration of M.Saakashvili’s legacy.

In this regard it should be mentioned that stirring up of Moscow in this issue should be expected after Tbilisi will remove all the restrictions on transportation of military cargo for the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia, imposed by Georgia unilaterally².

For its part Sukhumi, within the framework of this project, during the negotiations with Tbilisi may insist on the foremost necessity of decreasing subversive-terrorist and criminal activity of the paramilitary groups of “undefined submission” mainly acting in Gali District of Abkhazia.

In this context the events in other region of Georgia – in Kakhetia – when in consequence of a fight in Lapota Gorge, which lasted for several days, a group of militants, consisting of the citizens of Georgia and foreign citizens, was destroyed.

The real background of this incident was anybody’s guess (whether this was failed and clumsy pre-election PR action of the Saakashvili team or it was really the operation of the Georgian special services on interdiction of the activity of the international terrorist organizations on recruitment, training, equipping of the militants and creation of the ways of their redeployment to the North Caucasus). However it should be stated that there are sufficient conditions on the Georgian territory for organizing illegal armed groups including the ones, in which mercenaries and volunteers from abroad are involved.

In case of stirring up the negotiations process with Abkhazia and South Ossetia and opening of the transport connection through the territory of Abkhazia, appearance of new flash-point of activity of the illegal armed groups, created on the initiative of some powers from abroad in order to pursue their raw national interests, becomes rather probable. And this will be another challenge to the foreign and domestic policy of a new leadership in Georgia.

As for the information operations carried out by B.Ivanishvili’s team, two examples particularly can be brought:

Firstly it was spreading through the mass media the recording of abuse and beating of the inmates in Gldan prison #8 in Tbilisi by the jailers which was probably the most vivid and mobilizing action that not only shattered the electorate’s confidence in the authorities and president Saakashvili personally, but also in the ability and wish of his team to use administrative resource on the s day of elections and in the votes counting process. However the information about the illegal actions in the penitentiary facilities in Georgia was not new; simply it had not been spread in an appropriate way before.

Secondly, it is the triggering by B.Ivanishvili of the issue of joining NATO. On the one hand, this seems to be logical in the light of the statements made by B.Ivanishvili that joining NATO and integration into the European structures were the strategic goals of Georgia which was proved by the movement on the already beaten track.

On the other hand, the parallels with the Turkish political experience arise when accession to power of R. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party caused step-by-step change of accents in foreign political priorities of the country.

Besides the fact that the JDP activated negotiations with the EU on the accession of Turkey to the EU and took the initiative in this issue in their hands, which was of fundamental importance for the former secular authorities of the country and the militaries, they also insisted on specifying clear and distinct requirements after fulfillment of which the country would automatically join the EU. Under the pressure of Erdogan’s party the EU was obliged to formulate its requirements, thus demonstrating to Ankara that the realization of its expectations was unlikely. As a result Turkey reconsidered and clarified the priorities of its foreign policy.

In the same way today Ivanishvili appeals to NATO to take fast and real measures on the accession of Georgia to NATO; against this background the senior leaders of the organization really pleaded the member-countries to consider positively Georgia’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). In consequence this may bring to the situation when distinct requirements will be presented to Tbilisi which will postpone its plans on NATO membership for an indefinite term. It is suffice to remember the necessity to solve the issue of the territorial integrity of the country. It is not a mere chance that on November 29, 2012 in the parliament of Georgia closed discussion on the relations with NATO was held; it featured the representatives of the committees on the foreign affairs, European integration, defence and security, as well as NATO Liaison Office in Tbilisi. According to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Tedo Japaridze during the discussion the participants “frankly discussed the issue of relations and assessed the feasibility of the approaches”³.

Anyway, Ivanishvili receives an objective justification for the lack of progress in the process of Georgia’s accession to NATO. In the long run it is possible to maneuver in narrow gauge only by means of brakeage.

¹ ИА «Регнум», 27 ноября 2012г., http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1597947.html.

² This aspect of prospects of opening a transit through Abkhazia is one of the main irritants for Baku (and in a less marked form for Ankara either).

³ИА «Регнум», 29 ноября 2012г., http://www.regnum.ru/news/georgia/1598953.html.

“Globus” analytical journal, #12, 2012

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