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25.03.2010

YEREVAN-ANKARA: NEW STAGE OF POLITICAL MANOEUVRES

   

Gagik Ter-Harutyunyan

The actualization of the RA-Turkey relations stirred up Armenian analytical community and today you can rather often meet the studies and comments connected both with those relations and with issues regarding Turkey. This tendency enriches our political thinking and thus promotes conducting current diplomatic processes. At the same time there are approaches which are inadequate to the realities and here we do not speak about the political approaches or non-professional analyses.

Of course, Armenian-Turkish relations are very sensitive sphere and there are any, even very radical evaluations there. But the most bothering is that our native “radicals” sometimes do not see anything common in the notions of Motherland and State. It is also known (there are many such processes in the political history to be found) that such approaches are often imported or at least controlled by the third powers or international organizations with great potential, in term of their benefits. Besides the foreign political aims (it is suffice to remember that one of the grounds of the “colour revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia was “vulgar nationalism”) such postulates depreciate real national values and ideas.

At the same time, today there is another group of commentators who also do not take into consideration the common edges of Motherland-State notions but in a quite different context. The Armenian-Turkish relations are perceived by such commentators as a simple issue between two abstract states without taking into consideration our national memory and historical and political experience. Of course, this is also the expression of “vulgar”, but at this time liberalism and this does not reflect our national interests either.

Returning to the relations between the RA and Turkey let us state once more that the context of rather tough current military and political and economic realities demands political flexibility and ability to manoeuvring. Today there are all reasons to state that in this sphere the official Yerevan has achieved some success.

The initiative belongs to Yerevan. The complex policy of the RA (the well-known resolution of the Constitutional Court, which clarified the obscure formulations in the Armenian-Turkish protocols, the programme address of the RA president in London, the substantial political comments made by the deputy of the head of the president’s administration at the conferences in Turkey and US, the well-known meetings of the ex-president of the RA in Tehran) essentially influenced the situation round the relations between Yerevan and Ankara. We can state that the negotiations have embarked on a new stage and here the diplomatic and informational initiative belongs to the Armenian party.

The foreign actors who “support” the process had also stirred up. They show that besides “exhortations” they also have other means of influence. Russia positively denied the Turkish attempt to present the future of the NKR issue and the RA-Turkey diplomatic relations in “one package”. The possible discussion of the issue of the Armenian Genocide in the US Congress House of Representatives deserves special attention. This issue has always been used by the US as a leverage against Turkey and the adoption of H.RES 252 resolution by the US Congress House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee (and, further to, the decision of the Swedish parliament) brought the issue even more up to date. If in one of the theoretically possible scenarios the “protocols” are denied in Turkish parliament and the resolution on the Genocide is considered and accepted in the US Congress, as a result, the positive situation round the RA and NKR will compensate “the closed borders”.

In any case, one can state that due to this processes the political situation, which is profitable for Yerevan, has been formed and this, in its turn, should bother Turkey.

Global shifts. The current activity of Turkey is conditioned by the geopolitical shift taking place in the process of the multi-polar system formation. This reality, in practice, is expressed by the definite tendency of reducing American military presence in the “big region”. As it is known, in the near future, the United States is going to withdraw its troops from Iraq (this year) and Afghanistan (2011) and this is not a temporary phenomenon but a result of the objective reduction of the general resources1. It is also obvious that such a process will cause destabilization and this refers not only to Iraq or Afghanistan (the inevitability of this scenario has been recently discussed at the “Middle East – 2020” conference in As-Suveima (Jordan)). The pessimistic scenario makes the countries of region seek for the new forms of “survival” and try to take places according to their ideas under the new situation.

At the same time all these do not imply that Washington loses its positions in the region and the long-run American-Turkish partnership comes to the end. And here we speak not only about the fact that the US, possessing the unique possibilities to conduct actions on a global scale, in multi-polar system also preserves its status of the leader. In past the Americans made efforts to form the current Turkish image and it does not look like they are going to “turn over” their country easily.

Political technologies and their results. Anglo-Saxon strategy has rich traditions of the protection of their interests in case of retreat. The manifestation of such a strategy is the creation of the so-called “special political forces” which later on, in “independent sailing”, implement previously planned policy.

In this aspect it is remarkable that during the “Bush age” you could meet in the mass media illustrations according to which the formation and the progress of the current Turkish “moderate Islamist’” Justice and Development Party (JDP) is associated with the American “neo-cons”. Later on the “neo-con” approach was systematized by RAND Corporation in the conceptual work Building Moderate Muslim Networks2 published in 2007 where, in particular, the description of the “moderate Muslims” and their advantages over the “radical Muslims” are brought.

Of course, such political technologies contain many risks, because it is difficult to predict the evolution of the social and political movements, especially in the East. But bringing into the game the “moderate Islamists” was grounded as there could have been no worse scenario for the US, which “combated terrorism” on two fronts (Iraq and Afghanistan), than the formation of the “radical” Turkey. Such a possibility became quite real when after the elections in 1996 Welfare radical Islamist party came to power which leader Necmettin Erbakan called for the “exit from NATO” and “drifting apart from the US”. As it is known this party was prohibited due to the efforts of the Kemalists and Erbakan was put under the house arrest. Perhaps, this was the stimulus for the elaboration of the alternative option and in 2002 the JDP won the elections and Recep Erdogan became a prime-minister. Erdogan was the supporter and the companion-in-arms of Erbakan, but, in accordance with his “moderate” mission, he is much restrained in his policy and statements.

Let us mention that “Islam way” corresponds to the current mood of the Turkish society. This can particularly be seen in the public opinion poll carried out in 2007 (See Table) 3.

Identity/ those who voted affirmatively JDP, % RPP, %
I am a Turk 80,1 60,7
I am a Muslim 88,3 38,0
I am modern 18,1 42,2
I am the successor of Ataturk 17,7 67,0
I am a citizen 30,0 25,7
I am a democrat 13,5 28,5
During the poll the options were given

As you can see the percentage of the JDP supporters (unlike Republican People’s Party’s (RPP) supporters) who consider themselves Turks and Muslim Turks is high.

The “Islam way” allows Turkey participating “Islam” processes and even laying claim for the leadership in the Muslim world. The ideological field of the country has also “compressed” and became more offensive. Such trends as neo-Ottomanism, neo-pan-Turkism and Eurasianism (in its Turkish interpretation) can be observed there and there are nostalgia for the empire and the manifestations of the expansionism in this “mix”. Such an aggressive ideology and nationalist tendencies are adequately manifested in the party and political system of the country. The Great National Assembly of Turkey (GNA) consists of 338 members. JDP and Nationalist Movement Party (a part of Grey Wolves militarized organization) which take the most radical stance as for the issue of the Armenian-Turkish relations, respectively, have 97 and 69 places. The rest of 29 GNA places are divided between 3 small parties.

Such an “ideological resource” dictates Ankara to conduct active foreign policy and in this aspect the well-known “Caucasian platform” and incomparably less discussed initiative on the creation in Eurasia the union of the countries like the European Union can be mentioned, and both of these initiatives directly refer to Armenia. At the same time the political and ideological field dominating in Turkey and its claims bother its competitors and partners.

“Multi-aspect manoeuvres”. The US, promoting the substitution of the “radicals” with the “moderate Islamists”, continues to be Turkey’s military and political partner and in this aspect it is suffice to mention Incirlik American military base which is the key logistic centre of the US Armed Forces in the region and where the essential part of the US nuclear arsenal which is situated abroad is deployed (according to different sources from 60 to 90 units4).

At the same time the US is concerned with the recent developments and this refers not only to the well-known “Kurdish issue” but also to the rapprochement between Syria and Turkey. According to Troubled Partnership report5 by RAND, which is devoted to Turkey, Americans are mostly concerned with the strengthening relations between Turkey and Iran and the possible “nuclear” claims of Turkey. Turkey cannot pretend to the role of the regional and Muslim leader without nuclear weapons (when Pakistan and most probably Iran already posses it). Let us also mention that the abrupt growth of the scientific publications in Turkey (as well as in Iran) also indirectly points to its nuclear claims. The option when under some political conditions Iran supplies nuclear technologies to Turkey cannot be excluded either. Undoubtedly such a prospect is rather bothering and not only for the US or Israel. According to the RAND experts Americans give a great importance to the Iranian factor, including the relations between Yerevan and Ankara. They believe that the settlement of the relations will allow “estranging” the RA from the Islamic Republic.

It is remarkable that such consideration is also present in regard to the partnership between the RA and Russia. It is supposed that the establishment of the diplomatic relations with Turkey (and in this context the settlement of the NKR issue) will lessen the relevance of the military and political alliance between the Armenia and Russia which will enhance the influence of the US and Turkey in the region. This circumstance, as well as (and probably foremost) the presence of the distinct “Turkish trace” in the separatist movements in the North Caucasus, dictates Russia to take more restrained stance in Armenian-Turkish relations, despite the common interests in the energy and economic spheres. But, at the same time, Moscow may consider the development of the relations with Turks as a possibility to “alienate” Turkey from the US.

The RA also acts in harmony with the political manoeuvres in the global plane. The establishment of the diplomatic relations with Turkey will allow Yerevan not only to be adequate to the regional and global “peaceful” processes and solve the problems connected with opening of the border. In our opinion the special attention should be paid to the fact that Armenia tends to establish the relations with Turkey without preconditions. It is known that Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and this allows considering this country de-facto a party to the conflict. In this context the possible establishment of the diplomatic relations with Turkey can be considered as an important precedent on the ground of which adequate solutions of the NKR issue’s establishment can be found.

1See for example, Эндрю Крепиневич, Убывающие активы Пентагона, Россия в глобальной политике, т.7, #6, с. 26, 2009.

2Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, Peter Sickle, Building Moderate Muslim Networks, RAND, 2007, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG574/

3According to Вячеслав Шлыков, Поиск политического равновесия. Эволюция партийной системы Турции в период Третьей Республики (1983-2009), http://www.perspectivy.info/print.php?ID=36113

4It is remarkable that after the well-known troubles with Turkey during the campaign in Iraq, according to the press reports, the options of relocation of the military base in Icirlik to other country of the region were considered. At the same time such “relocation” would mean not only an end of the US-Turkey partnership but it would also demand considerable material resources, which is rather problematic today, and it would imply the essential changes in the infrastructure, which had been created in Icirlik for many years, and in the mechanisms of the actions of the US Armed Forces. This complex of the issues would affect the American position not only in the region but also in global plane.

5F. Stephen Larrabee, Troubled Partnership: US-Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change. RAND, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG899/. It is remarkable that the strained relations between the US and Turkey also shifted to the personal and emotional plane: hand-to hand fighting between American ambassador Joseph LeBaron and prime-minister Erdogan’s top counselor Fuad Tanray which took place at “US-Muslim world” forum in Doha, Qatar, is an evidence of that.


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