
THE ISSUE OF THE CASPIAN SEA STATUS AND THE TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE
Together with the collapse of the USSR was given birth to negotiations on the new international status of the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan together with Russia and Iran “undertook” the process of negotiations and in spite of the past 17 years, one can state as a fact that up till now there has been no international document concerning to the Caspian Sea. This is one of the reasons that many experts think that in spite of the fact that the three Caspian See Basin countries – Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, have signed bilateral and even tripartite agreements1, however, the intergovernmental agreement signed between the USSR and Iran concerning to the see still remains in force.
So, on February 26 of 1921 was concluded the first agreement on the status of the sea between RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) and Persia. Let’s remember that before that the Bolshevik government of Russia invalidated all the agreements concluded in the past. The second and the final agreement, which was regulating issues connected with fishing and navigation, was concluded between the USSR and Iran in 19402. By this agreement the USSR achieved exclusive rights in the Caspian Sea, was prohibited the exploitation of the sea lithosphere by the other countries as well as navigation and fishing of not Caspian countries, and the USSR gained an exclusive right to keep a navy in the sea. Although this agreement is not de-facto in force, as many other countries are engaged in oil extraction in the sea and the new ones have already taken up the process of establishing their navies, however, the above mentioned agreements continue functioning de jure as they haven’t been invalidated by the agreement parties. And in spite of all these, together with the new countries emerging around the sea, it became clear that the agreements can satisfy neither the countries which have concluded it nor the newly recognized ones.
For 20 meeting on the new international status of the sea were organized by the 5 basin countries within the last years. This uncertainty hinders not only the coastal countries but also the ones which have serious expectations and political interests in the Caspian Sea Basin. Among them the US takes the first place which tries to convince Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to come to common terms on the sea status issue. Let’s remember that last month the official representatives of Ashgabat visited Baku trying to make common terms with Azerbaijan3. And although no substantial progress was reported as a result of those negotiations, as it was expected, but this bilateral meeting after the visit of the American high ranking guests to Baku and Ashgabat is also quite distinguishing. the visit of the American influential senator Richard Lugar to the capitals of both of the countries and the meetings on the highest level have come to prove that Washington is seriously interested in progressing in negotiations on the sea status4. However, there are serious obstacles in coming to common terms between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan: for instance, the oil field located in the center of the see which is called “Kyapaz” by Baku and “Serdar” by Turkmenistan. Geographically it is situated closer to coastal regions of Turkmenistan and still under the Soviet rule it was handed over to Azerbaijan for operation. But, after the collapse of the empire, Ashgabat has been pretending on the field. This is one of the main obstacles the parties can not overcome to come to any decision and conclude a bilateral agreement on the Caspian Sea status.
Let’s mention that according to some sources there are 150 million barrels of oil and gas condensates in this field, which is a reason serious enough for Baku and Ashgabat not to desire to yield to each other. In this issue the US is more interested in Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, the construction of which, according to Washington, will seriously shake the position of Russia in the region and will create an alternative of Russian gas flowing to Europe. Thus, in the American plan the Azerbaijani-Turkmen agreement acquires strategic character; consequently, the US high ranking officials go to Ashgabat one after another. After senator Lugar the Turkmen capital was visited by the head of the US Central Command, Admiral Fallon and later on by the special State Department envoy for the Caspian Sea Steven Mun. The latter one has been engaged in the Caspian Sea issues for many years and he also was the US ambassador to Turkmenistan as well as the co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk group engaged in Karabakh conflict settlement. It is also worth mentioning that still under the rule of S. Niyazov, Turkmenistan was trying to establish good relations with Washington, and however, it didn’t manage. The White House was keeping appropriate distance from the dictatorial regime of Turkmenbashi. But, after the death of the latter one Washington noticeably changed its position and wanted to establish a dialogue with the new president G. Berdimuhamedov, whose political “value” raises for the west and especially the US in case of the construction of Trans-Caspian gas pipeline. That’s to say it is in the interest of the US for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to come to common terms as soon as possible, which, according to it, may further the construction of the new gas pipeline in the lithosphere of the sea. However, there are other interested parties in the status of the sea, Russia and Iran, which are unequivocally against any program of laying on gas or other pipelines. It is clear that that this is not only the matter of nature protection but also the one of political interests of those countries: they want those Central-Asian energy carriers to pass through their territories. That’s to say, even if Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan come to an agreement, it doesn’t mean that the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline will be constructed as to decide the final status of the sea it is necessary to have the consent of the 5 countries. At that, Teheran is persisting and Ashgabat has already reached agreements with Russia and China.
Which are the political interests of Turkmenistan? On May 11 of 2007 the presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed a new agreement on the construction of Near-Caspian gas pipeline5. Let’s remember that according to the agreement the parties have decided to build a new gas pipeline passing round the Caspian Sea, which should reach Kazakhstan through the coastal territory of Turkmenistan and join the already existing Russia-Kazakh gas pipeline called Middle Asia-Center. Within the framework of this agreement is also planned to contemporize the gas pipeline functioning since 1967, through which the Turkmen gas reaches to Russia. As a matter of fact, should this program be realized, the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline will be the one to suffer. Thus, in its struggle for Central Asia, Russia acquires a new card in the face of the Near-Caspian gas pipeline.
It is clear that such a development of events can not satisfy the main pretender of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, the US, the representative of which, the minister Samuel Bodman, announced three days after the agreement was concluded that “the possible gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Russia is not the best decision for Europe.”6
The tripartite agreement doesn’t coincide with the interests of Europe as well. For the latter one it is important the creation of new, alternative routs for gas supply, which will possibly reduce the dependence of Europe from the Russian supply and Russia provides 1/3 of the European gas demand keeping this serious political lever in its hand. However, for the political system of Turkmenistan ties with Russia have not only important political but also economic significance as that system functions on the account of sums got from Moscow. Turkmenistan has nothing to suggest the world besides gas the only rout of its production and subsequently financing of which passes through Russia. For Ashgabat to decline the Russian route is the same as to commit suicide. Turkmenistan annually exports 40-50 billion cubic meters of gas through this route. As a result of long lasting negotiation, the former president of the country, Saparmurad Niyazov, managed to make “Gazprom” agree to get Turkmen gas by $100 for 1000 cubic meters instead of the former $65 beginning from 20097. Russia agreed to pay such a price for gas only after Turkmenbashi declined the alternative gas construction program which was to pass round Russia thus endangering the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline construction project supposed to produce gas from Turkmenistan and Central Asia in general through the lithosphere of the Caspian Sea.
We may state as a fact that this policy will hardly undergo any changes after Turkmenbashi’s death as any political regime of that country has direct dependence on “Gazprom” company, which is controlling the main route of exporting gas from Turkmenistan and is building the new one. Perhaps, the Chinese route is an exception here with witch an agreement was reached still under the rule of Niyazov. The latter one was assuring the Russian party that the construction of the gas pipeline to China would have no affect on the realization of the agreement concluded between Russia and Turkmenistan.
In its games with the west the authorities of Turkmenistan are very cautious, as they understand that “Gazprom” is the only financing company. And if the official Ashgabat stops cooperating with “Gazprom,” the latter one will stop its flow of financing to that country, and the construction of a gas pipeline to the West within a month is not an easy task. Consequently, it will also be impossible to survive without gas incomings during that period.
So, dependence of Turkmenistan on Russian gas pipelines and finance as well as uncertainty over the status of the Caspian Sea make a ground for us to suppose that the construction of Trans-Caspian gas pipeline becomes less and less possible for the west.
1Олег Горупай, Каспийская эпопея, «Красная звезда», 16.03.2007.
2Грунин В.Ф., Правовой статус Каспийского моря и проблемы обеспечения национальных интересов Российской Федерации в прикаспийском регионе. Журнал теории и практики Евразийства №13. www.e-journal.ru/bzarub-st6-13.html
3Сигов Ю., К разделу Каспия все готово?, «Деловая неделя»,19/ 02/ 2008
www.newsazerbaijan.ru/analytics/20080219/42165349.html
4ИА REGNUM «Новости», Азербайджан и Туркмения делят Каспий в Баку,
www.regnum.ru/news/953309.html, 06.02.2008
5ИА REGNUM, Россия, Казахстан и Туркменистан договорились о строительстве Прикаспийского газопровода. www.regnum.ru/news/826354.html 12.05.2007
6ИА REGNUM, США не довольны решением о строительстве прикаспийского газопровода.
www.regnum.ru/news/827155.html 14.05.2007
7Арсюхин Е., Связанные одним газом, «Российская газета», 22.12.2006.
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