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30.07.2010

DOES THE SOUTH CAUCASUS NEED RECALIBRATION OF GERMANY’S AND EU`S POLICY UPON THE PATTERN OF MR. MEISTER?

   

Armen Martirosyan

A.Martirosyan - Ambassador of Armenia to Germany

Recently, on July 7th the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) organized a discussion on the report presented by Mr. Stefan Meister, during which the author introduced the outlines of his study (Recalibrating Germany`s and EU`s policy in the South Caucasus). Several participants, including me, approached critically some of his assumptions and conclusions. However, later on, having read the full document, I felt myself compelled to present some comments in written form, which I do hope will contribute to more objective comprehension of the issues concerned.

If bias and predisposition of diplomats could be justified, the obvious prejudice of expert aspiring to elaborate on the multifaceted policies of the leading international actors in any region seems irrelevant, diminishes the value of analysis and undermines the relevance of conclusions.

The very beginning of the paper, where the author reproaches the European Union for “inability of its member states to develop a common policy toward the post Soviet space” had caused my initial perplexity. The mentioned “vice” is as old as the EU is and for very obvious reasons it concerns not only the post Soviet space but goes far beyond. Afghanistan and Iran, reform of UN Security Council and membership of Turkey to the EU, the problems of Polisario and Kosovo - are few examples of pluralism among the member states of the European Union. But is it a flaw of the EU or a trait inherent to the Union of independent states? I would rather choose the second option. Whether we like it or not, quite often the legitimacy of any international organization or union of independent states comes at the expense of its efficiency and its ability in getting things done. In the meantime it allows to ensure a legality of EU`s actions or inaction, thus making the Union not only attractive for the states of the South Caucasus but mostly welcome external actor.

The distinguished author in fact calls upon the EU in general and Germany in particular to replace an obsolete “darling”, and namely Georgia, with a new one – Azerbaijan, because “by focusing on relations with Azerbaijan, Europe could increase its relevance in both the South Caucasus and in Central Asia, as well as become a more competitive economic player within these markets, which cumulatively represent more than 100 mln consumers”. Having read this sentence, I involuntarily recalled the resignation of the former Federal President of FRG Mr. Köller, whose interpretation of Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan was interpreted by the public as non consistent with essentials of German foreign policy. One could hardly find more irrelevant argument for the appeal to review the policies of EU than consumer based statistics. I have no doubts that the distinguished author is aware that various external actors put too much emphasis on prudent geo-economic considerations which deprived these very states of the role of honest broker in the regional affairs. To my understanding, the author pursues the opposite role, and wants to see the EU and Germany in particular as proactive players in various regions worldwide. Two core elements of German foreign policy – multilateralism and the culture of restraint, balance between interest based and value oriented policies have allowed Germany to be viewed as an honest international actor both in global and regional politics for decades. The involvement of Germany in the South Caucasus, in particular, is the best manifestation of such paradigm of German foreign policy.

Conclusion that “EU`s ability to impact change in this region will come mainly from engagement in economic and energy issues, as opposed to democracy and human rights” causes my irritation. Does Mr. Meister talk about China or the European Union!? Since the paper is rich with this kind of comments and observations and it is impossible to comment on all of them, I would rather concentrate on the issues directly linked to my country, Armenia.

Armenia has never been an isolated country as the author claims by reproducing Azeri rhetoric. Nor my country is “desperately searching for alternative allies to avoid dependence on Russia.” Since its inception, the independent Armenia, unlike its neighbors, has never played on the contradictions and discords between various external actors. It has allowed us to synchronize our interests and harmonize our bilateral relations with Russia and the United States, with CIS and EU, with OCST and NATO. We enjoy fruitful cooperation with our other two neighbors - Georgia and Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Armenia, while impeding the development of the region, as a whole do not serve their goal to isolate Armenia.

On Turkey, which is the subject of Mr. Meister`s many references, I would like to elaborate in details. Armenia was not only “keen to restart its negotiations with Turkey”, but initiated a policy of reconciliation. And it was not Armenia but Turkey that “abandoned this policy”, as author claims. From the very beginning, when the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs inaugurated his policy of Zero problems with neighbors, I thought of it as either declarative and unrealistic or demagogical. Having learnt more about Mr. Davutoglu`s academic background, I became personally inclined towards the first option: his plans had not taken into consideration some realities of our region, particularly, related to the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation. Many experts and practitioners of foreign policy within Armenian political establishment and outsiders likewise still believe that the government of Turkey was candid and sincere in its wishes to normalize non existing bilateral diplomatic relations. The opponents claim that Turkey being very well aware of Azerbaijan’s uncompromising opposition to the process of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, has intended to use that process for its own interests.

Developments following the signing of protocols in October 2009 strengthened the arguments of the second camp. On the very same day when the documents were signed, Turks, although unsuccessfully, undertook the first attempt to condition openly the process of normalization of the bilateral relations by the resolution of Nagorno Karabagh issue, thus violating the fundamental principle of the ongoing negotiations. Since then, the rhetoric has not changed and the Turkish side has continued to stipulate the normalization of our bilateral relations by the progress in NK dispute. Therefore, one can draw two conclusions. First, either the Turkish government had made a miscalculation, which allowed Azeris to exercise their veto right in the domestic policies of Turkey, or, second, the government of Turkey was cunning when it had announced its readiness to normalize the bilateral relations with Armenia without any preconditions.

Irrespective to the causality, the process of Armenian-Turkish reconciliation has stalled and mistrust between Armenians and Turks has deepened. (Nevertheless this did not prevent Minister Davutogly from winning various honorary titles abroad.) In Armenian society the authority of international brokers, which sincerely have been mediating this thorny process for years, had staggered. Hopefully such outcome would not have a negative effect on the whole notion of international mediation in dispute resolution. Had Turkey conducted its policy as a regional power in the interests of the region, we would have a different geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus. However, Turkey has put its ethnic affiliation with Azeris ahead of its interests as a regional power, thereby proving unfoundedness of its pretensions and claims for a broker in Nagorno Karabagh dispute.

The author extensively attempts to elaborate on this problem and does not leave me a choice but to make my own comments regarding this painful regional issue.

First, though a few years ago at a stretch one could reflect on the Nagorno Karabagh conflict “as the key conflict of the South Caucasus”, after the August war in 2008 and the following recognition of South Ossetia`s and Abkhazia’s independence by Russia and some other states, one could hardly regard the NK dispute as a primary one for further resolution of other disputes in the region. Talking about the consequences of war unleashed by Azeris in early 1990s with unexpected outcomes for Azerbaijan itself, the author repeatedly labels one of these outcomes as “Armenian occupation.” No doubt, such rhetoric will please author’s like-minded persons from Azerbaijan, but it would never contribute to the peaceful solution of the problem. Instead of courting Azeris, it would have been more productive had the author impartially looked at the causality of the conflict. Only such deep insight and unbiased interpretation of all fundamental principles of international law might have presented more thorough and deep analysis of the Nagorno Karabagh dispute. The fact that the European expert in its attempt to approach the regional affairs in an innovatory manner does not even mention such fundamental principles of international law as non-use of force and the right of people to self- determination, seriously questions the theoretical value of the paper, let alone its practical one.

Respected author illustrates an erroneous comparison on the role that the Armenian and Azerbaijani states play in their national economies. In case he is not aware, I want to inform that the share of the state in GDP of Armenia comprises less than 10%, while in Azerbaijan the same indicator is around 16%. No doubt, neighboring Azerbaijan has demonstrated quite impressive growth of economy, even though, as the author admits, 60% of its GDP is produced exclusively from the export of hydrocarbons. In the meantime, according to the latest report of the UNDP, the Human Development Index (HDI) of Armenia is still highest in the region, and it is a manifestation of the quality of economic growth and institution building in Armenia.

I do not aspire in this paper to elaborate thoroughly on the role that EU and Germany can play in the region. But I do believe that effective realization of the Eastern Partnership initiative would bring qualitative changes to the region. Regrettably, Mr. Meister had not found it expedient even to mention The association agreement and The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement aimed at strengthening relations between the EU and South Caucasus states. Both tools indeed require recalibration of activities of the EU as well as Germany in the region and Armenia attaches utmost importance to the comprehensive realization of the above mentioned European initiative.

Berlin, July 16, 2010


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