31.03.2010ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE CAUCASUS
The dynamics of the processes in the region of the South Caucasus and in the world in general come to prove that the post-Soviet period of history which was formed in a consequence of the collapse of the USSR begins to change. The new reality is being formed and status-quo in the South Caucasus is changing thus reflecting the new forming balance of the powers. The necessity of understanding of the existing regional security system in the South Caucasus and adjusting it in accordance with the new realities are the challenges which should be met despite the fact whether this or that countries or blocks are ready to that or not.
The attempts to evaluate the stirring up of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue demand taking into consideration the observed global dynamics and difficult regional context which generalities are given below. At the beginning of the 21st century Iran and Turkey managed to confirm their claims to the status of the regional superpowers which have the ambitions and potential to carry out independent policy directed to the protection of their centuries-old interests. Such a conduct meets the counteraction of global centers of power. However, today (and this is obvious both for the regional countries and global centers of power) one cannot implement any initiative without taking into consideration interests of Iran and Turkey.
The Republic of Armenia is involved into the armament drive initiated by Azerbaijan which openly speaks about its intentions to revise the status-quo formed as a result of the war between Azerbaijan and Karabakh in 1991-1994. And both countries had to sacrifice, in a varying degree, the possibilities of the social and economic development, establishment and strengthening of their societies.
Georgia owing to the imprudence and short-sightedness of its authorities and attempts of the military revanche was drawn into the aggressive war with the disastrous consequences for itself. Currently Georgia tries to overcome some of the consequences of that action.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia at present are in the process of realizing of all the aftermaths of the new status which caused not only advantages but also new and unknown challenges and threats when the recognition by a number of states of the international community and even Russia, as one of the global power centers, does not provide a guarantee for the sovereignty and independence.
The NKR has managed for the recent 20 years to switch from the authoritarian, tough system of government which is characteristic of wartime to the civil, democratic society. The way passed by Artsakh allows stating that it is closer than other countries of the region to the qualitative leap in the level of the development of its statehood. In fact, the NKR is the only new country of the region which managed to carry out the presidential and parliamentary elections in term of the legal procedures for the third time without convulsions. The claim to that leap can also be observed in the act of accepting of the NKR Constitution on the referendum in 2006. At the same time Artsakh was also solving the problem of the further development and strengthening of the system of defence in depth which would be able to withstand the aggressive intentions of Azerbaijan.
Thus, even a surface look allows stating that the South Caucasus is an open and complicated system. Besides, the specifics of the region do not allow speaking about the self-contained system and there are competing and sometimes even contrary interests of the world power centers. The nature of the complicated open systems shows that the steps made by the actors (diplomatic, information, military, economic) cause the cascades of aftermaths and effects expanding on the other arenas as well. While taking steps on the diplomatic arena it is necessary to be ready to the response and reaction on economic, military and other arenas, the scale change when bilateral initiatives acquire regional or even global character. Under such conditions it is impossible to speak about capability of any power centre, global or regional, separate country or a block to forecast the consequences of the steps taken.
Amid such conditions the statement made by the Republic of Armenia and Turkey about the readiness to establish diplomatic relations and to open the border without preconditions was rather unexpected and unpredictable. This is a bold step which effects could not have been predicted but which, in the opinion of all the parties, allows putting the region on the new level of stability. The initiative was supported by almost all the global power centers and there was an impression that the region is really on the threshold of the sudden breakthrough.
The fact that the parties differently see the ways of that breakthrough, how and on what principles the stability should be achieved was not clearly realized by the Armenian party. The motives and the intentions of the parties which were not fully understood and other factors brought to the failure of the “Blitzkrieg”, “storm and pressure” in the Armenian-Turkish relations. Under the current situation the analysis is required which allows to understand the reasons of why the Armenian-Turkish process may come to the standstill. In this context the grounds of the negotiation process, the principles on which the breakthrough should be based are of special interest.
The authorities of the RA and Turkey proceeded from the fact that they are able to make terms within the framework of the closed negotiations and then to pin other actors, their own societies down to the fact of the made agreement. The support from a number of the global power centers was considered enough to implement that diplomatic breakthrough. Embarking on the negotiations and intending to form a new regional reality Turkey and the RA proceeded from the possibility to ignore the existing realities, their ability to overcome the resistance in the region and in their own societies. But the South Caucasus, the Great Middle East is not the right place where the decisions which contradict to the centuries-old patterns can be taken.
The second point is connected with the usage of the predicate “without preconditions”. Its usage supposes the refusal of the parties from the “pre-history”, putting the history out of the general context of the negotiations. But in the South Caucasus which is impregnated with history, connections based on culture, spiritual relationship and antagonism it seems a bit doubtful. Armenian-Turkish relations cannot be interpreted as an isolated, closed system where the influence of the environment, historical and other contexts can be ignored. Such an approach to the region and bilateral relations has little chances to turn into a reality even at the cost of the convulsions and destabilization of the region. It is suffice to take a look at political history of the region for the recent several centuries.
If we suppose that the parties realizing the impossibility to untangle the centuries-old knots deliberately wanted to cut that Gordian knot of the Armenian-Turkish relations, such a step could have really been possible within the scope of the lightning and irreversible process. The “Blitzkrieg” had to allow opening a new, clean page in the relations between two peoples and states. In this case the document should have been brief, containing several clear distinct points which do not stand ambiguity. E.g. a) to establish diplomatic relations, b) to open the borders, c) to prohibit the parties to appeal to history, d) to accept the political realities which established in the region at the moment of conclusion.
But both the text of the protocols and the further actions of the parties showed that one cannot speak here about the fast process and “cutting the knot”. There are many conditions in the signed protocols which open a room both for establishing and breaking the relations, opening the borders and closing them again. Particularly, the protocols contain “historical” provisions and this immediately brings back to the issue of history. At what time point should the Armenian-Turkish relations be started, from which page: at the beginning of the 20th century when the Genocide took place and the Ottoman and Russian Empires were collapsing, in 1991 when the USSR collapsed and new states of the region were formed, in 1994 when the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was over, in 2008 after the 5-days war?
Thus, the protocols in their current form could not but to bring the Armenia-Turkish process to the dead end. The authorities of Turkey have already stated about the necessity to change the security environment of the South Caucasus, connecting it with the process of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Armenian-Turkish process quite reasonably sticks in historical, political, military realities of the region. It is impossible to jump over the precipice looking back at the same time.
Holding new talks and discussing in the bilateral format the relations between the states, it is necessary to understand that the realization of reached agreements is possible only within the scope of the collective security system of the South Caucasus. We should speak about the bilateral relations and talks in the general context of the collective security system of the South Caucasus.
This, in its turn, makes it necessary to consider in general terms the outlines of the system of the collective security of the South Caucasus. At present the considered projects of the collective system of the regional security of the South Caucasus treat the region within the scope of the linear paradigm. Furthermore, we can even speak about the attempts of the further simplifying of the picture by ignoring the separate elements and realities of the region. The formed simplified picture comes down to singling out several power poles which are considered as a homogeneous “geometrical points” which do not have inner structure and policy. Those points are connected in a kind of static structure on which the architecture of the regional security system is built. The collective system of regional security of the South Caucasus is based on a simplified linear model and in order to characterize it not only term “geometry” but even “arithmetic” can be used.
It is suffice to remember the recent initiatives which have been reduced to a “regional arithmetic”:
- Turkey’s initiative and Russian-Turkish platform (3+2) – three states of the South Caucasus plus Turkey and Russia;
- Iran’s initiative (3+3) - three states of the South Caucasus plus neighbouring countries (Iran, Turkey and Russia);
- Iran’s another initiative (3+3+1) – three states of the South Caucasus plus neighbouring countries (Iran, Turkey and Russia) and the EU.
In the best case not only arithmetic is reflected in the offered projects but also the multi-directional vectors in domestic and foreign policy when one can speak about the “regional algebra”, system of equations or matrix which is called to catch, reflect and interpret the region within the framework of one or another model.
But the “regional algebra” metaphor cannot reflect the situation in the region, which is sometimes called “the Eurasian Balkans”, adequately. Here while speaking and reasoning we have to use not the terms of a static structures, architecture but of a dynamic picture and processes in a complex non-linear system and turbulent environment. The look at the region in the light of non-linear metaphor and complex adaptive systems allows formulating the demands to the projected regional security system more vividly. First of all, it becomes clear that we have to set the limits, structural and functional elements of the system. Meanwhile, the attempts to simplify or even to exclude any element or function are unacceptable.
We can speak about the following actors which are a part of the security system of the South Caucasus: {[(3+2+1)+3]+2+1(?)},
where
(3+2+1) – are the three recognized states in the South Caucasus, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have the mixed status, and unrecognized NKR.
+3 are the three neighbouring states – Russia, Iran and Turkey;
+2 are the EU and the US;
+1(?) – China. After the recent initiatives in the Central Asia it is necessary to think about the role of China.
The picture within which the collective security system of the South Caucasus should be built may seem too complicated. But the specificity of the region is that it can pass to the point of the self-organized criticality when one poorly thought-out move or political step may cause avalanche-like processes which may go out of control. We have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that there are no simple solutions in the Caucasus. The South Caucasus was and is the region in regard of which the thesis of the strategists that “any difficult problem has simple, clear and …wrong solution” is right. The task of the politicians, regional expert community must proceed from the postulate “do not harm”, thus, firstly, trying to exclude short, simple solutions which take the region to the edge of chaos and disastrous scenarios.
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