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21.10.2005

Turkish-Syrian relationships

   

Artak Shakaryan 

The new stage of Turkish-Syrian relationships began in 1998, when the relations between these two states became extremely tense making a ground for military clashes.

The reason was the activation of PKK’s rebels. Ankara had facts that most of the PKK members used the Syrian banks in Turkey to finance their activity besides taking shelter and having military trainings in the territory of Syria. Moreover, PPK leader Abdulah Ojalan found shelter in Syria. Till 1987 Syria was refuting the fact that Ojalan was in their country or Syria anyhow supported PKK. However in July 1987, during the visit of Turkey’s Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, both countries signed a treaty committing them not to support any organization acting against the partner country. Anyhow Syria didn’t keep its promise together with the other ones given in August 1988, in April 1992, in November 1993, in April 1994.

In this way Damascus wanted to oppose Ankara, the later has built a few dams on the rivers Tigris and Euphrates and controlled the water resources to Syria. Turkey was able either to reduce it to a minimum, as it has often threatened, or to flood Syria. According to the treaty signed during the above mentioned Ozal’s visit Turkey committed itself to give Syria 500 cubic meters of water a second, though the later clamed that for satisfying its irrigation requirements it needs 700 cubic meters. Thus Ankara uses water resources to exert pressure on Syria and in 1991, as a result of intergovernmental crisis caused by Kurds, water provision was reduced to 165 cubic meters.

During Turkey’s National Security Council session in 1998 a decision was made to add proportionality of military units on the boarder with Syria as well as to make more precise the frontier territories’ minefields maps to cross them if necessary.

However in the same year after a few attempts the parties at last succeeded to reach diplomatic agreement. PKK’s leader Abdulah Ojalan was deported from Syria. Ankara and Damascus signed the agreement of Adana according to which a few PKK military and training camps were closed and its active members’ bank accounts were blocked in Syria. This roused a positive response among Turkey’s public, political and business circles. A decision was made to clear of mines the frontier territories which spurred the development of frontier trade. The frontier population’s visa regime was eased. Ten thousands of relatives were separated by the border since1939 when France on the ground of the League of Nations mandate gave Syria’s Aleqsandret sanjac to Turkey where it was named the vilaet of Hatay. The water provided to Syria reached 900 cubic meters a second.

After this gesture by Turkey Damascus stopped stressing up the territorial problem, which in all the Syrian official maps also included the vilaet of Hatay. Israel accepted this step of Syria with enthusiasm as it could save as a precedent for the Golan Heights.

* * *

There was an unprecedented development of intergovernmental relationships after the death of Syria’s president Hafez Asad. The son of the late, Bashar Asad, used the visit of Turkey’s president Ahmed Nejded Sezer to the burial for an attempt to regulate the relationships.

Turkey’s and Syria’s authorities paid more then 55 official visits during the period 2000-2005. In 2004 commodity circulation reached up to $1 billion.

The US army’s invasion to Iraq as well as the attaching of importance to the Kurds’ role in the Northern Iraq by the Washington were the main political reasons to improve Ankara-Damascus relations. Both Turkey and Syria were worried about the possibility of Kurdish independent stats. Both of the countries have thick population of Kurds (for about 14 million in Turkey and 4 million in Syria) the problems will only get worse if the Kurds get independence in Northern Iraq.

At that period the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relationships also furthered Ankara-Damascus relations’ strengthening, as the later one considered Turkish-Israeli cooperation to be anti-Syrian.

In January 2004 Syria’s president Bashar Asad became the first president to pay an official visit to Turkey after Syria’s independence. Turkish-Syrian relations were spurred into a new phase of mutual understanding. The presidents in both countries condemned the US intervention to Iraq as well as spoke in favor of Iraq’s territorial integrity, that’s to say against the Kurdish independent state.

Turkish-American and Turkish-Israeli cool relations as well as the improvement in Turkish-Iranian relations made a ground for a new possible regional axis: Turkey-Iran-Syria. All the three are very much worried about Kurdish problem, Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as Israeli and the US support to the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

In July 2004 Syria’s Prime Minister Muhamed Naji Otari paid an official visit to Ankara, and in December of the same year Turkey’s Prime Minister made a return visit to Damascus after 17 years of interruption. During this visit Recep Tayip Erdoghan signed an agreement with his colleague Muhamed Naji Otari on building a joint hydroelectric power station, besides Syria became the first Arabic country to sign an agreement on free trading zone with Turkey.

Both parties made a joint declaration owing to the positive results of the visit: “Turkey is an open gate to Europe for Syria, and Syria is an open gate to Arabic world for Turkey”.

In his interview given in January 2005 Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gule pointed out that Ankara was ready to develop relations with Tehran and Damascus: “The development of these relations interests Turkey from economic, political and military standpoint, as they further security and stability in the region”. He also added that the interests from economic ties with Syria were so big that the other responses couldn’t make Turkey reconsider them.

This was immediately followed by the visit of US military-diplomatic senior officials. The US made an attempt to review its cold relations with Turkey aiming to deter Ankara from making relations with Iran and Syria wormer.

However, on the 13th of April 2005 Turkey’s President Ahmed Necded Sezer made an official visit to Syria. Washington frequently claimed Sezer to invalidate its return visit to Damascus aiming to keep up Syria’s isolation. Anyway Turkey stressed up its independence in foreign policy and didn’t yield to the Bush administration’s pressure. At the same time the delegation headed by Turkey’s deputy foreign minister Ali Tuygani left for the USA to make the situation better.

* * *

In Turkish-American relations the problem of Damascus has an important role. One of the subjects discussed during Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdoghan’s visit to Washington in June 2005 was the Syrian issue.

During the press conference invited after the meeting with Bush, Erdoghan especially stressed up the role of Turkish “primary mission” in the Great Middle East project, among which was multy-party system creation in the regional countries (especially in Syria). In this way Erdoghan probably wanted to ease Washington’s criticism concerning to Ankara’s close relations with Damascus.

The appeals directed to Syria continued in the interview given to “The New York Times”, where Turkey’s Prime Minister, apparently taking up the new role, clamed Syria to follow the example of Turkey.

* * *

Turkey’s vague European future prompts it not to ignore the alternative of claiming the role of the leader in the Middle East. The result of such a policy we can see in Turkey’s wormer relations with its neighbors and America’s willingness to include Ankara in its Great Middle East project.

In the near future Turkey will try to keep worm relations with Syria aiming to reach cooperation in the framework of the Great Middle East project.

As a leader state of this project Turkey will continue offering its mediation in Syria-Israeli conflict settlement process as well as will be a negotiator in Washington-Damascus dialogue.

At the same time the unsolved water and territorial problems as well as possible external spurs can seriously hamper Turkish-Syrian relations’ development.


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