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04.12.2006

New “Cold War” and transformation of “deterring strategy”

   

Gagik Harutyunyan 

The character of the United States-Russian relations today is sometimes compared with the First “Cold War” (CW) (for the terminology of this word combination see the appendix) in the second half of the 20th century. This war was a tough confrontation between the geo-ideological and geopolitical projects, the supporters of which (sometimes against their will) are united round the US and the USSR. It’s worth mentioning that the competition of the above mentioned states has begun still at the period of World War II: “the alliances” of that time were struggling not only against their common enemy Germany and often also against each other. That’s to say the “allied” phase of US-USSR relations already had a considerable part of elements of the future classical Cold War.

Such a situation may be considered to be natural, as the USSR-Germany confrontation and USSR-USA-Great Britain alliance during World War II may to some extent be regarded as “political anomaly”. From geopolitical and ideological standpoint the USSR and Germany had common interests, which can not be said about USSR-US-Great Britain relations of pragmatic character, which were the outcome of the present situation. As a matter of fact there were contradictions of principal character between Germany and US-Great Britain. In this context USSR-Germany confrontation may be considered to be a victory of Anglo-American diplomacy. The perception of this reality is very important to appreciate the present political processes adequately.

While considering today’s realities, let’s try to take into account the principal transformations, which took place in the world after the collapse of the USSR. The present period is defined as a transition from the unipolar system to the multipolar and in this “transitional” phase two processes are developing in parallel:

  • The main geopolitical elements, which already condition or in the near future will condition multipolar logic of international relations, are in the phase of military-political, economic and ideological formation.
  • One may notice reduction of the US superiority: Today even the American political elite accepts that even the superpower like the US is not able “to govern” the world all alone and it is already working out scenarios of “organized retreat” (the discussions on withdrawing the American troops from Iraq in political and expert circles have come to prove such an attitude).

The above mentioned realities outline the multipolar system already existing in this or that way today with the element of international relations’ “Cold War” logic. At the same time one should state as a fact that the First and the Second Cold Wars have both common things and differences of principal character. We’ll try to present these similarities and differences briefly.

Synthetic ideologies with civilization or national elements and economic systems. The First CW was the confrontation of two economic-ideological models, “liberal democratic” and “communist totalitarian”, diametrically opposite, pretending to be called universal. At present the situation is quite different.

From the first sight it may seem that after the collapse of the USSR, liberal economic model is prevailing in the global field. However this model acquires quite different form and shape in different political zones and countries1. Let’s also mention that in comparison with the previous one, today transnational corporations are also considered to be international economic actors the construction and mode of action of which often have totalitarian character and their own interests sometimes prevail over the national interests of their “country of registration”.

The same thing may be said about ideological conceptions. It seems that the world is ruled by democracy. Only South Korea and somehow Cuba have remained faithful to “genuine communism”. Today even “socialistic” China has renounced the slogans like “class struggle” and the others making the essence of communist ideology, and next to the eastern “royal residences” work parliaments and other democratic institutions. At the same time it is not well grounded to speak about “the prevailed universal democratic model”, as the idea of “democracy” in different political zones and countries is often perceived and implemented in quite different ways. In this connection it is noteworthy that even the advocates of “genuine” and “universal” democracy and liberalism, the US and Great Britain, have borrowed some totalitarian elements from their former adversary communist model and in the logical field have acquired transnational, so called “ultranationalistic” shades.

The above mentioned realities have come to prove that in spite of the victory won in the Cold War, “universal and genuine” liberal economic models and democratic ideological conceptions don’t prevail. Instead of them work the modified, somehow synthetic ideologies and economic approaches expressing political and national values2. As a result, ideological and economic systems working in the world today have similarities and contradictions of principle character. This complex of contradictions of political and national character dictates “Cold War” logic of up-to-date international relations.

“Deterring policy-2”: As it is known during the First Cold War the American policy was lead by the conception of “deterring strategy”3. Such a strategy was justified and had objective groundings. The USSR won absolute military victory at World War II. As a result was created “a communist empire” with unprecedented great territory stretching form Beijing to Berlin. This empire was armed with attacking ideology, had a great number of armed forces forged at the war, as a country which defeated fascism it had high international prestige and was quickly re-establishing its economy in spite of human and material losses suffered at the war. At the same time the USSR political leadership was not satisfied with the results of the war: it was considered that geopolitical acquisitions, especially in the western and southern directions, could be larger scaled.

In the above mentioned context it is natural that the united West leaded by the United States was to unite its resources to deter the expansion of such a super power. The nuclear weapon was used as the main tool for carrying out such a policy. Monopolistic ownership of this weapon by the US was the only obstacle to deter the USSR in the first phase of the Cold War. Later on balance in the nuclear field practically excluded US-USSR face to face contradiction.

At present the situation has completely changed as the US is in the role of an attacking state with absolute military priority. Political leadership of that super power also was not satisfied with the absolute victory at the First Cold War, as a result of which was established the United State’s political leading role. “Antiterrorism war” unleashed on September 11, 2001 and its component parts (various “black lists” and publication of “evil axis”), the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq aimed at taking human and row material resources under global control. At present the efforts of those political actors are directed “to deter” the pretensions of that super power and to preserve their own sovereignty, that’s to say “deterring policy” is carried out against the US. One may state as a fact that today’s Cold War conducted against the US is a struggle for civilization or national sovereignty.

It is noteworthy that like in the past, today also the nuclear weapon is one of the main “deterring” tools. According to expert approaches, still in 1990s Russia’s nuclear potential was the only factor preserving that power’s sovereignty. The nuclear programs of Iran, North Korea (in case of the latter in a perverted version) and the other countries trying to follow their example (the number of which is enlarging) in this or that extent had the same meaning.

At the same time the strategy of “nuclear deterring” (one of the main theorists of which was Henry Kissinger) in case of the same Iran or North Korea is not the very mechanism of “symmetric deterring” which existed in the epoch of US-USSR arms race4. In that phase it was supposed that as a result of nuclear attack the parties would strike crushing blows and inflect unrestorable loses to each other. At present the approaches of the nuclear states have more asymmetric character and bring to the blow of “partial requital” as a result of which the US military basses or alliances and in some cases the very environment may suffer serious losses.

1 For example see Стивен Роузфилд, «Сравнительная экономика стран мира», РОССПЕН, Москва, 2004.

2 In this context it is noteworthy an ideological thesis on “sovereign democracy” widely used in Russia recently.

3 Let’s notice that that policy is more characteristic to the first phase of UE-USSR relations. Since 1970s the Americans took the military initiative and from that on the term of “deterring policy” had more a propagandistic character.

4 During the first Cold War was also sometimes voiced readiness to give “asymmetric” answer to the US threats, especially by Moscow. However “asymmetry” had a technical meaning and didn’t disturb “symmetric” development of “arms race”.

Appendix

On the terminology of the word combination of “Cold War”

By different researchers the origin of the word combination of “Cold War” is interpreted in different ways. In the past almost all the resources showed that this expression was first used by an American businessman and politician Bernard Baruch in his speech in senate in 1947. However, according to information provided in the web page serving the US state department (Washington ProFile, #89(720), 29.10.2006), the author of that term is a popular English writer and publicist George Orwell, who used this word combination still on October 19, 1945 in his essay published in “Tribune” after which it began circulating in information field.

The roots of other expressions characteristic to Cold War period lead to the well known speech given by Winston Churchill in Fulton (USA) on March 5, 1946, when he put the expression of “iron curtains” into circulation. In this connection let’s notice that in that speech Churchill also said that “English speaking” brother nations should unite to struggle against tyranny, which, as a matter of fact, is “ethnocratic” approach to the risen problems.

The author of the term “deterring policy” peculiar to the strategy carried out by the US against the USSR during the Cold War was co-worker of the US embassy in Moscow Gorge Cenan, who expressed his ides on “Soviet expansion” in his reports (they were named “a long telegram”) directed to Washington in 1947 (it is noteworthy that in his article published in “Foreign Affairs “ G. Cenon predicted Soviet system’s collapse).

The above mentioned terms were just definitions which were (from the definition of the Cold war are formally excluded for example Korean, Vietnamese and Afghan wars, in which the parties were carrying on more then heated war against each other) expressing confrontation of “capitalistic” and “socialistic” “camps” after world war II. At the same time “Cold War” terminology characterizes the very information-physiological atmosphere the competing parties were in more then half a century.


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