THE OBAMA VISIT TO TURKEY: THE BROADER CONTEXT
Richard Giragosian is the director of the Yerevan-based Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS).
While Armenia views today’s Barack Obama-Abdullah Gul meetings through the prism of border relations and genocide recognition, from the broader perspective of US national interests, Turkey is seen to now hold particular strategic significance, for three main reasons.
First, the Obama Administration recognizes Turkey’s more recent role as a resurgent regional actor, with influence and access in the broader Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Within this context, the Obama Administration is now seeking to leverage Turkey as a mediator or facilitator to deal with Syria and Israel and possibly even Afghanistan and Pakistan. Washington is also now considering a new Turkish role in supporting the US approach toward Iran as well.
Secondly, for the US, especially in the wake of the August 2008 war in Georgia, there is a new need for stability and security in the South Caucasus region. And for American interests, the possible breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations, and the resulting benefits of open borders and at least normal diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan, offers a dynamic opportunity for greater regional stability.
Third, from the American perspective, Turkish cooperation is an essential requirement for US military needs in Iraq and even Afghanistan, as Turkey serves as a vital center for logistics and military operations in both theaters. In light of this broader context, the issues of the Armenian Genocide, and even Cyprus, are actually now seen as secondary considerations.
Yet as the aura of the Obama visit will soon start to fade, the limits of US-Turkish relations will become clearer, and even more considerable. The inherent limits of Turkey’s role in support of the US strategic agenda are rooted in the reverse of the very same three factor outlined above.
First, no matter how attractive Turkey’s new effort to reassert its role in the broader regions of the Middle East, Black Sea and the Caucasus, this is very much a Turkish initiative—based on Turkish interests and not designed to please or support either the US or the European Union. In fact, there is now clear evidence to the contrary, as Turkish leaders have strongly condemned Israel for its actions in Gaza, imposed strict new limits on NATO activities in the Black Sea and have even made it clear that the Turkish initiative in the Caucasus has more in common with Russian interests than with American goals. And judging by past Turkish efforts, such as inviting the leaders of both Iran and Sudan to Turkey, it does not seem very likely that Ankara will be too anxious to support Washington’s foreign policy agenda, no matter how much they may like Obama (or his wife).
Second, Turkey was still the only NATO member to adopt a position of “neutrality” during the Russia-Georgia war, and actually imposed limits on US Navy ships attempting to reach Georgia during the crisis – each move reflecting its now close relationship with Russia, not Washington. And for the Caucasus, Turkey not only announced its “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” without even informing the US (or NATO) in advance, it even withheld support for the US bid to obtain “observer” status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization.
And third, in light of the Turkish perception of a threat from the emergence of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the only real ally for the Americans in Iraq, it is also unlikely that Turkey will assist or support US military operations in Iraq in any sincere or meaningful way. Rather, the Iraq and Kurdish issues only promise to remain fundamental obstacles in US-Turkish military relations for some time to come.Although the Obama visit can be seen as an important and symbolic event, Turkish and US interests seem likely to only diverge even further, while Turkey and Russia become closer. Such a more realistic assessment also affirms that the real burden for Turkish-Armenian relations rests with Ankara, not Yerevan or Washington.
For these reasons, President Obama seems unlikely to offer any clear or coherent recognition of the Armenian Genocide on this April 24. Beyond the immediacy of “will he/won’t he” speculation of using the g-word, Turkish-American relations over the coming months may actually serve to bolster, not weaken, Obama’s campaign promises to pursuing a strong and sincere recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
6 April 2009
ArmeniaNow.com
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