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19.05.2008

THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORT ON ISLAM IN AZERBAIJAN

   

Araks Pashayan

International Crisis Group has published a report titled “Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and the State,” Europe Report No. 191-25, 25 March, 2008, www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/191_azerbaijan_independent_islam_and_the_state.pdf. The report consists of four parts, Conclusion and Appendices.

In the first part (Introduction) consisting of two subparts – “The secular tradition” and “Terrorism convictions” – is in outline taken up the issue of advent and further spread of Islam in Azerbaijan. Since the 16th century Shiite Islam has been dominating in the territory of present Azerbaijan except for its northern part, where Sunni Islam is prevailing because of Persian influence. The conclusion of Turkmenchay Treaty between the Russian Empire and Persia in 1828 resulted detachment of Azerbaijanis inhabited in Azerbaijan and Iran. As a result czarism increased its influence on Azerbaijani territory stimulating russfication and marginalization of Islam. Later on, under the Soviet rule, was formed a secular society. Most of the mosques were closed and the religious figures were persecuted. Consequently, rehabilitation of religious consciousness turned up to be a very difficult task even in 1991, when Azerbaijan declared its independence. Today Azerbaijan is a secular state and only a little part of the Azerbaijani citizens follows the basic rules of Islam. According to a pall result 7.2% of population is truly religious, 49.7% believe in God, but follow the principles of Islam in their daily life. The Islamic identity mainly bases on culture and ethnicity, but not at all on religion. 2/3 of the population in Azerbaijan are Shiite, 1/3 are Sunnite. The body of religious groups cooperates with the government and recognizes the spiritual authority supported by the state and ruled by the Muslims of Caucasus. Only separate religious groups consider themselves to be independent and don’t obey the control. The inhabitants of northern and southern regions are more religious. Nardaran district to the north of Baku is also considered to be quite religious.

Although Azerbaijan is considered to be a secular state, however, its neighborhood to Iran, Turkey and Dagestan as a part of Russia, as well as immediate proximity to the Near East is a target for the external Islamic influence. In 1990s radical Islamic movements were launched in Azerbaijan. The first international radical organization emerged in Azerbaijan was “Al-Jihad” having ties with “Al-Qaeda.” Together with “Al-Qaeda” there were also “Jeishullah,” “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” “Islamic army of the Caucasus”, “Jamaat al-Muwahiddun” the activity of which was, as a rule, neutralized by the authorities. As a matter of fact, during the last few years Azerbaijan was periodically facing the possibility of sheltering radical Islam on its territory, however, the authorities managed to avert these challenges by means of violent acts representing them as outward impositions.

The second part (“Foreign influences”) consists of four sub-parts: “Middle East,” “Dagestan” and Chechnya,” “Iran” and “Turkey.” The young Azerbaijanis who went to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to study at the end of 1980s and in the beginning of 1990s, as well as pilgrims brought Salafi Islam into Azerbaijan which in the country was associated with the word Wahhabism. As a matter of fact Salafi Islam was brought from the Middle East as an attempt to feel the spiritual vacuum created after the declaration of independence, and the youth were among the first to adopt it. For about 10.000 followers of Salafism were counted in the country, there were a number of Salafi organizations – “The Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (which restored 62 mosques, 4 of which – in Baku and financed the construction of Abu Bakr mosque built in Baku), the branch of the Saudi “International Islamic Charitable Organization” and others.

The role of Mujahids from other Arabic and Middle Eastern countries at war in Chechnya (also passing through the territory of Dagestan and Turkey) was not of little importance. The national minorities inhabited in the country’s northern part – Lezgins, Avars and Tsakhurs have close ties with Dagestan. Moreover, the Chechen refugees settled in Azerbaijan in 2000-2001 (for about 10.000 people) were the carriers of Salafi ideas. Some Azerbaijanis adhered either to Dagestan Jamaat (military groupings) or Chechen insurgents. According to official data for about 300 Azerbaijanis went to be trained in the training camps of Chechnya and Dagestan. One can fallow such tendencies today as well.

After the independence was gained Azerbaijan little by little got under more intensified Iranian influence. “Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation” was helping Azerbaijan after the Nagorno-Karabakh war and a big quaintly of Iranian literature was brought into the country. In 1991 was established “Islamic party of Azerbaijan,” however, the authorities were afraid that Iran would use that structure to shatter secular principles and in 1995 the party was prohibited to work. There was a pro-Iran branch of “Hezbollah”: in 2000 the authorities accuse its members of the assassination of the Azerbaijani scientist Zia Buniatov (1997). In 2001 were closed all the 22 Iranian religious schools – madrasa.

Though Azerbaijan is a Shiite state, it is quite different from Iran in the context of religious institutionalism as there isn’t Shiite spiritual hierarchy and no marja’ at-taklid – a religious primary source on which the religious people must appeal to; the Azerbaijani Sheikh ul-Islam is not considered to be the absolute interpreter of dogmas and holly lows of Islam. That is why the Iranian missionaries could have an influence in some Shiite frames. As a result, they were exiled from the country by 2000.

Today the religious influence of Iran is too weak, at the same time “Iranian cultural center” and “Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation” are still existing. In all probability Iran is establishing relations with the Tallish inhabited in the south of Azerbaijan. The Iranian “Sokhar” TV channel, also broadcasted in the South of Azerbaijan, periodically speaks about the rights of Tallish national minorities and condemns the authorities of Baku.

After independence was gained, the Turkish Sunni Islam took roots in Azerbaijan: this course is acceptable for the authorities and adequate with the model of the secular Azerbaijani state. The Azerbaijani authorities are in active cooperation with Turkey in the matters concerning religion. Turkey financed restoring of a number of mosques, some clergymen were retrained there, and many Azerbaijani students go to Turkish Islamic high-schools. Baku will accept entering of Turkish Islam into the country through governmental channels, however, there are such non-official Turkish circles in Azerbaijan as the movement of Fethullah Gulen, and, in particular, Nursu groups which Allah-Shukur Pashazade announced to be “unwanted.

The third part which is titled “Independent Islamic groups”, includes the first sub-part called “Salafi groups” is spoken about Baku, northern Azerbaijan, Sallafis and Khawarijs. The main emphasis here is put on the community of Baku based Abu Bakr mosque and its charismatic young leader Hamet Suleymanov, who got education in Saudi Arabia.

The second sub-part is called “Independent Shiits.” The main stress here is put on the community of Juma mosque, are presented other independent directions, as well as the Nardaran events in 2002 and 2006.

The fourth part titled “The state reaction” is divided into the following two subparts: “State control of religion” (which includes the subjects “legislative field,” “The state committee for work with religious organizations,” “The reform of the Caucasus Board of Muslims”) and “Sate repression.”

In the fourth part are roughly presented the regulations fixed in the low “on religious rights and institutions,” is considered the issue of Islam and state interrelations.

The following conclusions are drawn in closing: independent religious communities not under the control of the Caucasus Board of Muslims pose no threat neither to authorities, nor for the country’s secular principles. At the same time, there is no group considered to be “Jihadist.” A few groups, which openly speak about creation of Islamic state, don’t have enough strategic conceptions and mechanisms of influence to realize their program. However, the authorities exaggerate the threats posed by Islam, to ground the repressions and control religious life of those tending to politicization and radicalization as a result violent persecution by police.

It is also mentioned that the government began paying special attention to moderate religious groups. That’s to say, much effort must be exerted to organize religious education of middle-aged citizens, the clergymen should be encouraged, public discourses should be organized on Islam and Islamized institutions drawing in free and official clergymen, scientist and non-governmental representatives. In their turn, the independent religious communities, in particular Salafi groups, must worn their members about the possibility of terrorism and militant Islam and establish a dialogue with the government and Islam representatives.

In the Appendices is inserted the map of Azerbaijan as well as information about the activity, objectives and geography of the International Crisis Group.

The International Crisis Group report on “Azerbaijan, Independent Islam and the state” is of great importance for us and helps to reveal a number of realities relating to the Islamic factor in Azerbaijan.


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