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16.07.2015

PROPAGANDA, AGITATION, MANIPULATION AND PERSUASION

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Anna Zhamakochyan
Head of the Noravank Foundation’s Center for Information Studies

Propaganda and agitation

The notion of propaganda (Latin propagare, meaning to spread or to propagate) has originated in ecclesial context, in relation to preaching and missionary activities. The first known usage of this term is dated 1718, which was related to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (Congregatio de propaganda fide) established in early 1620s to control missionary activities in foreign countries.1 Since 1790 the term gained a meaning of a movement aimed at spreading any practice and ideology.

In Armenian language propaganda is often replaced with the words քարոզ or քարոզչություն (karoz or karozchutyun). This is a borrowing from Assyrian language kārōzā, which meant herald, messenger (of the king, general, city mayor, God or state) and over the ages it gained the meanings of deacon’s prayer (order), festive ode, writing interpretation or speech.2 In Grabar (Old Armenian), karoz has the meanings of call, announcement, praise and the verb karozel means to inform or influence, announce loudly, presage, preach gospel.3

As seen, in medieval thinking the informing and influencing were fused. The preacher informed to influence, which appears rationally positive. It points to the preacher’s perspective, which understandably, may have diametrically opposite denotation in the perspective of the one who is preached. For example, this can be viewed as a challenge posed by another church or state to convert from one’s religion, faith, change the rituals and traditions. Despite etymological and direct meaning differences, the Armenian word karoz has similar connotation of spreading the word of God and church, the same as propaganda does. Hence, it should not surprise that in modern Armenian language karoz and propaganda are quasi-synonyms. Actually, at the beginning of the 20th century the verb karozel was used in a full meaning of spreading political ideas.4

In the Soviet context, the word agitation was used in parallel to propaganda, as well as their combination “agitprop”, a portmanteau denoting the departments of agitation and propaganda of communist party committees, their leaders or their activities. The concept of agitation (Latin agitatio; to drive, to put in motion)5 placed even more emphasis on the dimension of causing others to act in line with one’s political objectives. In the explanatory Dictionary of the modern Armenian Language (published in 1969)6 interprets agitation as “oral and written activities aiming at influencing wide masses in a certain political direction”.7 In essence, as a form of effecting propaganda, agitation is often used in political jargon as an equivalent of propaganda (e.g. in ABBY Lingvo the English term agitation is explained as agitation-propagandistic activity…). In Soviet-published Armenian dictionaries the word agitation is not translated, but rather, its figurative sense is noted as to persuade. However, in the political jargon of post-Soviet Armenia agitation is replaced by notions of քարոզարշավ (karozarshav) and քարոզչություն (karozchutyun).8 As a result, in modern political language karozchutyun often entails both propaganda and agitation, without letting to note the differences between the two. Hence, in theoretical narratives, where the individual features of the terms are important, there is a need to predefine or clarify the meanings of the concepts. Given the religious contextual commonality of karoz and propaganda, their quasi-synonymous usage appears reasonable, whereas agitation (ագիտացիա) can be left as is, without translation. This is especially because nowadays there are usable phrasings to substitute agitation, such as իրազեկում (awareness), արշավներ (campaigns), տեղեկատվական արշավներ (information campaigns), etc.

The Possibility of Positive Propaganda

Propaganda is a phenomenon as old as religion, but it also relates to modern history, because the most elaborate and massive forms of it appeared in modernity and continue to enhance daily in the current technologized world.

Propaganda received a negative connotation in the West due to the experience of the world wars, bolshevism, Nazism and Stalinism when the harshest methods of mass propaganda were developed and utilized, leaving the most tragic ramifications in the perception of the modern Western culture.

As early as 1928, one of the first propaganda theorists, E. Bernays wrote about the negative connotation of this word in his book titled Propaganda: “I am aware that the word "propaganda" carries to many minds an unpleasant connotation. Yet whether, in any instance, propaganda is good or bad depends upon the merit of the cause urged, and the correctness of the information published”.9 In this period, thus, it was still possible to talk about whether propaganda is good or bad. In the days of the World War I, E. Bernays cooperated with the U.S. Committee on Public Information (CPI)10 and strived to maintain the positive overtone of the term propaganda. However, propaganda could no longer be put in a positive sense in Western social sciences after the World War II and Holocaust, because of the terrible consequences it left.

Therefore, starting mid-20th century the Western theorists rejected the notion of positive propaganda and replaced it with other wordings. For example, E. Bernays used the term Public Relations. He is remembered today as one of the founding fathers of Public Relations theory and practice, in which we notice the origins of interrelation between propaganda and PR. In late 20th century modern philosopher Noam Chomsky questioned the positive perception of PR as well, critically calling it a “public relations industry”. In his public speeches and works Chomsky calls Bernays “kind of the public relations industry guru” and points out adverse effects of latter’s activities, such as getting women to smoke in order to increase cigarette sales, and engineering the public relations effort behind the U.S.-backed coup which overthrew the democratic government of Guatemala for the interests of United Fruit Company.11

In post-Soviet social science and public consciousness, though, bivalent perception of propaganda remains, one of the reasons for which is that perhaps, Soviet social sciences were shielded and isolated from the western influences. A second reason is the low level of reconceptualization of Stalinism experience in the post-Soviet social sciences. The question of how could fascism (and Stalinism) emerge in Europe that bore the poignancy of humanism and enlightenment12, the answer to which was much sought by Western thinkers after the World War II, is yet to be voiced in clearer manner in post-Soviet societies. Searching for answers to this question inevitably leads to an encounter with the darker side of any good-intended propaganda and enlightenment, which forces to reconsider the positive meaning of the notion. And the third reason is the religiousness in the ex-Soviet countries that rose in response to the former Soviet atheism, due to which the phenomenon of propaganda (that is, preaching) maintains its positive connotation in this part of the world.

Therefore, use of the Armenian word karozchutyun or the Russian пропаганда in neutral or positive meanings can be observed frequently, as they never underwent the same evolution in social sciences, as propaganda did.

Propaganda and Democracy

As it was mentioned, the book Propaganda by E. Bernays (1928) had a key role in the history of theory and practice of propaganda. The author considers propaganda “a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized” and “an important element in democratic society”. He contends that in market economy, where there are no “committees of wise men” who would make choices for us, propaganda becomes a necessity. Thus, Bernays justifies the rule of elites over masses and the propaganda based on human subconscious and unconscious urges. He starts the book with the following reasoning: “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of. This is a logical result of the way in which our democratic society is organized”.13

Theoretic elaborations of E. Bernays (as well as many other media-theorists) were in part based on ideas of his uncle Sigmund Freud about the existence of the sub-consciousness and unconsciousness in addition to consciousness. This reinforced doubts about rational behavior of humans, and consequently, “the successful propagandist must understand the true motives and not be content to accept the reasons which men give for what they do”.14

His other theoretical cornerstone was formed by Walter Lippmann’s approaches. Lippmann was a colleague of Bernays at the U.S. Committee on Public Information, a criticist of democratic societies that have denied socialist ideas. He questioned the ability of “ignorant many” to form their own opinion. He suggested that: “The individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs. I cannot imagine how he could know, and there is not the least reason for thinking, as mystical democrats have thought, that the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of people can produce a continuous directing force in public affairs”.15 In Public Opinion written earlier (1922) he formulates propaganda as “the effort to alter the picture to which men respond, to substitute one social pattern for another”.16 However, unlike Bernays, Lippmann believed propaganda is an indicator of absence of democracy. He argued that propaganda necessarily implies censorship and a certain barrier between the public and the event. In his opinion, the man does not fully know his environment, but rather, indirectly, through an imagined “pseudo-environment” in his mind. Therefore, in order to build a picture of real environment one must affect the formation of the pseudo-environment through managing the necessary conditions: “Access to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-environment that he thinks wise or desirable.” Through inaccessibility of the event in the environment the elite gains an ability to manipulate the event and provide the public with limited information. Although for Lippmann propaganda is not always negative, but remains a tool for the elites to pursue their own objectives, with the argument unaffected regardless of how “patriotic” those are. He brings an example of adverse effects caused by French military leadership constantly exaggerating the German casualties: “A group of men, who can prevent independent access to the event, arrange the news of it to suit their purpose. That the purpose was in this case patriotic does not affect the argument at all. They used their power to make the Allied publics see affairs as they desired them to be seen”.17

By and large Lippmann left the gravity of the problem of propaganda unresolved. However, he prioritized re-education that could help bring the public opinions into grip with the environment. He first of all means learning psychoanalytic knowledge, which would allow disentangling the ideas from affiliations of some sort with the Ego and make them some things subject to critical analysis. Psychoanalysis helps separate the idea from subjective part of Ego, objectify it, and make it so much more open to correction by new data and re-conceptualization.

Thus, he believes the “enormous censoring, stereotyping, and dramatizing apparatus can be liquidated” through institutes and education that make the reality accessible to people. This is something that would seem naïve in the eyes of late 20th century postmodernists (as for example, Louis Althusser suggested that education itself should be viewed as “Ideological State Apparatus” to form the subject and reality.”

Propaganda/Manipulation, or Persuasion?

The topic of propaganda then and now remains open for discussion by social scientists, especially in conditions of information technologies development, with media-organizations turning into complex structures and globalizing. Then how to treat the information flows that no doubt cannot be inconsequential data, but to one degree or another influence people’s decision-making, viewpoints and behavior. For resolving this problem, in a book titled Propaganda and Persuasion (1st ed. in 1986) Jowett and O’Donnell differentiate informative discourse from propaganda, with the former considered as persuasion. The difference is that informative discourse or persuasion affects receivers “by allowing them to acquire information, understand their world, and learn”.18 Obviously, the persuaders seek influencing the persuadees to adopt their views, but the authors contend that they do not cast aside the interests of persuadees19. Conversely, propaganda attempts to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist, regardless whether it is in receivers’ interest or not20. Jowett and O’Donnell note that propagandists often take up the role of persuader, though in fact promoting their own interests, sometimes at the expense of the recipients: “The point is that the propagandist does not regard the well-being of the audience as a primary concern. The propagandist is likely to be detached from the recipients”. 21

Hence, Jowett and O’Donnell distinguish propaganda from persuasion at the level of their purpose, which points to the issue of uncovering the objectives of an informative discourse. The problem is, similarly to persuasion, propaganda also uses informative discourse. An ordinary reader, listener or viewer may have hard time telling apart propaganda and responsible informative discourse.

What Jowett and O’Donnell consider propaganda is viewed by some theorists as manipulation. 22 This is another concept that often complements or substitutes propaganda. In Armenian language manipulation is translated as ձեռնածություն (dzernatzutyun), which has synonymous meanings to jugglery, witchcraft and deceit.23 Manipulation, akin to the Armenian dzernatzutyun has a more distinctly negative connotation, as it implies controlling emotions, viewpoints and even behavior, without the person’s knowledge, will and often against his/her interests.

Manipulation is performed through management of discourses and events (e.g. by organizing provocations that cause predictable mental or behavioral response). The first method is more widely used and often accompanies the second one. Accordingly, manipulation first of all means communicative and symbolic interaction practices of the discursive influence on individuals.

In this sense, the discourse analysis framework, which includes both discourse and social context levels, is the most appropriate method to study manipulations.

For example, T.A. Van Dijk offers a triangulated approach, which is based not only on intentions of the propagandist or manipulator, but prioritizes its consequences. In his works written in various years, and particularly in the article titled Discourse and Manipulation24, Van Dijk views manipulation as a form of:

1. social power abuse,

2. cognitive mind control,

3. discursive interaction.

Van Dijk argues that ‘triangulation’ framework explicitly links discourse, cognition and society. It is paramount in systemic understanding of the structures of manipulation and processes it involves.

Socially, manipulation is defined as “illegitimate domination that (re)produces, or may reproduce, social inequality”. Manipulation not only involves power, but specifically abuse of power, that is, domination. Manipulator exercises illegitimate influence by means of discourse, making others believe or do things that are in the interest of the manipulator, and hence, reinforcing inequality.

Those manipulated are people, so manipulation process involves manipulating their minds, and therefore the second issue, cognition is important. At the cognition level, “manipulation as mind control involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies”. Discursively, at the level of texts, pictures and talk, “manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse, such as emphasizing Our good things, and emphasizing Their bad things”. It is important though to consider the situation where a discursive event takes place: discourse structures may be interpreted as manipulative in one situation, while not in some others.

According to the author, none of these three levels can be skipped or reduced to one another and all three of them are needed in an integrated theory to understand manipulation. Van Dijk’s model shows how manipulation is different from legitimate mind control, for instance in persuasion and providing information. In persuasion the interlocutors are free to believe or act as they please, depending on whether or not they accept the arguments of the persuader, whereas in manipulation recipients are typically assigned a more passive role: they are “victims” of manipulation.25 Van Dijk believes this negative consequence occurs when the recipients are unable to understand the real intentions or to see the full consequences of the agenda advocated by the manipulator. This may be especially the case when the recipients lack the specific knowledge or information that might be used to resist manipulation. Van Dijk brings the example is governmental and/or media discourse about immigrants in European countries, so that ordinary citizens blame the bad state of the economy (e.g. unemployment) on immigrants and do not notice shortcomings of government policies.

Van Dijk notes that the boundary between (illegitimate) manipulation and (legitimate) persuasion is fuzzy and context-dependent. He then provisionally assumes that the crucial criteria are that people are being acted upon against their fully conscious will and interests, and that manipulation is in the best interests of the manipulator.

Perhaps, answers about the differences between propaganda, manipulation and persuasion offered by Jowett, O’Donnell and Van Dijk bring up even more questions, such as those about the ability to recognize, define and formulate one’s own interests. In a way, this is exactly the value of their approaches, which allow us having deeper thoughts about the questions that pop up in our minds.

1 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda

2 Գ. Ջահուկյան, Հայերեն ստուգաբանական բառարան, «Ասողիկ», Երևան, 2010, էջ 779 կամ http://www.na-yiri.com/imagedDictionaryBrowser.jsp?dictionaryId=51&pageNumber=1200&query=%D6%84%D5%A1%D6%80%D5%B8%D5%A6 և այլ բառարաններ, նույն կայքից։

3 Ռ.Ս. Ղազարեան, Գրաբարի հոմանիշների բառարան, Մեծի Տանն Կիլիկիոյ Կաթողիկոսութիւն, Անթիլիաս, 2006, էջ 692 կամ http://www.nayiri.com/imagedDictionaryBrowser.jsp?dictionaryId=36&query=%D6%84-%D5%A1%D6%80%D5%B8%D5%A6

4 See, for example: «Մի շարք մարդիկ գրչով, խօսքով քարոզում էին ազատութիւն», Ալ. Խատիսյան (1938, մայիս); https://nakhshkaryan.wordpress.com/category/%D5%B0%D5%A1%D5%B5%D5%A1%D5%BD%D5%BF%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%AB-%D5%A1%D5%BC%D5%A1%D5%BB%D5%AB%D5%B6-%D5%B0%D5%A1%D5%B6%-D6%80%D5%A1%D5%BA%D5%A5%D5%BF%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B6/

5 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=agitation&allowed_in_frame=0

6 http://www.nayiri.com/imagedDictionaryBrowser.jsp?dictionaryId=29&query=%D5%A1%D5%A3%D5%AB%D5%BF%D5%A1%D6%81%D5%AB%D5%A1

7 http://www.nayiri.com/imagedDictionaryBrowser.jsp?dictionaryId=24&query=%D5%A1%D5%A3%D5%AB%D5%BF%D5%A1%D6%81%D5%AB%D5%A1

8 For example, in the context of election campaign or advocating a movement.

9 Edward Bernays, Propaganda, Routledge, 1928, p. 20.

10 This committee was in charge of war propaganda inside the USA during the World War I.

11 For example, Chomsky’s article What Makes Mainstream Media Mainstream in Z Magazine (October, 1997).

12 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in preface to their Dialectic of Enlightenment published two years after the war, in June 1947, wrote that what they set out to do “was nothing less than to explain why humanity, instead of entering a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism."

13 Edward Bernays, Propaganda, Routledge: 1928, p. 10.

14 Ibid, p. 52.

15 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public, Harcourt, Brace: 1925, p. 39.

16 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, Harcourt, Brace: 1922, p. 19.

17 Ibid, p. 28

18 Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage: 2006, p. 30

19 Ibid, pp. 31-32

20 Ibid, p. 7

21 Ibid, p. 44

22 Donna L. Lillian Modality, Persuasion and Manipulation in Canadian Conservative Discourse // Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines. 2008. Vol 2 (1), 1–16.

23 Ա.Սուքիասյան, Հայոց լեզվի հոմանիշների բացատրական բառարան, ԵՊՀ, Երևան, 2009, էջ 679, http://nayiri.com/imagedDictionaryBrowser.jsp?dictionaryId=47&query=%D5%B1%D5%A5%D5%BC%D5%B6%D5%A1%D5%AE%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B6

24 Van Dijk T.A. (2006). Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse & Society 17(3), 359-383.

25 Van Dijk T.A. (2006). Discourse and Manipulation. Discourse & Society 17(3), p. 361.


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