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19.05.2014

KESSAB EVENTS: AN OUTLOOK FROM YEREVAN

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Vahram Hovyan
Expert, Noravank Foundation’s Centre for Armenian Studies

On March 21, 2014 a sudden breakthrough of militants from Turkey and capture of the Armenian-populated Kessab1 near the Turkish-Syrian border once again attracted the attention of the Armenian media and experts’ community on the Syria crisis and within this context, on the security problems of Armenians living in Syria.

The attack forced almost the entire Armenian population of Kessab to flee to Latakia. During the attack the militants were backed by Turkish armed forces. This was vividly demonstrated when the Turkish troops shot down the military jet that was providing air support to the Syrian government forces fighting on the ground with the militants.

The armed attack on Armenian-populated Kessab caused an immediate emotional response from the Armenian public and the diaspora communities due to a number of reasons. Previously, the Armenian-populated areas (in particular, the Armenian districts of Aleppo) have also become arenas of military clashes and suffered casualties and property loss. However, the military actions before have never targeted specifically the Armenian community of Syria as a whole or in part. Amid military clashes, the Armenian community has suffered to the same extent as other peaceful population or citizens of Syria.

The next reason is the ancient, unique and rich-flavor Armenian subculture of Kessab. It enriches the Armenian diaspora as a whole and the Armenian community of Syria in particular. The loss of Kessab would be a huge blow to the Armeniancy.

Another reason was the unexpectedness of military attack on Kessab. Due to its remote location Kessab has avoided becoming an arena of military activities during the three years of Syrian crisis. Moreover, Armenians often moved from fighting flash points elsewhere in Syria to find shelter in Kessab as a relatively safe place, away from war.

Finally, the Kessab events fully unveiled Turkey’s direct involvement in the Syrian conflict. If before that Turkish involvement was only presumed, despite some factual evidence, and its indirect participation in destabilization of Syria was talked about, after the Kessab events no one (at least among Armenians) has any doubt that Turkey is one of the active parties in the Syrian conflict. This was proved during the attack on Kessab, when the militants penetrated into Kessab through the Turkish border and were supported by Turkish regular army artillery units during the battle, as well as when during later military operations the Syrian army attempted to liberate Kessab. As it was demonstrated during the battle, Turkish military intervention was carried out in the following manner:

  • The militant groups penetrated Kessab from Turkey to join the ranks of the militants who fight there, as well as to supply them with weapons and ammunition. Yet the Turkish border troops are supposed to prevent that. Furthermore, we believe this happened not just through inaction of the Turkish military stationed at the border, but through their support, because without it the militants would have not been able to penetrate into Kessab.
  • During the whole course of the battle the Turkish army units stationed near the Turkish-Syrian border provided artillery support to the militants fighting against the Syrian government troops. Without this support they would have not been able to resist the Syrian army for long.
  • The militants wounded in combat were quickly transported to Turkey and received medical attention in hospitals there.

This active support of militants by Turkey is the reason why Syrian government forces have not been able to liberate Kessab yet, and military operations aimed at that are still underway.

Motives of the Attack

What was the reason for sudden expansion of armed hostilities onto Kessab? Perhaps, this is the main question related to Kessab events that draws attention of Armenian reporters, scientists, experts, public and political actors. In respect of this question the viewpoints are divided in two:

  1. opinions that view the issue in the framework of Turkish traditional Armenian-persecuting (Armenophobic) policies,
  2. opinions that view the issue in the context of the three years long Syran conflict and geopolitical developments.

Proponents of the first approach view the attack on Kessab as yet another intentional anti-Armenian exploit or hostile act by Turkey. They even link the attack to the Armenian genocide and see it as an extension thereof. In this context they contend that Turkey has an objective to get rid of the Armenian communities in the Middle East (especially Lebanon and Syria). This viewpoint holds that Armenian communities of Lebanon and Syria are a headache for Turkey, because they are the bearers of the most undistorted Western Armenian culture and civilization, and were able to preserve their ethnic identity2 for a long time (several generations already). In addition, they are a headache for Turkey also because of their consistent and unwavering pursuit of the Armenian Genocide recognition, condemnation and restitution. Hence, neutralizing the Armenian communities of Lebanon and Syria is especially important for Turkey in terms of its foreign policy and generally for the international situation. In this context the attack on Kessab and it capture are viewed as an action to weaken the Armenian community of Syria with a further prospect of its total obliteration.

Some experts link the attack on Kessab with 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide to be marked in 2015, as a means to struggle against international recognition of the genocide.

Without denying the fact of Turkey’s anti-Armenian policies and efforts to weaken the Armenian diaspora, it still seems that the above-mentioned comments related to the attack on Kessab are somewhat exaggerated. This especially relates to the idea of Armenian communities in the Middle East being a headache for Turkey. Despite having maintained their ethnic identity for a prolonged period throughout several generations, the Armenian communities of the Middle East do not have the potential to cause serious concerns for Turkey. In terms of human3, financial, economic and other resources the Armenian communities of Lebanon and Syria are no match to the communities of the USA, Russia, France, Ukraine and Georgia. To compare, about 70-80,000 Armenians live in Lebanon, and before the conflict in Syria broke out, about the same number of Armenians lived in Syria, whereas the number of Armenians in Russia, USA and France constitutes 2.5 million, 1.2 million and 450 thousand, respectively. Due to various factors, the most important among which appears to be the turbulent situation in the region with internal and external conflicts4, the Armenian communities of the Middle East gradually weaken and dissolve over time. A vivid example of that is the Armenian community of Egypt, which currently is at the verge of extinction. As a result of the current Syrian crisis, the Armenian community of Syria has shrunk by half. Hence, Turkey does not need to undertake special actions in order to weaken and neutralize the Armenian communities of the Middle East, because they dwindle and decline even without that5.

In addition, the Middle Eastern countries, particularly Syria and Lebanon, do not have enough international weight and clout through which the powerful Armenian communities could have caused headaches to Turkey. At least their political weight and influence cannot be compared to those of the USA, Russia, France and other countries, where the activities of the Armenian lobbies indeed cause headache for Turkey and always keep it on alert.

We believe it is also not justified to connect the attack on Kessab with the centenary of the Armenian Genocide in 2015, because at least in the propagandistic dimension it should have a diametrically opposite effect, unveiling the true face of Turkey.

In the other group of interpretations, the attack on Kessab is viewed in the context of the Syrian conflict and geopolitical developments. All these comments seem to be substantiated or at least contain a modicum of truth. It is worth presenting the factors that in these comments are used to explain the attack on Kessab:

  • The Alawite factor. This factor explains the attack on Kessab by change of tactics used by the rebels and their supporters. Kessab sub-district is located in Latakia Governorate in North Syria, which has a large Alawite population and is the “citadel” of Syrian Alawites. The Assad family also hails from Latakia. As the insurgents were unable to succeed in three-years-long battles around Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, and elsewhere, they decided to change the direction of fight and to assault the Alawite stronghold Latakia, seize it and thus neutralize one of the main support bases of the Assad regime. And Kessab is a strategically significant location for that. By capturing Kessab the insurgents are in a position to develop the success and seize the whole Latakia Governorate.
  • The factor of militants gaining access to sea. Having access to maritime transport infrastructure would considerably contribute to strengthening of the militants who fight against the government forces. This would create new opportunities for supply of weapons, ammunition and other military materiel, bringing in new recruits, etc.
  • The Turkmen factor. In Latakia Governorate there is a large Turkment population residing not far from Kessab. According to G. Yazejian, other than the name, they in no way differ (by their language, customs, etc.) from Turks. Hence, the attack on Kessab was aimed at activating the Turkmen elements, as well as increasing the influence of Turkey on them. This issue is linked to a certain extent to the events in Crimea. Having utterly failed in the effort to influence and energize the Crimean Tatars, Turkey is trying to compensate this failure through Syrian Turkmens.
  • The factor of the Russian anti-aircraft defense system. Latakia hosts Russian ani-aircraft defense radar locator stations. This factor is quoted to explain the attack on Kessab, arguing that Turkey wants destroy these stations. After Kessab, the militants will also penetrate into Latakia and strike the stations.
  • Mediterranean domination factor. This interpretation also connects the issue to the events in Crimea. As Crimea became part of Russia, the latter’s positions in the Black Sea strengthened at the expense of Turkey. Turkey attempts to compensate this shortfall by potentially dominating the Mediterranean, and the Kssab attack was aimed at this.
  • The gas factor. Recently large natural gas deposits were discovered in eastern Mediterranean. Naturally, Turkey has claims on these huge gas reserves. So the attack on Kessab is interpreted from this perspective. By capturing Kessab, Turkey strengthens its positions in the eastern Mediterranean in order to more easily take over the natural gas reserves.
  • The factor of Turkey’s internal situation. This matter is related to the local municipal elections. Discredited by various corruption scandals, R. Erdogan needed a little victorious war on the external front in order to boost his party’s ratings. By the attack on Kessab, R. Erdogan was trying to play with the nationalist sentiments in the society so as to enhance his standing.

We attribute most significance to the first factor among the listed, although we believe a combination of all above mentioned factors or most of them played a role in staging the attack on Kessab.

Possible developments

The fate of Kessab Armenians depends on the outcome of the ongoing battle for Kessab. If the Syrian army manages to liberate Kessab in the near future, then despite significant property losses (caused by destruction and plundering) Armenians will return to their hometown.

However, even in this case Armenians of Kessab will not be safeguarded against similar attacks and recurrence of the present situation, especially given that the factors which contributed to the Kessab attack will continue to play a role in Syrian and international processes. Therefore, when Armenians of Kessab return to their homes, the Syrian government and the international community have to exert efforts for preventing such attacks. There are two options to solve this problem. One option is that after liberating Kessab the Syrian government should significantly reinforce defenses at this section of the Syrian-Turkish border in order to preclude opportunities for similar attacks. The second option is to materialize the idea voiced during the talks between Aram I, Catholicos of the Holy See of Cilicia and Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, i.e. to create a demilitarized zone around Kessab, where military operations would be prohibited.

And if the Syrian army is unable liberate Kessab in the near future, then we believe the return of Kessab Armenians to their hometown would be problematic due to two reasons. Firstly, continuous military standoff with use of heavy weaponry (artillery, aircraft) would devastate Kessab, because of which the return of Armenians would be quite difficult, if not impossible at all. Secondly, with continuation of the fighting the Armenian refugees of Kessab will have to settle elsewhere (including outside Syria), whether they want it or not, in which case again, returning later to Kessab would be very difficult. Under such circumstances the most suitable solution to save the Kessab Armenians would be their repatriation to Armenia.

1 Kessab is a town near the coast of north Syria with about 2000 Armenian population. There are also some neighboring Armenian villages: Sev Aghpyur, Karadouran, Duzaghaj, etc. Kessab is one of the oldest Armenian settlements in the Middle East. Armenians have settled here during the times of Tigran the Great (95-55 BCE).

2 This is unlike the Armenian communities in other regions of the world (America) Europe, CIS or post-Soviet countries), where assimilation processes are much faster.

3 I.e. the number of people in the communities.

4 In addition to this, the Islamic environment, relatively poor economic conditions and other factors play an important role.

5 See Վ.Հովյան, Հայկական սփյուռքի տրանսֆորմացիան. մարտահրավերներ և հնարավորություններ, «Գլոբուս» վերլուծական հանդես, 2013թ., թիվ 5, էջ 43-47:

“Globus” analytical bulletin, No. 4, 2014

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