THE CORRIDOR FOR EXIT OF PEACEFUL POPULATION FROM KHOJALY
I.G. Gukasov
Colonel, Adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia during the years of Artsakh War
Intentional creation of a corridor for exit of peaceful population fr om Khojaly pursued several objectives. First, showing humanism towards peaceful population and preventing casualties among them would have won their sympathies and demonstrate that we do not fight with peaceful civilians, but rather, with an armed adversary, firing by which forced the Armenians to defend themselves. Second, it was meant to reduce the defense potential of the town, since part of its defenders would leave with the fleeing population, thus bringing down the number of the defenders and creating “legal” deserters, who would abandon the defense positions under the pretext of escorting the peaceful population out of the town and hence, would weaken the town defenses. In addition, with this the adversary was brought to the question: “who are you defending, if the local people are fleeing their homes and land in panic?” Most of the local residents were relatives of the town’s armed defenders, who would have to abandon the defense positions to make sure that their families and relatives had a safe passage to Agdam district of Azerbaijan.
There are known examples when Armenian population actively participated in defense of their homes shoulder to shoulder with defense fighters. For instance, despite having an overwhelming advantage in troops and military equipment, Azerbaijanis were unable to take over Karintak settlement in January 1992 and Askeran in January-February 1992.
Had no corridor been left in Khojaly, the adversary would have to fiercely resist together with the peaceful population and fight for each position, street and house. The advancing Armenian defense forces could have suffered a large number of casualties and military hardware losses. The capture of the town could have taken a longer time, to which our troops were not ready due to their order of battle. In street fighting the town defenders would have had an upper hand, since the personnel combat power ratio was 1:1.
Thus, one of the factors contributing to the capture of Khojaly was the part of the operation plan to allow voluntary exit of the residents and defenders of the town through an intentionally left corridor toward Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani army.
Indeed, we forced the adversary to leave the town through the corridor and this weakened their defenses. Some of the troops abandoned their defense positions on their own, without receiving orders fr om the command. The fear of advancing Armenian detachments was stronger than each soldier’s and resident’s feeling of individual responsibility for defense of their home and town.
In line with the Geneva Convention, the command of the Armenian offensive group used loudspeakers and radio to request the residents to leave the town through the corridor left, so as to avoid casualties.
And this corridor operated reliably.
Bakhtiyar Aslanov, a policeman remembers: “We, the armed people, had a task to get the population of the town out with minimal losses. Under the orders of Alif Hajiyev I went to and returned fr om Shelly village of Agdam district three times. Through this “road of life” 150 people were saved. When I came back fourth time, I saw that Alif and his small detachment still continues to fight.” (Bakinsky Rabochiy newspaper, 26.02.1997)
Sedyk Mamedov, a police captain was quoted to say: “… To save the peaceful population we had to start their evacuation fr om the town. The population was led towards Nakhichevanik, through the so-called “corridor”. About 40-50 people hit the road. Everyone in Khojaly who had a weapon – the policemen, military – went ahead and fought the enemy to stop the offensive.” (AZERBAYCAN newspaper, 26.02.1997).
Elman Mamedov, Mayor of Khojaly stated: “We knew that the corridor is for evacuation of peaceful population.” He also adds: “After learning about the operation to capture the town I requested to send helicopters from Agdam in order to evacuate the elderly, women and children. We were assured that “tomorrow we will launch an operation and break the blockade.” That help never came.” (Megapolis-Express weekly, No. 17, 1992)
In an interview to Czech reporter Dana Mazalova published in Nezavisimaya Gazeta April 2, 1992 issue, ex-president of Azerbaijan A. Mutalibov said: “Azerbaijan was informed about the operation to seize Khojaly and during the operation the Armenians left a corridor for evacuation of the peaceful population from Khojaly to a safe place in Agdam district.” He then asks the question: “Why would they start shooting then? Especially on a territory close to Agdam wh ere enough forces were concentrated to get in and help the people!” He also stated: “As I was told by Khojaly survivors, all of this was organized to prompt my resignation. Some forces acted to discredit the president. I do not believe that Armenians, who are very sharp and knowledgeable in dealing with such situations, could have let Azerbaijanis get their hands on any evidence implicating them in fascist-like actions. One may assume that somebody was interested in showing that footage in the Supreme Council, then finger-pointing at me.” On March 6, 1992 A. Mutalibov resigned under the demands of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA).
Eynulla Fatullayev, editor-in-chief of Real Azerbaijan newspaper, wrote in his “Karabakh Diaries in 2005: “… several days before the offensive the Armenians warned the population by loudspeakers about the planned operation and recommended the civilians to leave the town and escape the encirclement through the humanitarian corridor along Gar-Gar river.” He was told about this by refugees from Khojaly who used the corridor and survived, because, quote: “the Armenian soldiers positioned behind the corridor had not opened fire on them.” He confirms that “a free corridor had indeed been left, as otherwise totally surrounded and isolated from the external world Khojaly residents could not have broken through and escape the encirclement. But after passing through the terrain beyond Gar-Gar river the crowd of refugees was divided… It appears the battalions of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan did not make efforts to free the Khojaly residents, but instead, wanted a big bloodshed in order to oust A. Mutalibov.”
As reported by the Iranian Arannews information agency, this was also stated by Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan Ameli, the representative of the Supreme Leader, imam jum’a of Ardabil: “For a successful coup d’état large losses were needed in the war front, a truly grave tragedy. The Khojaly tragedy was staged under such circumstances. Mutalibov was supported by Russians. Would Russians oust him to bring Elchibey to power? Clearly not, and the coup d’état was against the pro-Russian leadership… This was an evil plan to prevent Iran’s active involvement in Karabakh, implemented through the blood of innocent people. Ergenekon was behind all of this, but actually, it was Mossad1.”
Between November 1991 and February 1992 people of Khojaly sent many telegrams to Heydar Aliyev, leader of the Nakhichevan Republic, requesting help to defend the town. In late 1991 Elman Mamedov wanted to visit H. Aliyev in Nakhichevan and tell him about the problems of the town’s defense. “At that time anybody who uttered H. Aliyev’s name, faced a harsh punishment. But people of Khojaly were not afraid of that.” (Xalg gazeti newspaper, 26.02.1997). H. Aliyev could not do anything. He only stated: “Bloodshed would be useful for us”, as he also wanted to strike a blow to A. Mutalibov.
Bahman Halilov, a Khojaly resident has been quoted to say: “A few days before the tragedy the Armenians informed us several times that they are going to capture the town and demanded that we abandon the town… We knew that we could not expect help from anyone. We decided to evacuate as many as possible women, children and elderly people. We were promised that an urgent military operation is prepared to liberate Askeran, so as to connect it with Khojaly. All that turned out to be lies. Thus, Khojaly was sacrificed by the fault of the country’s leadership.” (Respublika newspaper, February 26, 1997).
In the February 26, 1997 issue of Azerbaycan newspaper a story told by police lieutenant Shahid Muradov was published. As the town was stormed he went to his post wh ere 12 defenders made their stand. There was shooting going on all over the town and it was necessary to save the peaceful population. “Our group came to take positions in the town outskirts and approached to a newly built five-storey residential building, wh ere we saw 70-80 people hiding there. Battalion commander Tofik Huseinov’s UAZ-465 vehicle was parked near the same building. The car was full of weapons and ammunition. After talking with everybody we entered the building, took positions and waited for the adversary to approach. In the morning of February 26 we saw two attack helicopters land in Khankendi. Having found out our location the Armenians demanded us to surrender. We refused and the Armenians attacked. Nobody wanted to surrender and I took over the command. We resisted for 12 hours, till the dusk. Dark of the night was what saved us. In total darkness we went out of the building. The Armenians could not stop us. We took the peaceful civilians with us and headed to Agdam. Near Nakhichevanik village we encountered the Armenians. They told us that if we put down our weapons on the ground and surrender, they will let us go to Agdam. It was an Armenian trick though. We knew that if we lay our weapons down they will kill us. That’s why we answered by gunfire to their offer. After that they stood out of our path and we went to Adam together with the civilians.”
It might be assumed that the defenders and residents of that building thought that Khojaly was not captured by Armenians yet. For this reason, they stayed in the town on the night February 26 and left it only on the night of 27th, after realizing that no Azerbaijanis remained in the town except for themselves.
It is clear from Lieutenant Muradov’s story that the soldiers together with 70-80 local residents left Khojaly on foot on the night of February 27 and reached unharmed the Agdam district controlled by Azerbaijani military detachments. They were not shot upon or attacked by Armenians on their way, which proves that Armenian defense forces had nothing to do with the deaths of civilians or even Khojaly armed defenders outside the town and on the territory of Agdam district.
The humanitarian corridor was set from the eastern outskirts of Khojaly and went along Gar-Gar river to north-east towards Agdam. The corridor was 120 – 300 meters wide and even wider. The offensive was launched in four directions, but the encirclement was never complete, as there were not enough troops for that. Khojaly residents took advantage of this to flee to Agdam district. All available Armenian defense forces were deployed to seize Khojaly and the combat ended only by 7am on February 26. However, some local pockets of resistance remained and we had no extra forces to act outside the town. The local civilians fleeing Khojaly and combatants accompanying them were not chased by our detachments, since there were no free troops to do that and there was no such intention anyway.
In addition, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense had an attack force near Agdam city, which was capable of capturing Askeran in mere hours and break the blockade of Khojaly. Dadash Rzayev, Chief of the General Staff of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces personally told about this to Elman Mamedov, head of the executive power and defense of Khojaly, when he was visiting Baku to discuss strengthening of town and district defenses. D. Rzayev informed that the operation plan to break the Khojaly blockade and open communications with Askeran and Agdam was ready, and in a few days a signal to start the operation will be received in Khojaly. However, such signal was never sent.
On February 17, 1992 colonel S. Jangirov, deputy chief of the interior for Karabakh zone presented a report during a meeting of all commanders of Agdam garrison detachments and forces at Agdam district department of the interior, talking about a plan for the operation to break the blockade of Khojaly developed by D. Rzayev. It was planned to carry out on February 21-25, but was constantly delayed and never materialized. Under these circumstances the Armenian defense forces stole a march on Azerbaijanis and captured Khojaly on February 26.
Not a single Armenian warrior would have risked going to the location of Azerbaijan’s Agdam grouping of forces, because it would have simply been a death journey to him and would have provoked an offensive on Askeran with consequent breaking of the Khojaly blockade. Armenian military leadership anticipated that assistance might arrive to the town defenders from Agdam, Shushi and other Azeri settlements and was wary about it. For this reason, the Armenian detachments could have never entered Agdam outskirts controlled by the Azeri troops to kill peaceful civilians fleeing Khojaly through the humanitarian corridor.
The tragedy was carried out by Azeri armed detachments in outskirts of Agdam on the territory controlled by Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces, wh ere no Armenian soldier could go, since a large offensive grouping of forces was located there. The fact that this force was never deployed into action points to controversies among the president’s team and that in the Azerbaijani Republic’s Ministry of Defense there were PFA supporters who would use any occasion to harm the president. A ruthless political struggle to take the power was going on in the country, and to achieve this objective the political opponents spared no means, including the killing of their own compatriots. Even such significant politician and manipulator as Heydar Aliyev welcomed and considered necessary a bloody sacrifice of his own people in the struggle for power.
Some foreign powers, especially Turkey and Israel were very interested in the internal political struggle to overthrow the pro-Russian president A. Mutalibov. For the anti-Russian forces to seize the power in Azerbaijan it was necessary to discredit the president. This was possible by blaming him for incompetent command of the Azerbaijani army in the war against Armenia and for unjustified losses. There were several scenarios for this, and one of them turned out to be the tragic events with peaceful Khojaly civilians on the territory of Agdam district controlled by the Azeri military. After A. Mutalibov was ousted, the power in the Azerbaijani Republic was overtaken by pro-Turkish and anti-Russian leaders.
Conclusions
1. Peaceful civilians of Khojaly were shot to death on the territory of the Agdam district controlled by the Azerbaijani armed forces and the NKR land adjacent to Agdam district. These forces are fully responsible for the deaths of civilians.
2. Soldiers of Armenian defense forces have nothing to do with this tragedy.
1Аятолла Амели рассказал сенсационные сведения о событиях в Ходжалу: За всем этим стояли «Эргенекон» и «Моссад», http://www.panorama.am/ru/politics/2011/05/12/imam-ameli/
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