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09.09.2013

THE MULTIPOLAR REALITIES, MIDDLE EAST AND NEWS TICKER GENOCIDE (Part 2)

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Gagik Harutyunyan
Executive Director, Noravank Scientific Educational Foundation, Yerevan

“In my opinion, any future defense secretary
who advises the president to again send a big
American land army into Asia or into the Middle
East or Africa should have his head examined.”
Robert Gates, US Secretary of Defense (2006-2011)

“The scenery after spring”

Today it can be stated that the developments initiated in the Arab world have yet a long way to go: as some well-known ideologists dreamt in the beginning of the 20th century, the revolution in Egypt becomes permanent, and confrontation between Islamists and their opponents has spread even into Turkey that had been considered a stable country. Syria has to be reviewed separately, as war there entered its third year, and we shall return to this issue later. Today one may summarize some preliminary outcomes. Apart from somewhat different Tunisia, where processes occur in a relatively soft manner, the overall result for the countries of the region is their “destatization”1. For instance, Libya used to have a certain degree of political influence and economic development, and now it has actually turned from a state into a “territory” with energy reserves and groups of population clashing with each other. Characteristically, after the final act of war, i.e. Gaddafi’s murder, Libya (or rather, “former Libya”, as dubbed by some commentators) all of a sudden fell into the “grey zone” of the world media, and even terrorist attacks on diplomats just slightly enliven this country’s spot in the information space.

Egypt, which is considered the leader of Arab world, is now ruled by in principle illegitimate “junta”, while the Muslim Brothers who won the election, along with supportive Salafis try to restore ousted Morsi to presidency. Regardless of the outcome of this standoff, the country’s society has been split and degraded, perhaps irreversibly: the crime rates skyrocketed (e.g. over the last 12 months the number of robberies increased by 350%). Quite naturally, the economy plummeted, too: apart from bare figures of IMF and other international organizations, what speaks volumes is the fact that since 2011 4500 plants were closed down and 25% of population fell below the poverty line (by Egyptian standards) [9]. This combination of problems practically deprives Egypt of any development prospects, at least for the near future.

Regardless of the mechanisms applied, Iraq was pushed into a status of a “territory” even earlier. After the American invasion the country is split along ethnic and confessional lines, the government system practically does not function, while inter-confessional clashes and terrorist attacks occur routinely. Thus, development prospects for Iraq are as dubious as those for Libya and Egypt.

There is another commonality in the region. In Iraq, for instance, after the reform of the state governance system the government is led by representatives of the Shia majority, who do not concur with the American policies on Syria, but rather have a largely pro-Iranian stance. Situation was almost the same in Egypt, where no full collaboration was achieved between the USA and Muslim Brothers who took the power (that is despite the American “track record” of ex-President Morsi, who at some point used to work in the USA). Judging from the suspension of military aircrafts supply, things did not work out well with the Egyptian military either, who are in charge now. If any common pattern is to be observed among the “new governments”, then it is only the “re-Islamization” of the region, perhaps inspired by somewhat outdated ideas of the RAND Corporation on “moderate Islamism” described in the project Building Moderate Muslim Network2.

So it turns out that the traditionally main goal of the externally inspired revolutions or direct interventions, i.e. forming loyal governments (as in cases with Ukraine, Georgia or Afghanistan), was not achieved. It follows that replacing the ruling regimes with “own cadres” was not the main motive of what was happening. One may not rule out previously mentioned assumption about independent actions of NGOs, mass media or “states within a state”, while the US administration had to face the fait accompli. But rather, the actions of these NGOs and/or “states within a state” emphasize the complicated structure of the concept of “national interest” in modern world, particularly in America.

In this context, especially given the developments around Syria and Iran, one of the main motives for transformation of the region’s countries could have been ensuring the security of the “number 1” ally Israel. Obviously, no matter how warlike is the governments’ rhetoric, if their countries are in condition of collapse, they could pose no threat to the Jewish state that has a successful track record of fighting terrorist groups. However, this is true only in the short term, since further evolution of the existing situation is not all that unequivocal and we shall return to this issue later.

Full implementation of this “regional scenario” is currently under a big question mark. The mechanism of triggering an inner turmoil, or if that is not enough, then staging a small military campaign to “save the opposition from physical extermination” that ultimately results in a country degrading in all senses, did not work in Syria. It is the third year that a hard-fought war rages in this country, with yet unknown outcome3.

“The Multipolar War I”

At the initial phases the processes in the Middle East kind of followed the rules of monopole world. Even occupation of Iraq or military intervention in Libya did not encounter serious opposition, as the international community has already gotten used to disapproving comments from leaders of some countries (including those of NATO member countries) or rather devalued UN resolutions. Situation changed during developments in Syria, where:

  • Relying on multiethnic population overwhelmingly loyal to the authorities (note that Syria was not even included in the above mentioned Revolting Index list), the government of Bashar al-Assad exercised political will and started rigorously suppressing the armed mercenaries, the actions of which targeted not only government, but also peaceful population and religious/confessional minorities.
  • Mercenaries come to Syria (according to some estimates less than 20% of the militants are Syrians) from the countries of the region and even CIS (particularly from Azerbaijan, North Caucasus and Central Asia). These include various terrorist groups, among which Al Qaida and Jabhat al-Nusra stand out. The militants receive arms and materiel from the USA, France and UK. Support of the militants is particularly considerable from the countries of the region, first of all Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
  • The events in Iran’s important ally Syria had a clear anti-Iranian orientation from the very beginning and were perceived as “force supplement” to the economic sanctions against Iran. Naturally, Iranian government provided real military support to Syria (both military hardware and volunteers from elite troops). Remarkably, Syria receives support also from immediate neighbors: Iraq (Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah (from areas under Hezbollah control).
  • Capabilities of Syria-Iran tandem enabled Russia and China to more persistently defend their national interests, and hence, their pro-Syrian stances in the international arena. And this is not only about diplomacy: Russia and Syria assist Syria both economically and with military hardware supply (especially Russian-made, as in a recent case of agreement to supply $4-5 billion worth of aircrafts and missiles).

Thus, a rather large number of countries and religious, militant and terrorist structures related to (and sometimes not so related to) these countries were involved in the events around Syria. The current conflict possesses all attributes of Cold War era local conflicts: the countries widely use all possible diplomatic, military, informational/psychological4, economic and terroristic leverages. The intelligence services are particularly active in Syria, implementing their specific information/diversion functions: there are numerous media reports about participation of Turkish, French, British special forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the military operations.

All of this prompts that the Syrian crisis has gained a status of a “global” one. An important element of the Syrian war is that first time ever after the Cold War interests of Russia and NATO clashed in a ‘hot war” outside CIS. In some aspects reminiscent of the Vietnam War, this conflict can be called the “Multipolar War I”. The following has to be noted in this respect.

Although the military strength of the USA considerably exceeds that of the other countries, the political and economic capabilities of this superpower are significantly restricted. This reality is adequately recognized by the USA and the American policy making structures strive to use this already “temporary” advantage to strengthen their positions to the best possible extent. However, this is understood also by the opponents of the USA: their “disobedience” is caused not just by the philosophy of the multipolar world order, but also by specific calculations. The American project of turning the “New Middle East” into a “turbulent territory” not only is intended to deprive Russia and China of military/political and economic leverages in one of the critically important regions, but also poses a threat of “infecting” these two nations. Hence, their counteraction to such plans is likely to be based on critical necessity. At the same time, Russia-China-Iran relations have not grown yet into a large-scale military/political cooperation. In this sense, positions of the USA, Israel, their European and regional partners look much better, as over decades they have gained a rich experience of strategic partnership and a common political culture.

The list of above said factors playing important role in the Syrian conflict can be expanded. Such multitude of variables makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to predict outcomes of the war in Syria.

Apparently, the anti-Syrian bloc’s assumption about a quick military victory turned out to be a delusion. In the military respect the government troops and supportive regional forces have overtaken the initiative and the mercenaries suffer significant defeats. After information became available that the terrorists have perpetrated cruel acts of violence on prisoners of war and peaceful population, the overall informational environment around Syria had changed, too.

There is no doubt that defeat in Syria will first of all disgrace the USA. With this in mind, idea-wise repeating the provocative Iraqi scenario President Obama accused the Syrian government in chemical attack and decided to carry out at least some “limited strikes” on Syria. It is rather hard to predict all repercussions of such a new development, especially given the possible involvement of Iran in military actions. Such war would definitely bring drastic changes to the regional (and global) situation. However, regardless of various military scenarios, the main outcome of the Syrian war is that it became a catalyst in the process of shaping the multipolar world order and was kind of a wakeup call not only to Iran, Russia and China, but possibly to some other countries as well. If this wakeup call prompts Russia and China to come closer (a silhouette of such rapprochement is already observed to some extent), then it may put under a question mark the correctness of the big strategy of the USA and its allies. Yet this is not the only problem.

Some scenarios/predictions suggest5 that the crisis phenomena in the current system of global governance may lead to fragmentation of the global space along the civilizational or other lines. The segments formed in this manner, i.e. associations of nations and peoples, strive to isolate themselves from the globalizing world with its rules. With the current realities and persistent trend of regional Islamization it is possible that development of the NME countries may take this direction. Needless to say, emergence of such a vast, ideologically radicalized Islamic world may result in creation of geopolitical ruptures and hence, higher likelihood for various conflicts in the style of the Clash of Civilizations theory. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that the final goal of the modern global political technologists was exactly the creation of such “fragment” next door to Russia and China. However, such structure with dominant anti-Western sentiments in its societies and relatively easy access to nuclear technologies would be extremely explosive and might result in dire consequence for the USA itself, not to mention its regional allies.

Meanwhile, apocalyptic scenarios happen not only in future. Today already a major humanitarian catastrophe is ongoing in the Middle East.

The News Ticker Genocide

Any attempt to accurately count casualties and refugees among the peaceful population of the Middle East is doomed to fail. Data provided by different sources (UN, UNICEF, statistical services of the region’s countries, reputable organizations like The Lancet, Costs of War Project, Business Survey, Associated Press, etc.) often vary considerably. This is hardly surprising: amid the chaos reigning in the region human life is worth little and necessitates no special recordkeeping. However, having discarded some apparently exaggerated figures and sticking to near-minimal numbers, we shall try to get at least an approximate idea about the human dimension of the Middle Eastern processes for the countries where armed hostilities had taken place.

Table

These impressive numbers are comparable to those of casualties among peaceful population of Vietnam (ca. 2 million people), though the difference is that in Indochina the war in a way was classic, with participation of regular (as well as other) troops, and also Americans used chemical weapons, carpet bombed settlements, etc. Conversely, in the Middle East extermination of people is mostly a result of actions by the natives of the region. It would not be entirely correct to describe these events as civil war, given the foreign intervention. There is some evidence suggesting that in this case a somewhat unique form of genocide is taking place6.

The UN convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”7 This definition matches to what is happening in the Middle East. However, unlike the previous instances known from the history, such as the Genocide of Armenians in Turkey or Holocaust of Jews in Nazi Germany, it is problematic to identify the perpetrators of the committed crime. Perhaps the following paragraph of the convention should be used as basis: “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in part.” If the external interference theory is taken as basis, it is possible that the designers of the current NME format initially did not intend causing mass extermination of people. However, sometimes it is useful to judge by the outcomes.

It is also characteristic that the new genocide has assumed a curious informational guise. When several innocent marathon runners and bystanders fall victim of a terrorist attack, it becomes a topic for global discussions. At the same time terrorist attacks are carried out on daily basis in Iraq and Syria, every day taking lives of hundreds, but in the informational dimension currently they appear only in news tickers.

1 Harutyunyan, G., New Middle East: Reality and Prospects. http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6353.

2 http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG%&$.pdf.

3 Harutyunyan G., War in Syria: Probable Scenarios http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6769.

4 See, for example: Акопян А., Приемы и способы информационно-психологического воздействия в информационном противоборстве воюющих сторон в Сирии. Центр стратегических оценок и прогнозов. – М.: 2013. http://www.csef.ru/files/csef/articles/4445/4445.pdf

5 Global Governance 2025: At a Critical Juncture. National Intelligence Council, European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2010, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Global_Governance_2025.pdf.

6 Арутюнян Г., На Ближнем Востоке реализуется новая форма геноцида. http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=7124

7 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/260(III)

References

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2. Дерлугьян Г., Внезапны, но иногда предсказуемы. Эксперт, #29(859), с.60, 2013.

3. Zakaria F. The post-American World. - N.Y.-L. : W.W.Norton, 2008.

4. Параг Ханна, Второй мир. – М.: Изд-во «Европа», 2010.

5. Крауч, К., «Пост - демократия». – М.: Издательский дом Государственного университета – Высшей школы экономики, 2010. Колин Крауч, Странная не - смерть неолиберализма. – М.: Издательский дом «Дело», 2012.

6. Арутюнян Г., Интернет структуры в контексте «постдемократии» и информационной безопасности. 21-й Век, #4(16), с.3, 2010.

7. Гриняев С., Поле битвы – киберпространство. – Минск: Харвест, 2004.

8. Арутюнян Г., Распад «системы» и формирование будущего. – Ереван: НОФ «Нораванк», 2011.

9. Мирзаян Г., Революция пошла вразнос. Эксперт, #27(858) с.54, 2013.


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