

LINGUISTIC PLURALISM AND IMAGINED COMMUNITIES OF UKRAINE

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In Ukraine, there has always been a debate whether it should be an integrated part of the European community or be in a close brotherhood with Russia. For the past two decades this question has grown and penetrated into each layer of socio-political life. The controversy over this matter has especially escalated a few days prior to the signing of the European Union Association agreement on 29 October 2014, when the Ukrainian government suddenly suspended the process. As a result, western-oriented uprisings were organized in Kiev, which lasted for several months and were dubbed *Euromaidan*. Consequently, the Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovich and his “lads” were forced to flee. The Ukrainian government finally announced its intention to sign the agreement, and new presidential elections were assigned. In the meantime, Crimea, having an autonomous status in Ukraine, held a referendum on its independence and with overwhelming 96.77% “for” immediately unified with Russia. Since then, a bloody conflict started in the East of Ukraine, which has traditionally been oriented to Russia and for centuries was a part of the former Russian Empire.

In this article, it argued that the reasons of these developments, i.e. escalation of tensions between the West and East after *Euromaidan*,

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are rooted centuries before the European Union Association agreement was even drafted.

First cracks of the ideological diversification of Ukraine took place after the collapse of Kievan Rus, a federation of East Slavic tribes in Europe from the late 9th to the mid-13th century. Ukrainian lands came under the rule of Polish Kingdom and then Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After partition of Poland, Western Ukraine became a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Eastern Ukraine became a part of the Russian Empire. Over the coming centuries, each part had its own path towards national revival and independence and faced tough obstacles from ruling political powers. Ukraine, in its current geographical shape, was unified first only in 1944 (in 1954, the Crimean peninsula was transformed from Russia to Ukraine), however neither the Soviet government, nor the independent Ukraine made success in merging two parts of Ukraine into one nation with a unified and common national identity.

The initial impetus and inspiration for current project was given by Benedict Anderson, who in his widely acclaimed book “Imagined Communities” defines the nation as “imagined political community, [...] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. Anderson states, that community “is imagined as the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meanwhile in the minds of each lives the image of their community”. It is a community, “because regardless of the actual inequality the nation is a deep horizontal comradeship” [1, p. 3].

According to Anderson, and this is the major foundation of this research, one of the fundamental aspects that unify people around specific communities is the language. Anderson mentions that the sacred

languages like Latin for Christians or Arabic for Muslims were the media through which the greater global communities in the past were imagined [1, p. 8]. Consequently, the fall of Latin exemplified a larger process in which the sacred communities, integrated by old sacred languages, were gradually fragmented, pluralized and territorialized [1, p. 10]. By mid-nineteenth century, language became accepted as the most important single defining characteristic of nationality [2, p. 27] including for Ukrainians.

Development of the Ukrainian language was one of the most important engines that shaped and marked the Ukrainian identity. In this article it will be demonstrated how language influenced the formation of the modern Ukrainian identity, a state that is currently divided in two drastically different regions – Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine. Developments in Galicia will be researched, as the most important center for revival of national consciousness in Ukraine, and *Hetmanate*, or Dnieper Ukraine, a Ukrainian territory that has been under the Russian rule for centuries and consequently, did not have a chance to define its identity independently and had to follow a path dictated from above.

The key feature of Ukraine's historical development was its regionalism [3, p. 85]. Until 1944, most Ukrainian lands had been divided between the Russian Empire, later Soviet Union, and Austro-Hungarian Empire, later Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Each of these empires and states had their own policies towards the Ukrainian language. The process of nation-building, language-building and national revival in general was divided among two lands, and each of them having their own obstacles and victories.

The Western Ukraine appeared as a single unit in the 18th century, when predominantly Ukrainian Galicia (1772) and Bukovina (occupied 1774, annexed 1787), were annexed by the Austrian Empire. Transcarpathia was already a part of the Austrian Empire. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and the defeat of the Ukrainian national revolution in 1919-20, Western Ukraine did not disappear as a valid historical unit. Although divided between three of the Habsburg monarchy's successor states, the West Ukrainian territories were similar in being excluded from the Russian political sphere [4, pp. 392-393].

Meanwhile, the Eastern Ukraine came under the control of the Russian Empire following the signing of Pereyaslav Treaty between the *Muscovite Tsardom* (precursor of the Russian Empire) and Ukrainian *Hetmanate* in 1648. Since then the *Hetmanate* gradually had been losing its independence, and finally its autonomy was abolished, and the territory became an integral part of the Russian Empire. Starting from this point, Ukraine dramatically lost its national unification that was so essential to its self-determination. Russian policy-makers tried their best to convert Ukrainians into Russians; Polish policy-makers wanted "their Ukrainians" to assimilate and turn into the New Polish. Only those, who rejected both the Russian and the Polish identities, formulated the truly Ukrainian identity [5, p. 86].

Ukrainian national revival

Magocsi defines two types of nationalist movements – intelligentsia-inspired national movements and state imposed nationalism. These two movements always contradict each other. On the one hand, there are nationalistic intelligentsia leaders who seek to convince their group members that they have a distinct nationality and deserve at least cultural

autonomy. On the other hand, there is the government that tries to persuade the given community that their nationality is defined by loyalty to the existing nation-state's government and social structure. In summary, the Ukrainian nationalistic intelligentsia leaders both in the Russian Empire and Austrian Empire aimed to create a distinct nation with some extent of autonomy, while the two imperial authorities strived to transform Ukrainians into loyal Habsburg or Tsarist subjects [6, p. 355].

However, the Ukrainian nationalistic intelligentsia was not homogenous as well. One of the features of the Ukrainian nationalism is that the hierarchy of multiple loyalties or identities is opposed to that of mutually exclusive identities. In multinational states, individuals can feel perfectly comfortable with more than one national identity. The evolution of the 19th century Ukrainian national revival can be seen as a story of the conflict between multiple loyalties, on the one hand, mutually exclusive identities on the other. Therefore, some Ukrainians did not see any problem in being both Little Russian¹ (Ukrainian) and Russian, or being an ethnic Ruthenian² (Ukrainian) in the Polish nation. Others still argued that national identities, such as Ukrainian and Russian or Ukrainian and Polish, were mutually exclusive and the individual must make a choice between them [7, pp. 56-57].

Intelligentsia-inspired national movement in Ukrainian inhabited territories can be viewed as going through three basic stages:

1. The heritage gathering stage, which consists of efforts of individuals collecting the linguistic, folkloric, literary, and historical artifacts of a given people;

¹ Ukrainians were called Little Russians in the Russian Empire.

² Ukrainians were called Ruthenians in the Austrian Empire.

2. The organizational stage, when organizations, schools, and publications are formed to propagate knowledge about the cultural heritage that has been collected;
3. The political stage, when noticeable efforts are put for the participation in political life, often with intention of obtaining autonomy or independence

These stages developed independently in the Austrian Empire and the Russian Empire, and in each part the Ukrainian population faced challenges with regard to the state-imposed nationalism.

During the first stage of heritage gathering, both in Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia, books in vernacular Ukrainian were published. In 1837 in Galicia the first Galician Ukrainian vernacular book written in modern civil script "*Rusalka Dnistrovia*" (Nymph of the Dniester) was published by Yakiv Holovatsky. In Dnieper Ukraine, in 1840 the leading symbol of the Ukrainian national revival Taras Shevchenko published his first major work "*Kobzar*". This became the starting point of the nationalistic movement in Ukraine [6, pp. 355-364], whereby Shevchenko's contemporaries started to believe that Ukrainian "dialect" had the potential to become a full-fledged language. Seton-Watson agrees that "the formation of an accepted Ukrainian literary language owes more to him than to any other individual. The use of this language was the decisive stage in the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness" [1, p. 40].

Anderson states that in Europe the print-capitalism played the biggest role in the process of awakening of national consciousness when private printing in vernaculars spread all around Europe. According to him, print-languages laid the basis for national consciousnesses in fol-

lowing way: “first and foremost, print languages created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow-readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the embryo of the nationally imagined community”. Second, print-capitalism gave some stillness to language that in the long run helped to build the image of antiquity, which was central to the subjective idea of the nation. As Febvre and Martin mention, the printed book kept a permanent form, capable of virtually infinite reproduction, temporally and spatially [1, p. 24].

Thus, adopting Anderson’s theory, Ukrainian language gathered together people in one community, who identified their similarity by the language they spoke. The print-language, in turn, stabilized the language in the form it existed.

During the next organizational stage of the Ukrainian national revival, in Galicia a department of Ruthenian language and literature was established in 1848 at the Lviv University. In Dnieper Ukraine, Kharkiv and Kiev Universities were established. However, in contrast with Galicia, here Russian was the language of instruction. Facing the increasing popularity of the Ukrainian language the authorities of the Russian Empire resorted to the policy of denationalizing of Ukrainians and argued that Ukrainian language was just a dialect of the Russian

language [6, p. 368]. In 1863, the Russian Minister of the Interior, Petr Valuev, sent out a Circular that limited the scope of Ukrainian language publications primarily to belles-lettres and banned any kind of literature in Ukrainian language for common people. Although the circular was enacted as a temporary administrative regulation, it remained in force until it was included in another act that restricted Ukrainian publishing, namely, the so-called Ems Decree. The Ems Decree, in turn, remained in force until the first Russian revolution of 1905 [8, p. 87]. Meanwhile, in 1893, the Austrian government recognized vernacular Ukrainian as the standard for instructional purposes in Galicia. By 1914 there were 2500 Ukrainian elementary and 6 state gymnasia in Galicia [6, pp. 441-442].

Other techniques for denationalizing of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were the development and propagation of a distorted “All-Russian” historiography. The official use of the term “Little Russian” served to create an invidious effect. The absence of public Ukrainian-language schools retarded the emergence of a national intelligentsia. Another damaging technique was the corruption of the Ukrainian upper classes with titles, rewards, estate for their joining the ranks of the “All Russian” Nation [9, p. 248].

During the political stage of the Ukrainian national revival, both in Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine political parties were established. In Dnieper Ukraine, despite the activities of the Ukrainian parties, being Ukrainian was still not “prestigious”, and Ukrainian nationalism was just intelligentsia oriented, while the broad part of the population was still influenced by the Russian imperialistic ideology. The situation was different in Austro-Hungarian Empire where the Ukrainian nationalism survived and prospered [9, p. 382].

In the second half of the 19th century, the Ukrainian political life in Galicia was characterized by a struggle to achieve equality for Ukrainian language in schools and public life, establishment of the Ukrainian universities and the implementation of the universal suffrage. However, by the end of the century, in 1895 the Ukrainian Radical Party proclaimed the unification and independence of Ukraine to be essential both in the Austrian and in the Russian empires. It was the first time when the voice for Ukrainian independence rose [6, p. 447].

The World War I brought significant changes for Ukrainians both in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire. Both empires collapsed, and consequently, the Ukrainians took attempts on establishment of a sovereign state. However, all of them failed. Galicia became part of Poland, while the Dnieper Ukraine became a part of newly created Soviet Union. In summer 1923 the Communist party (*Bolshevik*) of Ukraine implemented a new policy of Ukrainisation trying to attract broader spectrum of the local population to its ranks. Also known as indigenization, Ukrainisation put emphasis on promoting the Ukrainian language and culture.

In 1928-1932, called a transitional period, important changes happened in Ukraine. By 1932-33, 88% of all students in Soviet Ukraine were receiving their education in the Ukrainian language, and by 1930 80% of all books and 90% of all newspapers published in Ukraine were in Ukrainian. In 1933, Ukrainisation was abolished, and the Ukrainian grammar, alphabet and vocabulary were brought closer to the Russian language. In 1937, a law was passed providing language trainings to ensure that all Ukrainians would have a good command in Russian. In March 1938, the study of Russian was made obligatory at all non-Russian schools throughout the Soviet Union. Between 1931 and 1940 the per-

centage of Ukrainian-language newspapers decreased from 89% to 69%, the number of Russian language theatres increased from 9 to 30. As a result, the total number of students in Soviet Ukraine enrolled in Russian schools rose from 14% in 1938 to 25% in 1956 [Ibid, pp. 529-571].

Polish educational policy in turn also had a negative impact on Ukrainian language use. In 1924 the government passed a law, which set up bilingual Ukrainian and Polish schools. In actual practice Polish became the primary language in bilingual schools. The law also banned the use of the Ukrainian language in government agencies. In fact, the Polish government never referred to the Ukrainian language the way it was called by Ukrainians. The Polish called Ukrainians as Rusyn. Nevertheless, during the 1920s the Polish government increased the total number of schools in Ukrainian areas especially in the former *tsarist* territories, where the number of elementary schools increased from 1000 to 3100 by 1938. In Eastern Galicia, the number of elementary schools increased from 4030 to 4998 during the same period. Meanwhile, the literacy among people over age of 10 declined from 50% in 1921 to 35% in 1931 [Ibid, pp. 583-598].

After the World War II western Ukrainian lands joined to Soviet Ukraine. These lands, not counting a few years, had never been part of the Russian Empire or Soviet Union. The Galicians, Bukovinians and Transcarpathians had acquired the Central European mentality in the decades of Austro-Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak rule. With regard to ideology, Ukrainians in Soviet Union were expected to accept the notion that Ukraine's latest achievements were made due to its relationship with Russia. All Soviet Ukrainian historians were required to adapt their works in accordance to the theses that the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian people trace their origin to a single root and that

throughout the history the Ukrainian and Belorussian people always desired reunification with Russian people.

The Khrushchev era (1953-1964) was remarkable for being more relaxed towards non-Russian nationalities. As a result a new wave of revival of the Ukrainian literature rose. The culmination of this movement was the publication of the novel by chairman of the Ukrainian writer's union Oles Honchar "*Sobor*" (The Cathedral). The novel glorified the traditional Ukrainian culture, opposed Russification and condemned the government's destruction of the Ukrainian monuments. In 1957 the Historical Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences started publication of a historical journal in Ukrainian. Soon other historical journals and monographs appeared, which questioned the Soviet theory of the common origin of the East Slavs.

In 1959 a Ukrainian encyclopedia under Soviet auspices was published in 17 volumes. It was followed by 3-volume general encyclopedia, a 4-volume historical encyclopedia and 26 volume detailed description of the each region of the Soviet Ukraine.

In 1970-1980 a 136.000 word Ukrainian language dictionary was published. The movement also reached to culture, music and cinema. In 1964 the best known achievements of the world cinematography, "*Tiny Zabutykh predkiv*" (Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors) based on Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi's 1913 novel of the same name, was produced by the Dovzhenko Studio in Kiev.

In 1964, the Khrushchev era was replaced by Brezhnev's era of "stability". The scholars who had been in the forefront of the Ukrainian cultural revival were arrested in 1971-1972. The intelligentsia went underground. However, after Brezhnev's death in 1982 things changed a little. The next two Secretary Generals of the USSR were on their posi-


tion for a short period of time. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as the new Secretary General whose policy of “*perestroika*” and “*glasnost*” resulted in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ukraine declared its independence on August 24, 1991. Ukrainian language became the one and only official state language [Ibid, pp. 638-676].

However, surveys focusing on the actual use of language give a different picture. According to surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in 1991-94, more than half (55%) of all adults in Ukraine used Russian as a language of convenience/preference, defined as the language that an individual prefers to speak in his/her home, with a bilingual interviewer.

The statistics for language use according to this indicator (and as superimposed onto ethnic belonging) were the following: Ukrainophone Ukrainians: 40%; Russophone Ukrainians: 34%; and Russophone Russians 21%. (see Chart I).

Chart 1

Language use in Ukraine in 1991-1994



Eastern and Western Ukraine differ significantly in terms of language practices. Surveys conducted by the KIIS in 1991-94 suggest that

in the East a majority of the population (81.5%) used Russian as a language of convenience, while in the West 77% of the population used Ukrainian as a language of convenience [10, p. 419].

Such high level of use of the Russian language in Ukraine is not merely the result of that fact that Ukraine was an integral part of Russia for over 300 years, and another 70 years within the structure of the USSR. It is a result of the linguistic imperialism imposed by the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union. In this regard, Russian Empire/Soviet Union should be identified as Mother Country or the Center and Ukraine being the Periphery. Russian cultural policy towards Ukraine fits into the colonialist cultural images where the most central labels are the tribe and the dialect. They both express the way the dominant group differentiates itself and stigmatizes the dominated group. The rule is that “we are real nations with real language” versus “they are tribes speaking dialects” [13, p. 398], that is Russian is a holistic language and Ukrainian is its mere dialect.

Phillipson, in his “Linguistic imperialism”, explains his ideas on linguistic imperialism on the example of English language. In this work Phillipson’s ideas and definitions will be used to explain the Russian linguistic imperialism towards Ukraine and Ukrainian language throughout the history. Phillipson defines English linguistic imperialism as “the dominance of English asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages [Ibid, p. 347]”. If we replace English by Russian for a moment, we will have the clear picture of the Russian linguistic imperialism and Russian linguistic penetration into Ukraine. The process can be traced back to 1720, when Russian Emperor Peter I forbade publication of all books in Dnieper Ukraine except those deal-

ing with religious matters, and those had to be verified with the Russian texts. The need for more effective measures later led to the Interior Minister Peter Valuev's secret circular.

In early colonial phase of imperialism, the elites in the Periphery consisted of the colonizers themselves, whether settlers or administrators. In present day neo-colonialism, the elites are to a large extent indigenous, but most of them have strong links with the Center. In the next phase of imperialism, neo-neo-colonialism Center-Periphery interaction will be increasingly by means of international communications. Computer technology will eliminate the need for the physical presence of the exploiters. New communications technology will step up the Center's attempt to control people's consciousness. They will play an ever-increasing role in order to strengthen control over the means of production. For this to be effective, the process requires the Center's cultural and linguistic penetration into the Periphery [14, p. 94].

The shift from one type of imperialism to another goes in parallel with the changes in the ways of power imposition. During the early imperialism, power was exerted by means of sticks (imposition force), then it changed to carrots (bargaining) and then to ideas (persuasion). For the latest stage, nothing plays a more significant role than language, as "language is the primary means for communicating ideas". Therefore an increased linguistic penetration is essential for completing the move away from crude means, the sticks of colonial times, the asymmetrical bargaining of the neo-colonial times to neo-neo-colonialist control by means of ideas"[14, p. 94].

Thus from the Pereyaslav treaty of 1648 until the establishment of independent Ukraine in 1991, the Russian power was exerted by impositional force. Since 1991 till now it changed to bargaining. Nowadays

Russian policy towards Ukraine is balancing between bargaining and persuasion and here Russian linguistic imperialism comes to play the decisive role.

Linguistic imperialism as a distinct type of imperialism

Linguistic imperialism permeates all types of imperialism for two reasons. First reason is that the language is the primary medium for transmitting ideas. Communication assumes mutual understanding on the basis of shared code. And it is the Center's language that is used for it. Secondly, linguistic imperialism dovetails with other types of imperialism and is an integral part of them. Linguistic imperialism is a primary component of cultural imperialism and through language the Center's social values are transmitted to the Periphery [13, p. 353].

As it was mentioned, the majority of the population in the Eastern part of Ukraine is Russophone. They form the target group for transmitting of Russia's ideological values. Russian is the second language in the rest of the Ukrainian territory, especially the central and eastern parts of Ukraine, therefore the whole country to some extent "suffers" from the imposed imperialism.

The interaction between the Center and the Periphery, that is Russia and Ukraine, is asymmetrical. This can be clearly seen in the media imperialism, one of the branches of cultural imperialism. As proposed by Phillipson, "media imperialism is a process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution, or content of the Media in any country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected" [15, p. 117]. In Ukraine according to the 2012 study of over 60% of newspapers, 83% of

journals and 87% of books in Ukraine were in Russian, only 28% of TV programs were in Ukrainian, even on state-owned channels. All these mass-media create a prism through which Russia is exporting its vision of the world to Ukraine.

There is a trickle of products, ideas, and influence from the Periphery to Center, but the overwhelming flow is from the Center to Periphery [13, p. 361]. Taking into consideration that most Ukrainians get information about world affairs from Russian and Russian-speaking media, it is obvious that Russia is playing a decisive role in formation of the public opinion in Ukraine.

A question should be posed: why Russia is exercising linguistic imperialism and intending to increase the role of Russian language in Ukraine? As mentioned above, as the primary medium for transmitting ideas, language is a very convenient and long-term tool through which Russia shares its values and vision. This, in turn, merges Russians and Ukrainians into one greater Russian entity. Russia claims supremacy of a linguistic identity through the preservation and perpetuation of the “Russian-speaking” identity (including the latter’s Ukrainian component). In doing so, it “extends” Russian identity into Ukraine, symbolically pushing back the border and pointing to an alleged lack of correspondence between Ukraine’s state borders and national boundaries.

Conclusion

One conclusion to be drawn from the above is that in Ukraine a new form of imagined community appeared as a result of the convergence of capitalism and print technology. This new community was limited by language and became one of catalysts for emerging the modern nation. The boundaries between these communities became political borders between states.

“However, when literacy level increases, it becomes easier to increase the popular support, with the masses discovering a new glory in the print elevation of languages they had humbly spoken all along. The lexicographic revolution in Europe demonstrates, that languages (in Europe at least) were, so to speak, the personal property of quite specific groups, their daily speakers and readers, and moreover that these groups, imagined as communities, were entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity of equals. Thus, language became the fundamental aspect of unification of people around communities” [1, p. 46].

Viewing Ukraine from the perspective of language communities it can be stated that it consists of two main communities: Russian-speaking in the East and Ukrainian-speaking in the West. In fact, there are two horizontal comradeships in Ukraine, each of them having their own path for development and struggle for independence. The debate over European Union Association agreement came to prove the existence of this gap between the two communities. The Russian speaking population in former Dnieper Ukraine, today’s Donbass, imagines itself not as a consisting part of Ukraine, but rather as Little Russian community, boundaries of which are limited by usage of the Russian language. Russia, in turn, highlights the language issue and argues that the Russian-speaking community in Ukraine is oppressed and these people need support. Western countries argue that under this argument Russia annexed Crimea and intends to annex Ukrainian East. Nevertheless, the problem here is much deeper, and the problem is that Ukraine is culturally, linguistically and ideologically fragmented.

After *Euromaidan* and change of the political elite in Ukraine, on February 23, 2014, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill that would have altered the law on languages of minorities, including Russian. The

bill would have made Ukrainian the sole state language at all levels. Repeal of the 2012 Law "On the principles of the state language policy" was met with great disdain in Crimea, populated by a Russian-speaking majority, which ultimately culminated the Crimean crisis. The same situation was in the East of Ukraine. The Lugansk People's Republic was declared on the April 27, 2014, and the representatives of the Republic demanded that Ukrainian government to provide amnesty for all protesters, enshrine Russian as the official language, and hold a referendum on the status of the region.

In the context of the language diversity in Ukraine, the recent developments may be also considered from the perspective of the connection between social mobility and linguistic pluralism, when ambitious members of minority groups see the opportunity to make careers for themselves by fanning a large potential group into consciousness of its separate identity. Language is well suited to become the basis of such cleavage, even if awareness of the group identity is low. Such individuals expect that they can rise higher at the head of a large but relatively leaderless minority group, rather than as an assimilated member of the majority society [11, p. 29]. This kind of developments took place in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine where the members of the Russian-speaking community awakened consciousness of its separate identity within large masses.

It should be also mentioned that Magocsi's hierarchy of multiple loyalties didn't disappear. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was replaced by the European Union, and the Russian Empire was replaced by the Russian Federation. If centuries ago the Ukrainians did not see any problem in being both Little Russians (Ukrainians) in the Russian empire, or ethnic Ruthenians (Ukrainians) in the Polish nation, nowadays Ukrainians of the Western Ukraine wish to become an integrated part

of larger European community, while the Ukrainians in the East still crave to be a part of Russia or Russia-oriented integration processes.

Thus, the central issue of the modern Ukrainian history is the emergence of an integral nation and the transformation of two linguistic communities into two different self-conscious political and cultural communities [12, p. 202].

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