

COLLECTIVE AND HISTORICAL MEMORY IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

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The article considers the factors contributing to the emergence and escalation of ethno-political conflicts in multicultural societies. When attempting to resolve these conflicts the task is to build mutual awareness through a more profound comprehension of the past and thus to overcome conflict. It is pointed out that the efficiency of the meetings, discussions, and projects jointly implemented by the representatives of various Caucasus NGOs for over a decade has been relatively low. According to the author, this is due to the lack of targeted thematic problem definition and systematic comprehensive government campaigning. As illustrated by the example of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the article raises the importance of historical and collective memory of the belligerent parties in the process of ethnic mobilization and the subsequent transformation of identity. Important components of this process are outlined and the basic manifestations of the post-war German experience in the normalization of the past are set out. It is suggested that inter-cultural dialogue aimed at the reconciliation of conflicting nations must be based on open, professional, consistent, and broad discussions, lasting perhaps for decades, dwelling upon various problems of historical and collective memory; this process must be supported by the political elite of the parties. Only this approach, i.e. the creation of the philosophy of real recognition and mutual understanding based on cultural dialog between peoples on major elements of identity will lay the foundations for an in-depth solution to ethno-political conflicts.

I

It is hard to unequivocally contend, but the experience of the past century apparently demonstrates the following pattern: multicultural societies experience crises when an array of factors starts to play essential and crucial roles at the same time: a) multiculturalism goes hand in hand with multiethnicity; b) multiethnicity goes hand in hand with the existence of minor fatherlands within the given country; c) ethnic communities manifest rapid revival of national identity; d) the ruling political elite acquires the distinctive features of an oppressive regime (totalitarian, authoritarian) or the commitment to democratic values dramatically plummets.

This reflection does not claim to be axiomatic, however, it can be supported by various examples. Thus the roots of the ethno-political developments that have been unfolding since the mid-1980s in the Caucasus date back to the early years of Soviet power when the borders known for 70 years were tailored. Political constituents of non-titular nations with minor fatherlands emerged in the Soviet republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The cultures of these entities also differ, sometimes in contrast with the dominating state, they even stand on various civilizational levels. Since the mid-1980, under the impact of changes taking place in the USSR, numerous amassed problems have erupted, most of which were of ethno-political origin. Swift ethnic and national identity revival took place, and when the ruling political entities of the central government responded by various forms of suppression, the problem deteriorated into an ethno-political conflict. Hence, the well known escalation of the Karabagh-Azerbaijani, then Armenian-Azerbaijani, as well as Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. In Europe, at the end of the 20th century, the latter were manifested by the demise of Yugoslavia and the devastating wars on its territory (see [1] for more detail on the role of historical memory in this conflict), the Russian-Chechen conflict, etc. As a rule, these conflicts go along with ethnic cleansing first exercised during the Sumgait events, and practiced broadly during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict as a result of which 360,000 Armenians were violently deported from Azerbaijan in 1988-1990, and about 200,000 Azerbaijanis left Armenia. Thus this phenomenon became commonplace: most Georgians abandoned Abkhazia; in Yugoslavia, forced formation of monoethnic territories has been going on to-date. The ethnic cleansing that was about to start in Moldova was prevented by the Russian troops. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary this did not happen owing to more democratic local regimes. Instead, in Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia this process was limitless.

Ethnic cleansing as a remedy (method, instrument) for ethno-political conflicts was used in the USSR by central Soviet authorities which switched from democratic rhetoric to salvaging their reign not shunning anything even bloodshed. Ethnic cleansing is, naturally, accompanied by the elimination of multiculturalism or, at best, by dramatic reduction of its scope. We can say the cultural factor plays the role of an "easy" ethnic-cleansing tool thus making the latter indirect and somewhat civilized for the outer world. For example, in the case of Armenians of Georgia, ethnic cleansing is manifested by veiled backing of shutting down of Armenian cultural centers, including schools, the policy of enforced Kartvelization of Armenian churches overtly sponsored by the state, fraudulent search for Georgian origins in Armenian surnames and unducing the change of

the latter by direct and indirect pressure, the propaganda of the “historical” thesis presenting Armenians as guests, hindrance to the economic development of Armenian-populated regions, etc. By the way, the latter was practiced in the Soviet time by the Azerbaijani government; its outcome is well known.

Thus, we considered the cultural substrate of ethno-political conflicts and subsequent ethnic cleansing. It should be noted that monoethnic entities such as Armenia are also prone to such (intra-ethnic) conflicts. For instance, according to our ethnographic field materials collected in the 1990s in Vardenis district¹, there were deep cultural differences between the local residents and the refugees from Azerbaijan, a sub-ethnic group of Armenians, representing Western and Eastern cultural and value systems, respectively, which manifested a well known ethnographic dichotomy: “ourselves vs aliens” and “us vs them.” The research conducted by my colleagues and me demonstrates that instead of calls for unity, regular communication and better acquaintance with each other will help to overcome such situations. The task behind our proposals was to overcome the intra-ethnic conflict rooted in culture and values through enhanced reciprocal familiarization with each other’s histories, traditions and culture, i.e., through the past. Is it possible to apply this approach to communities with various ethnic and, hence, cultural and value systems in the context of conflict situations?

II

Every year, since the mid-1990s, meetings have taken place between various NGOs representing the conflicting parties of the Caucasus region, political scientists, human rights specialists, artistes, mass media, scholars, and people’s diplomacy groups [see, for example 4.] The basic content of the meetings consists in situational analysis and the quest of conflict settlement methods. Numerous proposals are made, numerous events are initiated, numerous joint projects have been implemented, however, up to-date the issue has not got off the ground. There are numerous reasons for that. No attempt is made below to analyze the phenomenon in its entirety; we would just like to share a few considerations on this issue as to why the issue has not been resolved.

I would like to single out two major reasons. First, as far as we know, for these meetings no target thematic problem was formulated, which could become an implemented political course, totally, directly or indirectly, sponsored by the

¹ Field materials were collected during the survey conducted within the framework of the research, “Poverty and Survival Strategy in Armenia” financed by the World Bank (1994, supervisor N. Dudwick, the head of Vardenis team H. Marutyan), then under the project funded by the NGOC/UNHCR, “Cultural Dialog for Harmonious Coexistence” (1998, supervisor H. Petrosyan), and “Refugees-local residents: a decade of relations” based on Vardenis and Vayots-Dzor materials (1999, supervisor H. Kharatyan.) Also see 2, 3.

state. Second, these approaches were not voiced by the leaders of the conflicting states, while the scale of public initiative has been limited probably owing to poor support from the authorities. This can be regarded as a lack or deficiency of political will.

What can be the main culture-based theme on which discussions could be organized in order to shape mutual understanding in the peoples of the conflicting parties? It could take decades to transform the latter into real reconciliation or at least into changes in the identity elements which would enable to establish relations not only on the level of states and treaties but would outline the Caucasian model of the European Union called the Caucasus House. We are surely far from summarizing conflict settlement principles and defining a single recipe: any problem must be discussed and considered in terms of its distinctive features.

We believe, in the case of the South Caucasus region (and greater Caucasus), one should focus on the root of the problem in the relations between the peoples of the conflicting states and ethno-political entities, and then one can see history, to be more exact, the factor of collective and historical memories.

III

What is collective and historical memory? [see, for more details, 5¹]. Let us try to outline its basic properties. According to M. Halbwachs who is currently believed to be a classical source on the theory of memory, autobiographic memory, historical memory, history and collective memory are differentiated in memory. *Autobiographic memory* is a recollection of the events resulting from our life experience. *Historical memory* is a recollection that comes down to us only through historical records. *History* is the memorable past we are not “organically” related to, the past that is no longer an important part of our life, whereas *collective memory* is the active past that shapes our identity. Memory inevitably gives way to history when we lose the ties with our past. *Historical memory* can be either *organic* or *dead*: we can celebrate what we never experienced in reality, live and maintain such past alive, or be alive only in historical records, the so called cemeteries of knowledge.

Collective and historical memory is passed on both through oral (from the senior to the junior) and written sources in the family, school, college, the public

¹In the brochure a reference is made to fundamental phenomenon and component elements of collective and historical memory, the factors shaping it and the main forms of its manifestation, building and transferring mechanisms, the ways implemented by ethno-mobilization potential and political elite, the role played in the relations among the present and past, some issues of traumatic memory through thorough observation of the works within the reach of the author.

at large and via mass media. Historical memory, as a part of social memory, is a complex category encompassing the history pictured by the people itself and the general concepts of history. The moral norms contained in the comments on historical events, and the behavioral norms of the major historical figures and heroes of the people shape behavior norms for individuals, groups of individuals and the whole nation. Collective and historical memory are major elements determining the terms “nation” and “national identity” [6, pp. 21, 40, 43 etc.¹] based on people’s knowledge and attitudes to the nation’s entire historical past, actual or perceived, or episodes thereof. The manifestation of this history embraces branchings growing from the same source and developments which at first sight may have no immediate connection with this memory, however, actually, are determined and fed by the latter, and its totality forms the collective memory of the nation. As a component of national identity, collective and historical memory also becomes an integral element of national culture and, ultimately, one of the factors that shape the dominating value system in the given society.

Below I will attempt to refer to the elements of collective and historical memory that in our opinion are crucial in terms of the problem in question.

First, a major property of collective and historical memory is its powerful *ethnic mobilization potential*. At the same time, the concepts of national identity and collective and historical memory are not static phenomena but subject to transformations that can be caused both by internal and external developments. The two noted factors, as a rule, follow one another, the latter manifesting the consequences of the former.

In the life of the society, ethnic mobilization [for details see 7] takes place both owing to the internal mechanisms working in this society and driven by the state propaganda machine. In the latter case, the summed up components are simply switched: the political elite attempts to shape a national identity and transform collective and historical memory which can promote ethnic mobilization of the society around certain political problems put forward by the elite, and ultimately places the political life of the society under state control.

Here the “locals-aliens” dichotomy comes into play. Why? Whatever the foundation of the community may be (territorial, ethnic or national), the image of the “alien” or “stranger” is part of the latter compared and contrasted with the image of the “friend.” The image of the stranger can be endowed with negative, neutral and positive features; in certain contexts, especially, during confrontation, the enemy image may emerge. Research demonstrates the role the enemy image

¹ In the book, the author considers historical memory to be one of the 6-7 major components of “ethnic cohesion” and “nation” that comprise the ethnic basis of national identity.

can play when national identity is shaped. Confrontation and the “enemy,” real or perceived, become an incentive for national mobilization.

Unless the role of historical memory is appraised, it is impossible to appreciate the process of ethnic mobilization around certain political tasks. This must be considered to account for the crucial role of historical and collective memory of conflict-generating events during ethno-political confrontations. Historical memory becomes the foundation on which the perception of confrontation is built up, the legitimacy of one’s own demands and the illegitimacy of the opponent’s are explained. This memory serves as the basis around which the nation’s forces can be consolidated and driven to the solution of certain problems. Moreover, collective and historical memory about conflicts during ethno-political confrontations not only contributes to ethnic mobilization but can also morally justify brutalities against the opponent.

The enormous mobilization potential of collective and historical memory explains why the political elite intends to control and use it for certain political purposes. There are numerous examples of certain perceptions of history created by the political elite or certain strata of intellectuals which thereafter are instilled into the public at large through the education system and propaganda. In this process, the political elite or certain intellectuals are not always interested in objective memories about the past. As a result, an attempt is made to strictly monitor the formation of collective and historical memory. In other words, the ruling elite does not want the society to remember what actually took place but what is advantageous to remember in terms of the elite. This “controlled” and somewhat restricted memory enables the elite to make the society more manageable and to consolidate it around certain political purposes.

There are numerous instances when the political elite tries to artificially shape or transform collective and historical memory. In particular, in the USSR the intervention of the political elite into memory formation was widespread and unscrupulous which left an imprint on the processes that were underway in Soviet and some post-Soviet republics.

Thus for example, in the Soviet time, the targeted operation of the Azerbaijani state propaganda machine shaped certain stereotypical perceptions about Karabagh, its Armenian population and Armenians in general in the Azerbaijani society. These perceptions became part of the Azerbaijanis’ collective and historical memory and have been actively manifesting themselves since 1988¹ first in the Karabagh-Azerbaijani legal and political dispute, and thereafter, during the

¹ It is indicative that during the Karabagh Movement (1988-90) and up until now, the Azerbaijanis have attempted to emulate the Armenian model of historical memory.

ethno-political conflict. After the 1994 ceasefire, for more than a decade the Azerbaijani elite has been pursuing a policy aimed at the creation of the enemy image in order to consolidate the Azerbaijani society and to legitimize the authorities. Exploiting the conflict, the Azerbaijani authorities enhance the negative image of the Armenians and create “historical memories” based on this image.

After 1991, the revival of state ideology has begun in the former Soviet republics: if previously the ideology of state structures was based on communist ideas, then after the demise of the USSR, it was replaced by nationalist ideology. This was a quite logical process. The former union republics were being transformed into nation states. It was also logical that parallel to the process of establishment of nation states, certain ideas about national history would be defined in order to ensure the legitimacy of the national statehood. It was also necessary to prepare the population for ethnic mobilization and to consolidate it against an external enemy. For this very purpose, historical narratives are created to replace previously circulating ideas and perceptions.

IV

As it was mentioned above, the development of collective and historical memory is largely influenced by the course of events which changes in the perception and interpretation of phenomena. By using the Armenian material, I would like to specify, in particular, the role of collective and historical memory about the Armenian Genocide in the Karabagh movement (1988-90).

A brief historical note: the 1915-1923 Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Turkey and, partially, in Eastern Armenia caused the physical extermination of the majority of Armenian ethnos¹, the loss of the most part of the historical fatherland, the formation of the Armenian Diaspora, and, consequently, the emergence of new historical memory. However, for a long time, out of political considerations, in Soviet Armenia, references to the Genocide were effectively prohibited. Thanks to certain freedom caused by changes in the domestic political situation (the Khrushchev’s “thaw”) and literature, in April 1965 during the 50th anniversary of the Genocide, mass rallies took place in Yerevan which was a rather unusual phenomenon in the USSR at that time [for details, see 11, 12]. These rallies, as well as the growing previous and consequent interest in the theme of the Genocide in art and literature attests to the fact that the memory

¹ As it was noted, particularly, in recent history genocides rarely achieve their goals, i.e., the extermination of ethnic communities and have apparently unforeseen consequents. Thus, they can have an adverse effect, cause the revival of ethnic ties and national identity, and enhance its crystallization (6, p. 31.) Lastly, as in the Armenian case, a genocide can trigger a new phase of ethnogenesis (for more details, see 8, p. 331; 9, pp. 47-52; 10, p. 60).

of the Genocide, despite the official policy of silencing the latter, continued to live on in the hearts and minds of the people. However, in these recollections the Armenians were innocent victims who lost most of their historical fatherland and needed compassion. In terms of ideology, the free and unrestricted references to the national liberation struggle, the freedom fighter heroes, and independent statehood remained to be under undeclared ban [see 13, pp. 36-47; cf. 14, p. 173]. The main content of the works on the Genocide written at that time can be summarized in the dictum about “peaceful revenge” by Silva Kaputikyan in her poem, *Contemplation in the middle of the road*, “A revenge should be taken by your existence.” [15, p. 112]. It was in fact the poetic formulation of the state policy in the sphere of genocide memory. The 1965 rallies, followed by the construction of the Genocide memorial and annual hundred-thousand strong mourning processions, enhanced the memory and its uninterrupted transfer from generation to generation.

In the mid-1980s the factor of collective and historical memory about the Genocide came to the forefront again. It was determined first of all by the politics of perestroika, glasnost and democratization declared by the Soviet authorities which caused a process of review and re-evaluation of the Soviet-period history in the mass media and fiction (based on archival materials.) The ever growing Azerbaijani propaganda served as an external spur because of the so called “Albanian theory” in the Azerbaijani historiography according to which the Armenian cultural monuments in the Azerbaijani territory were declared fundamental cultural elements of the Albanian nation (which played a certain role in the ethnogenesis of the modern Azerbaijanis), when attempts were made to divorce the ethno-cultural heritage of Karabagh from its Armenian roots and to portray the Armenians of Karabagh as Armenized descendants of Albanians. It seemed, the modern Azerbaijanis and the Armenians of Karabakh had common ancestors and thus in historical and cultural terms they apparently became “cousins.” Denunciation of everything that was Armenian was quite purposefully intended to destroy the ethnic self-consciousness of the Karabagh Armenians (Armenian origin, historical memory, ethnic symbols, etc.) to undermine the Armenian value system, and thus to make a basis for the change of national identity. Armenians perceived this as encroachment on national identity and, especially, on historical memory; this and other crucial factors induced Armenians to start the struggle for the restoration of historical justice. Great importance was attached to the latter, it was enhanced by the confidence that the criticism of injustice committed under Stalin must result in the correction of these drawbacks. Hence, it was not coincidental that from the very outset, the Karabagh Movement

initiated comprehensive scrutiny of the 1921 Resolution of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist party (under which the territory of Karabagh inhabited by Armenians (95%) was given to Azerbaijan) and denunciation of the latter based on Karabagh's legal and historical status. Such debates were conducted not only in historical journals, newspapers, on TV and radio, but also in the Opera square, in the presence of tens and hundreds of thousands of people. Thus, the factor of historical memory slowly, step by step, consciously or subconsciously became a decisive locomotive power of the Karabagh Movement ideology [see 16, pp. 56-57.]

A week after the commencement of the Karabagh Movement, the Sumgait events erupted when thirty or perhaps more Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan were massacred by Turkish genocidal methods (dating back to the early 20th century.) These pogroms (continued in Baku in January 1990 when according to incomplete data over 400 Armenian citizens of Azerbaijan were killed) were unequivocally perceived by Armenians as a manifestation of yet another genocide and stirred up the most powerful layer of historical memory, that of the 1915 Genocide. Thus the Karabagh Movement initially aimed at backing self-determination of the Armenians in Nagorno Karabagh and in this way restoring the historical justice in terms of territorial belonging of Karabagh was given a renewed impetus.

The analysis of various sources (speeches, articles in press, posters and banners) of the Karabagh Movement shows that because of the early 20th century genocide and late 20th century massacres, during the Movement, the theme of the Armenian Genocide remained a most important manifestation of the Armenian's collective and historical memory. At the same time, the examination of the material proves that this memory was under transformation: the attempts to find a way out of the late 20th century crisis were combined with the struggle against the early 20th century crisis manifested in the symbol of the victim begging for justice and compassion that gave way to the image of the fighter who is aware that national goals can be achieved only by struggle¹. Perhaps this very change in the Armenian identity determined the success in the struggle for the liberation of Karabagh.

¹ During the Karabakh Movement, as a rule people "went one century back" in their memories, not more. In Armenian reality, in less than one century large Armenian families have been replaced by small ones. However, in the system of family and kinship, some elements of clan relations survive, in particular, the generational ties are still relatively strong in terms of transfer of memories. This century-long period corresponds to the sum total of autobiographic and collective memories. To be more specific, for hundreds of thousands of people, the genocide memory remained in the domain of collective/personal recollections; it had not become history in the broad sense of the word. For many people surrounded by various age groups this memory was of autobiographic order: strongly emotional genocide or deportation narratives imparted by the grandparents and then by parents. In the case of the younger generation, for whom the ties were disrupted for some reasons, the historical memories acquired in the form of knowledge were in the foreground. For other important changes see 17, pp. 55-56.

The analysis of materials demonstrates that the appraisal of the Sumgait events perceived as genocide became the crucible for the people's stereotypes shaped over the decades of Soviet power, a stumbling block for the Soviet paradigms propagated for nearly 70 years: for the mass media which is the mirror of truth; for the peoples' friendship; for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that cared about the wellbeing of the Soviet people day and night; for the Soviet-Russian army perceived as an element of Armenians' survival; for the "fairest" judiciary in the world, etc. Thus the researcher faces the citizen who shuffled off the authoritarian ideology during the Karabakh Movement and, what is important in the given context, the collective and historical memory of the genocide guides him in the shaping of free thinking. This is manifested in the perception of the Sumgait events as genocide; in the demand for political condemnation of the latter; the prosecution and adequate punishment of the perpetrators and organizers; the exposing of the possible implementers and organizers and court proceedings. In other words, the genocide factor becomes the locomotive that enables to gradually change the old perceptions and stereotypes, to transform the identity based on old values, and to shape a new identity. Thus, the theme of the Genocide in the Karabakh Movement, goes beyond the initial domain of pain and mourning and drives people to active actions which, ultimately, resulted in the new parliament established in anticipation of radical changes.

Since mid-1990s, the state has undertaken the achievement of Genocide recognition and condemnation of its organizers, and, apparently, the popular manifestations of memory somewhat weakened. However, the mass popular protests against the treacherous assassination of Lt. Gurgen Markarian in Budapest in the winter of 2004 proved that this was not so¹.

V

Thus, the active role of collective and historical memory about conflict issues in ethnic mobilization and subsequent identity change has been briefly demonstrated with the two belligerent South Caucasus republics. As a result, there are two nations, the current conflict between which is largely determined by the diametrically opposite perceptions of collective and historical memory about each other during the previous and new developments in the 20th century.

Let us note that this phenomenon is characteristic not only of the Karabagh

¹ Lt. Gurgen Markarian was a RA Army officer sent to Budapest under the Partnership for Peace program to English courses. On February 19, 2004, early in the morning, he was brutally killed in his sleep by an Azerbaijani officer who participated in these courses.

conflict. Numerous and diverse manifestations thereof one can come across in the Russian-Chechen, Russian-Ukrainian, and other conflicting post-Soviet regions. We have also witnessed national identity changes rooted in historical memories that take place in Europe and other parts of the world. However, below a brief reference to only one civilized example will be made.

Historiographic issues can always change due to the imperative of time, as it happened in Germany after its defeat in World War II. In other words, it is subject to change, it causes identity changes. The historical memories continues to exist over the whole period of changes in historiography. In the case of Germany, the 1959 lecture by Theodor Adorno "What does it mean to come to terms with the Past?" played a pivotal role. One of the principles he preferred was "working through the past" which required continuous self-criticism in contrast with "mastering the past" which suggested silencing the past. In the 1970-80s, commentators and political leaders called for "a 'normalization' of the past." The West German authorities drafted a program, a strategy for normalization of the past. It had various manifestations such as the willingness of the political leadership to solve the problem of the past on the institutional level. One of its manifestation was the payment of compensation to Israel (and probably the compensation paid to the Soviet POWs.) Next, the creation of Germany's and German nation's image as a moral nation determined by the fact that in contrast with the generation of the 1950s, the new generation wished to learn more fundamental lessons from the past. Back in the 1970s, the Chancellor portrayed West Germany as a Normal Nation facing the same problems as other western states and its history incorporated both "ups and downs." It was claimed that new solutions depended on the old ones, that the images of the past and the past itself were both resources and obligations for the present. In other words, the images of the past were neither dictated by the past, nor entirely created in the present but were the result of continuous dialog wherein the earlier images shape and suggest what can be done with them in a more successful present. The so called regularization or ritualization is another form of normalization. Recognition of historical responsibility has become a distinctive feature of periodically held political liturgy such as various memorial dates, May 8, 1945, September 1, 1939, visits to former concentration camps, etc. [for more details see 18, 19.]

Otherwise stated, over the decades following World War II, the mankind has witnessed the transformation of German identity caused by critical review and re-evaluation of collective and historical memory concerned with some conflict-generating issues, and, ultimately, the full-fledged Franco-German reconciliation which enabled the successful unification of Europe.

Students of collective and historical memory (M. Halbwachs, E. Hobsbawm, B. Schwartz, J. K. Olick, E. Zerubavel, etc.) note that often the “past” is a cultural structure built in the present and, thus, subject to numerous modern interests based on the latter. In other words, the transformation of the current national identity can be achieved first of all by means of critical review of the past (and collective and historical memory based on it.) In any case, this is a long and time-consuming process that can not be achieved by numerous mutual visits of delegations on various levels or signing friendship and economic cooperation agreements, seminars and NGO activist discussions. This process must be based on civilized European examples of inter-cultural dialog rooted in open, professional, consistent, nation-wide debates on various issues of collective and historical memory of the belligerent nations supported by the political elites [cf. 20] of the parties [cf. 21; 22, pp. 76-78.]¹

Only this approach, i.e., the philosophy of real recognition and mutual understanding by means of a cultural dialog between nations on the crucial component of identity can lay the basis for fundamental resolution of ethno-political conflicts.

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¹ Cf.: “57.1% of the respondents in Armenia consider historical hostility [between Armenia and Azerbaijan] to be an obstacle to Karabakh settlement.” (23.)

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