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IDEOLOGY AND INFORMATION SECURITY

Gagik Harutyunyan

The article shows that because of the current system crisis the liberal concepts lose their monopolistic positions. In turn, competitive abilities of societies and their levels of national security are stipulated by their capacity to create a polyideological system with proportionally represented universal and nationally conservative ideologies. According to the our approach, a national-conservative ideology can be identified with the concept of information security for a given society. In this context a special significance will belong to establishing and preserving the critical infrastructures having ideological character.

The current crisis is often interpreted as a result of mistakes committed exclusively in the financial sphere. However, this explanation is primitive, and the economic problems are only one part of the cause-and-effect complex. In particular, the establishment of the multi-polar world is indicative not only of the termination of the American monopoly in the political and economic spheres. The liberal ideology supporting the value system of consumer society and having acquired totalitarian tendencies is also losing its dominant positions today (see, e.g., [1]). It means that changes occur primarily in the public consciousness and psychology, i.e., in the ideological sphere, new, original and multi-polar approaches are also being established. Such conceptual changes affect the systems of national security and ideology.

1. Formation of Polyideology

It is known that today the traditional Western (particularly American) liberal postulations and their unified forms of economic management renounce their monopolistic positions. This is partially corroborated by a considerable growth in the role and interference of the state into the issues of market regulation, as seen in the nationalization of some large corporations that have become insolvent, as well as in granting large bailouts to private companies by the state, and etc. It is remarkable that economic community today is re-reading the seemingly forgotten “Capital” by Karl

Marx, which has been re-published in some countries in enormous numbers of copies. The current developments result in validating the socialist ideas in countries considered liberal.

Meanwhile, the situation at hand is different from what was going on in the 90s of the last century, when the ideological crisis, being a priority, resulted in a collapse of the Soviet System. In those years an attempt was undertaken to de-legalize the socialist and communist ideas, however, the current ideological re-validations do not assume oblivion of the liberalist classics. For resolving the emerging problems today any ideological-economic models and methods will do, only that they be efficient. In other words, the following famous principle is used: “To resolve problems, all means are good, except the bad ones”.

The resulting formation is a poly-ideological society with differing proportions of socialist, liberal as well as nationalist or civilization-related and conservative ideas¹. It is also to be noted that the universal ideologies have also lived through a certain evolution losing previous unambiguous and even dictatorial character of their positions² (which was particularly relevant to e.g., the totalitarian, communist or the vulgar-liberal concept). Besides, since the 90s, within the context of the so-called postmodernity, there has been a sort of crisscrossing of various ideologies. E.g., in Great Britain the “Neo-laborites” represent the “Liberal-Socialist” movement [3]. The George Bush Jr. Administration employed many important “neoconservatives” whose ideological origins, according to some researchers, showed traces of Trotsky-related approaches, etc. The result is an increased compatibility of diverse outlooks, forming a multi-component, though integrally-oriented ideological dimension³. This type of ideological format will augment and make the conceptual resources of society multilateral, eliciting more adequate reactions to challenges and beneficial uses of unfavorable situations. Evidently, a society using such technologies of self-organization, will substantially boost its capabilities in the geopolitical, geo-economic and other domains.

¹ It is certainly suggested that these trends thought to be universal include the civilizational featured characteristic for a given society.

² The term “ideology” introduced into the European tradition by Antoin Destute de Trassi (“Elements of Ideology”, 1801), have been given multiple and often complementary definitions to this day. This situation is complicated with regard to the concepts being modified continually, so that in this presentation the term will be used with regard to the context.

³ Such processes seem to be uncharacteristic for the “post-modernistic” epoch of permissiveness, so they will have to be regarded as application of advanced political technologies.

2. *Ideology and National Security*

Let us make a brief schematic comparison and evaluation of National Security systems¹ in some societies, depending on the ideological formations of those societies.

The British and American Technologies. In the context of what has been presented, the most efficient experience may be perhaps that of Great Britain also implemented in other English-speaking countries. Ideological tolerance is inherent in the societies of those countries: the carriers of conservative (national-conservative) and labour (socialist-oriented) ideas have developed mutually complementary mechanisms to carry on joint action on the ideological field (which is known to be close to the Anglo-Saxon mentality). This factor is responsible for the great strategic achievements of the British Empire² as well as the fact that in the last few hundred years that civilization has managed to retain its status as world leader.

It is remarkable that the US, having borrowed the political logic of the British, because of the singularity of its historical development, ignored the political significance of the left-wing orientation. The resulting extreme cultivation of liberalism and consumerism in the United States generated some serious problems causing this power to lose its positions of the world leader. The emergence of ideological oversights seems to be acknowledged by the American elite, hence the legitimization of socialist postulations and the ideas of deterrence in the American Society (see, e.g., [4]).

Continental Europe. It is remarkable that the Anglo-American ideological tendencies are substantially different from the realities in the European countries. In continental Europe there are traditionally developed universal (liberal and leftist) movements (see, e.g., [5]), however, so far, understandably there are no Europe-wide national-conservative approaches. Moreover, the nationalist parties of European countries often counter the integration projects of the EU. That is a stipulating factor that the EU, having practically an economic potential similar to the US, manifests inadequacy to this potential in the aspect of military power or geopolitical influence.

The Reforms after Deng Sao Ping. Ideologically, a remarkable thing is “the Chinese Miracle”. Only two decades ago China used to be suppressed by the yoke of many different problems. The same situation was in the mono-ideological USSR which collapsed having been unable to react adequately to challenges. The situation in China changed in the late 20th century through Deng Sao Ping having established

¹ In should be borne in mind that this concept includes not only purely defensive functions but the expansionist ones as well.

² The US is generally assumed to be successor and inheritor of the British Empire.

a multi-ideological field, triggering both the socialist¹ and national-conservative (Confucian) and liberal concepts. The PRC today is a legitimate contender for global leadership; its rapid empowerment shows efficiency of ideological technologies.

Ideological Revolutions in Russia. Alongside with the carriers of national and liberal ideas, mentality of a great part of the Russian society is close to the socialist ideas (the national-ideological principles of those ideas are assumed to have originated from the traditional structure of the Russian rural community). It is general knowledge that in the Russian reality the ideological antagonisms resulted in revolutions (socialist in 1917 and liberal in 1991), with all ensuing negative consequences and an artificial consolidation of a single viewpoint. As a result, Russia, possessing all necessary premises and ambitions to become the world leader, in the last century many times has appeared in difficult situations. In this regard, the Russian authorities today are trying to combine the different ideological trends. In any case, it has to be stated that the unfavorable ideological situation has had a considerable impact on the development of the Russian-Slavonic world.

Islam and Liberalism. The current general situation in the Islamic world has largely been stipulated by the domination of religious conservatism in the ideological domain. It is remarkable that the countries combining the religious traditionalism (containing, in particular, some ideas on social justice) with the liberal or purely national approaches, have substantially improved their situation within the International Community. Among those states, besides Myanmar and Indonesia, a special focus should fall on Iran, where the radical Islam, the Iranian national-civilization traditions and elements of democratic liberalism has been successfully integrated. As a result, Iran has become a religious leader posing as one of the most dynamic and diversely developing countries on the International scene. It is to be noted that the deficiency in competitive ability of Islamic countries is often thought to be caused by a certain shortage of intellectual resources. Interestingly, Iran has launched a satellite using their own rocket, while in nanotechnology the Iranian scientists occupy the 25th place in citation index (Iran is the sole Islamic country in this domain (see, e.g., [7])).

¹ It is to be noted that the basics of the socialist ideology originated not in the 19-20th centuries (as it did in Western Europe and Russia), but rather in the 5th c. B.C. The founder of that doctrine was the philosopher and thinker Mo Tzi (see, e.g., [6]).

3. National Ideology and Information Security

It follows from the above that the proportionality of ideological field will stipulate the efficiency of the society's national strategy. It is quite natural that according to the contemporary ideas of social science, ideology is determined as a "complex of commands providing the most efficient mode and interconnection of processes"¹. This dynamic wording by Vyacheslav Yanko, will most probably determine the national security as well. That is to say, under the current situation the goals and objectives of National Security and of the integrated ideology compiled by the state and the society, the methods of achieving these goals and resolving these problems, are in actual fact merged in a single entity.

Both in the sphere of ideology and in the sphere of NS the system efficiency will suggest the interconnection of practically all domains of human activity. It is remarkable in this context that Information Security (IS) being the principal component of NS and including the processes of the intellectual and spiritual spheres, is related to the national-conservative ideology, which is part of the generalized ideology of society.

The Uniformity of Information Security and the National-Conservative Ideology. According to the classical formulation embracing the sphere of intellectual-spiritual processes and ideas, the national-conservative ideology is the system of views and national values enclosing the comprehension and estimation of people's interrelations with each other and with the reality. In turn, ideology can be considered as a factor of reality only in case it becomes a component of public consciousness, which however can be achieved only through information technologies. In other words, the national ideology, if adopted as a necessity, will have to be perceived as a prioritized and basic component of the information field. Hence, the main objectives of the information-psychological (non-technical) security are:

- Implementation of the national-conservative ideology in the domestic information field;
- Protection of the main postulations of this ideology from external and internal distortions;
- Dissemination of ideological concepts within the context of national interests in the external information environment.

¹ Янко В.А., <http://yanko.lib.ru>

Thus, if the generalized ideology of society and the generalized postulations of the NS are coincidental, then the national-conservative component of ideology is in turn directly connected with the questions (non-technical) of IS, the functions of these two concepts being coincidental. In other words, these concepts can integrally be defined as a complex of commands providing the most efficient mode and inter-connection of information processes.

Inclusion of “critical infrastructures” in the content-oriented segment of IS and the need for their protection. In some advanced states (particularly in the US) the priority task of the technical segment of information sphere is providing security of information systems for the so-called critical infrastructure: those of control, communication, information, energy and water supplies, police and rescue, financial and other systems. It seems that the similar “critical infrastructures” are characteristic and very important also for the content-oriented, i.e., for the national-conservative segment of ideology: quite naturally, the American experts consider it a crucial task of the NS to protect the national values. Practically that means that the national system of values will have to select and to protect specially those postulations which deformation can result in national loss of morals (demoralization) and paralysis.

Meanwhile, it follows that a full-fledged IS system is impossible without having the ideological postulations. That however does not mean that establishment of the IS system must be done only after the clarification of those postulations. As noted above, the information security is to be actually identified with the national-conservative ideology, while the conceptual developments of the IS will have to facilitate the formation of complex ideological approaches. In particular, the set of IS concepts will have to yield the postulations having a critically important significance.

July, 2009

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TRANSCAUCASIA AMID THE GLOBAL CRISIS

Sergey Grinyaev

The article is devoted to the analysis of the situation caused by the global financial and economic crisis. It is shown that as most of the countries of the world the countries of Transcaucasia were in the whirlwind of crisis, their economies suffered substantial losses. It is especially mentioned that crisis influenced not only social and economic situation but in some cases it has also affected foreign political positions of the states of Transcaucasia: under new difficult circumstances they have to look for new solutions of the old problems. The special attention in the article is paid to the Russian interests in Transcaucasia. It is mentioned that today Russia have to struggle for the preservation of its influence in the region. The role and the influence of a number of international projects realized in the region (particularly such projects as *Nabucco*) are examined.

Fast Facts

Crisis, which broke out in 2007, still continues to determine the main tendencies today, in two years after the beginning of those serious perturbations in the economy. The situation in the world economy is still alarming. The forecasts of analysts come to the conclusion that the beginning of the overcoming the crisis will start not earlier than in 3-5 years¹.

At the same time the analysis and assessment of the peculiarities of the current crisis show that this is not an “ordinary” crisis, not another wave connected with the overproduction of any product, but it is something more serious and deep – this is a system crisis which touches on the grounds of the modern post-industrial civilization and overlaps the social, cultural, spiritual and other crises and this intensifies synergetic effect of their mutual influence and destructive effect on the modern soci-

¹ http://www.volgograd.ru/business/obzor_fond/186102.pub
http://www.fedpress.ru/38/econom/banks/id_124598.html

ety. As a result, at the turn of the first quarter of the 21st century the world faces new era which demands fundamentally new architecture.

Amid the crisis the processes connected with the reorganization of the system of the world order are developed. The emergence of the various formats of the communication within the frame of the so called “G”-s became the characteristic feature of the anti-crisis managing. If before 2009 there had been only one G7 format and its broadened political variant with the participation of Russia – G8, then since the beginning of 2009 that format has become dominant and it included into its orbit many new countries. They began talking about G11, then about G15, G20 and even G50. Concurrently everybody denied even the possibility of the solution of any significant issue within the framework of the existing world order. Till June 2009 nobody remembered about the UN. All the world mass media were full of the information about the international meetings within various “G” formats which results did not comply with the existing system of the international law and reflected the wishes of the richest people of the world to arrange new post-industrial re-division of the world.

The aspiration not “de jure” but “de facto” to remake the system of the world order is rather understandable. The right of veto of the permanent member countries of the UN keeps some on the hop and it would have been impossible to miss such a chance as a global financial crisis.

Today the experts concur that the current financial and economic crisis is managed by the world financial elite. The purpose of the crisis is to preserve the dominance of the current financial elite and put a ground for a new model of world finances amid the ongoing global transformations. Among the latter are the exhaustion of the discovered hydro-carbon resources in the near future; the grave changes of climate which bring to the transformation of geopolitical space; the essential change of the migration flows of the planet’s population; the appearance of the break-through technologies in industry, which can cardinally change the direction and the tempo of the humanity development.

Per se, those who have arranged this crisis face the same problems which were solved during World War I and II by the military force. In other words a world war is going on today and it is conducted by the economic pressure, blackmail, speculations and bribery (e.g. – for struggling with the crisis Russia has already spent more than \$220 billion while the US during the year appropriated \$160 billion for the operations of their army in Iraq and Afghanistan). As a result, the geopolitical picture of the world is changing fast, the needs of the world

powers and the interests connected with those needs also change. The cardinal change of the geo-economic picture of the world is the consequence of such transformations.


1. General geo-economic estimation of the of the situation in Transcaucasia

Generally the developments in Transcaucasia were characterized by the tense stability. The economies of the republics of Transcaucasia were pending for the active phase of the development of a number of regional energy projects which have been started in recent years.

The inflow of foreign investments to the countries of the region was at a rather faster pace first of all to the branches connected with the development of the natural resources. This caused the growth of GDP of the republics (*Picture 1*). Rather good results were acquired by Azerbaijan which actively engaged foreign capital in the development of its own production fields.

Pic.1

The changes of the GDP of the republics of Transcaucasia, \$ billion




Source *CIA FactBook*

The high energy costs allowed Azerbaijan accumulating rather serious financial resources thus creating in the country the mechanism of financial stabilization (Pic.2.)

Pic.2


International reserves of the countries of Transcaucasia, billion of dollars



Source CIA FactBook

Pic.3

The aggregate foreign dept of the republics of Transcaucasia



Source CIA FactBook

But alongside with the definite economic achievements the foreign dept of the republics of Transcaucasia also grew (*pic.3*).

Over the regarded period interesting and rather crucial changes took place among the trade and economic partners of the countries of Transcaucasia which partly illustrate the general change of the situation in the region¹.

As for Georgia in 2005 its production was exported to the following countries: Russia (18.1%), Turkey (14.3%), Azerbaijan (9.8%), Turkmenistan (8.9%), Bulgaria (5%), Armenia (4.7%), Ukraine (4.4%), and Canada (4.2%). In the same year the main importers to Georgia were Russia (15.4%), Turkey (11.4%), Azerbaijan (9.4%), Ukraine (8.8%), Germany (8.3%), and USA (6%).

But in 2007 the situation changed. Georgian production was exported to the following countries: Turkey (13%), USA (11.2%), Azerbaijan (6.3%), Great Britain (5.4%), Bulgaria (5.1%), Ukraine (5%), Armenia (4.8%), Turkmenistan (4.5%), and Canada (4.2%). The main importers were Turkey (14%), Russia (12.3%), Ukraine (8.5%), Azerbaijan (7.3%), Germany (6.8%), USA (5%), Bulgaria (4.6%).

In 2005 Azerbaijan preferred to trade with the following countries. Export: Italy (30,3%), France (9,4%), Russia (6,6%), Turkey (6,3%), Turkmenistan (6,3%), Georgia (4,8%), Israel (4,5%), Croatia (4,1%). Import: Russia (17%), Great Britain (9,1%), Singapore (9,1%), Turkey (7,4%), Germany (6,1%), Turkmenistan (5,8%), Ukraine (5,4%), China (4,1%).

As for Armenia then in the regarded years its foreign trade balance was formed due to the trade with the following countries. In 2005 goods were imported from the following countries: Russia (13.5%), Belgium (8%), Germany (7.9%), Ukraine (7%), Turkmenistan (6.3%), USA (6.2%), Israel (5.8%), Iran (5%), and Romania (4.2%). The production was exported to Germany (15.6%), the Netherlands (13.7%), Belgium (12.8%), Russia (12.2%), Israel (11.5%), USA (11.2%), and Georgia (4.8%).

In 2007 the situation changed. The products were exported to Russia (17.5%), Germany (14.7%), the Netherlands (13.5%), Belgium (8.7%), Georgia (7.6%), USA (6.6%), Switzerland (4.3%), Bulgaria (4.1%), and Ukraine (4%). Import came from Russia (15.1%), Ukraine (7.7%), Kazakhstan (7.4%), Germany (6.8%), China (6%), France (4.6%), USA (4.5%), and Iran (4.3%).

At the same time analysis and the assessment of the developing situation allowed supposing that at the turn of 2005-2006 due to the concentration and mutual intersection of the interests of a number of leading states (Russia, Germany, Great Britain, USA and China) in the region, first of all in the issues of the free access to

¹Source *CIA FactBook*

the resources of the Caspian region, the situation could have changed radically. Even more it became clear that a kind of status-quo which had been formed in the region earlier, by 2006 did not suit some powers, which purposefully worked to destabilize situation in the region.

The activation of the work of Israeli official and non-governmental organizations in Transcaucasia is a rather interesting fact. Particularly, the active cooperation between Israel and Georgia started in 2005. The elaboration of the security and defence of the “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan” oil pipeline by NATO forces also refers to that period (the main participants to the project are *BP* (30,1%), *SOCAR* (25%), *Unocal* (8,9%), *Statoil* (8,71%), *TPAO* (6,53%), *ENI* (5%), *Itochu* (3,4%), *ConocoPhillips* (2,5%), *INPEX*(2,5%), *Total* (5%) and *Amerada Hess* (2,36%).

Back in 2003 in a number of mass media information appeared that the American instructors train in Azerbaijan special detachments, which were called “Caspian guard”, for the operative solution of the problems connected with the guarding of the feed production and transportation objects in the Caspian region¹. In the same period the possibility of sending American soldiers to the region with the same mission was actively discussed². And though the leadership of NATO officially gave up on the guarding of the oil pipeline³, unofficially a part of military contingent of NATO and the employees of the private militarized security companies from the US and other western countries carry out that mission on the territory of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The guarding of that strategic object by NATO forces introduced another essential destabilizing factor into the general situation in the region.

The first signal about the change of the situation in the region was the sharp deterioration of the Russian-Georgian relations in 2005 caused by the aspiration of the Georgian authorities to close Russian military bases, the withdrawal of the Russian troops and their possible change by NATO troops. In that period the terrorist activity in Russia was activated and it was accompanied by the shift of the centre of confrontation of the “federals” and illegal armed bands to Ingushetia (with possible further plans on the expansion of the interethnic conflict of Ingushs and Ossetians).

The beginning of the world financial and economic crisis, which fell on the autumn 2007, did not affect directly the situation in Transcaucasia. The results of the influence of the crisis on the economy and social sphere of the countries of Transcaucasia has been perceptible since the second half of 2008 and has acquired more

¹ http://www.rspenergy.ru/main/content.asp?art_id=3576

² <http://www.rususa.com/news/news.asp-nid-1447-catid-3>

³ http://www.rspenergy.ru/main/content.asp?art_id=3576

visible outlines since the beginning of 2009.

The sharpest and the most significant event directly connected with the escalation of the economic situation in the world was the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia. Georgian leadership and its western advisors strove for the solution of at least two problems. Firstly, they wanted to try to solve domestic problems of Georgia and, secondly, to destabilize the situation on Russian market. It should be accepted that if the first task was failed then the second one was executed. Just from the beginning of the conflict in South Ossetia Russian stock market index dropped abruptly thus involving into the crisis the whole financial system of the country.

But this conflict has also illuminated other aspects of geopolitical situation transformation in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia and one of them is the clarification of geopolitical interests of Israel in the region.

As it turned out the military instructors from that country in large numbers took part in the training of Georgian soldiers¹. Such a large-scale military presence of that country in Transcaucasia turned out to be unexpected for most of the Russian analysts.

At the same time, though the military cooperation of Georgia and Israel was rather vividly outlined in the period of the conflict in summer 2008 still many aspects concerning the role of that country in the region remain unseen. Thus, according to some information, Israel in the recent years has considerably activated its contacts not only with Georgia but also with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The following fact is particularly characteristic: approximately at the same time Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as a consequence of geostrategic reshaping of the territories, were put down by the CIA to the Middle Eastern region. Thus the strategy of the US administration to form the Big Middle East was confirmed. It looks as if Israel pays the role of the coordinator of the project but everything does not shape well.

As for the influence of crisis on Armenia there are also some essential aspects connected with the attempts to revise a number of foreign policy theses which have dominated recently but complicated the situation under the crisis.

The estimations show that situation in Armenia is difficult: the crisis affected the economy in full. The crisis was apparently initiated by the serious devaluation of the Armenian dram (at once on 30%)². Today already 71% of population feels that crisis affected economy of the country³.

¹ <http://www.newsru.com/world/23sep2008/war.html>

<http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/243803.html>

² <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/03/06/623907.html>

³ <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2009/06/30/651229.html>

The situation in the republic was aggravated by the fact that the essential stake in the GDP of the country was formed by the means transferred by the representatives of the Diaspora¹. The worsening of the financial standing of the representatives of Diaspora seriously and negatively affected Armenian economy.

The other factor which affected economic situation in the republic was the problem of return of the Armenian workers who worked abroad. Armenian sources do not bring the exact statistics on the number of those who returned but it is supposed that there is a considerable number of them. Those categories of Armenian citizens join the dole queue and increase the social expenses of the government.

At the same time the remittance volume (almost 80% of which came from Russia) which constituted \$2.5 billion annually (it is almost 20% of the Armenian GDP) fell on 25% in 2009.

Generally, the analysis shows that crisis affected almost all the countries of Transcaucasia without exception and rather seriously and deeply. The development of crisis occurrences makes the leaderships of those countries look for the ways to stabilize the situation in economy very often using methods and actions that would have seemed impossible in the former years and this may bring to the aggravating of a number of regional conflicts.

It is also characteristic that Russia, which did not have the clear stance in regard to the countries of Transcaucasia before the crisis, was not ready to react operatively on the swift changes of the situation in the region which manifested itself in the serious oscillations of foreign policy interests vector in the CIS space.

2. Can Russia withstand in the struggle for the CIS?

Today rather big number of experts in Russia deals with the analysis and study of the influence of the crisis on the relations within the framework of the CIS. Their general conclusion is that the crisis escalated the difference in the social and economic development of the CIS countries. According to some estimates, such a situation has already provoked centrifugal tendencies in the Commonwealth².

In analytical researches it is mentioned that the leaders of most of the CIS countries did not elaborate special anti-crisis plans, and even more the Commonwealth has no joint operating plan³.

At the same time it should be mentioned that Russian leadership realizes that under the crisis the process of disintegration of the CIS will be precipitated. That is

¹ <http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/248862.html>

² <http://www.gazeta.ru/financial/2009/06/25/3215222.shtml>

³ <http://www.fbk.ru/upload/contents/561/anticrisis-CIS.pdf>

why the measures were assumed to boost the economies of the CIS countries. Particularly, Russia has already granted credits ease to a number of CIS countries (unlike Western countries which demand for the preferences – both political and economic).

The most significant factor promoting the stoppage of the centrifugal tendencies among the CIS countries has been the creation of the EurAsEC anti-crisis foundation and \$7.5 billion of \$10.5 billion of its funds were contributed by Russia¹.

The aspiration of Russia not to allow the further separation of the near abroad countries has already given rise to serious complaints on behalf of the expert community of the US. Thus, particularly, in one of their recent works well-known American experts A.Cohen and L.Sasdi offer the Obama administration the following immediate plan in order not to allow the strengthening of the economic position of Russia in the CIS:

- to create “the global security system” which will be able to trace the investing activities of Russia and other countries bias against the West, first of all, in the branches of economy directly connected with the defence and security;
- to strengthen the cooperation with the energy resources producing countries - neighbours of Russia - as well as the countries with whom Russia tries to arrange the cooperation in the energy sphere and for this purpose to use different programmes including those directed to the modernization of their armed forces and power structures by implementing “Partnership for Peace” NATO programme;
- to extend cooperation with the special services and law-enforcement agencies of other countries in order to control the financial and economic operations of Russian state structures and oligarchs which are potentially connected with money laundering, corruption and unfair competitive practices and for this purpose to make the collection of the reliable intelligence information about the suspicious activity of Russia one of the priority tasks of the law-enforcement agencies of the US and its allies;
- to encourage the transnational corporations from the US and other countries to cooperate with such Russian companies as “Gasprom” in their struggle for the energy projects on which the Russian Federation has a claim in India, South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America. To strive to implement the alternative energy sources all over the world which would allow to overcome excessive dependence on the energy supplies from Russia, Iran and Venezuela

¹ <http://www.oko-planet.su/politik/newsday/14431-dmedvedev-vnes-v-gosdumu-na-ratifikaciyu-dogovor.html>

- which openly tend to undermine economic and military might of the West;
- suppress anti-market, politicized, secret or illegal actions of any country to undermine western market outlets and security of the US to which Russia tends actively;
 - to provide the Foreign Investments Committee in the US (FIC) headed by the minister of finances – as a means of counteraction to Russia – with necessary resources and support for carrying out the investigations in accordance with the American law, inducing the allies to establish analogous institutions for the estimation of the threats to their national security.

The reduction in Russia's energy yield as a consequence of recession in world economy – they conclude – may promote the softening of its foreign policy course directed to the lowering of the role the US, slowing down the strengthening and modernization of its army. Nevertheless, the US should not rely on that objective circumstance and the Obama administration have to elaborate “comprehensive strategy” to restrain economic expansion of Russia.

The characteristic feature of this work is that the authors reflected the common feeling of threat coming from Russia which is cultivated on the West. It is suffice to remember the attempt of Russian VTB bank to boost its stake in the stock capital of the European *EADS* concern. This attempt caused a number of initiatives on behalf of the EU and the US leadership with the demand to prohibit the investments of the foreign state funds into the strategic enterprises.

Thereupon, there are rather good reasons to suppose that the initiatives of 2006-2009 in regard to the CIS countries on behalf of the US and the EU leadership, somehow or other, reflected the ideas which later were manifested in the work of A. Cohen and L. Sasdi.

Among those initiatives, firstly, the programme on the reconstruction of gas pipeline system of Ukraine with the further establishing of the control of the EU over it can be mentioned; secondly – the start of the “Eastern Partnership” programme of the EU; and thirdly – the conclusion of the documents on *Nabucco* project.

As for the first initiative, the agreement signed between Ukraine and the EU in March 2009 in the large extend remains simply a declaration. Many experts at the very moment of conclusion called this document an advertizing move and element of political bargain of the Ukrainian leadership. Today, it can be seen clearly that amid the aggravation of the financial crisis the EU financed only the preparation of the business plan and draft design of the works directed to the reconstruction of the gas pipeline system of Ukraine.

As for the second initiative – “The Eastern Partnership” – the situation is similar but a little tangled.

It is known that the US and the EU have used such a way of working with countries where their interests are centered for quite a long time and rather actively. For example, we can remember “The Partnership for Peace” programme actively elaborated by NATO for the potential members of the alliance.

The official definition of “The Eastern Partnership” programme is as follows¹: it is a project officially initiated by the European Union. It was presented by the foreign minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The main aim of the project is the setting of closer relations between the EU and 6 former-Soviet republics – Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. It is meant to complement the “Northern Dimension” and the “Union for the Mediterranean” by providing an institutionalised forum for discussing visa agreements, free trade deals and strategic partnership agreements with the EU's eastern neighbours, while avoiding the controversial topic of accession to the European Union.

Different interpretations in the estimation of the suitability of the continuation of the project by the EU countries is characterized at least by the fact that on July 2, 2009 the prime-minister of Sweden stated that the project would have been suspended till the December 2009². But the next day, on July 3, the EU office made a statement that the financing of the project would continue³.

At the same time many commentaries and expert's estimations appeared in the mass media which reflected the essence and the character of the aims of “The Eastern Partnership” project.

The material of the American expert Rick Rozoff deserves special consideration⁴. In his opinion, the real aim of “The Eastern Partnership” is to complete the break down of the CIS, EurAsEC, which members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as well as not to allow the formalization of allied relations between Russia and Belarus⁵. In other words, the purpose of “The Eastern Partnership” is to isolate Russia from 6 of 12 CIS member countries, meanwhile other five countries are in the action field of another integration initiative of the European Union (“Northern

¹ http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE

² <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1181665.html>

³ <http://www.regnum.ru/news/1182010.html>

⁴ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=listByAuthor&authorFirst=Rick&authorName=Rozoff>

⁵ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12299>

Dimension”). In the opinion of the expert, finally, the EU intends with the help of “The Eastern Partnership” to exclude former-Soviet republics from the sphere of cooperation with Russia in the issues of trade relations, politics and security and to integrate them to Northern-Atlantic structures in the range from the EU to NATO¹. In this vein the statement by the Secretary General of NATO seems to be rather unexpected².

In his article Rick Rozoff mentions rather an interesting fact: the result of the NATO summit, which was arranged in Romania last year, was the closer integration of the EU and NATO, particularly, the agreement of the division of labour between the EU and NATO on the principle “soft power” – “hard power”³. Within this format “The Partnership” have to demonstrate the possibilities of the “soft power” and show that the decision about its establishment was made, among other reasons, also under the influence of August conflict in Georgia⁴.

Then Rozoff writes⁵, that for the first time the offer to initiate “The Eastern Partnership” was made in May 2008 but the impulse to its realization was given by the aspiration of the European Union to complement in the spirit of a “soft power” the decision of NATO to create “NATO – Georgia” Commission which was made after Georgia provoked a war in the Caucasus by the intrusion into South Ossetia in summer 2008. The role of the EU is to act by “diplomatic persuasion” means and to subsidize, meanwhile NATO generally and its member countries separately will provide Georgia with advanced offensive arms and reconnaissance systems, as well as they will train its army and supply it with the staff of the advisors.

The fact that Belarus was included in the list of the partners only on conditions that it would accept the plan of development of democracy⁶ can be regarded as a manifestation of the true intentions of the EU. The similar requirement was not so evidently formulated in regard to Armenia but due to the two crucial reasons it falls under the same category as Belarus. Armenia and Belarus are in the second echelon of the candidates for participating “The Eastern Partnership”, and they will be required a long term “improvement” before being absorbed in the process of “soft” expansion to the East.

According to the author it is also important that Armenia and Belarus are not a part of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) – block created in 1997 in

¹ Ibid.

² <http://delo.ua/news/110063/>

³ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12299>

⁴ PanArmenian.net, December 11, 2008

⁵ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12299>

⁶ PanArmenian.net, December 12, 2008

opposition to CIS as a result of joint efforts of the Clinton administration and its European allies¹. The “tulip revolution” which was accompanied by the victims among the civilians in Armenia a year ago and failed “jeans revolution” in Belarus two years ago did not have the effect their more successful prototypes in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004 and in Kirgizia in 2005 had and thus it is time to use other means of political reorientation of Armenia and Belarus and their exclusion from the close allied relations with Russia².

Soon after the announcement of the new initiative British *The Daily Telegraph* wrote: “Poland will take on its mighty neighbour Russia today when it proposes that the European Union extends its influence deep into the former Soviet Union by establishing an “Eastern Partnership”. The Eastern Partnership would be particularly galling for the Kremlin if its aspiration to include Belarus is achieved.”³

At the eve of the EU summit in December 2008 which formalized the plans on establishing “The Partnership”, the following commentary appeared in *Georgian Daily* newspaper: “...This latest EU action could entail another consequence, one that few appear to be thinking about now. In the early 1990s, the United States took the lead in pushing the idea that the EU membership for East European countries could serve as either a surrogate or a stepping stone to NATO membership. If that idea should resurface, and some of its authors return to office with the incoming Obama Administration in Washington, it would change both the EU and NATO and equally would change how Moscow would deal with Brussels, thus introducing yet another complication in East-West relations.”⁴

Conclusion

Thus, summarizing one can state that the development of the situation in many regions of the world including Transcaucasia is closely connected with the general situation in the world economy and further development of crisis occurrences.

The situation in Transcaucasia is revealing in the plane that on its example once again rather vividly the artificial character of the ongoing global financial and economic crisis can be seen. The way the mechanism of “soft power”, which were laid four or three years ago when there was no word about the crisis, are efficiently used today comes to prove this.

¹ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=12299>

² Ibid.

³ The Daily Telegraph, May 26, 2008

⁴ Georgian Daily, December 8, 2008

Unfortunately, Russian leadership has only now realized most of the problems connected with the preservation of the unity of near abroad, and only now it has started to elaborate some mechanisms. But for the beginning of their efficient work time, which is too little, is needed

On the other hand today the rivals of Russia simply intensify the efficiency of the well planned and partially carried out projects which work today only for the result.

At the same time there is still hope that the efforts applied will bear fruits and Russia will preserve and partially regain its positions in Transcaucasia lost for those years.

August, 2009

CRISIS: STRICT LIMITS OF THE GLOBAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT

Igor Bagiryan

The current crisis is an integral phenomenon – a fundamental cause being manifested in a complex of negative processes. The crisis is generated by the economy as a subsystem removing itself from the total system of public development and its natural limitations and the economy being transformed into a self-contained force. This article considers the ways to overcome the crisis.

1. Crisis as Reflected in Public and Economic Life. Its Basic Forms

The world expert community has built up a consensus as to the current crisis being an integral phenomenon: a fundamental cause being manifested in a complex of negative processes.

These processes can be grouped as follows:

1. economy as a whole

- structural imbalances at the level of industries and countries resulting in *rapid drop in world demand*,
- growth of instability, i.e. *unpredictability of the macroeconomic environment (exchange rates, price level, tax rates, priorities of state policies and the associated benefits) for business*,
- recession: *a suspended growth of gross domestic product, - increased state budget deficit* in leading world economies.

2. financial system

- drop of exchange indexes and capitalization,
- reduction and hardening of terms of crediting,
- insolvency of certain financial institutions,
- expanding negative impact of stock market upon the economy, the stock market being incapable of autostabilization.

3. social sphere

- drop of occupancy,
- drop of consumer expenditure,
- unsustainably high risks in the draft of pension funds and those of insurance companies,

4. total psychological background

- uncertainty of the future,
- loss of trust to control system at national level,
- unavailable reliable distribution of funds with a history of operation: real estate, modern currency, gold.

Comparing the current crisis with the previous crises of currency and finances, 1992-93 – Europe (England, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finland), 1994-95 – Latin America, 1997-98 – Asia (South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia), the World Expert Community has come to a logical conclusion that on the one hand the current crisis is their natural development, and on the other hand there is a principle difference in system operation and scale.

Medically speaking, the causes of the current critical condition were there as far back as the 1990s, however, since the therapy used to be applied to cure the effects or to do adjustments of individual financial institutions, the disease was driven inside, to get developed and manifested full-scale.

With regard to the previous crises the experts were unanimous in identifying their three basic origins:

- redundant liquidity in the form of risk capital,
- isolation of financial system from the real sector
- financial system virtuality, primarily in the stock market sector,
- country egoism, mostly the US, seeking to sterilize the money supply dumped onto the outside world.

Only the outlying regions of some provincial countries having the analytical potential shifted in time persisted in stating erroneously that the problem of national economy is in the underdeveloped condition of the stock market, or in its lacking virtuality.

2. Origins of the Crisis

Two groups of origins are clearly seen.

1. One is associated with the logic of the economic process being transformed into a self-sufficient power,
2. Two is associated with the US imperial policies.

2.1 Self-sufficiency of the Economy is the Prime Origin of the Crisis

The system character and the scale of the crisis are so enormous that now experts and even leaders of developed countries underscore the need to replace the entire paradigm of public development.

As to the prima causa of its starting motive power, the expert opinion is practically uniform: the crisis is generated by the economy as a subsystem removing itself from the total system of public development and its natural limitations and the economy being transformed into a self-contained force.

It is quite natural therefore that the type of the existing public system is characterized by an economic concept formulated as “a society with market economy”. ***Interestingly, that is exactly the Marxist approach based upon viewing economy as the foundation of all public relations. And so, who the modern economists think they are, to say nothing of our local national economists?***

The process of the economy being transformed into a self-contained force (economization of society) has necessarily entailed a number of formally reiterating stages or phases when one part of a subsystem is not any more controlled by the system limitations:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{economization} \rightarrow \text{financial system} \rightarrow \text{stock market} \rightarrow \\ & \text{derivative financial instruments} \quad (1) \end{aligned}$$

Isolation of economy from the reality of public life has stipulated the isolation of financial system from the real sector at the second stage. Stage three is an accelerated virtualization inside the financial system through increased complexity of stock market. Within recently capitalization in US has been growing twice as fast as the Gross Domestic Product, however with regard to the stock market being largely constituted by the stocks of the financial sector, the growth rate of financial sector is by 3 to 4 times in advance of the growth rate of GNP.

It is important to see the following:

String (1) shows chronologically the virtualization of economy and thus the entire public life.


Cause-and-effect relationship between the subsystems (1) is described by the reverse diagram:

*new innovation institutes of the stock market,
connected with derivatives → stock market → financial system →
real sector → total economy (2)*

In other words, the top-complexity virtual abstract reality determines the primary reality or production. The risk of this process was once pointed out by Thomas Weblen, founder of Institutionalism in the US.

See analysis of some fragments of the diagram below (2).

The real sector and financial system



Interconnections with the stock exchange and the banking system (diagram 2.1) widen the discrepancy between demand and supply in real sector.

These interconnections were rigidly stipulated by the modern innovational model of economy oriented to imposing more and more consumer goods and services. In the US there is a redundancy of the “New Economy” share. The total capitalization of the real sector is 10 trillion, of which 2.5 trillion is the new economy.

The correct statement on the need to convert science into the prime mover of economy practically resulted in a massive compulsory upgrading of domestic appliances.

To this end, use was made of mighty psychological methods of consumer brainwashing through advertising campaigns.

Psychological advertisement was accompanied by the mechanisms of consumer lending.

The result was triggering of the two predictably uncontrollable dead-end processes:

- There was an inevitable phase of “fatigued demand” to follow. - Consumers will become bored of an excessively speedy process of upgrading the equipment and services.

- An individual can get used to living beyond his means which can result in losing the feeling of responsibility in the process of decision making. That was exactly what happened in the sphere of the US mortgage lending, whereby the low-income groups enjoyed access to crediting.

A similar situation has been brewing in the real sector's supply of goods and services. The commercial companies were put into situations of continuous borrowing from outside financial sources, lest there should be an increased risk of losing the competitive edge.

Since stock market is a weighty origin of financial resources, the manufacturing companies become rigidly linked to the indicator of their shares' capitalization. This criterion being maximization of the shares' market value has long become classic theory of financial management.

That would however mean a substantial displacement of gravity center in company control from improving the technology and production efficiency to manipulating the dividend policies.


The raising share prices is not associated with the improving situation in the real sector (production efficiency), but rather with the subjective expectations generating a positive self-accelerating link to the stock prices. Within the last 15 years the total trading in shares has grown 80 times. Profits of corporations have grown 3 to 4 times, while the GDP growth rate has not exceeded 5%, i.e. there have been refinancing of shares in the US corporations.

The market value of shares is also a key factor for the capability to receive banking credits by pledging the shares. The result is an interacting risk or a positive feedback between the real and financial sectors. *The classical role of the banks in continuous assessment of credit-to-risk ratio appears to have been pushed off into the background by the factor of strike-it-rich quickly.* That was what made Lord Turner speak out on the need to bridle the animal instincts of bankers.

Credit pumping of households does not result in inflation, but rather in reduced useful life of consumer goods and growing prices of new goods.

Diagram 2.2 shows the process when the stock market being a subsystem of the financial system tends to close upon itself, i.e. to become self-sufficient.

Financial innovations generate ever more derivative financial instruments, or derivatives of the p^{th} order based in their turn upon derivatives (of the $p+1^{\text{th}}$) order. As a result, the investment portfolios are becoming so complicated as to defy all analytical evaluations.



Theoretical vindications of this process by the need to neutralize the financial risks (hedging) have practically become devices to mask the risks.


The modern stock market has not only turned out to become a casino, but also does that to the entire economy using its channels of impact. That has been aptly commented upon by Louis Ipassiu, President of Brazil: the world economy has become “the casino capitalism”.

Specialists mention in this connection four phases of financial innovations: 1. the triumphant course; 2. speculations; 3. the crisis; 4. reappraisal of values.

Mention should of course be made of the strong incentives to this process on the part of the Federal Reserve System (FRS). The motivating philosophy was formulated by A. Grinspen, President of the FRS: investor (purchaser of equity) and business have to share the risks.

Implementation of this concept started with the mechanism of securitizing the banking credits (converting into equity). This mechanism has undergone the first trial within the sphere of mortgage lending.

Securitizing creates a closed chain:



Percent accrual on the credit goes mainly to payment of interest on equity. Thus, business and households on the one hand, and investors on the other hand are locked into a single risk chain. That is how the concept of risk sharing is implemented.

This concept has practically whipped up the process of virtualization, so that most experts discern here a premeditated intent.

A certain part was also played by Basel Convention-1 (requirements to registered capital and reserves in case of losses in shares from assets). The banks reacted by trying to move the assets beyond the balance. The mechanism of securitizing the credits was an option for implementing this effort.

Specialists have severely criticized the latest financial innovation in the field of derivatives (Credit Default Swaps – CDS). This class of derivatives joins two fundamental financial institutes – banks and insurance companies – into one risk group. The CDS provide the banks with insurance from default on their liabilities for certain fees to insurance companies.

Insurance companies selling CDS seeking maximum profits are unjustifiably involved into the stock market environment, uncontrollable or controlled by hidden agents. Due to the reputation of the insurance institution, the demand for the CDS is very high, the sales reaching a trillion dollars. For the taxes the CDS are also profitable through a special procedure reflecting them in the balance sheet.

An overly complicated structure of investment portfolio will reduce the operation of rating agents to complete inefficiency. However, since they are formally functional, they contribute substantially to the Chaos and the Crisis.

The resulting was the virtualization of the US financial system in 2007: only 23% of total liquidity is in the service of the reality sector. The remaining mass is closing upon itself. The ratio of the world financial assets to the GDP in 2009 = 10.

The general indicators of virtualization are indexes of ratio growth rates: derivatives to financial assets and financial assets to the GDP.

The situation was summarized by the US FRS (2008): “the cause of recession is excessive trust in the market”, in other words, economizing and suppressing the role of the state.


Offshore Networks and Criminalizing the Virtualization of Economy. - Virtualization of economy is closely associated with another process: integration of shadow and criminal capitals.

The key links of merging the processes of criminalization and virtualization are the offshore companies, the grounds with special rules of taxation, deposit regis-

tration and establishment of organizations.

By this reason, deliberately created, offshore companies turned out to be extremely attractive to the shadow capital. Here are figures for Russia, 2007: \$70 billion of \$93 billion of foreign business debt falls on the offshore companies.

The modern stage of offshore development is transition to offshore networks with the main link as a sparring-offshore company in an offshore territory, effecting a financial transaction between the seller and the buyer. This transaction is conducted at an offshore company with all the relevant benefits. The layout is as follows:



The scale of offshore impact upon criminalization of economy is so great that this problem was to become a special subject of discussion by the Heads of States, while the Pope Benedictus the 7th has denied the offshore companies his blessing.

Currently different options from rigid control to a complete ban are under discussion.

2.2. The US Imperial Policies and Globalization

In the modern world the official borders of national states do not any more show the real impact zone of their ruling elites. That zone is determined by the boundaries of informational, cultural-political, financial-economic and military-strategic influence.

In this aspect the US is a global empire with the boundaries embracing the entire globe.

Accordingly, the US elite is adopting a supra-national character wherewith the US itself is becoming part of the controlled entity, though identified, since it is the resources of this country that are primarily used as an instrument of control.

There is however a fundamental controversy here between the level of the entity under control (the whole planet) and the US economic capabilities.

This contradiction was resolved by shaping the globalization process in the form of dollarization and accessibility of the real national assets through bringing them to the International Markets.

This triggered the unlimited use of the printing press. According to the Japanese experts, as far back as in the 1980s commodity security of the dollar was not in excess of 10%.

The logic of this process required on the one hand to intensify the process of dollarization, on the other hand to fence the US domestic market from the outside dollar supply to avoid a run-away inflation.

A significant number of experts generated a solid opinion that all the latest local downturns and the current global crisis have an artificial nature in the sense that they help resolve the mentioned objectives, including the substitution of a full-blown real crisis of the dollar by a structural crisis in world economy.

The shape of modern globalization is such that the links of the countries with the US economy outrun their horizontal connections. That means that collapse of the US Stock Market is necessarily developing into a world-wide economic crisis. This indeed is the case. Mentioned among the reasons are of course the low interest rates of the FRS, redundant liquidity, caused by mistrust of the US investors to foreign markets, irresponsible lending policies by the banks, and an excessive complexity of stock market.

Not the least important was also the wrong policy of the FRS at the start of the crisis. It was actually in contravention to the real process: when interest rates needed a boost, they were struck down, when they needed to go down, they were pushed up.

All that is so. But one question remains: what is the correlation between the objective and subjective (perceived) components of the crisis?

3. Decision-making Ideology at National and International Levels

3.1 Globalization Level

The essence of the emerging global ideology can be shown in a simplified analogy: local crisis → strong national government (Roosevelt, US, Depression 1925); global crisis → strong world governance.

Globalization as seen in an integral financial system and integral world economy will require a distinct global strategy and distinct coordination of the main actors. Otherwise the situation with the global crisis is under the risk of multiple repetitions with ever degrading consequences.

Most experts think that the crisis has put an end to the ideology of liberalism, i.e., the end of the state's non-interference, thus showing the complete ideological background of the heads-of-state meetings on ending the crisis. The epoch of liberalism today is also characterized as the time when the US will project its financial problems onto the outside world.

In actual fact, we look here at the psychological and organizational support to the process of forming the new world order. The crisis in this case has played after the synergy theory the role of Chaos creator in entering the state of bifurcation (a fork in the roads to development). ***In this condition the system of world community can easily be prodded to the necessary option of the world governance.***

With regard to the directional trends of utterances by the heads of states, they can be divided into two groups: the radical ones: Germany, France, Russia; and the relatively moderate ones: the US, Great Britain. Group one shows tough talk on the need to strengthen the supranational bodies, with no priority given to any country. Group two agree in principle to the need for strengthening the principle of worldwide regulation, but are less radical as to abrupt changes of the existing entities. All that is very likely to reflect the deep processes going on within the world elite. On completing those processes the US Administration is very likely to confirm their leadership in radical statements.

Most remarkable in this context were notes by J. Sores on the need to introduce the new world currency. The preliminary stage may be accompanied by establishing several currency zones.

There is presently a vigorous competition going on for the right to become the centers of those zones.

3.2 The Country Level. Recommendations for Armenia

Ideology. The general directionality of decisions should be determined by the final goal: to bring back the economy as a whole and the real and financial sectors in particular into the natural condition of subordination to the objectives of human development, rather than the contrary, that would be to make man hostage to economy.

The crisis has indicated the insolvency of the existing innovational economic model generating disproportional supply and demand thus distinctly delineating the boundaries between the informational society and the society of knowledge. Within the latter the economy produces goods and services stipulating the opening of human potential. The need for this transition and its partial implementation in the form of personalization of supply and demand is also suggested by the ideologists of post-modernity.

Economy must be psychology-charged, in the best sense of this concept, rather than in the sense of a primitive principle of mainstream individualism. This suggests a restructuring of basic science in favor of the trends associated with the study of consciousness, thinking, psyche. It is only the availability of this scientific potential in combination with the already available toolbox of the innovational model of economy will yield a real opportunity to go over to the society of knowledge.

This process has been intensified in Western countries, first of all in the US. We are to decide on the future model of society.

Interlink between the Real and Financial Sectors. It seems that this point can gather most agreement of the experts.

The formula of exit from crisis is briefly as follows:

- Restructuring of the real sector
- Financial system subordinated to objectives of the real sector.

In the aspect of the first item the programme by Barak Obama may be taken as a guide:

- energy – renewable sources of energy
- healthcare
- science and education.

The whole of this unit is read by analysts as a turn taken by the innovational economy towards man, towards the society of knowledge.

At the level of an individual country it is to be recognized that it is the raw materials industries that make the economy vulnerable to business fluctuations, all the more so in the context of the mentioned situation of turning to the renewable sources.

Policies of the State. An important principle is inclusion of big business (oligarchs) in the implementation of government programmes.

This factor is an indicator showing the termination of society economization. Otherwise the ongoing autonomous function of the large capital will somehow or other result in the state machine being submitted to its objectives and an actual loss of statehood.

All real phenomena of the economic miracle from today's Finland to South Korea have at the starting point a distinct and unambiguous involvement of the oligarchs into the government-sponsored programmes. Interestingly, the oligarchs' involvement later turned out to be substantially beneficial for them.

Substantiation of this key factor suggests that the government has a clear idea of what it wants, i.e. the model of the future. To this effect what is rapidly to be established is the Institute for Development Planning. Most experts point out the insufficient government vision and competence as one of the important causes of the crisis.

Another important premise is establishing a real system of economic security to be headed by the Prime-Minister and embracing the relevant structures of the security services, economic ministries, and the Central Bank. The issue to be reviewed within the framework of this system is a weak responsibility of the state officials.

Restructuring of economics suggests the orientation to identify and to update a *potential demand* for money which is one of the fundamental items of evolutionary theory.

The entity for selecting business projects under the Government of Armenia seems to be the first step in this direction. This policy will have to continue in the way of creating similar mechanisms based upon specialized financial institutions that would take part in funding the scientific developments.

A close control is to be established of the indicator showing the ratios of summary investments by all sources into the infrastructure (energy, transport, information) to the GDP.

In a joint operation with the Central bank the Government should take under control the channel "commercial banks – offshore companies" within the framework of the system of economic and financial security.

The economic and legal environment in each industry will have to become a separate assignment for the Government and the Ministry of Economy.

We look here at harmoniously combined forms of property.

A universal component for all countries of crisis-exit process is an *advance growth of domestic demand*, both through the growing domestic economic integration and through social policies. There is an interesting US experience: the Congress amended the plan of budgetary aid to the American economy under the slogan “**Buy American**”, *with the relevant companies receiving support from the budget*.

Under recession the tax reduction should concern not the income tax, but rather VAT (Value-added tax).

At the level of budgetary policy the policy of budget formation has to be abandoned in favour of budget control or stimulating the increase of export and domestic demand. The social policies, primarily the mechanism of job placement will have to become prioritized.

In all, we look at a rapid boost in the quality of executive authority in the institutional (structural) and personnel aspects.

The Banking System. Central Bank (CB). Statements by some European and Russian experts can be summarized as follows: tight control by CB makes a banking system healthy. In this case, as noted by Professor Dani Rodrig, there should be a minimal interference of the supranational bodies.

In this context the Institute of Special CB Representatives is the right step.

One important objective is control over the exchange balance of the bank, operations with derivatives and with the banking margin.

An important objective is control of credit quality and the real valuation of assets or the capability to segregate real and phony assets.

Some experts insist on banning the closure of the over-the-counter stock market.

Whatever financial support to the banks will have to be accompanied by very close control of its targeted usage.

At this stage non-stimulated development of stock market seems to be evident.

There is currently a clear tendency for a modified vector of the Anglo-Saxon model of controlling the stock market built on the equivalence: individual segments of market → individual control structure. There is already a clear understanding that the financial system is not a set of individual segments, but rather a system. One option of the solution: “The Polson Program”, US. As a whole: expanding the CB authority by the strategy of stock market development and operative control.

Central banks are advised to make the refinancing interest rate a real (rather than an estimated) parameter of control.

A close control over the rating procedure should become a special assignment of Central Banks.

The collective opinion of experts with regard to the dynamics of the banking system:

- Lowering reservation standards to stimulate lending.
- Lowering the refinancing interest rate. Of course, it is suggested to be a real control parameter.
- Expanding guarantees of deposits to natural persons up to 100 percent.
- State Directory on problem-related assets.

The relevance of the items mentioned is not completely indisputable: it may require a separate analysis.

However, some CB-related propositions of an institutional character deserve an individual pointed interest:

- Re-establishment of direct CB financing of budget deficit,
- Relieving CB of the monopolistic responsibility for the price-level.

While the first proposition seems relevant within the context of the world crisis largely caused by the stock market, the second proposition has become considerably overripe. Opinions have been expressed long ago (Kenneth Rogoff “The Myth of Central Banks and Inflation”) that the problem of prices *goes very far beyond the capabilities of CB, and is in fact a national assignment.*

Considering the factor of the CB being independent of the Government, stock-taking and registration of those propositions will require CB to be converted into a real analytical institute.

Financial System. Commercial banks. At the level of individual banks experts have earmarked the following defects:

- Analytical work at banks is done by the wrong people, both in intelligence and knowledge
- Information flows are not designed for real control and planning
- There are no mechanisms of recording the quality of credits
- The available credit registers are substantially insufficient for a full-fledged mechanism of detecting potentially insolvent clients.
- Unsatisfactory mechanisms of recommendation on lending zones, and prospective lines of service.

The state policy as a whole will have to provide a rapprochement of the real and financial sectors. To this end, the financial sector must possess priorities on developing the real sector and be informed on the real benefits associated with the financing of the real sector in confluence with the state-sponsored programmes. The indicated information will have to take its origin from an official state-issued document equivalent to a programme of socio-economic development for a near-term outlook that would be a programme for overcoming the crisis at the same time.

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ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: DENIAL AND RECOGNITION

Yair Auron¹

The attitude of Israel toward the Armenian Genocide is significant. Israel regards itself as the state of the Jewish people who were victims of the Holocaust. It is difficult to overestimate how important the position of the Jews, and especially the attitude of the state of Israel to the Armenian Genocide, are for the Armenians (as well as to the Turks and the rest of the world), because the Israeli state was established by a nation victimized by the Holocaust.

During an international conference “L’actualité du Génocide des Arméniens” (“The Reality of the Genocide of the Armenians”), organized in Paris by the Armenian community of France on April 16-18, 1998, one of the leaders of the community declared from the podium that the Armenians are going to struggle for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by the US, Israel and France.

France did recognize the Armenian Genocide in January 2001. In the U.S. the issue has been raised in the Congress several times, and the processes of recognition, in one way or in another, began, but these processes were stopped by the American administrations, both Republican and Democrat in 1985, 1987 1989, 2000, 2007 and 2009. The Turkish Government warned that American interests might be jeopardized, including permission to maintain American military bases on Turkish territory, and the American administrations gave up. Israel is very far from any real process toward a possible recognition of the Armenian Genocide.

¹ Associate Professor, The Open University of Israel.

In the 1980s, the authorities in Israel were reserved and restricted regarding recognition of the Armenian Genocide and practically tried to avoid it. Later on Israel refused to recognize it, and furthermore, became the most significant supporter (with the U.S.) of the denial policy promoted by Turkey.

The theoretical debate over morality versus politics or interests is not within the scope of our article. Let us note, however, that the ancient Greek philosophers did not distinguish between morality and politics. This distinction characterizes the thinkers of the beginning of modern philosophy, like Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, and Nicholas Machiavelli, whereas the liberal philosophers tried to combine, in one way or another, politics and morality. It seems that politics and its cynical calculations are quite often not related to morality in modern times.

All states are guided in their foreign policy by considerations of their interests and sometimes even need to appeal the *raison d'État*. This is practically an international standard. But all (at least many) states also set limits to such pragmatic and cynical considerations, limits that are dictated by the most profound aspects of their national ethos. Not a few claim that *Realpolitik*, which sacrifices justice at the altar of political considerations and compromises, is no longer acceptable, and surely not in the case of genocide.

In the debates in Israel over the Armenian Genocide (and practically in every state where the issue is debated), the tensions between values and interests, between morality and politics have been high. It is obvious that from a purely political attitude, it is a logical decision to support Turkey. In Israel it was and it is still political interests that dominate.

It is clear that the short term interests of France were harmed because of the decision in 2001 to recognize the Armenian Genocide. The significance of moral values in the French as an example decision is a fact that many Israelis find difficult to face. It is difficult for them to admit the Israeli moral failure regarding its attitude to the genocides of other people in general and its attitude to the Armenian Genocide in particular. It is easier to regard morality as utopia – as indulging in luxury. It is easier to say I cannot than to admit I do not want to. It is crucial to notice that by downplaying the moral factor in the French decision and portraying instead the political configuration that made such a decision worthwhile one undermines the possibility to criticize the Israeli policy regarding the issue. If the recognition of the Armenian Genocide is nothing but a cynical political maneuver that may become worthwhile under certain conditions, then as long as Israel does not confront such circumstances, there is not reason for it to recognize the Armenian Genocide,

The relationships between Israel and Turkey are considered one major factor

underlying the Israeli and French attitudes toward the Armenian Genocide. In Israel they even spoke about “vital interests” regarding the situation of the Jewish communities in Iran, Syria and Turkey itself. On the other hand, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Israel is crucial, since the denial of the Armenian Genocide is very similar to the denial of the Holocaust of the Jews (even though the denial of the Holocaust can have also direct implications, and can strengthen the anti-Semitism). Understanding and remembering the tragic past is an essential condition, even though not sufficient in itself, for preventing the repetition of such acts in the future.

The Armenian Question was not a major subject in Israel and was regarded as a marginal issue. Only ten to fifteen out of 120 Israeli members of parliament attended the debates.

1. Israeli Attitudes

The question of Israeli recognition of the Armenian Genocide was never debated in the Knesset directly, but the State of Israel has consistently refrained from acknowledging the genocide of the Armenian People. Government representatives do not participate in the memorial assemblies held every year on April 24 by the Armenians to commemorate the Genocide. The public debate in the State of Israel about the attitude toward the Armenian Genocide has focused on some prominent media events: in 1978 the screening of a film about the Armenian Quarter in Jerusalem was canceled after pressures of the Turkish government that opposed the film because it included several references to the Armenian Genocide, primarily the testimony by several survivors of the genocide of 1915 who resided in the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem's Old City. In 1982, the Israeli Government intervened in plans for an international conference on the subject of the Holocaust and genocide. The Israeli Foreign Ministry applied heavy pressure on the organizers of the conference in order to prevent the participation of Armenian researchers. Six out of 150 lectures planned dealt with the Armenian Genocide. Finally the conference was held with the participation of 300 out of an originally expected 600 researchers from the United States, Europe, and Israel. In 1989, the Israeli Government was apparently involved in preventing the commemoration of the Armenian Genocide by the American Congress in dedicating a memorial day in the American calendar, and in the debates in the U.S. Congress over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, in 2000 and apparently in 2007. In 1990, the screening on the Israeli television of an American television documentary film, "Journey to Armenia," was canceled, a decision that raised a lot of critics. In 1994, a controversy also developed over teaching about the Arme-

nian Genocide and genocide, in general, in Israeli high schools. Till today the issue is not taught officially in high schools and the level of knowledge of the young Israelis about the Armenian Genocide is very limited. In 2003 one of the people who were chosen to enlighten the beacons in the ceremony in Mount Herzl, that marks the end of the Memorial Day and the beginning of the Independence Day, was an Armenian nurse. She was not allowed to mention, in her short personal representation, the fact that she is the third generation to the Armenian genocide because of pressure put on the Israeli government by Turkey. Every one of these events raised a *vive* polemic; many articles were written in the press, most of them criticized the official attitude.

Many observers estimate, in the case of the Armenians, that one act could radically change the long-standing denial of their Genocide: recognition of the Genocide by the United States or Israel. These are the pivotal countries that could bring about a Turkish recognition of the Genocide. There is a connection or even interdependence between the decisions of the two states. If one of them recognized the Genocide, sooner or later the second would do the same.

There is no doubt that, morally speaking, Israel should be the first. Sadly, however, taking a realistic view of Israeli society and policy, this is not likely to happen in the near future. In my view Israelis are held to a higher standard than other nations not because we are the chosen people, but because we are, generally speaking, survivors of the Holocaust and because of the Jewish legacy and heritage. I'm aware to the fact that not all the Israelis and not all the Jews agree with this point of view. However, we Israeli-Jews failed to keep higher moral standards (also regarding our attitude towards acts of genocide like those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia).

Two main reasons can be given to explain the attitude of the state of Israel to the Armenian Genocide: (a) constant pressure by the different Turkish governments; and (b) strong pressure from groups within Israeli society that are afraid that the recognition of the Armenian Genocide would damage the concept of the uniqueness of the Shoah. Apparently the impact of the second reason is less significant in the last years. The political establishment of Israel, from the left wing as well as from the right wing, with a few exceptions, has decided to further develop and strengthen the relations between Turkey and Israel. It was a geopolitical decision and a strategy influenced by political and military interests that were sometimes represented as "vital Jewish" interests and later on as "vital Israeli" interests.

To all those involved, overtly and covertly, in the controversy – Jews, Turks, and Armenians, but also the rest of the concerned world – it was clear that there was special significance to the issue which went beyond the debate, for example, over

the screening of a film about the Armenian Genocide in any other country. The fact that the country in question was of the people who were the victim of the Holocaust, and the unique problems which resulted, came to the fore.

In the debates over the Armenian Genocide, it is often said by officials in Israel and in other countries, that historians, not politicians, should discuss the issue. That is what Israeli officials said to Turkish representatives after the Minister of Education Yossi Sarid's statement in April 2000 (see later), and what the Clinton administration (like all the other U.S. administrations before it) claimed, when it tried and succeeded in preventing the legislative initiative in the U.S.A. in the year 2000. This argument was also raised during the debate in France over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, eventually adopted by the Parliament. It is significant in this context to mention the statement in which 126 Holocaust scholars affirmed in June 2000 the incontestable fact of the Armenian Genocide and accordingly urged the governments of Western Democracies to recognize it as such¹ [1].

The claim of politicians to leave the issue to the historians is, of course, cynical, and it is usually a device to avoid discussion, mainly because of political interests. However, in recent years – after a stubborn struggle by the Armenians and their supporters, usually on moral grounds – the debate over the recognition of the Armenian Genocide did enter some parliaments that recognized it.

2. Israel 1994: Semi Official Recognition?

In 1994, the Armenian Question was raised in the Israeli Parliament. This time the debate centered on a report on Israeli First Channel Television (FCT). The reportage was connected to the curriculum that was being prepared about the Armenian Genocide, which ultimately was rejected, and to the Armenian Memorial Day. The Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Embassy in Tel Aviv exerted pressure, as in previous cases, not to air the program, although unsuccessfully. Finally, the report (12 minutes long) that included information about the Genocide, interviews with Armenians, including one survivor of the Genocide who lived in Jerusalem, and interviews with Israeli students were shown, followed by an interview with the Turkish Ambassador in Tel Aviv, which repeated the official Turkish version about the events of 1915 and criticized the fact that Israel is interested in the Armenian Question, which was, according to him, against the common interests of the two countries.

¹The *New York Times* and the *Jerusalem Post*, June 8, 2000. The petitioners also asked the Western Democracies to urge the Government and the Parliament of Turkey to finally come to terms with a dark chapter of the Ottoman-Turkish history and to recognize the Armenian Genocide.

Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin (in the Rabin government, in which Shimon Peres was the Foreign Minister) answered (April 27, 1994) on the podium of the Knesset the question about what the Turkish Ambassador had said in the reportage some days before [2]. In his written answer, Beilin stated that “according to the Jewish historical experience, we cannot but express understanding of the suffering and the destiny of the Armenian people.” He said also that the attitude of Turkey is well known to us, but this issue should not become a source of tensions between the two countries, which have recently considerably improved their relationships.

In another question, a member of the Knesset claimed that the Turkish Ambassador’s statement that “in war like in war” could support the deniers of the Holocaust and therefore we have to answer if they were killed as a result of war or as a result of genocide. Then he raised the issue of morality and politics in claiming “this [the Armenian Question] is an issue that is above politics for us as Jews.” In his answer to this, Beilin replied that Israel had never yielded to Turkish pressures to obliterate the terrible massacre, and that “we will always reject any attempt to erase those events, even for some political advantages.” Later on he added “we never accepted the very superficial analysis that it [the Armenian tragedy – Y.A.] was done in the war. It was not a war. It was certainly massacre, genocide. We will support remembering it because this is one of the events the world must remember.” [2] By this Beilin practically rejected the Turkish denial of the crime and the claim that what was involved was only “a civil war,” or that the Armenians were victims of the war’s acts.

Significant as these last words of Beilin’s were, and they represented the view of some other members of the Knesset, the comments which appear in Dadrian’s comprehensive book, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, that claimed “Israel issued its first official condemnation of the Turkish genocide of the Armenians, ending a tradition of silence, to appease its regional ally, Turkey,” are unfortunately an exaggeration, and in fact only a wish [3].

3. Israel and the Recognition of the Armenian Genocide

Five years after his declaration in 1994, in April 2000, Yossi Beilin, then minister of Justice, said with the same decisiveness:

It doesn’t have to be this way. I think that our attitude toward such a dreadful historical event cannot be dictated by our friendly relations with Turkey, even though this relationship is particularly important to me as one who worked so hard

to develop it. I also see the contradiction between the political track and the ethical one. Something happened that cannot be defined except as genocide. One-and-a-half million people disappeared. It was not negligence, it was deliberate. I do not think that the government has to take an official decision on the issue, but we must clarify to the Turks that we cannot accept their political demands to ignore a historical event. An ethical stand cannot be dictated by political needs - these are two separate tracks [4].

The declarations made by Sarid on Armenian Memorial Day on April 24, 2000 (see later) and by Beilin, caused, paradoxically, the lukewarm attitude of the Foreign Ministry to be even more explicitly cool. The attitude of Barak's government in late 2000 to the beginning of 2001 was clear – it accepted the Turkish argument. In an interview with the *Turkish Daily News* (October 26, 2000), the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry Undersecretary Dr. Alon Liel was reminded of certain Israeli ministers' comments on the so-called Armenian Genocide, to the effect that Turkey should recognize it [5]. Liel said that the Israeli authorities sympathized with Turkish anger over these statements of the two ministers (Sarid and Beilin) and that they had received the Turkish side's message on the matter loud and clear. "Our government policy is that we should refrain from making these kinds of statements. These topics should not be for politicians to comment on, but for academics," said Liel.

In January 2001, France officially recognized the Armenian Genocide. Unlike the U.S. Congress, the French Parliament, did not yield to Turkish demands and to the demands of its government and was thus "punished" by Turkey. Turkey hoped to stop the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, which had gained momentum during the years 2000-2001, by other countries. It withdrew its ambassador to France, one of its main trading partners; cancelled a spy satellite contract with a French firm, worth \$259M (according to Turkey's Defense Minister); the Turkish government was also considering excluding French companies from ten other projects. Among them was state-owned arms maker Giat, which lost the chance to tender for the joint production of 1,000 combat tanks, estimated to be \$2 billion worth [6]. Cynical as it is, it seems that Israel profited from these developments. While the negotiations over the deal went on, an Israeli firm had lost to a French company, but when the relations between France and Turkey soured over the Armenian question, Ankara threatened to cancel projects assigned to the French firm [7]. Israel won the major contract to upgrade hundreds of Turkish tanks in a deal estimated at \$2 billion (a contract was agreed upon in March 2002). The Israeli Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben-Ami, raised the possibility that Turkey might also reconsider buying an Israeli imaging satellite.

The attitude of the Israeli government, being in a much more complicated and sensitive situation, is very far from even the ambivalent attitude of other western states involved in the matter. There is much more at stake where Israel is concerned. In some cases that involve its very existence, Israel has to make many difficult compromises, moral and otherwise. Unfortunately, Israel has made compromises even in cases where its very existence was not at stake.

4. Peres Statement in April 2001 and the Ambassador's Statement in February 2002

The headlines of the *Turkish Daily News*, the influential English Turkish daily on April 10, 2001, were clear: "Peres: Armenian Allegations are Meaningless..." [8] The newspaper described Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister in Sharon's government (currently the Israeli president), as being a supporter of the Turkish position regarding the dispute over the meaning of the events that had taken place during World War I. Peres had been described before in the Turkish press as the personality who had influenced President Clinton in preventing a pro-Armenian resolution in the House of Representatives in the year 2000. This claim was repeated in the Turkish press in 2001¹.

The interview with Peres was conducted on the eve of his official visit to Turkey. Peres claimed in it that it is for historians to deal with such historical issues.

According to the Turkish newspaper, Peres said that Israel should not take a historical or philosophical position on the Armenian Question, but added: "If we have to determine a position, it should be done with great care as not to distort the historical realities."

Furthermore, Peres was quoted as saying:

We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. It is a tragedy what the Armenians went through, but not a genocide.

Israel, as we have shown briefly, had been systematically avoiding the Armenian Question. Now the Foreign Minister joined the deniers on behalf of the Israeli government. This represented an escalation from passive to active Israeli denial, from moderate denial to hard-line denial. Imagine the Israeli and Jewish reaction to a similar claim by another country's Foreign Minister regarding the Holocaust. What would be their reaction if the Holocaust had been called a "tragedy"?

¹ For example see Burcun Imir, "Sharon: Turkish Israeli Relationship Can Be Defined as an Alliance of Democracies," *Turkish Daily News*, August 6, 2001.

And what was, in fact, the reaction in Israel to these controversial words of Peres? At first, the Israeli media ignored the subject completely, although Peres's visit to Turkey had received much attention in Israel. Only after the outraged reaction of the Armenians all over the world, including those who live in Israel, and the reaction of some "Armenian supporters" was the issue raised at all in the Israeli newspapers [9].

Why did Peres, the experienced, respected politician decide to make this statement? Surely not out of ignorance of the Armenian Genocide. It is very difficult to point to any enlightened politician in a democratic state – surely not of the stature of Peres – who has ever made such blatant remarks as these on that issue. Many politicians avoid using the term "genocide," but never, to the best of my knowledge, have any official person claimed that **it was not** a genocide. It seems that Israel wished to advance its relations with Turkey and completely push aside the subject of the Armenian Genocide, including all the moral and historical implications of such a position.

After a lot of protests poured into Israeli embassies and consulates around the world by outraged Armenians, and after some critics in Israel denounced Peres for genocide denial, Peres claimed (through his officials) to have been partially misquoted. The Israeli Foreign Ministry then issued the following cable to its missions:

Israel's position regarding Armenian massacre: 1. a number of missions have received protests, partly by e-mail, over an inaccurate report of Foreign Minister Peres's words in the Turkish press during his visit to Ankara. 2. In case you need them, here are the exact comments made by Foreign Minister Peres (as reported by Ankara): A. The subject should be left to historians, not politicians. B. We do not support the comparison of the Armenian tragedy to the Holocaust. C. Israel will take no political or historical stand on this issue. D. The minister absolutely did not say, as the Turkish news agency alleged, "What the Armenians underwent was a tragedy, not a genocide."

Peres himself did not retract his statement. He has made no serious attempt to correct the newspaper or to deny what was quoted in the Turkish media. This cynical use of the Armenian Genocide as part of a bargain by the Israeli government continues.

Israel, a state under siege, has the right to seek military alliances with states such as Turkey. It has the right not to take an official position on the Armenian Genocide if it deeply and sincerely believes that an official act of recognition would cause it **irreparable harm**. Though not the most ethical of decisions, that

may be understandable and even tolerable [10]. But this does not give justification for Peres, in the name of the state of Israel to have "entered into the range of actual denial of the Armenian Genocide, comparable to the denial of the Holocaust." [11] After Sarid's statement in 2000 (to be discussed in detail later), Israeli officials claimed that it was his personal view; nobody claimed the same this time. It should be clear: Israel was ready, and is ready, to bargain with the memory of the Armenian Genocide. It used the Genocide as merchandise, and by doing so Israel is ready to go beyond a moral boundary that no Jew should allow himself to cross. Israel should never, under any circumstances, and for any reason, aid and abet those who deny a genocide, **any genocide**.

But Israel has gone even further. The new Israeli Ambassador in Georgia and Armenia, Rivka Cohen, repeated Pere's statement in a press conference she held in February 8, 2002, in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia [12]. She made remarks to the effect that, while the Jewish people are saddened by the deaths and tragedy that were suffered by the Armenians between 1915 and 1916, the Holocaust was a unique phenomenon, as it was a planned program for the annihilation of an entire nation and nothing should be compared with it. This was not reported in Israel at the beginning, but Armenians in Armenia and all over the world were enraged. Government officials and politicians demanded that the Ambassador be declared *persona non grata*. The Armenian Council of America declared:

We categorically reject the Israeli government's policy as immoral and unprincipled. It is most abhorrent that the Israeli government would use the Armenian Genocide as a bargaining chip towards its interests. We call on the Jewish people, who are still reeling from the pain of the Holocaust, to condemn the Israeli government policy regarding this issue. We ask them to discourage the Israeli government from becoming one of those governments, which until recently were denying the Holocaust with lame excuses [13].

In an unprecedented action, several hundred Armenians held a demonstration in front of the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles [14]. This also was not reported in Israel, to the best of my knowledge.

The Foreign Ministry of Armenia made an official note of protest to the Israeli Foreign Ministry (February 15, 2002), saying that Armenia considers any attempt at rejecting or belittling the significance of the Armenian Genocide as inadmissible, regardless of the motivation. "Armenia never intended to draw parallels between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust, believing as we do that any crime committed against humanity is 'unique' with its own political, legal, historical, and moral consequences."

The official answer of the Israeli Foreign Ministry (February 18, 2002) was:

Israel has never tried to deny or diminish the reality of the events that occurred during the years 1915-1916. As Jews and as Israelis, we are especially saddened by the deaths and the tragedy, which took place in 1915 and 1916. We understand the strong emotions this subject arouses in both parties considering the enormous number of victims and the great suffering undergone by the Armenian people. Investigation of this sensitive subject must be approached through open public discussion and dialogue between historians, based of course, on documents and facts.

Israel also asserted that the Holocaust was a singular event in human history and was a premeditated crime against the Jewish people. Israel recognizes the tragedy of the Armenians and the plight of the Armenian people. However, the events cannot be compared to the Holocaust. This does not in any way diminish the magnitude of the tragedy [15]. [Some sources wrote that the events cannot be compared to the Holocaust and others that they cannot be compared to genocide. However, both Peres and the Ambassador had said that the events that occurred during the years 1915-1916 cannot be compared to genocide – Y.A.]

The implication in the Israeli Foreign Ministry's statement is that while the Armenian deaths of up to 1.5 million may have been a tragedy, they do not constitute a case of genocide. Another implication is that there must be public discussion and dialogue between historians to determine the facts of what happened to the Armenians.

There is no way to minimize the historical significance of this terrible statement. Not a Holocaust, not a genocide – only “victims,” “plight,” “tragedy” without even mentioning who the perpetrators were. There is no mention of any responsibility for the murders, as if they were some natural disaster. But there is mention of the emotional relevance to both sides – the Turks and the Armenians (imagine Jews and Germans being mentioned together in the case of the Holocaust!). And of course, mention is made of the uniqueness of the Holocaust.

There is a lot of cynicism, arrogance, self-contradiction and irresponsibility in this dangerous official statement. By it Israel took another big step from passive to active denial. And this declaration was made by a state whose people were victims of the Holocaust only a little over 60 years ago! It puts in question the whole significance and relevance of historical scholarship on genocide, not to say that it also desecrates the memory of the Holocaust and its significance.

In Israel the “usual protests” were publicly made by only a few people [16]. The arguments used by the Foreign Ministry in this debate are the basic principles of Israeli policy toward the Armenian Genocide to today (2009).

5. Sarid's Statement – 2000

Education Minister Yossi Sarid supported the idea of visiting the Armenian Quarter on Armenian Memorial Day, April 24, 2000, realizing that his visit and statement there would create a precedent. It should be said that Sarid (Meretz Party) was not the first Israeli minister to visit the Armenian community on Memorial Day. Yair Zaban (Meretz), the Minister of Absorption in Rabin's government, had previously done so on Armenian Memorial Day, April 24, 1994. However, visiting the Armenian Quarter was Sarid's personal decision, taken without consulting anyone, and without asking permission of Ehud Barak, the Prime Minister, or even informing him. He may have assumed that such permission would not be granted.

Sarid carefully planned his address to the Armenians, aware of every word and knowing the significance and consequences of his act. Although he did not represent the Israeli Government on this occasion, his presence there was emphasized as being in his capacity as Minister of Education.

"I am aware of the special significance of my presence here today, along with other Israelis," he said early in his speech. "Today, perhaps for the first time, you are less alone." He went on to say, "I am here, with you, as a human being, as a Jew, as an Israeli, and as Minister of Education." Sarid noted that it was the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau Sr., a Jew, who, in 1915 was among the first to tell the world about the genocide of the Armenians. He also referred to *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, the novel of the Jewish writer Franz Werfel, which had influenced him and his generation. Sarid concluded his statement with a declaration of commitment to ensure that the Armenian Genocide would be included in the Israeli secondary school history curriculum.

Sarid's speech received much attention in the Israeli and the world press and was quoted in many countries. At first there was no official protest by the Israeli government, which usually acted in support of official Turkish opinion. But quite soon it was obvious that Sarid's attitudes were not in accord with the official policy of the State of Israel.

A *Ha'aretz* Editorial (April 27, 2000) carried a very clear title, "The Need to Learn and to Remember," and stated that:

Israel's stuttering official position about the genocide of the Armenian people rests upon the mistaken assumption that there is an irresolvable contradiction between political interests and a moral stance.

Though it would seemingly be natural for the people brutalized by the Holocaust to recognize the mass murder done to another nation, lobbying pressure ex-

erted by Turkey, which disclaims responsibility for the Armenian genocide, has influenced Israel's position. In recent years, when important relations with Turkey have solidified, Israel's cautiousness has risen, approaching a situation tantamount to the willful forgetting of the past sufferings of another people.

The problem isn't the lobbying pressure exerted by Turkey: instead, the problem is that Israel submits to it.

Israel's position appears particularly problematic when it is examined in light of the campaigns waged by the Jewish people to counter renewed trends of Holocaust denial, efforts which peaked recently in the libel trial involving David Irving. One doesn't need to ponder similarities and differences in the fates of the two peoples to understand that Israel's waffling about Armenian history weakens the moral cogency borne by campaigns against Holocaust denial, as well as efforts to educate about the lessons of the Holocaust.

Israel's fuzzily obscure official statements expressing "regret about the deaths of many Armenians in wars which accompanied the end of the Ottoman Empire," and declarations that overlook the circumstances of these deaths, erode its moral right to demand that the world make sure that the Jewish Holocaust is never forgotten. And cautious Israeli formulations about the "massacre" of Armenians do little to improve Israel's moral position.

Israel missed its chance to become the first country to recognize the Armenian genocide officially. A growing cluster of nations has conferred such recognition; these include France, Belgium and Sweden. Study and remembrance of the murder of another nation must be a supreme normative priority for the people that endured the Holocaust, and no perceived diplomatic interest should be allowed to obstruct such earnest reckoning [17].

The Armenians were moved by Sarid's statement and praised him. The Armenian National Institute translated the speech, which they called "a powerful statement," into English. The speech was reproduced, or quoted extensively, in the Armenian media all over the world. Armenian communities world-wide, including, of course, Israel, congratulated him for his "precious decision," and his "courageous role as a human rights defender," and expressed their gratitude¹.

The Turkish reaction was wholly different. According to the Anatolia News Agency in Ankara and Turkish Daily News (May 3, 2000), Turkey was reassured that no change in Israeli policy on the Armenian "so-called genocide" had occurred. The

¹ Letters to Yossi Sarid from, among others, the Union of Armenians in Italy, Milan; May 16, 2000; from Armenian Educational and Cultural Society, Athens, May 19, 2000; from "one who lost most of my family members in 1915," May 10, 2000.

Israeli Ambassador, Uri Bar-Ner, said that Sarid's statement reflected the democracy in Israel, but the attitude of the government is different and clear. Diplomatic sources said that at the meeting between Ahmet Uzumcu, Turkey's ambassador to Tel Aviv, and Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, they stressed again that the statements made by Yossi Sarid, Israeli Minister of Education, pertaining to the so-called genocide of the Armenians were his personal views, and noted that they did not reflect the official policy of the government. These officials said to the *Turkish Daily News* that Israel desired to further improve bilateral relations between the two countries. They stressed that there was no policy change whatsoever on the part of Israel, and that they would stick to their position that historians, not politicians, should discuss the issue. Speaking to the *Turkish Daily News*, an unidentified Israeli diplomat said, "It is not a matter needing an official declaration. We do not want to take a side on this issue; we leave it to the historians. The two ministers' statements are their personal opinions and they do not reflect the government's policies."

Because of the opposition of the government of Turkey, and because of fears that the significance of the Holocaust would be belittled, the Armenian Genocide is not taught in Israel¹.

Another time the Armenian Genocide was raised in the Israeli Parliament was in March 2007. This time, member of the Knesset Haim Oron (Meretz) proposed to discuss the issue of the Armenian Genocide in the Knesset. He did not ask to recognize the Genocide at that stage, but only to debate it and later on, not in the same session, to vote on it, and hopefully recognize it.

The coalition of the government opposed his request that the subject be debated in plenum or even in the Committee of Education. The government won the vote (16 against 12) of 120 members of the Knesset. The Knesset decided that the issue could not even be discussed.

In the following year, in March 2008, Oron again raised the issue before the Knesset. This time the Knesset accepted Oron's initiative and in an unprecedented move decided to discuss the Armenian Genocide. Eleven Knesset members voted in favor of the proposal, and none were opposed or abstained. Oron had requested that

¹ What is the current status of the Armenian Genocide in the Israeli school curriculum? In reply to a question by Georgette Avakian, the head of the Armenian Case Committee in Israel, to the Director General of the Ministry of Education, Shlomit Amichai, the Chairman of the Pedagogical Secretariat, Michael Abitbul wrote (July 31, 2000), that a comprehensive book on the Armenian genocide would be published soon by the Ministry of Education. According to the promise of the former Minister of Education, Yossi Sarid, the book was to be available for history teachers who intended to teach the subject in the school year 2000-2001. Up to the time of this writing, however (2009), the book has not materialized. To the best of our knowledge, it will not materialize in the near future. After the nomination of the new Minister of Education from the Likud, and after another new Minister of Education from the labor, and then another from the Likud, the possibility of the program's realization are, in fact, close to nil.

the Knesset's Education Committee hold the discussion, but the government decided it would be the Committee of Foreign and Security Affairs, where the debate could be closed even to journalists. To the best of our knowledge the debate did not take place. Oron raised the issue another time in March 2009. To conclude, we can notice that there is not a real or deep difference between the left wing and the right wing in Israel regarding their attitude toward the Armenian Genocide, at least when they are in the government.

Both wings regard the issue with a pragmatic attitude, one of *Realpolitik* – giving priority to relations with Turkey. When the issue was raised in the Knesset, it was raised mostly by members of the Meretz Party (Civil Rights with Socialist or Social Democate tendency), which is quite a small party, comprising only five, and since 2008 three, members in the Knesset. In their view, politics and morality are not contradictory, and the policy of a state can be and has to be moral. The late member of the Knesset Yuri Stern from a right wing party supported the recognition of the Genocide; that shows that sometime the personal convictions are significant.

6. The Turkish-Israeli Alliance

The geopolitical considerations of Israel have to be noted in examining Turkey-Israel relationship. One might argue that they have to be given greater weight. One can surely appreciate that Israel stands between a variety of rocks and a hard place. The need for allies is great. Turkey, as a secular Moslem, highly militarized state, permits certain latitude to Israel with respect to countering fundamentalist ambitions to annihilate Israel as a sovereign entity – and even its population of Jews.

In order to understand the pragmatic *Raisons d'État* and *Realpolitik*, considerations that have influenced the Israeli attitude toward the Armenian Genocide, a brief overview of Israel-Turkey relations is needed. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to go into Israel-Turkey relations in depth¹.

Turkey and Israel have since the 1990s forged an unlikely alliance that baffles many observers of the region. On the face of it, there would seem to be little historical or contemporary logic to a close relationship between the two; one is the well-established successor of a vast and long-lived empire; the other an embattled state – whose boundaries and very existence are constantly challenged by neighbors; one is

¹ Many articles and books have been written about this in Israel. Our short survey is based mainly on Rapheal Israeli, "The Turkish-Israeli Odd Couple," *Orbis*, volume 45 issue no. 1 (winter 2001), p. 65-79. See also: Alon Liel, *Turkey in the Middle East, Oil Islam Politics* (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1994); Alon Liel, *Tukey-Military, Islam and Politics 1970-2000* (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1999); Aryeh Shmuelevitz, *Turkey in the 20th Century: Between Modernization and Tradition* (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1997); Ehud R. Toledano, *An Introduction to the History of the Ottoman Empire* (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Defence, 1985).

Muslim, the other Jewish; Turkey is just emerging from what is considered Third World status and aspiring to join the European Union, while Israel is thoroughly modernized and well entrenched in Western culture; Turkey is notoriously deficient with regard to international norms of human rights and the rule of law, while Israel is a liberal democracy (with its internal deep tensions between being democracy and a Jewish state and the fact it controls another people); Turkey is highly influenced by its military, while Israel is civilian in its demeanor; one is large in size and population, the other is comparatively tiny.

There are numerous elements in the Turkish-Israel alliance, each of them complex and deserving of in-depth treatment. In this framework we can only identify them as factors affecting Israel's response to the Armenian Genocide. These factors include the following:

1. The Jewish community in Turkey;
2. The provision of water, gas and oil to Israel by Turkey;
3. Turkey as a military ally against Iraq and Iran, with whom Turkey does not maintain cordial relations;
4. The US policy towards Russia and Turkey's role in that policy;
5. The US policy in the Middle East, especially regarding oil, and Turkey and Israel's role in that policy.

Of all the complex issues affecting Turkey's relationship with Israel, security, strategy, military and technological collaboration are perhaps the most acute and certainly the most important ones for the Turkish generals, who monitor their country's politics. It is therefore no wonder that the most striking and rapid advance in the relations between the two countries has been in the military-strategic domain. Turkey has purchased advanced Israeli weaponry and electronics, engaged in joint maneuvers, cooperated in counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering, and exchanged high-level visits with the Israeli military. These initiatives rest on the assumption that Turkey, surrounded by hostile, authoritarian, unpredictable, and anti-Western regimes, would be foolish not to cooperate with the only other power in the Middle East that is democratic, stable, strong, and pro-Western.

No doubt, the dilemma of morality versus policy is at the core of the issue. The close relations between Israel and Turkey are based on the mutual interests of the two countries. The question is whether Israel erred in the Armenian Question in the early stages of its relations with Turkey. In the 1970s and 1980s, the rationale of the Israeli government as to why it should yield to Turkish pressure was that it has been

important to keep relations with the only Muslim country willing to do so. More important (and mysterious) was the claim regarding Jewish interests: it was explained by Israeli officials that supporting the Armenian Question could endanger the lives of Jews in Turkey, as well as in some other countries (once saving Jews from Syria was mentioned, and on another time saving Jews from Iran). This was sometimes described as a “vital interest.”

We do not presume to judge if these issues are really in the “vital interest” of Israel or the Jews. Suppose, however, the pretext of “vital interest” was not used. What would Turkish-Israeli relations look like if Israel had explained from the beginning that the memory of genocide – **any genocide** – is not a negotiable issue in the relations between two sovereign states, especially when one of them is the country of the survivors of the Holocaust? What would have happened if Israel had explained to Turkey that what Israeli children learn in school and what is shown on Israeli television channels is an internal Israeli concern?

The number of Armenians in Palestine grew significantly with the arrival of the refugees from the Genocide during the First World War and after it. In addition to Jerusalem, they settled in Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and a few families in some villages in the Galilee. Nowadays the small Armenian community in Israel of around 3,000 members, divided between citizens of Israel and Armenians living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, has very little political power. The Armenians of East Jerusalem live amongst the mosaic of different communities, and their future is uncertain if a political agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians is implemented – who will control the Armenian Quarter? In considerations of *Realpolitik*, the small Armenian community, its tragedy and its memory, have no weight.

The Armenian Question has been, from the outset, one marked by political weakness. Armenia is a little country, isolated in a difficult economic situation. In the Diaspora there are two big and strong communities: the US and France.

Also in other countries the Jewish communities are involved in the struggle about the recognition. We want to mention briefly the debates in the USA.

There is no doubt that Israel was involved at least in some of the debates (1989, 2000) in the US over the recognition by supporting the Turkish side directly, and in other cases by asking Jewish organizations to act on behalf of the Turks.

Jews and Israeli diplomats work to prevent commemoration of the Armenian Holocaust (the word "Holocaust" and not "Genocide" was used) was the front-page headline in the respected Hebrew newspaper Ha'aretz (October 17, 1989). The Turks accused the "Jewish lobby in Washington" and the Jewish representative in Congress

of involvement in the debate by supporting the Armenians. In 1989 the chief Rabbi of Turkey sent a personal letter to every member of the U.S. senate saying that the new initiative greatly troubles their community.

Both in Israel and in the Jewish community in the US there was a public debate over the involvement of Jews and Israeli representatives in the affair.

There were those who supported the Jewish organizations and Israeli involvement – individuals and at least part of the Jewish establishment that raised the pragmatic considerations. Against those considerations tied to the Israeli-Turkish relations moral arguments were presented both in Israel and the US. The enormous sensitivity to Jewish involvement in the affair acquired an additional dimension in the relations between Israel and Diaspora. Liberal Jewish organizations in the U.S. were embarrassed. Some of them criticized publically, sometimes anonymously, Israel. To demonstrate its different attitude, the Union of American Hebrew congregations passed a resolution at its biennial convention in November 1989 in support of marking Armenian memorial day and to teach in its synagogues the facts and lessons of these tragic chapters in modern history.

Generally speaking, the attitudes of the Jews and the Jewish communities in Diaspora are more universalistic than the attitudes in Israel, which are more Zionist oriented, more pragmatic and less universal. Surely they are more open to the Armenian tragedy than the official attitude of the state of Israel. In my view in the real world, *realpolitik* will not always trump *moralpolitik*, even though this is the case in many events. Moral attitudes have their own power, and if individuals, parties or states that struggle for justice (in our case against genocide and for recognition of past genocides) in a consistent way, they can succeed. Politics and morality are not contradictory, and the policy can be and has to be moral.

In my view there are almost no purely moral decisions or only cynical, self-interested decisions. If we were to look at the tension between morality and self-interest as two ends of a scale, decisions are somewhere in the middle. I don't accept the assumption, mistaken in my view, that there is an irresolvable contradiction between political interests and moral stance.

Epilogue

The strong alliance that had existed between Turkey and Israel since 1990s passes a crucial crisis in 2009. Turkey became very loud voice against the Israeli operation in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. In October 2009 the relationships became very critical and the crisis – open and public.

At the same time (October 2009) Turkey signed with Armenia a historical agreement; they decided on diplomatic relations and opening the borders between the two countries. The Armenian Genocide, a main issue between the two countries is not mentioned.

Some circles in Israel who were angry and upset of the hostility of Turkey against Israel proposed to answer Turkey by recognizing the Armenian Genocide, as if Turkey will pay the price of its new hostility toward Israel, by using the Armenian Genocide as a weapon. When there are not at all (or almost) moral considerations these cynical calculations can become the essence of the struggle for recognition of the Genocide, and its memory is lost.

November, 2009

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PROBLEMS OF THE THIRD GENERATION OF ARMENIAN DIASPORA

*Gevorg Poghosyan*¹

During almost 100 years following the Armenian Genocide Armenian Diaspora underwent several stages of development. Different fragments of the Diaspora history are studied rather thoroughly. Nevertheless, we think that it needs generalization and complete re-interpretation. Now let us discuss several conceptual aspects relating to the issue.

The main task for the first generation of the Armenian Diaspora was to survive physically and assert themselves in new settlements.

Although the Armenian Communities had existed since the loss of the Armenian Statehood in the 14th century, they grew in size after the Armenian Genocide. 1.5 million Armenians were exterminated, others managed to escape, and established themselves in various Eastern European, Balkan, and Middle Eastern cities. Thousands of Armenians settled in Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) as well as in the North and South Americas. Substantial number of Armenian communities also exists in Russia as well as in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Armenian communities can also be found in India, Australia, New Zealand, Africa (Sudan, South Africa, and Ethiopia), and as far east as Singapore, Myanmar and Hong Kong and the Philippines.

According to different expert judgments today the number of Armenians all over the world is approximately 8 million

Today, the countries with the largest number of Armenians are Russia which is the first as to the size of the communities, the United States, France, Iran (although the communities have shrunk in size since 1970s), Lebanon, Georgia, Syria, Argentina, Canada, and the Ukraine.

¹The head of the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Right at the NAS of Armenia; the Doctor of Social Sciences; Correspondent-member of the NAS of Armenia.

State	The number of Armenians
Armenia	3,215,800
Russia	1,130,491 (2002 census)
USA	1,000,000
France	500,000
Iran	400,000
Georgia	248,900 (2004 census)
Syria	190,000
Lebanon	140,000
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic	138,000
Argentina	130,000
Ukraine	99,894 (2001 census)
Poland	92,000
Turkey	40,000 to 70,000 (the Hamshenis are not included)
Jordan	70,000
Uzbekistan	70,000
Germany	42,000 - 60,000
Canada	40,505 (according to 2001 census) (some estimates to 60,000)
Greece	35,000 - 55,000
Brazil	40,000 - 50,000
Australia	45,000
Abkhazia	44,869 (according to 2003 census)
Spain	42,000
Turkmenistan	30,000
Bulgaria	30,000
Belarus	25,000
Kazakhstan	25,000
Iraq	20,000
Uruguay	19,000
United Kingdom	18,001
Hungary	15,000

State	The number of Armenians
Belgium	10,000
Czech Republic	10,000
Israel	9,800
Egypt	8,200
Moldova	7,000
Netherlands	6,000
Tajikistan	6,000
Latvia	5,000
Switzerland	5,000
Sweden	5,000
Kiewit	5,000
Kyrgyzstan	3,285
United Arab Emirates	3,000
Denmark	3,000
Austria	3,000
Nicaragua	2,907
Ecuador	2,800
Cyprus	2,740 (1987 census)
Venezuela	2,500
Lithuania	2,500
Italy	2,500
Estonia	2,000
Romania	1,780
Norway	1,000
Finland	1,000
Chili	1,000
Sudan	1,000
Thailand	1,000
Honduras	900
New Zealand	600

State	The number of Armenians
Mexico	560 - 10,000
Albania	500
India	500
Colombia	250–300
Monaco	200
South Africa	200
Qatar	150
Cuba	100
Ethiopia	100
Dominican Republic	75
Ireland	50
Costa Rica	40
Singapore	35
Peru	35
Zimbabwe	28
Indonesia	20
Pakistan	20–200
Japan	20-100
Guatemala	20–50

Approximately 10.000 Armenians are said to reside in Mexico, while the Armenian community in Iraq has dwindled after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and according to www.Wikipedia.org., www.Armeniandiaspora.com a scattering number of Armenians remain in East Asia.

These are rather general data and it is quite obvious that the current number of the Diaspora, its potential as well as its place and role in different countries of the world need to be seriously studied by applying various scientific methods. To have the real picture, we need to conduct a census-like study in all those countries of the world where the number of the Armenian community is rather big – e.g. in the USA, Russia, Georgia, France, Lebanon, Iran, etc. It is not an easy task and for this purpose we need to mobilize the efforts and structures in Armenia, Diaspora, as well as the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The conducting of the so called all-Armenian census is to be considered as a number one all-National project. There may be several all-National programmes of such importance. Only one-third of the world's Armenians live in Armenia.

The second generation established many different structures operating in the Diaspora.

Immediately after the Armenian Genocide, the resettled Armenians lived in refugee camps. However, as their financial situation improved, the camps grew into towns, and these towns became cities. This was the case with many of the Armenian-populated regions in Lebanon. In time, the Armenians organized themselves by building churches, schools, cultural centres, etc. Various political parties and charities, such as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) "Dashnaktsutyun", Ramkavar-Azatakan Party, Social-Democrat Hnchakian party ("Hnchak"), and the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), started to act wherever there was a considerable number of Armenians.

There was also a conflict between the leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church. As it is known Armenians had two Catholicoses. One of them resided in Echmiadzin and was supported by the Soviet Armenia, the "Hnchaks" and the "Ramkavars", while the other seated in Antilias, Lebanon and was supported by the "Dashnaktsakans". As a result of the Pan-Arabism in Egypt and Syria, Islamism in Iran, and the Lebanese Civil War, tens of thousands of Armenians emigrated from the Middle East and established themselves in the USA, Canada, France, and elsewhere, where they are lobbying to support the Republic of Armenia and to extend the international recognition and condemnation of the Armenian Genocide.

Armenian Diaspora Political Organizations

1. European Armenian Federation for Justice & Democracy - Europe
2. Armenian National Committee of America - USA
3. Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne – France
4. Campaign for Recognition of the Armenian Genocide – United Kingdom
5. Armenian National Committee of Canada - Canada
6. Armenian National Committee of the Middle East –Middle East

In our opinion, the task of the third generation is to study the historic role and the place of the Armenian Diaspora and its future actions. It is necessary to create new so called think-tank active Diaspora structures, which will study from scientific perspective the situation, future actions and development programmes.

Armenians are introduced to the world by their three segments: the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Artsakh and Armenian Diaspora. By the way, these three parts are important subjects to the international relations existing in the modern world: an independent state, a non-recognized state (or territory) and international movement (in this case, ethnic or national movement).

Today the world differs completely from the traditional conceptions. It is not merely a family of independent states but a rather diverse and many faced phenomenon. Today it exists also in the form of different international, supranational and transnational structures, also non-recognized state entities, as well as non-state, non-official movements and associations. Thus, today Armenia is introduced to the world in three different forms: state, non-recognized state entity and international trans-state movement.

This can be of a great advantage if the three parts coordinate their activities, in other words, if they are treated as the implementers of common all-national programmes. The interrelation between these three segments, their harmonized and nation-oriented development, as well as elaboration of conceptual ideology of their roles and contribution can be considered as an all-national scientific programme.

Traditionally, Diaspora activities were managed by the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Armenian Catholic Church, Evangelistic organizations, political parties (Dashnaktsutyun, Ramkavar-Azatakan, Hnchak), cultural associations, countrymen unions and charities. But it is already high time to coordinate and unite all these historically established organizations by one, all-national, elective body with representative functions. Already established Diaspora structures act as “ministries” for the Armenian Diaspora, which does not have and cannot have a *structure of a state*.

If, for a moment, we assume that they execute the functions of a state, we can say that the Diaspora “ministries” have proved their vitality and efficiency long ago. Today it is often mentioned that it’s high time to find a body, which will coordinate the Diaspora structures’ activities as well as to establish an All-national Assembly or Parliament to pass legislative resolutions. Undoubtedly, this hour has already struck and even more it is even late to speak about it. Not at all trying to underestimate the role of the abovementioned structures, we find it important to mention that Diaspora does not and cannot have a structure of a state. Diaspora in general, and Armenian Diaspora, in particular, has a network structure; hence, we need to think about creating such units *that will correspond to that structure*.

The Diaspora investment in the RA economy is rather big. It becomes obvious when we study the data related to the Diaspora direct investments in Armenia: Russia 29%, USA 17% and Iran 14% (www.crrc.am). We always appreciated the financial support of the Diaspora. But today it is evident that for Armenia the intellectual potential of the Diaspora is probably more important than the financial assistance it provides.

The Republic of Armenia together with the Armenian Diaspora has initiated a number of voluminous events; among them Armenia-Diaspora conferences (1999, 2002, 2006), Pan-Armenian Olympic games (1999, 2001, 2003, 2007) and different events (“One Nation, One Culture”, “Golden Apricot” etc). And finally, the new edition of the RA Constitution of 2005 set forth the legislative basis for dual citizenship and in 2007 the National Assembly adopted the corresponding law. The RA Government envisages the creation of a Diaspora Ministry this fall.

Every single Armenian should realize that all the events of national importance are more essential than personal or private affairs and family matters and events. That is, we need to make fundamental changes in the mentality of the Armenian people. As long as the wedding seremonies and christening celebrations of Armenians in California are much luxurious and genezous, than the events organized by the Diaspora, which are aimed at well-being of our people, we can say that the Armenians historical-political consciousness needs to be cured. Every Armenian should consider the affairs and matters of national importance much higher than his/her personal affairs (including family and personal matters).

Every nation, which has established a state, has also a Diaspora. In other words, every state consists of the main part or the bulk of the given nation, and as a rule, a definite part of the nation representatives live abroad in foreign countries. This is a natural phenomenon and it holds true for all the nations and countries. The representatives of the given nationality that live abroad may be very small in number, but sometimes they can make 15-20% of the population of the given country or even more. However, in the case of Armenia, we deal with an exceptional phenomenon, when the one-third of the nation lives in Armenia and the two-thirds live abroad, in different countries. It is a unique phenomenon, when the number of the Diaspora exceeds the main population of the state in two or three times, which can only be compared with the case of the Jewish and Irish peoples. You can never come across such a phenomenon elsewhere. But this is not the only thing that makes Armenians exceptional, due to the national homogeneity inside the country. The thing is that 97% of the population of Armenia is eth-

nic Armenians. This is also an exceptional phenomenon and probably, you will not be able to find any other country in the world with such homogeneity of population structure.

Only 3% of Armenia's population belongs to other ethnic groups. They are mostly Kurds and Russians. There are also a few representatives of other ethnic groups. According to the world statistics in different countries of the world national minorities make 10-25%, sometimes 50-60%.

Thus, we can say, that the Republic of Armenia is a unique phenomenon in the world due to its internal national structure as well as the much bigger Diaspora. The historical reasons for this are quite clear and understandable. It can be explained by historical processes related to the creation of the Armenian statehood, the Genocide phenomenon and the formation of the Armenian Diaspora. Nevertheless, the outcome of the phenomena of being exceptional and the perspectives of the further development of the Armenian statehood are not sufficiently studied. We may even say that they are not studied at all.

We must establish an international scientific research centre (institute) for the Diaspora, like the Museum-Institute of the Genocide in Armenia. It should be a rather powerful research structure, "think-tank", with its full-time staff, but there may also be a lot of scientists from different countries, and not only those who are ethnic Armenians, who will collaborate with the institute on a contractual basis. I do not doubt even for a while that the Diaspora and the Genocide are interconnected aspects of the Armenian Question. Simply, the Genocide Museum studies the past, whereas the Diaspora institute should be future-orientated.

In our opinion, the scientific research work and the scientific approaches on the Diaspora on the whole are late. It is undeniable truth. But, let us not forget, that the reason for it was the Soviet Union. All of us know very well that during many years communists prohibited not only scientific studies but even speaking about the Genocide. In this respect, one can say, that the Soviet Union acted as accomplice to Turkish perpetrators of the Genocide. Now, we are doing what our previous generations were supposed to do some 50-80 years ago. We started to study freely the Genocide about 20 years ago (and not even since 1965). So, what does it mean? It means that we don't have time; we are to hurry, in order to fill the gap, resulting from decades of silence. The Soviet Union did everything so that the Armenian Genocide was forgotten. But they failed.

Coming back to the scientific research work, we must realize that the thorough profound legal study is very important, but at the same time it is not less im-

portant to try to find non-traditional, innovative, coercive, pecuniary, and other solutions to the problems. We must try everything.

The more we succeed in the just and efficient solution of the Armenian Question the more will increase the influence of the Turkish State, which will try to intervene, sent its agents and spies, and even try to organize coup d'état in Armenia.

We should not overestimate our enemies, as it will affect our courage. Yet, it is more dangerous if we underestimate our enemies, as it will bring us to failure.

April, 2008

CURRENT TENDENCIES AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENOCIDE

*Vladimir Vardanyan*¹

The last decade of the XX century was crucial from the point of view of comprehension and new perception of the issues related to the Genocide committed against Armenians (hereafter “the Genocide”). The tendency of shifting the debates on the Genocide into the legal sphere has come to the surface in the late 1980’s. In the 1990’s the coverage of the legal issues of the Genocide has become more active. As for the third millennium, it is safe to say that the legal dimension is a basic component in the debates on the Genocide.

In fact the transfer of the issues on the Genocide to the legal field reanimated the process of calling to State responsibility for the crime – the process which has been “frozen” since the early 1920’s. Although it is clear that after 70 years of inaction, consideration of this issue nowadays cannot have the same content and coverage as it used to have in the 1920’s. Nevertheless, the possibility of the most practical and efficient means of responsibility for the Genocide – i.e. the State responsibility – is still there. This is the reason why it is appropriate to analyze the issue of the State responsibility for the Genocide.

Obviously, it is impossible to consider the issues of the State responsibility for the Genocide without an analysis of the relevant provisions of the fundamental international instrument combating that Crime – *the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. An analysis of its potential application to the Genocide is also necessary.

Although *the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* can be considered as the first contemporary universal international document in the field of human rights (it was even adopted a day before the adoption of

¹The head of the department of international treaties of the legal advice bureau (service) of the RA Constitutional Court’s administration; the lecturer at the Chair of European and public law at the YSU, Candidate of Sciences (international public law).

the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*), practically it was virtually unused for about half a century. In this connection it is impossible not to quote G.Schwarzenberger, an outstanding International lawyer: “[Convention] unnecessary when applicable and inapplicable when necessary” [1].

Such was the general international legal evaluation of the Genocide Convention towards the end of the Cold War, when the events in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda forced the UN Security Council to initiate the establishment of the two *ad hoc* international criminal tribunals through the adoption of Resolutions 827 and 955, the *ratione materiae* jurisdiction of which also extends to the crime of genocide. Almost at the same period, the efforts of bringing the states to the international responsibility for the genocide were also undertaken. As a result, in the 1990’s several cases were initiated at the International Court of Justice (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia (1993) [2], Yugoslavia vs. NATO (1999) [3], Croatia vs. Yugoslavia (1999) [4]. Thus, one can claim that the practical application of the Genocide Convention has begun in the 1990’s. Consequently, the issue of State responsibility for Genocide has been raised on a new level.

1. The general outline of the provisions of the convention on prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide

The Genocide Convention was adopted on December 9, 1948 and entered into force on January 12, 1951. According to the modern standards the Genocide Convention is a relatively small document. It consists of only 19 articles. Furthermore, only articles I to IX can be considered “substantial”, for the last ten articles are rather of a technical nature (i.e. they regulate the issues of its coming into force, review, period of effectiveness, territorial application of the Convention etc.). The very objectives of the Convention were the following:

- to confirm that genocide is a crime under international law;
- to recognize once for all the fact of existence of the general international law provision prohibiting genocide;
- to stipulate the very essence of the Convention, i. e. to clarify the notion of the crime which was long ago prohibited by the norms of the general international law.

That is why, adopting the 1948 Genocide Convention, the UN member states stipulated in Article I that “*The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law*”

*which they undertake to prevent and to punish*¹.

Actually this conclusion was confirmed along with the Convention's coming into force by the 1951 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which stated that: *"The principles underlying the Convention are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States even without any conventional obligation"* [5].

Article II of the Convention is the key one. It stipulates the notion of the crime of genocide. Article III, which stipulates other acts punishable along with the crime of genocide (such as conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide), can be deemed as the logical continuation of the preceding article.

Articles IV to VII of the Convention have to do with the principles of responsibility of persons committed genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention, enactment of the necessary legislation for the efficient suppression of genocide and provision of effective penalties for persons guilty of the mentioned crimes, as well as state jurisdiction and extradition of persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention.

Article VIII of the Convention is concerned with the authorities of the State Parties to the Convention in the field of prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Thus, according to Article VIII *"Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III"*.

And finally the basic purpose of Article IX of the Convention is to provide the necessary mechanism of settling disputes between the Parties. In particular, this article stipulates: *"Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute"*.

In conclusion of this outline, it is necessary to mention that the analysis of the Convention primarily raises questions rather than provides answers. The issue of State Responsibility in the framework of the Convention is still ambiguous, for unfortunately it is not detailed enough in the Convention. In what follows we will attempt at clarifying some aspects to the mentioned issue.

¹ The terms "confirm" and "подтверждают" are mentioned in English and Russian original texts of Convention.

2. *The issue of state responsibility for Genocide*

For those who are not deeply aware of the peculiarities of Public International Law it may seem unbelievable that till nowadays there has been no written obligatory international statutory document stipulating the principles and rules of State responsibility in Public International Law. Nevertheless, it is the clearly case that there is no international treaty setting forth obligations to States as to what rules and principles ought to be applied to States committed internationally wrongful acts. In other words, the so called “*secondary*” rules and principles of state responsibility have virtually no conventional basis (with the exception of some curtailed reports in some documents). Evidently, the adoption of such statutory document is not advantageous for any state, since it is always preferable to regulate issues of State Responsibility using flexible provisions of customary international law than using the rigid norms stipulated in the treaties.

In any case, the UN General Assembly, by adopting on December 12, 2001 the Resolution 56/83 on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts [6], is definitely clarifying the issue. A document with the same title has been attached to it as an annex. This document was a result of more than 50 years of activities of the UN International Law Commission and it was indeed the unique document verifying the existence of customary norms in the fields of International Legal Responsibility.

The issue of the responsibility for Genocide and other international crimes considered as internationally wrongful acts *inter alia* was solved definitely in the document. So, Chapter III “Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law” (Articles 40-41) was envisaged in the Document stipulating the provisions of State Responsibility for the international crimes. The drafters of the document rejected term “*international crimes*” and substituted it by the expression “*serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law*”, although this expression is deemed to be more complicated, it nevertheless expresses the essence of the phenomenon more precisely, separating it from the international criminal offences committed by natural persons. Although the document does not say explicitly that genocide is considered a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law¹, the Commentaries to the Document prepared by the International Law Commission state unequivocally that prohibitions of genocide should be considered as a serious breach of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law [7].

¹The only hint is found in Article 40, paragraph 2: “A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill the obligation”.

It can be concluded from the above that the document has put an end to the opinion frequently expressed by international law scholars that a state cannot hold responsibility for committing “international crimes” and state responsibility is extensively of a political but not of a legal nature. As a result the gossips about impossibility of international legal responsibility for genocide also were dropped.

Nevertheless, I am sure that the mentioned developments did not provide an answer to the question at issue – namely, whether the problem of bringing a state to responsibility is realized on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention. In other words, it is still vague whether the Genocide Convention is designed to call states for responsibility or whether its mission is limited by individual criminal responsibility.

3. The possibility of international legal responsibility on the basis of the Genocide convention

This issue became central for the International Court of Justice during the consideration of *Bosnia Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia* case. The main issue of Court’s *ratione materiae* jurisdiction was the following: what kind of obligations can the Genocide Convention put to the State Parties? The Court noted, in particular, that there “exists” a dispute between the Parties concerning the meaning and the legal scope of Article IX of the Convention. In particular, there is no unanimity whether the obligations the Convention imposes upon the Parties are limited to legislate, prosecute or extradite, or whether the obligations of the Parties extend to the obligation not to commit genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III [8, p. 58, para. 152]. The Court then observed that what obligations the Convention imposes upon the Parties depends on the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Convention read in the context and in the light of its object and purpose [8, p. 60, para. 160]. It reviewed the wording of Article I, which provides *inter alia* that “*The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish*”.

The Court held that “Article I, in particular its undertaking to prevent, creates obligations distinct from those which appear in the subsequent articles. That conclusion is also supported by the purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose of the Convention” [8, p. 61, para. 162]. The Court then considered whether the Parties are under an obligation not to commit genocide themselves since such an obligation is not expressly imposed by the actual terms of the Convention. Taking into account the established purpose of the Convention, the Court expressed the view that the effects

of Article I are to prohibit States from committing genocide. Firstly, this prohibition follows from Article I, which categorizes genocide as “a crime under international law”: the adoption of this categorization logically implies that the State Parties must undertake not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it follows from the explicitly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. Thus, it would have been paradoxical, had States been under an obligation to prevent genocide, without being forbidden to commit it through their own organs or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law [8, p. 63, para. 166].

In other words, the Court held that “the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of commission of genocide”. The Court then noted “*that its conclusion is confirmed by one unusual feature of the wording of Article IX, namely the phrase “including those [disputes] relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III”*”. The study of Russian and English original texts of the Convention provides a solid ground for claiming that the responsibility in question is responsibility “*for genocide*”, not merely responsibility “*for failing to prevent or punish genocide*”. Accordingly, the Court held that “the particular terms of the phrase as a whole confirm that Contracting Parties may be held responsible for genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III of the Convention” [8, p. 64, para. 168].

By the final confirmation of the proposition that a State can hold responsibility for the Genocide, the International Court of Justice put an end to the issue that the Genocide Convention is not designed to bring a State to responsibility. In my opinion, this can be deemed as a tactical victory in the issue of bringing the Republic of Turkey to international legal responsibility for the Genocide. For the Court evidently resolves two issues at once. On the one hand, it recognized the possibility of bringing a State to responsibility on the basis of the Convention. On the other hand, it verifies its jurisdiction over this issue.

4. Necessary conditions for bringing states to the international legal responsibility for Genocide

4.1. The Responsibility for the conducts of state organs and officials

Establishing the norm that a state can be brought to responsibility for committing Genocide on the basis of the Genocide Convention, is obviously not enough. It is also necessary to lay down the *conditions* under which a State may be entitled to responsibility.

Generally speaking, it is necessary to clarify the conducts for which a State may be responsible. In reality a State can act only via its machinery as well as via entities and persons under its supervision. That is why, the principle according to which, the conduct of each state organ shall be considered an act of the State under international law, is one of the cornerstones of the State responsibility. Thus, the issue of responsibility arises since such a conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of that State. Although at first sight this issue may seem of secondary importance or even unnecessary, it is clearly of fundamental necessity in the context of bringing the Republic of Turkey to responsibility for the Genocide. For it is not enough just to demonstrate the fact of the Genocide; it is also necessary to prove that it was committed by *the state organs of the Ottoman Empire, with their participation or connivance*. In other words, for each episode of the Genocide occurred between 1915 and 1923 it is necessary to examine whether the respective acts were committed by persons and entities, which at the time concerned had the status of acting bodies of the Ottoman Empire.

Certainly, I have never doubted the very fact of the Genocide or the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire for organizing the Genocide. However, in the case of transmitting the issue to the International Court of Justice the factual aspects of the Genocide should be obviously presented. Put differently, it is necessary to clarify the conducts, through which the Genocide was committed (*actus reus*) as well as the special intent (*dolus specialis*). Only after such a clarification it will be possible to discuss the issue of responsibility of the Ottoman Empire for those conducts.

As already noted, a State holds responsibility for conducts of all its organs (bodies) including those of army. Nevertheless, it is well known, that the Genocide was perpetrated with active participation of a number of the so called semi-state or quasi-state entities such as, for instance, Kurdish paramilitary units (formations). Now, a question arises: can their conducts be attributed to the Ottoman State. And if so, under what conditions?

In particular, the International Court of Justice has faced this problem deliberating the decision in the case *Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia*. It was necessary to clarify whether Serbia could hold responsibility for the conducts of paramilitary militia known as “Scorpions” in Srebrenica. In this issue the Court reiterated its Jurisprudence stipulated in the *Decision on the Case on Military and Paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. USA)*, according to which persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided that the persons, groups or entities do in fact act in “complete dependence” on

the State, of which they are ultimately merely instrument [8, pp. 140-141, para. 392].

Judging on the basis of materials submitted to the Court it held that it is unable to find that the “Scorpions” - referred to as “a unit of Ministry of Interiors of Serbia” were, in mid-1995, de jure organs of the Respondent. The Court therefore found that the acts of genocide in Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the Respondent, for they were not committed by its organs or by persons or entities wholly dependent upon it and, thus, do not entail the Respondent’s international responsibility.

It is safe to say that the case (factual situation) of the Genocide (i.e. genocide against Armenians) differs from that of the genocide in Srebrenica, for the level of criminal involvement of the Ottoman State bodies was much higher. Let us assume for the sake of argument that the participation of the organs of the Ottoman State in the Genocide is *principally unprovable* on the basis of the International Law. However, even in this hypothetical case nothing would alter the responsibility of the Ottoman Empire’s Successor. For albeit the key one, the responsibility for the acts of state bodies is not the sole basis for State Responsibility.

4.2. Responsibility for internationally wrongful acts carried out on the instructions of a State or under its direction or control

Another important basis of responsibility is set forth in the contemporary principles of State Responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, including genocide. A state holds responsibility even in those cases when it directs internationally wrongful acts of other persons or has control over them. Evidently this fact may play a decisive role in bringing the Republic of Turkey to responsibility for the Genocide. For, as it has been mentioned, a number of acts constituting the Genocide against Armenians were either perpetrated by quasi-state/semi-state structures or immediately directed or controlled by state bodies.

From this perspective, the decision of the Court discussed in 4.1 can cast some light on this issue. One of the questions considered by the Court was whether the massacres in Srebrenica were committed by persons who, though not having the status of organs of the Respondent, nevertheless acted on its instructions or under its direction or control. Reiterating the provision stipulated in Article 8 of the UN International Law Commission “Articles on State Responsibility”, the Court indicated that the applicable rule in this case is that the conduct of a person or a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons did in fact act on the instructions or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct. It is worth noting this is one of the customary rules of international responsibility. According to the Court, this provision must be perceived in the light of

the Court's jurisprudence on the subject, particularly that of the 1986 Judgment in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua [9] (Nicaragua vs. United States of America) [8, pp. 142-143, para. 392].

“It should be noted, that in this case the Court employed the so-called criteria of “effective control”, which holds that a State is responsible only if it directed or controlled every act of a person or a group of persons conducted internationally wrongful acts. That is: providing merely overall control over internationally wrongful acts conducted by a person or a group of persons is not sufficient to count responsible. Accordingly, the Court's decision was that the acts conducted in Srebrenica cannot be attributed to the Respondent, for these acts were not conducted under the immediate guidance of Serbia.

Apparently, the Court's position on the issue has seriously complicated the issue of bringing the Republic of Turkey to the responsibility for the Genocide on these grounds. The problem is that today, after more than 90 years since the events, uncovering the immediate control, direction and instructions of State organs of the Ottoman Empire over the conducts of persons and entities perpetrated the Genocide *in every single episode* is not an easy task. Albeit difficult, this task is still realistic, as the rich official correspondence and other official documents of that time, obviously, allow for answering this question positively.

Now, even if we assume that we may fail here, it won't give the Republic of Turkey an opportunity to escape responsibility, since it is well known that a State bears responsibility not only for actions but also for *inaction* (omission).

5. Possibility to institute proceedings in the international court of justice in respect of the genocide against Armenians on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide convention

As mentioned above, Article IX of the Genocide Convention stipulates that “*Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute*”.

As it is well known, both the Republic of Armenia and Republic of Turkey have acceded to the Genocide Convention (on June 23, 1993 and July 31, 1950 respectively)¹. Furthermore, neither Armenia, nor Turkey has made a reservation in

¹ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/1.htm> 02.05.2008

respect of Article IX or other articles of the Convention. Therefore, in principle the issue of the Genocide might have become a subject for consideration at the International Court of Justice even on January 12, 1951 (i.e. on the very date of entry into force of the Convention). Nevertheless, taking into account that the International legal personality of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in the USSR was just nominal, the institution of such a proceeding was practically impossible. The consideration of the issue of the Genocide by the International Court of Justice during the Soviet period was impossible also because of the Soviet Union's Reservation in respect of Article IX of the Convention that was preventing such an opportunity. It was not till the Republic of Armenia became a full-fledged member of the International Community (as well as a State Party to the Genocide Convention) that this opportunity came forth.

Therefore, the Republic of Armenia for more than 15 years has been offering the right to transmit unilaterally, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, the issue of Responsibility of the Republic of Turkey for the consideration to the International Court of Justice. This follows from the Article IX of the Genocide Convention and the fact of recognition of the Jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the issue by the Republic of Turkey. It is worth mentioning that genocide, as a violation of *erga omnes* international law obligation, enables not only the State, which immediately suffered from a genocide, but also any other State to institute proceedings in the International Court of Justice on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention.

However, the institution of proceedings by a non-victim state slightly limits the scope of Applicant's rights (frame of reference), since the latter may make demands exclusively directed to restitution of rights and compensation for damages of victims of the crime.

Obviously, we have to be ready to face a number of obstacles institutioning proceedings in the International Court of Justice. Some of the possible difficulties are the issue of retroactivity of the Convention, the issue of succession of the Republic of Turkey and the issues concerning the territorial application of the Convention.

Now, in order to transmit the issue of the Genocide to the International Court of Justice, it is necessary to determine the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in the first place. One can assert that the basis of the Court's Jurisdiction in this case is that very Article IX of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of the Genocide, which implies a possibility to submit to the Court disputes between the State Parties to the Convention relating to the interpretation, application or fulfillment of the Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for

genocide. Therefore, “in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the case on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, it remains for the Court to verify whether there is a dispute between the Parties that falls within the scope of that provision” [10, para. 27].

In the Judgment on the Preliminary Objections on the Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia), the Court has investigated polar and mutually exclusive positions of the Parties as well as referred its well established Jurisprudence to prove the existence of the Dispute between Parties. The Court accordingly noted that there persists “a situation in which the two sides hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain treaty obligations” (Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 74). The Court also stated that, because of the rejection by Yugoslavia of the complaints formulated by Bosnia-Herzegovina, “there is a legal dispute” between them (East Timor (Portugal vs. Australia), ICJ Reports 1995, p. 100, para. 22) [10, para. 29].

As for the Genocide, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey evidently hold opposite views concerning the question of the performance or non-performance of certain international obligations, which in particular, are stipulated in the Genocide Convention. Therefore, it may be implied from the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice that the issue of the Genocide is, in fact, an international legal dispute. Simply speaking, the jurisdiction *ratione materiae* of the International Court of Justice can raise no serious objection.

The issue of the jurisdiction *ratione temporis* of the Court is more complicated, taking into account that the conducts constituting the question at issue occurred prior to the Convention’s entry into force. In other words, in the case of initiating the proceedings in the Court on the mentioned basis, we will undoubtedly face a very disputable issue of the retroactive application of the Convention. To clarify the issue, I should refer to Article IX of the Convention once again. Unfortunately, the issue of the retroactive application of the provisions of the Convention is not touched upon in the text of the Convention. Naturally, this gives rise to different interpretations as to whether the Convention is retroactively applicable.

On the one hand, some interpreters have come to the negative conclusion claiming that International Law generally prohibits the retroactive application of treaties “unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established” [11]. For instance, such is the position of the authors of 2002 Legal Analysis prepared for the International Centre for Transitional Justice. According to the au-

thors of the Analysis, the *travaux préparatoires* of the Convention and the vast majority of its provisions support the view that the Convention imposes not *retrospective* but *prospective* obligations including the “prevention of future crimes” [12, p. 7]. Referring to Article XIII of the Genocide Convention, the authors of the Analysis have concluded that since it entered into force on January 12, 1951, it cannot give rise to individual criminal or state responsibility for events occurred during the early 20th century or at any time prior to January 12, 1951 [12, pp. 7-8].

On the other hand, there are others who believe that the Genocide Convention may apply retroactively, since it is a manifestation of the existing International Law. For instance, Alfred de Zayas claims that “*the language of the Genocide Convention neither excludes nor requires its retroactive application. In other words – there is nothing in the language of the Convention that would prohibit its retroactive application. By contrast, there are numerous international treaties that specifically state that they will not apply retroactively. For example, Article 11 of the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court specifies that “the Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute”* [13]. According to de Zayas, “*it is significant that the drafters of the Genocide Convention did not stipulate that it should apply only in the future, although they could easily have done so, had they intended to limit its scope of application*” [14].

Obviously, this paper is not an opportune place for a critical analysis of these opposing views. However, it is necessary to emphasize that both are nothing but *doctrinal constructions* regarding the retrospective application of the Genocide Convention and, hence, neither can have binding force. Since the issue of the retrospective application of the Convention is a matter of *interpretation*, it is, according to Article IX, clearly within the scope of exclusive jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Therefore, the exclusive right to take the final decision on the issue of the retrospective application of the Convention pertains solely to the International Court of Justice. Thus, as long as there is no Court’s Jurisprudence on the issue, all opinions on possibility or impossibility of the retrospective application of the Convention will remain merely theoretical comments.

April, 2008

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ARMENIAN QUESTION AND STAGES OF ARMENIAN SOCIETY SELF-ORGANIZATION PROBLEM

Vahan Melikyan¹

In the course of their development different nations have displayed different means and ways of self-organization. Not always the liberation struggles had been a priority factor heading towards creation or restoration of a sovereign independent statehood. In the old times different economic-trade systems of values and sometimes rough material and resource systems of values were dominant. Very often a comparatively fair social, i.e. communal and later city-state structures, as well as civilization, spiritual and religious values and etc. played a decisive role. For example, the recreation of the State of Israel became possible only as a result of the Holocaust.

One of the main specifics of the Armenian civilization and the history of our people is that being closely connected to its geographical environment and establishing rather powerful state entities on those territories for thousands of years, the inherited historic memory of the people when occurring in favourable conditions tries to rediscover the essence of the loss. During the centuries the aspiration to reach the maximum turned into a process of trying to achieve the minimum, basically through national-liberation struggle or through the assistance of a third party.

After the two partitions in 1555 and 1639 Armenia, from administrative point of view, was divided between Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Persia and the two notions came into being – Western and Eastern Armenia. This period was a crucial one for the Armenian reality, in the sense that beginning in the 14th century three hundred years decline period reached its climax from the point of view of human recourses' decomposition and degradation. Probably, the millennial history of Armenian people could have been interrupted there. From this very historical moment the helpless situation, in which Armenians occurred, was used by the Ottoman Empire to perpetrate a pre-genocide. First, mass immigration of Kurds to Western Ar-

¹The head of the chair of World politics and International relations at the Armenian-Russian (Slavonic) state University; the Candidate of Historical Sciences; Assistant professor.

menia was organized to change radically the Empire's demographic pattern in favour of the Muslims and later on, there was an attempt through devshirmeh (systematic collection of non-Muslim children and their involuntary conversion to Islam - Vahan Melikyan) and various anti-Armenian activities to vacate Western Armenia from Armenians. The only remaining Armenian institutions were the four Catholicoesates, which were also used to disrupt the Armenians, and to weaken the unity between church and ordinary people.

As for the immigration organized by Shah Abbas, it is worth mentioning that the Armenian Community in Nor Jugha was established under his protection and, being economically powerful, became the symbol of new upsurge and self-organization of the Armenianness.

The ideology of liberation of Armenia, which started in the 16-17th centuries after going through two long-lasting stages of European and Russian orientations under the influence of Russia's advanced foreign policy in the line of Asia Minor had finally led to the joining of Eastern Armenia to Russia. The liberation of Eastern or Russian Armenia from the rule of Persia, in contrast to Western Armenians, created for this segment of the Armenian population a tendency for a relative development and state of stability.

The radical social and political changes in Western and Eastern Armenia as well as in the Diaspora, which occurred in the 50-60s of the 19th century, resulted in the creation of the Armenian social-political environment where three social-political trends appeared, which tried to bring together the centuries-old political experience and marked the ways of self-organization. When there was no statehood it was first of all expressed by an attempt to preserve the Armenian ethnic identity as well as to unite around all-national goals.

In order to organize the internal life of Western Armenians the Constitutional movement of Western Armenians brought forward the idea of establishing Armenian legislative and executive bodies in Turkey –the National Assembly and National Central Committee, and it declared the development of the trading capital and economy as well as the economic cooperation between the Diaspora as a principle for self-organization.

As a result of the 1877-78 Russian-Turkish war the issue of reforms in Western Armenia was raised, which culminated in formation of the Armenian Question as an issue of International Diplomacy. The Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul Nerses Varjapetian refused the rooted idea of carrying out reforms exclusively with the help of Turkish government and on October 27, 1877, during the panel session of the National Assembly he decided to trust the solution of the Armenian Question to Russia

and this initiated the process of shifting the Armenian Question to the international level.

In the Armenian claims the expression “Ararat Marz’ and its joining to Mets Hayk (Western Armenia) was emphasized, which in 1919 became the issue for discussion during the Paris negotiations of the two Armenian delegations.

At the Berlin Congress the Armenian delegations had introduced two documents; 1. N. Varjapetyan’s “Programme” demanded for the autonomy for Western Armenia; in Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakir, Kharberd vilayets with the port Rize. 2. Poghos Nubar Pasha’s programme rejected the autonomy and was contented with reforms. The example of Yerevan province was brought where in 30 years after joining of Eastern Armenia to Russia Armenian population doubled. He admitted the historically dictated differences between two parts of the Armenian population and emphasized that the reforms were considered only for Western Armenians and advised the Sublime Porte to follow Russia’s example and to create favourable conditions for Armenians. By the way, M. Khrimyan was inclined to accept P. Nubar’s programme.

The Balkan Wars reopened the issue of Armenian reform. In October 1912 in Tbilisi at the Congress of representatives of Armenians from Armenian-populated regions of the Russian Empire the National Bureau was elected. A similar body – the Security Commission – was created also in Constantinople. Though being separated those two bodies should deal jointly with the same Armenian Question. P. Nubar was appointed the Head of Armenian National Delegation in Europe. The latter intended to include in the delegation only the Western Armenians so that nobody speculates the issue of Russia’s interference into the matter.

On May 1-2, 1915, in St. Etchmiadzin the Congress of “exiled” was held, which had as its goal to unify all Armenian institutions and benevolent organizations to help the refugees from Western Armenia. The Congress, which was chaired by all-Armenian Catholicos Gevorg the Fifth, adopted a programme of coordinated activities.

It was decided to turn to the Great Powers so that International law provisions on the compensation of the war damages extended also to the Armenian refugees.

According to the Declaration of the Allies, it was suggested to file evidence on the barbarities of the Turks and reveal the accessories to that crime. At the end of the Congress it was decided to meet again either in Yerevan or in Tbilisi

On May 10-13 1916, the Petrograd Armenian Congress took place. It was probably the first Armenian Congress, which had the opportunity of revealing and talking about the Armenian Question. It revealed the lack of experience, insufficient preliminary organization, helplessness of the presidency, in one word, all what in-

evitably accompanied the first steps of that great public initiative. At the same time the Congress pointed out another very important aspect – the perspicacious attitude of the 150 delegates to the Congress representing the Armenian organizations on the issues under discussion. The first important outcome was that the Russian society became aware of the great sufferings of the Armenian people both in Turkey and in Russia where the Western Armenian refugees had found shelter. Later on, measures were taken to unify the efforts to support Armenians and it was decided to establish a central coordinating body.

But the most important achievement of the Armenian Congress was that it was almost devoid of party disagreements typical to the Armenian society; everybody did a common task and realized that political disagreement would only create obstacles to the cause they are involved in and where minor disagreements might irretrievably discredit the achievements that were so valuable to everybody. A famous Armenologist Alexei Jivelegov is of the opinion that: “The joint work took place, and now a decisive step is to be taken in that direction. It is in the interests of the Armenian people” [1].

The Petrograd First Armenian Congress is important from the point of view of the organizational issues discussed there. At the Congress it was decided to establish a commission of 9 members in order to call a Central Committee of Armenian Congresses. The latter had the right of cooptation i.e. the right to invite the representatives of the national organizations abroad with the right to vote. The Central Committee of Armenian Congresses should act in accordance with its Charter. They also “called on all Armenians to realize the importance of the moment and to join the common task and the solution of the National Issue” [2].

In December 1916 in Baku a document on “The Organization of Self-Help of Armenians” was published, which by summarizing the results of the two years of World War I and foreseeing the growing revolution in Russia suggested new approaches and challenges to be ready for the drastic convulsions.

In 1917 and 1919 in Yerevan two Congresses of Western Armenians were convened. Those two Congresses were the natural outcomes of the new manifestations of WWI, the Armenian Genocide and Armenian Question. The first Congress was the result of the February revolution and the second one was the result of the creation of the Republic of Armenia.

In April 1916 the representatives of the traditional Armenian national-democratic parties following the joint initiatives of the Catholicos of all Armenians Gevorg the Fifth and Poghos Nubar decided to call a Congress of “Western Armenian intelligentsia and other public figures”. The equal participation of all political

parties was chosen as the fundamental principle. It was decided to hand over “the external aspect” of the Armenian Question to Poghos Nubar’s National Delegation and to leave “internal aspect”, i.e. Transcaucasia national and territorial problems to the representatives of Eastern Armenia and Armenians from the Caucasus.

The first Congress of Western Armenians was held in Yerevan on May 2-11, 1917. It elected the National Council and National Assembly. One of the central decisions of the Congress was to entrust the solution of the Armenian Question to the Armenian Delegation in Europe, which was to be staffed by Western Armenians. The main contradictions of the first Congress were caused by the fact of whether the Congress was authorized to declare itself as the mouthpiece of the will and aims of all Western Armenians.

The Congress revealed the deepening clash between the Western and Eastern Armenians, which was expressed by establishing National Council of Western Armenians, where the ARFD members were dominant. It is quite clear that after the fall of the Tsar Regime the authority and influence of the Dashnaktsutyun was a natural phenomenon, on the other hand, being very powerful it isolated other national organizations by turning them into irreconcilable adversaries. Artak Darbinyan expressed their worries concerning the opinion of Andranik that “the Caucasian Dashnaktsakans will oppose to any initiative of Turkish Armenians, if they do not become the leaders” to Aram Manoukyan [3, p. 208]. It is noteworthy that Aram also did not want the Caucasian Dashnaktsakans to intervene into the refugee matters, moreover, he was of the opinion that the Western Armenian Dashnaktsakans also wanted to stay apart from their Caucasian Armenian colleagues.

After the October coup d’état the liabilities of the Western Armenians National Council were transferred to the National and Safety Councils in Yerevan, which were established on the initiative of A. Manoukyan and which organized and led the Armenian self-defence movement, in particular, the Heroic Battles of May 1918 and thus also the process of establishing the Republic.

The second Congress of Western Armenians differs from the previous one first of all by the fact that it expressed the will of that part of Armenians who declared their independence.

The new Congress was viewed by the Western Armenian representatives of the Organizational Committee as the Western Armenians’ representative and political body of the Republic of Armenia. Taking into consideration the abovementioned fact, the Organizational Committee elected the delegates based on non-party two-stage principles. In the places 300-500 Western Armenians were to elect district deputies.

The second Congress of Western Armenians was held in Yerevan on February 6-13, 1919. Together with other crucial decisions the Congress decided to declare the Independence of the “Free and United Armenia”. In its “Political Resolution” the Congress expressed confidence to the first administration of the “Free and United Armenia”- Poghos Nubar’s Cabinet, declared the unity of common political and state will and goals and obliged the newly elected “Executive Body” to be in close relations with the RA Government.

The Congress elected also “The Executive Body of Western Armenians living in Ararat Republic”. The Executive Body had to be formed in accordance with the state principles and the Chairman and the members were equalized to ministers.

On February 25 the RA Government approved that document. The RA Council of Ministers passed a law, according to which the Council of Armenia was staffed by 12 Western Armenian representatives.

For the first time the Armenian Question had been introduced in a form of all-Armenian political programme since 1878 Berlin Congress.

The first Armenian National Congress, convened on the eve of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, had as its goal to bring together the standpoints of Western and Eastern Armenians and the Armenian Diaspora on the united national claims and to elect a body responsible for their implementation.

On October 15, 1918 and January 1, 1919 Poghos Nubar distributed circular letters. 8 Western Armenians, 8 Eastern Armenians (Caucasian Armenians) as well as 22 other representatives from 10 countries were invited to participate in the Congress. Through this representation Poghos Nubar tried to call an All-Armenian Congress, to form a more authoritative delegation, a common programme for Armenian Claims and to create All-Armenian Government in Paris.

The Congress started its activities on February 24, 1919. It had 43 meetings and was closed on April 22. Among the 38 delegates to the Congress were Levon Shant, Mikhael Vardanyan, Gabriel Noradunkian, Vahan Tekeyan, Armen Garo, Mihran Tamatyan, Vahan Papazyan, Hovhannes Khan Masehyan, Arshak Chopanyan and others.

A. Aharonyan and H. Ohanjanyan waived to participate in the Congress with the right to vote mentioning that they were authorized to participate in the Peace Conference only. The absence of the authorized representatives of Eastern Armenians made it impossible to call the Congress an All-Armenian one, it was declared as National Congress and was to represent the Western Armenians and the Diaspora.

On April 24, 1919, A. Aharonyan in his letter addressed to the RA Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Tigranyan spoke about the attitude of the Western Armenians and

P. Nubar towards the Republic as an expression of “fear”. First of all, this “fear” is expressed in the fact that “The Turkish Armenians surrender to the Russian Armenians as the latter are very powerful from the economic point of view, they are knowledgeable and big in number”. It is also mentioned that the ARFD is merely of socialist nature and tends to lead, and the most important thing is that finally Soviet Russia will become more powerful and will take possession of Caucasian Armenia, thus it is not right to let Western Armenia join it. At first the state of Western Armenia is to be established and later Caucasian Armenia will join it [4].

The Ramkavars didn't underestimate also the fact, which came from the April 1920 Declaration of the US President W. Wilson, in which welcoming Armenia's Independence he mentioned that the decision on final frontier between Turkey and Armenia would be made with the approval and participation of Russia. Probably, their scepticism concerning “United and Free Armenia” and the decision to vacate their seats in Parliament was grounded by this very fact.

As a result, the National Delegation was assigned to solve with the RA Government the problem of establishing a new United Government and Parliament. At the Conference the National Delegation was to represent the Western Armenians and the Republic of Armenia was to be represented by the RA Delegation. At the same time it was decided to join them together in the United Delegation of Armenia.

In mid October, 1919 in order to establish the Government of the United Armenia the mission of National Delegation arrived in Yerevan headed by V. Tekeyan. This issue was at the same time discussed by the ARFD 9th General Meeting. For about one month the Delegation (N. Stepanyan – independent, S. Harutyunyan – ADP) had negotiated with the RA Government, conceded in the issue concerning P. Nubar and left him the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But all that was in vain. The proposals of the National Delegation were not admitted by the Government and the Congress of Dashnaktsutyun.

Samson Harutyunyan also tried to come to a common ground on the creation of a coalition government. On March 25, 1920 he represented not the Paris but the Tbilisi opinion. But it became clear that the ARFD had changed its attitude towards coalition. There was also a contradiction on the issue of Armenia's mandate; the Dashnaktsutyun was against this idea: “The way we establish today's Independent Armenia in the same way we must establish the United and Independent Armenia and we must preserve it” [3, p. 253].

Then it was to be followed by Sevres and a big disappointment.

Nowadays in the context of the restoration of independence of the Republic of Armenia and liberation of Artsakh, the issue of Armenian Claims still faces the

problem of the Armenian's self-organization, which acquires new and various solutions. In this series the convention of the Third Congress of Western Armenians can serve as a starting point by joining together all the capable forces around the all-national ideology. The prevention from assimilation as well as new developments can serve at the same time as guarantee for the security of the Republic of Armenia and all Armenianness.

April, 2008

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23/1 Garegin Nzhde St., Yerevan, 0026, Republic of Armenia
Website: www.noravank.am
E-mail: 21dar@noravank.am, office@noravank.am
Phone: + (374 10) 44 38 46
Fax: + (374 10) 44 04 73

Lusine Baghramyan - issue manager

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